Safety recommendations, recipients, status, and linked accident/report context.
What Is This Collection?
When an NTSB investigation exposes a fixable problem, the Board issues formal safety recommendations to the FAA, manufacturers, and operators. These records track each recommendation, who received it, and how they responded. Many of the rules you train under started here.
Oct 30, 1979
From the Document
ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1977, CHAMPION HOME BUILDERS COMPANY, GATES LEARJET 25B, N999HG, CRASHED SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF AT SANFORD, NORTH CAROLINA. ALL FIVE PERSONS ABOARD WERE KILLED, AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS DESTROYED.
Requested Action: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: PREPARE AND ISSUE AN ADVISORY CIRCULAR TO ALL OWNERS/OPERATORS OF AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED WITH NICAD BATTERIES TO STRESS THE NECESSITY OF AN INSPECTION OF THE BATTERY VENTILATING SYSTEM DURING PREFLIGHT INSPECTIONS.
Study Focus: Review maintenance and airworthiness responsibilities.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
Recipient: FAA
Oct 30, 1979
From the Document
ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1977, CHAMPION HOME BUILDERS COMPANY, GATES LEARJET 25B, N999HG, CRASHED SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF AT SANFORD, NORTH CAROLINA. ALL FIVE PERSONS ABOARD WERE KILLED, AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS DESTROYED.
Requested Action: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: EMPHASIZE TO MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL AND FAA INSPECTORS, THROUGH APPROPRIATE FAA PUBLICATIONS, THE HAZARDS THAT CAN RESULT FROM IMPROPERLY INSTALLED BATTERY VENTILATION SYSTEMS.
Study Focus: Review maintenance and airworthiness responsibilities.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Aug 16, 1979
From the Document
ON FEBRUARY 12, 1979, AN ALLEGHENY AIRLINES NORD 262 CRASHED ON TAKEOFF FROM CLARKSBURG, WEST VIRGINIA. THE ACCIDENT RESULTED IN TWO FATALITIES AND SEVEN SERIOUS INJURIES. AT THE TIME OF TAKEOFF, THERE WERE LIGHT SNOW SHOWERS AT THE AIRPORT WITH AN ESTIMATED ACCUMULATION RATE OF APPROXIMATELY 1 INCH PER HOUR. DEICING OF THE AIRCRAFT, WITH A 78-PERCENT SOLUTION OF AN ETHYLENE GLYCOL-BASED DEICING FLUID AND WATER, WAS COMPLETED 25 TO 40 MINUTES…
Requested Action: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: INITIATE A STUDY OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ETHYLENE GLYCOL-BASED DEICING FLUID CONCENTRATIONS AS AN ANTI-ICING AGENT UNDER DIFFERING ICING AND SNOW CONDITIONS.
Study Focus: Review weather hazards and how they affect planning and flight decisions.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Aug 16, 1979
From the Document
ON FEBRUARY 12, 1979, AN ALLEGHENY AIRLINES NORD 262 CRASHED ON TAKEOFF FROM CLARKSBURG, WEST VIRGINIA. THE ACCIDENT RESULTED IN TWO FATALITIES AND SEVEN SERIOUS INJURIES. AT THE TIME OF TAKEOFF, THERE WERE LIGHT SNOW SHOWERS AT THE AIRPORT WITH AN ESTIMATED ACCUMULATION RATE OF APPROXIMATELY 1 INCH PER HOUR. DEICING OF THE AIRCRAFT, WITH A 78-PERCENT SOLUTION OF AN ETHYLENE GLYCOL-BASED DEICING FLUID AND WATER, WAS COMPLETED 25 TO 40 MINUTES…
Requested Action: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: PUBLISH AND DISTRIBUTE TO OPERATORS DETAILED INFORMATION REGARDING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF DEICING/ANTI-ICING FLUIDS AND GUIDELINES REGARDING THEIR USE.
Study Focus: Review weather hazards and how they affect planning and flight decisions.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Aug 10, 1976
From the Document
ON MARCH 28, 1976, NEAR PULLMAN, WASHINGTON, A PIPER PA23-250 C (N6199Y) STRUCK THE GROUND IN A HIGH SPEED SPIRAL. DURING ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE CRASH, THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD DISCOVERED THAT A MAJOR STRUCTURAL ALTERATION HAD BEEN APPROVED AND ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT PROPER ENGINEERING EVALUATION. THE MAJOR ALTERATION WAS AN EXTENSION OF THE FUSELAGE NOSE BY INSTALLING P/N 32958-00--SECTION ASSEMBLY - FUSELAGE NOSE. APPROVAL FOR…
Requested Action: REVIEW FUSELAGE NOSE ALTERATION APPROVALS ON ALL PA 23 AIRCRAFT AND DETERMINE THAT THE MODIFICATIONS ARE BASED ON APPROVED TECHNICAL DATA. (URGENT)
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
Recipient: FAA
Aug 10, 1976
From the Document
ON MARCH 28, 1976, NEAR PULLMAN, WASHINGTON, A PIPER PA23-250 C (N6199Y) STRUCK THE GROUND IN A HIGH SPEED SPIRAL. DURING ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE CRASH, THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD DISCOVERED THAT A MAJOR STRUCTURAL ALTERATION HAD BEEN APPROVED AND ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT PROPER ENGINEERING EVALUATION. THE MAJOR ALTERATION WAS AN EXTENSION OF THE FUSELAGE NOSE BY INSTALLING P/N 32958-00--SECTION ASSEMBLY - FUSELAGE NOSE. APPROVAL FOR…
Requested Action: REVIEW APPLICABILITY OF AD 72-21-07 FOR PA 23 MODELS OTHER THAN THE -250 AND EXTEND THE APPLICABILITY AS NECESSARY. (URGENT)
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Aug 10, 1976
From the Document
ON MARCH 28, 1976, NEAR PULLMAN, WASHINGTON, A PIPER PA23-250 C (N6199Y) STRUCK THE GROUND IN A HIGH SPEED SPIRAL. DURING ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE CRASH, THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD DISCOVERED THAT A MAJOR STRUCTURAL ALTERATION HAD BEEN APPROVED AND ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT PROPER ENGINEERING EVALUATION. THE MAJOR ALTERATION WAS AN EXTENSION OF THE FUSELAGE NOSE BY INSTALLING P/N 32958-00--SECTION ASSEMBLY - FUSELAGE NOSE. APPROVAL FOR…
Requested Action: ALERT GADO INSPECTORS AND HOLDERS OF INSPECTION AUTHORIZATIONS TO THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONFIGURATION MODIFICATIONS, POSSIBLE ASSOCIATED STABILITY PROBLEMS, AND WEIGHT AND BALANCE CHANGES WHICH CAN REQUIRE CONTROL SYSTEM CHANGES. REF. FAA HANDBOOK 8310.4A, PARAGRAPH 68, E.
Study Focus: Review maintenance and airworthiness responsibilities.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Aug 10, 1976
From the Document
ON MARCH 28, 1976, NEAR PULLMAN, WASHINGTON, A PIPER PA23-250 C (N6199Y) STRUCK THE GROUND IN A HIGH SPEED SPIRAL. DURING ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE CRASH, THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD DISCOVERED THAT A MAJOR STRUCTURAL ALTERATION HAD BEEN APPROVED AND ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT PROPER ENGINEERING EVALUATION. THE MAJOR ALTERATION WAS AN EXTENSION OF THE FUSELAGE NOSE BY INSTALLING P/N 32958-00--SECTION ASSEMBLY - FUSELAGE NOSE. APPROVAL FOR…
Requested Action: REMIND THE HOLDERS OF INSPECTION AUTHORIZATIONS OF FAR PART 43.5 (A)(4) WHICH REQUIRES RECORDING OF WEIGHT AND BALANCE CHANGES RESULTING FROM AIRCRAFT ALTERATIONS.
Study Focus: Review maintenance and airworthiness responsibilities.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Mar 3, 1976
From the Document
SEVERAL RAPID DECOMPRESSION MISHAPS INVOLVING DC-10 AND L-1011 AIRCRAFT HAVE DISCLOSED PROBLEMS WITH CHEMICALLY GENERATED PASSENGER SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS. THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S SPECIAL STUDY, "CHEMICALLY GENERATED SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS IN DC-10 AND L-1011 AIRCRAFT"1/INDICATES THAT THESE PROBLEMS ARE PRIMARILY THE RESULT OF A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE SYSTEM BY BOTH PASSENGERS AND FLIGHT ATTENDANTS.
Requested Action: REQUIRE, AFTER A CERTAIN DATE, THAT PASSENGER EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS HAVE READILY DISCERNIBLE MEANS TO INDICATE THAT OXYGEN IS FLOWING.
Study Focus: Review preparation and response to abnormal or emergency situations.
Response Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Mar 3, 1976
From the Document
SEVERAL RAPID DECOMPRESSION MISHAPS INVOLVING DC-10 AND L-1011 AIRCRAFT HAVE DISCLOSED PROBLEMS WITH CHEMICALLY GENERATED PASSENGER SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS. THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S SPECIAL STUDY, "CHEMICALLY GENERATED SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS IN DC-10 AND L-1011 AIRCRAFT"1/INDICATES THAT THESE PROBLEMS ARE PRIMARILY THE RESULT OF A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE SYSTEM BY BOTH PASSENGERS AND FLIGHT ATTENDANTS.
Requested Action: ISSUE AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE, REQUIRING INSTALLATION OF ADJUSTMENT TABS ON IN-SERVICE AND IN-STOCK PASSENGERS SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN MASK HEADBANDS.
Study Focus: Review maintenance and airworthiness responsibilities.
Response Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Mar 3, 1976
From the Document
SEVERAL RAPID DECOMPRESSION MISHAPS INVOLVING DC-10 AND L-1011 AIRCRAFT HAVE DISCLOSED PROBLEMS WITH CHEMICALLY GENERATED PASSENGER SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS. THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S SPECIAL STUDY, "CHEMICALLY GENERATED SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS IN DC-10 AND L-1011 AIRCRAFT"1/INDICATES THAT THESE PROBLEMS ARE PRIMARILY THE RESULT OF A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE SYSTEM BY BOTH PASSENGERS AND FLIGHT ATTENDANTS.
Requested Action: ESTABLISH SERVICE LIFE AND PERIODIC INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR OXYGEN MASK RESERVOIR BAGS.
Study Focus: Review maintenance and airworthiness responsibilities.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Mar 3, 1976
From the Document
SEVERAL RAPID DECOMPRESSION MISHAPS INVOLVING DC-10 AND L-1011 AIRCRAFT HAVE DISCLOSED PROBLEMS WITH CHEMICALLY GENERATED PASSENGER SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS. THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S SPECIAL STUDY, "CHEMICALLY GENERATED SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS IN DC-10 AND L-1011 AIRCRAFT"1/INDICATES THAT THESE PROBLEMS ARE PRIMARILY THE RESULT OF A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE SYSTEM BY BOTH PASSENGERS AND FLIGHT ATTENDANTS.
Requested Action: REQUIRE THAT OPERATORS OF AIRCRAFT HAVING THE CHEMICALLY GENERATED PASSENGER SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS INCLUDE DETAILED INFORMATION REGARDING THE OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THESE SYSTEMS IN THE TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR THEIR COCKPIT AND CABIN CREWMEMBERS. SUCH INFORMATION SHOULD INCLUDE FLOW RATES AND THE TIME AND VOLUME LAG IN THE DELIVERY OF OXYGEN. (CLASS II - PRIORITY FOLLOWUP)
Study Focus: Review training practices and proficiency.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Mar 3, 1976
From the Document
SEVERAL RAPID DECOMPRESSION MISHAPS INVOLVING DC-10 AND L-1011 AIRCRAFT HAVE DISCLOSED PROBLEMS WITH CHEMICALLY GENERATED PASSENGER SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS. THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S SPECIAL STUDY, "CHEMICALLY GENERATED SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS IN DC-10 AND L-1011 AIRCRAFT"1/INDICATES THAT THESE PROBLEMS ARE PRIMARILY THE RESULT OF A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE SYSTEM BY BOTH PASSENGERS AND FLIGHT ATTENDANTS.
Requested Action: ISSUE AN ADVISORY CIRCULAR (AC) TO ALL PART 121, 123, AND 135.2 CERTIFICATE HOLDERS TO PROVIDE GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVED PASSENGER BRIEFINGS AND PRINTED INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE USE OF CHEMICAL SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS.
Study Focus: Review qualification and recent-experience requirements.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
Recipient: FAA
Mar 3, 1976
From the Document
SEVERAL RAPID DECOMPRESSION MISHAPS INVOLVING DC-10 AND L-1011 AIRCRAFT HAVE DISCLOSED PROBLEMS WITH CHEMICALLY GENERATED PASSENGER SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS. THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S SPECIAL STUDY, "CHEMICALLY GENERATED SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS IN DC-10 AND L-1011 AIRCRAFT"1/INDICATES THAT THESE PROBLEMS ARE PRIMARILY THE RESULT OF A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE SYSTEM BY BOTH PASSENGERS AND FLIGHT ATTENDANTS.
Requested Action: ISSUE AN OPERATIONS BULLETIN FOR A REVIEW OF ORAL BRIEFINGS AND PASSENGER SAFETY CARDS FOR EACH PART 121, 123, AND 135.2 CERTIFICATE HOLDER TO ASSURE THAT BRIEFINGS AND PRINTED INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE USE OF THE PASSENGER CHEMICAL SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEM ARE FACTUAL AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND CONFORM TO THE GUIDELINES OF THE ABOVE AC.
Study Focus: Review qualification and recent-experience requirements.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Mar 3, 1976
From the Document
SEVERAL RAPID DECOMPRESSION MISHAPS INVOLVING DC-10 AND L-1011 AIRCRAFT HAVE DISCLOSED PROBLEMS WITH CHEMICALLY GENERATED PASSENGER SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS. THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S SPECIAL STUDY, "CHEMICALLY GENERATED SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS IN DC-10 AND L-1011 AIRCRAFT"1/INDICATES THAT THESE PROBLEMS ARE PRIMARILY THE RESULT OF A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE SYSTEM BY BOTH PASSENGERS AND FLIGHT ATTENDANTS.
Requested Action: DEVELOP STANDARDS FOR THE USE OF ACCEPTED HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES AND SYSTEM DESIGN CONCEPTS IN THE DESIGN OF PASSENGER SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS.
Study Focus: Review the human factors that influence safe decisions.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
Recipient: FAA
Mar 3, 1976
From the Document
SEVERAL RAPID DECOMPRESSION MISHAPS INVOLVING DC-10 AND L-1011 AIRCRAFT HAVE DISCLOSED PROBLEMS WITH CHEMICALLY GENERATED PASSENGER SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS. THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S SPECIAL STUDY, "CHEMICALLY GENERATED SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS IN DC-10 AND L-1011 AIRCRAFT"1/INDICATES THAT THESE PROBLEMS ARE PRIMARILY THE RESULT OF A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE SYSTEM BY BOTH PASSENGERS AND FLIGHT ATTENDANTS.
Requested Action: DEVELOP STANDARDS FOR TYPE CERTIFICATION DEMONSTRATION TESTS OF PASSENGER SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN SYSTEMS.
Study Focus: Review qualification and recent-experience requirements.
Response Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Oct 1, 1974
From the Document
ON NOVEMBER 3, 1973, A PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS B-707-321C (N458PA) WAS INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS. THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S CONTINUING INVESTIGATION HAS DISCLOSED INFORMATION WHICH SHOULD BE BROUGHT IMMEDIATELY TO THE ATTENTION OF CARRIERS AND REGULATORY AGENCIES THAT ARE CONCERNED WITH THE AIR CARRIAGE OF CERTAIN DANGEROUS ARTICLES ON CARGO AIRPLANES.
Requested Action: ISSUE APPROPRIATE NOTICES TO ALERT AIR CARRIERS TO INFORM FLIGHTCREWS WHO MAY BE INVOLVED IN CARRIAGE OF CERTAIN DANGEROUS ARTICLES CAPABLE OF PRODUCING SELF-SUSTAINING CHEMICAL REACTIONS THAT RELIABLE IN-FLIGHT THREAT ASSESSMENT OF PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH ARTICLES OFTEN WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE.
Response Status: Closed - Reconsidered
Recipient: FAA
Mar 26, 1974
From the Document
ON FEBRUARY 11, 1974, THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD CONCLUDED ITS PUBLIC HEARING INTO THE PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON NOVEMBER 3, 1973. THE AIRCRAFT WAS A JET-FREIGHTER CARRYING NEARLY 16,000 POUNDS OF RESTRICTED CARGO.
Requested Action: DEVELOP, IN COOPERATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, OFFICE OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, A COMPLIANCE CHECKLIST TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT A SHIPMENT CONFORMS TO FEDERAL HAZARDOUS MATERIALS REGULATIONS. THIS CHECKLIST SHOULD BE CIRCULATED TO ALL INVOLVED AGENCIES AND ORGANIZATIONS.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Mar 26, 1974
From the Document
ON FEBRUARY 11, 1974, THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD CONCLUDED ITS PUBLIC HEARING INTO THE PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON NOVEMBER 3, 1973. THE AIRCRAFT WAS A JET-FREIGHTER CARRYING NEARLY 16,000 POUNDS OF RESTRICTED CARGO.
Requested Action: DEVELOP AND DISSEMINATE INFORMATION ABOUT FEDERAL REGULATIONS WHICH APPLY TO AIR CARRIAGE OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TO THE AIR CARRIERS' MARKETING OR SALES REPRESENTATIVES AND THEIR APPOINTED AGENTS.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Mar 26, 1974
From the Document
ON FEBRUARY 11, 1974, THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD CONCLUDED ITS PUBLIC HEARING INTO THE PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON NOVEMBER 3, 1973. THE AIRCRAFT WAS A JET-FREIGHTER CARRYING NEARLY 16,000 POUNDS OF RESTRICTED CARGO.
Requested Action: INSTITUTE RULEMAKING TO REQUIRE THAT AIR CARRIERS NOTIFY THE SHIPPER AND THE FAA WHEN A SHIPMENT, OR ITS DOCUMENTATION, DEVIATES IN ANY MANNER FROM FEDERAL OR AIR CARRIER REGULATIONS. FURTHER, REQUIRE THAT WHEN NONCONFORMING SHIPMENTS ARE DETECTED BY THE AIR CARRIER, THEY MAY NOT BE MOVED UNTIL THE DEFICIENCY IS REMEDIED, OR THE TRANSPORTATION OF THE DEFICIENT PACKAGES-- WITH PRESCRIBED SAFETY CONTROLS-- IS AUTHORIZED BY THE COGNIZANT FEDERAL…
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
Recipient: FAA
Feb 7, 1974
From the Document
The National Transportation Safety Board 1 s continuing investigation of the National .Airlines DC-10 accident near Albuquerque, New Mexico, on November 3, 1973, has disclosed unsafe conditions in the passenger oxygen system, portable oxygen system, and cabin pressurization system. The Board believes that these unsafe conditions merit your immediate attention and the attentions of all air carriers which operate aircraft with this equipment. When…
Requested Action: REQUIRE ALL OPERATORS OF AIRCRAFT WHICH CONTAIN INDIVIDUAL CHEMICAL OXYGEN-GENERATING UNITS TO INSPECT THESE INSTALLATIONS TO ENSURE THAT CANISTERS ARE CORRECTLY INSTALLED IN THE MOUNTS AND THAT APPROVED PACKING PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED FOR THE SUPPLY HOSES AND OXYGEN MASKS.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Feb 7, 1974
From the Document
The National Transportation Safety Board 1 s continuing investigation of the National .Airlines DC-10 accident near Albuquerque, New Mexico, on November 3, 1973, has disclosed unsafe conditions in the passenger oxygen system, portable oxygen system, and cabin pressurization system. The Board believes that these unsafe conditions merit your immediate attention and the attentions of all air carriers which operate aircraft with this equipment. When…
Requested Action: ISSUE AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE TO REQUIRE CHANGES IN THE METHOD OF MOUNTING THESE OXYGEN-GENERATING UNITS TO ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPROPER INSTALLATION AND INSERVICE FAILURES.
Study Focus: Review maintenance and airworthiness responsibilities.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Feb 7, 1974
From the Document
The National Transportation Safety Board 1 s continuing investigation of the National .Airlines DC-10 accident near Albuquerque, New Mexico, on November 3, 1973, has disclosed unsafe conditions in the passenger oxygen system, portable oxygen system, and cabin pressurization system. The Board believes that these unsafe conditions merit your immediate attention and the attentions of all air carriers which operate aircraft with this equipment. When…
Requested Action: REQUIRE A MORE ACCESSIBLE LOCATION FOR THE PORTABLE OXYGEN UNITS IN THE LOWER LOBE GALLEY OF ALL DC-10 AIRCRAFT AND RELOCATE PORTABLE OXYGEN UNITS IN ALL OTHER AIRCRAFT, WHERE REQUIRED, TO ENSURE ACCESSIBILITY OF PORTABLE OXYGEN UNITS AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE FAR'S
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Dec 28, 1973
From the Document
INVESTIGATION OF THE PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., BOEING 707 ACCIDENT AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, ON NOVEMBER 3, 1973, HAS DISCLOSED SOME FINDINGS ABOUT WHICH THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD IS CONCERNED.
Requested Action: TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PRESENT SMOKE CHUTE INSTALLATION ON BOEING 707 CARGO AND CARGO- PASSENGER AIRCRAFT SATISFIES THE PROVISIONS OF FAR 25. 855 AND 25.857.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Dec 28, 1973
From the Document
INVESTIGATION OF THE PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., BOEING 707 ACCIDENT AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, ON NOVEMBER 3, 1973, HAS DISCLOSED SOME FINDINGS ABOUT WHICH THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD IS CONCERNED.
Requested Action: EFFECT RETROACTIVE MODIFICATIONS ON ALL SUBJECT AIRCRAFT TO ENSURE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF FAR 25.855 AND 25.857 PERTAINING TO PREVENTION OF HAZARDOUS QUANTITIES OF SMOKE, FLAMES, OR NOXIOUS GASES FROM ENTERING THE FLIGHTCREW COMPARTMENT.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Dec 28, 1973
From the Document
INVESTIGATION OF THE PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., BOEING 707 ACCIDENT AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, ON NOVEMBER 3, 1973, HAS DISCLOSED SOME FINDINGS ABOUT WHICH THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD IS CONCERNED.
Requested Action: PROVIDE OPERATORS OF THE SUBJECT AIRCRAFT WITH DATA TO ENABLE FLIGHTCREWS TO IDENTIFY SMOKE SOURCES, AND REQUIRE OPERATORS TO ESTABLISH PROCEDURES IN THEIR OPERATING MANUALS TO CONTROL AND EVACUATE SMOKE EFFECTIVELY DURING THE SPECIFIC FLIGHT REGIMES.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Dec 28, 1973
From the Document
INVESTIGATION OF THE PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., BOEING 707 ACCIDENT AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, ON NOVEMBER 3, 1973, HAS DISCLOSED SOME FINDINGS ABOUT WHICH THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD IS CONCERNED.
Requested Action: REEVALUATE PREVIOUS SMOKE EVACUATION TESTS CONDUCTED DURING CERTIFICATION RELATIVE TO THE QUANTITY AND SOURCE OF SMOKE AS APPLICABLE TO SMOKE EVACUATION PROCEDURES CURRENTLY EMPLOYED BY OPERATORS OF BOEING 707 AIRCRAFT.
Study Focus: Review qualification and recent-experience requirements.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Nov 29, 1973
From the Document
IN OUR CONTINUING INVESTIGATION OF THE PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., BOEING 707, ACCIDENT AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, ON NOVEMBER 3, 1973, WE HAVE IDENTIFIED UNSAFE CONDITIONS THAT SHOULD BE BROUGHT TOTHE IMMEDIATE ATTENTION OF ALL AIR CARRIERS INVOLVED IN THE TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS.
Requested Action: ACCORDINGLY, THE SAFETY BOARD RECOMMENDS THAT THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ISSUE A TELEGRAPHIC ALERT TO ALL AIR CARRIERS INVOLVED IN THE TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS CITING THE DANGERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE HANDLING AND TRANSPORTATION OF LIQUID RESTRICTED ARTICLES, INCLUDING THE NEED TO PRECLUDE THE AIR SHIPMENT OF ANY IMPROPERLY LABELED HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PACKAGES, AND THE NEED TO COMPLY WITH REGULATIONS CONCERNING "THIS SIDE UP"…
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Aug 23, 1973
From the Document
A RECENT IN-FLIGHT FIRE ON A BOEING 707-300 (SERIES) AIRCRAFT RESULTED IN 124 FATALITIES AND TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF THE AIRCRAFT AFTER A SUCCESSFUL EMERGENCY LANDING. THE IN-FLIGHT CABIN INTERIOR FIRE DID NOT INVOLVE THE AIRCRAFT'S FUEL BUT WAS FED BY THE INTERIOR'S MATERIAL.
Requested Action: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require emergency oxygen bottles with full-face smoke masks for each cabin attendant on turbine-power transport aircraft in order to permit the attendants to combat lavatory and cabin fires. (Superseded by A-83-70 through A-83-81).
Study Focus: Review aircraft-system operation, limitations and failure awareness.
Response Status: Closed - Superseded
Recipient: FAA
May 17, 1973
From the Document
DURING THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S INVESTIGATION OF THE GROUND COLLISION ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED AT O'HARE INTERNATIONALAIRPORT, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, ON DECEMBER 20, 1972, WE LEARNED THAT VISIBILITY FROM THE TOWER CAB, OFFICIALLY REPORTED AS ONE-FOURTH OF A MILE, LIMITED SEVERELY THE CONTROLLERS' ABILITY TO SEE GROUND TRAFFIC ON THE AIRPORT. THEREFORE, CONTROLLER PERSONNEL CONCERNED WITH THE TWO AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE COLLISION…
Requested Action: STANDARDIZE CONFIGURATIONS, ALIGNMENT TECHNIQUES, AND EQUIPMENT MODIFICATIONS AT THE THREE EXISTING AIRPORT SURFACE DETECTION EQUIPMENT ASDE "BRITE" FACILITIES IN AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE OF THAT EQUIPMENT.
Study Focus: Review traffic awareness and collision avoidance.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
May 17, 1973
From the Document
DURING THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S INVESTIGATION OF THE GROUND COLLISION ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED AT O'HARE INTERNATIONALAIRPORT, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, ON DECEMBER 20, 1972, WE LEARNED THAT VISIBILITY FROM THE TOWER CAB, OFFICIALLY REPORTED AS ONE-FOURTH OF A MILE, LIMITED SEVERELY THE CONTROLLERS' ABILITY TO SEE GROUND TRAFFIC ON THE AIRPORT. THEREFORE, CONTROLLER PERSONNEL CONCERNED WITH THE TWO AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE COLLISION…
Requested Action: NOT PROCEED WITH THE SCHEDULED INSTALLATION OF "BRITE" DISPLAYS AT OTHER AIRPORT SURFACE DETECTION EQUIPMENT ASDE-EQUIPPED FACILITIES WHICH NOW USE THE DIRECT VIEW RADAR DISPLAY UNTIL SATISFACTORY OPERATION OF "BRITE" EQUIPMENT IS ACHIEVED AT THE THREE FACILITIES WHERE IT IS NOW INSTALLED.
Study Focus: Review traffic awareness and collision avoidance.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
May 17, 1973
From the Document
DURING THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S INVESTIGATION OF THE GROUND COLLISION ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED AT O'HARE INTERNATIONALAIRPORT, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, ON DECEMBER 20, 1972, WE LEARNED THAT VISIBILITY FROM THE TOWER CAB, OFFICIALLY REPORTED AS ONE-FOURTH OF A MILE, LIMITED SEVERELY THE CONTROLLERS' ABILITY TO SEE GROUND TRAFFIC ON THE AIRPORT. THEREFORE, CONTROLLER PERSONNEL CONCERNED WITH THE TWO AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE COLLISION…
Requested Action: CONTINGENT UPON FAVORABLE RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION OF THE NEW MODEL AIRPORT SURFACE DETECTION EQUIPMENT ASDE "BRITE" DISPLAY CURRENTLY BEING CONDUCTED BY THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS CENTER, INSTALL THAT EQUIPMENT FIRST AT THE THREE LOCATIONS WHERE "BRITE" EQUIPMENT IS NOW USED.
Study Focus: Review traffic awareness and collision avoidance.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
May 17, 1973
From the Document
DURING THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S INVESTIGATION OF THE GROUND COLLISION ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED AT O'HARE INTERNATIONALAIRPORT, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, ON DECEMBER 20, 1972, WE LEARNED THAT VISIBILITY FROM THE TOWER CAB, OFFICIALLY REPORTED AS ONE-FOURTH OF A MILE, LIMITED SEVERELY THE CONTROLLERS' ABILITY TO SEE GROUND TRAFFIC ON THE AIRPORT. THEREFORE, CONTROLLER PERSONNEL CONCERNED WITH THE TWO AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE COLLISION…
Requested Action: ESTABLISH STANDARD PROCEDURES FOR THE USE OF AIRPORT SURFACE DETECTION EQUIPMENT ASDE RADAR, AND PUBLISH SUCH PROCEDURES IN APPROPRIATE AIR TRAFFIC HANDBOOKS.
Study Focus: Review traffic awareness and collision avoidance.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Aug 24, 1972
From the Document
OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, THERE HAVE BEEN A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF INSTANCES IN WHICH, SUBSEQUENT TO A LANDING AFTER A REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE OR AN INCIDENT, THE FLIGHTCREW HAS FAILED TO HALT THE OPERATION OF THE COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER (CVR), THUS CAUSING THE ERASURE OF ALL RECORDING PERTINENT TO THE OCCURRENCE. MUCH SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION WITH VALUABLE ACCIDENT-PREVENTION POTENTIAL HAS BEEN LOST.
Requested Action: TO ALL U.S. AIR CARRIERS: Instruct maintenance crews to check for deactivation of the CVR before restoring electrical power to an aircraft after any unusual occurrence.
Study Focus: Review aircraft-system operation, limitations and failure awareness.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: Midwest Airlines, Inc., Mercer Enterprise, Intermountain Aviation, Inc., Flying W Airways, Inc., Air Mid East, Inc., Overseas National Airways, Inc., Saturn Airways, Inc., Modern Air Transport, Inc., McCulloch International Airlines, Capitol International Airways, Wien Consolidated Airways, Inc., Western Airlines, Inc., United Airlines, Inc., Trans World Airlines, Inc., Johnson Flying Service, Inc., Southwest Airlines, Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc., Air California, World Airways, Inc., Universal Airlines, Inc., Trans International Airlines, Aero-Spacelines, Inc., Southeast Airlines, Inc., Ortner Air Service, Inc., Interior Airways, Inc., Holiday Airlines, Inc., Fairways Corporation, Air America, Inc., Perdue Airlines, Inc., Texas International Airlines, Inc., Southern Airways, Inc., Southern Air Transport, Inc., Seaboard World Airlines, Inc., Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc., Piedmont Airlines, Pan American World Airways, Inc., Ozark Air Lines, Inc., Northwest Airlines, Inc., Northeast Airlines, Inc., North Central Airlines, Inc., National Airlines, Inc., Hughes Air West, Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., Frontier Airlines, Inc., Eastern Airlines, Inc., Delta Airlines, Inc., Continental Airlines, Inc., Caribbean-Atlantic Airlines, Inc., Braniff, Inc., Aloha Airlines, Inc., Allegheny Airlines, Inc., Alaska Airlines, Inc., Airlift International, Inc., American Airlines, Inc.
Jul 26, 1972
From the Document
THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD HAS INVESTIGATED SEVERAL ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS INVOLVING NICKEL-CADMIUM BATTERY FIRES SINCE YOUR ISSUANCE OF ADVISORY CIRCULAR AC-00-33 AND AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE AD 71-21-5. THE SAFETY BOARD IS CONCERNED OVER THE NEAR- CATASTROPHIC CIRCUMSTANCES OF SOME OF THESE OCCURRENCES. THE BOARD BELIEVES THAT ALTHOUGH THE AD WAS RESPONSIVE TO THE PROBLEM AS IT WAS KNOWN AT THE TIME, THE FACTS REVEALED IN OUR…
Requested Action: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: BROADEN THE APPLICABILITY OF AD 71-21-5 TO INCLUDE ALL AIRCRAFT WHICH HAVE A NICKEL-CADMIUM BATTERY IN THE PRIMARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM.
Study Focus: Review aircraft-system operation, limitations and failure awareness.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Jul 26, 1972
From the Document
THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD HAS INVESTIGATED SEVERAL ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS INVOLVING NICKEL-CADMIUM BATTERY FIRES SINCE YOUR ISSUANCE OF ADVISORY CIRCULAR AC-00-33 AND AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE AD 71-21-5. THE SAFETY BOARD IS CONCERNED OVER THE NEAR- CATASTROPHIC CIRCUMSTANCES OF SOME OF THESE OCCURRENCES. THE BOARD BELIEVES THAT ALTHOUGH THE AD WAS RESPONSIVE TO THE PROBLEM AS IT WAS KNOWN AT THE TIME, THE FACTS REVEALED IN OUR…
Requested Action: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: REQUIRE COMPLIANCE WITH PARAGRAPHS (E)(3) OR (E)(4) OF THE AD, REGARDLESS OF THE CELL CASE MATERIAL USED IN THE BATTERY.
Study Focus: Review maintenance and airworthiness responsibilities.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
May 24, 1972
From the Document
A PAN AMERICAN BOEING 747 STRUCK THE APPROACH LIGHT STRUCTURE (ALS) FOR RUNWAY 19L WHILE TAKING OFF FROM RUNWAY 01R AT THE SAN FRANCISCO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. THE CREW CONTINUED THE TAKEOFF, AND AFTER AN INFLIGHT INSPECTION FOR DAMAGE, DUMPED FUEL AND RETURNED FOR A LANDING AT SAN FRANCISCO. TWO PASSENGERS WERE INJURED DURING THE IMPACT WITH THE ALS AND EIGHT OTHERS SUSTAINED SERIOUS BACK INJURIES DURING THE EVACUATION AFTER THE LANDING.
Requested Action: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: THE FAA REVIEW THE SLIDE PACK MOUNTING DESIGN, GAS GENERATOR RETENTION DESIGN, AND THE PROTECTION OF THE WHEEL WELL MOUNTED GAS GENERATOR INSTALLATION. THIS REVIEW SHOULD BE MADE TO DETERMINE WHAT ACTIONS CAN BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE THESE COMPONENTS AND MAKE THEM MORE RELIABLE.
Study Focus: Review surface awareness and decisions during taxi, takeoff and landing.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
May 17, 1972
From the Document
THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD INITIATED THIS STUDY IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE A RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION INCIDENT INVOLVING A U.S. AIR CARRIER AND TO INVESTIGATE ALL ASPECTS OF THE AIR SHIPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS. THE SAFETY BOARD'S STUDY LED IT TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS CARRIED BY AIR DO NOT NORMALLY CONSTITUTE ANY UNUSUAL RISK OF LIFE TO THE PUBLIC. NEVERTHELESS, AS THE GOVERNMENT…
Requested Action: TO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION: REQUIRE THE CONSIGNEES OF ALL SHIPMENTS OF TYPE B OR LARGER AMOUNTS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS TO ASSURE THAT THESE SHIPMENTS ARE PROMPTLY PICKED UP FROM THE CARRIER'S FACILITY, AND ARE DELIVERED TO AND MONITORED WITHOUT DELAY AT THE FACILITY OF THE CONSIGNEE.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: United States Atomic Energy Commission
May 17, 1972
From the Document
THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD INITIATED THIS STUDY IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE A RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION INCIDENT INVOLVING A U.S. AIR CARRIER AND TO INVESTIGATE ALL ASPECTS OF THE AIR SHIPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS. THE SAFETY BOARD'S STUDY LED IT TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS CARRIED BY AIR DO NOT NORMALLY CONSTITUTE ANY UNUSUAL RISK OF LIFE TO THE PUBLIC. NEVERTHELESS, AS THE GOVERNMENT…
Requested Action: ESTABLISH AN ADVISORY WORKING GROUP, COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF SHIPPERS, CARRIER MANAGEMENT AND LABOR, GOVERNMENTAL MODAL AND SAFETY ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC, TO INQUIRE INTO THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL PRIVATE OR REGULATORY SAFETY CONTROLS IN THE AIR TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, AND TO ADVISE HIM OF ANY CHANGES FOUND TO BE NECESSARY.
Response Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Recipient: DOT
May 17, 1972
From the Document
THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD INITIATED THIS STUDY IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE A RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION INCIDENT INVOLVING A U.S. AIR CARRIER AND TO INVESTIGATE ALL ASPECTS OF THE AIR SHIPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS. THE SAFETY BOARD'S STUDY LED IT TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS CARRIED BY AIR DO NOT NORMALLY CONSTITUTE ANY UNUSUAL RISK OF LIFE TO THE PUBLIC. NEVERTHELESS, AS THE GOVERNMENT…
Requested Action: TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: CONTINUE TO PURSUE VIGOROUSLY THE STATED OBJECTIVES OF THE HAZARDOUS MATERIALS REGULATIONS BOARD TO DEVELOP A REVISED AND STANDARDIZED FORMAT FOR ALL HAZARDOUS MATERIALS REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT, AND A REGULATORY SYSTEM BASED ON TECHNICALLY STANDARDIZED CRITERIA ENCOMPASSING ALL MODES.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: DOT
May 17, 1972
From the Document
THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD INITIATED THIS STUDY IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE A RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION INCIDENT INVOLVING A U.S. AIR CARRIER AND TO INVESTIGATE ALL ASPECTS OF THE AIR SHIPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS. THE SAFETY BOARD'S STUDY LED IT TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS CARRIED BY AIR DO NOT NORMALLY CONSTITUTE ANY UNUSUAL RISK OF LIFE TO THE PUBLIC. NEVERTHELESS, AS THE GOVERNMENT…
Requested Action: TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: ADOPT THE LABEL REVISION PROPOSED IN THE THIRD REVISED DRAFT OF THE IAEA REGULATIONS FOR THE SAFE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS. IN ADDITION TO ADOPTING THIS PROPOSED LABEL, WHICH SHOULD PROVIDE A MORE CONSPICUOUS AREA IN WHICH TO MARK THE TRANSPORT INDEX, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION STRESS THE NEED FOR MAKING THIS INDEX AS CONSPICUOUS AND LEGIBLE AS POSSIBLE.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: DOT
May 17, 1972
From the Document
THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD INITIATED THIS STUDY IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE A RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION INCIDENT INVOLVING A U.S. AIR CARRIER AND TO INVESTIGATE ALL ASPECTS OF THE AIR SHIPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS. THE SAFETY BOARD'S STUDY LED IT TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS CARRIED BY AIR DO NOT NORMALLY CONSTITUTE ANY UNUSUAL RISK OF LIFE TO THE PUBLIC. NEVERTHELESS, AS THE GOVERNMENT…
Requested Action: TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: INITIATE ACTION TO AMEND APPROPRIATE REGULATIONS TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE IN REGARD TO THE SEPARATION, IN STORAGE, OF AGGREGATES OF PACKAGES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, WHEN THE TOTAL TRANSPORT INDEX OF MORE THAN ONE GROUP OF PACKAGES EXCEEDS 50. THE NEW REGULATIONS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED ALONG THE LINES PROVIDED BY THE REGULATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.
Study Focus: Review traffic awareness and collision avoidance.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: DOT
May 17, 1972
From the Document
THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD INITIATED THIS STUDY IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE A RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION INCIDENT INVOLVING A U.S. AIR CARRIER AND TO INVESTIGATE ALL ASPECTS OF THE AIR SHIPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS. THE SAFETY BOARD'S STUDY LED IT TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS CARRIED BY AIR DO NOT NORMALLY CONSTITUTE ANY UNUSUAL RISK OF LIFE TO THE PUBLIC. NEVERTHELESS, AS THE GOVERNMENT…
Requested Action: TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: CONSIDER A REVISION TO THE REGULATIONS WHICH PERMIT EITHER A DROP TEST OR INCLUSION OF AN ABSORBENT MATERIAL REQUIREMENT FOR TYPE B OR LARGER SHIPMENTS, TO INCLUDE BOTH REQUIREMENTS IN THE CASE OF LIQUID RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, OR TO INCLUDE A REQUIREMENT FOR REDUNDANCY OF CONTAINMENT SUCH AS THE ENCLOSURE OF THE INNER CONTAINER IN A SEALED PLASTIC BAG. STANDARDS FOR CONTAINMENT OF LIQUID AND…
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: DOT
May 17, 1972
From the Document
THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD INITIATED THIS STUDY IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE A RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION INCIDENT INVOLVING A U.S. AIR CARRIER AND TO INVESTIGATE ALL ASPECTS OF THE AIR SHIPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS. THE SAFETY BOARD'S STUDY LED IT TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS CARRIED BY AIR DO NOT NORMALLY CONSTITUTE ANY UNUSUAL RISK OF LIFE TO THE PUBLIC. NEVERTHELESS, AS THE GOVERNMENT…
Requested Action: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: ACCELERATE ITS EFFORTS TO INSPECT AND MONITOR AIR CARRIERS IN ORDER TO INSURE COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE HANDLING AND CARRIAGE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
May 17, 1972
From the Document
THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD INITIATED THIS STUDY IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE A RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION INCIDENT INVOLVING A U.S. AIR CARRIER AND TO INVESTIGATE ALL ASPECTS OF THE AIR SHIPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS. THE SAFETY BOARD'S STUDY LED IT TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS CARRIED BY AIR DO NOT NORMALLY CONSTITUTE ANY UNUSUAL RISK OF LIFE TO THE PUBLIC. NEVERTHELESS, AS THE GOVERNMENT…
Requested Action: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: ACCELERATE ITS CONSIDERATION TO REQUIRE ALL PART 121 AIR CARRIERS TO DEVELOP AND INITIATE APPROVED TRAINING PROGRAMS CONCERNING HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, AND TO REQUIRE INCLUSION OF PERTINENT MATERIAL IN THE CARRIER'S OPERATIONS MANUALS. IT IS ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ESTABLISHING A SIMILAR MANUAL REQUIREMENT FOR THOSE PART 135 OPERATORS WHO REGULARLY TRANSPORT THESE MATERIALS.
Study Focus: Review training practices and proficiency.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
May 17, 1972
From the Document
THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD INITIATED THIS STUDY IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE A RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION INCIDENT INVOLVING A U.S. AIR CARRIER AND TO INVESTIGATE ALL ASPECTS OF THE AIR SHIPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS. THE SAFETY BOARD'S STUDY LED IT TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS CARRIED BY AIR DO NOT NORMALLY CONSTITUTE ANY UNUSUAL RISK OF LIFE TO THE PUBLIC. NEVERTHELESS, AS THE GOVERNMENT…
Requested Action: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: REQUIRE THAT AIR CARRIERS HAVE AVAILABLE ONE RESPONSIBLE, WELL-TRAINED INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESIGNATED TO ACCEPT ALL HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RECEIVED FOR SHIPMENT.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Mar 24, 1971
From the Document
THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD IS CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING A GROUND-FIRE INCIDENT INVOLVING A UNITED AIR LINES 737. THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED DURING OXYGEN REPLENISHMENT WHILE THE AIRCRAFT WAS PARKED ON THE LOADING RAMP AT NATIONAL AIRPORT ON DECEMBER 31, 1970.
Requested Action: THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE APPROPRIATE REGULATORY ACTION TO PROHIBIT THE SERVICING OF OXYGEN SYSTEMS WHILE PASSENGERS ARE ON BOARD.
Response Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Feb 22, 1971
From the Document
THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, ON NOVEMBER 4, 1969, CONVENED A PUBLIC HEARING FOR THE PURPOSE OF INQUIRING INTO THE CAUSE AND PREVENTION OF MIDAIR COLLISIONS. THE BOARD, SITTING EN BANC, HEARD THE TESTIMONY OF 26 WITNESSES, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, THE AVIATION INDUSTRY, AND MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC. ALSO RECEIVED INTO THE RECORD WERE WRITTEN STATEMENTS FROM 12 ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS.
Requested Action: ACCELERATE ITS EFFORTS IN DEVELOPING CERTIFICATION, PROCEDURAL, AND RULEMAKING PROCESSES INVOLVED IN IMPLEMENTING A FULL AREA NAVIGATION (RNAV) SYSTEM FOR UTILIZATION THROUGHOUT THE U. S. NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM.
Study Focus: Review airspace access, restrictions and coordination.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Sep 15, 1970
From the Document
FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, THE BOARD HAS BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT THE NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS CAUSED BY FATIGUE FAILURES IN THE TAIL ROTOR BLADES OF BELL MODEL 47 HELICOPTERS. THIS HAS RESULTED IN THE FAA ISSUING AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES AS DEEMED NECESSARY. SUBSEQUENT TO THE ISSUANCE OF AD 68-2-3, EFFECTIVE JANUARY 19, 1968, AND PRIOR TO JANUARY 10, 1970, WE HAD ONLY LIMITED KNOWLEDGE OF ONE ADDITIONAL FATAL ACCIDENT DUE TO A FATIGUE FAILURE OF A BELL…
Requested Action: THEREFORE, WE RECOMMEND THAT ALL BELL 47 MODEL HELICOPTERS, EQUIPPED WITH FIXED FLOTATION ASSEMBLIES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN APPROVED BY THE MANUFACTURER, BE RESTRICTED FROM FURTHER FLIGHT UNTIL THE AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS REQUIREMENTS OF PARTS 27.413, 27.571, AND 27.1503 HAVE BEEN EVALUATED AND APPROVED FOR THIS TYPE OF INSTALLATION.
Study Focus: Review maintenance and airworthiness responsibilities.
Response Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Jun 17, 1970
From the Document
JAPAN AIR LINES TRAINING FLIGHT 90 OF JUNE 24, 1969, CRASHED AT 16031/ WHILE EXECUTING A TAKEOFF ON RUNWAY 32R. OF THE FIVE CREWMEMBERS AND TRAINEES ON BOARD, THREE RECEIVED FATAL INJURIES AND TWO SUSTAINED SERIOUS BURN INJURIES. THE TWO SURVIVORS WERE THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR AND THE FLIGHT ENGINEER. SHORTLY AFTER LIFT-OFF, THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR REDUCED POWER ON NO. 4 ENGINE TO CHECK THE TRAINEE'S EMERGENCY PROCEDURES, AND THE AIRCRAFT BEGAN TO…
Requested Action: BASED ON THIS ACCIDENT AND OTHERS WHICH HAVE OCCURRED UNDER SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES, THE SAFETY BOARD RECOMMENDS TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, THAT THROUGH HIS AIR CARRIER INSPECTORS, ALL OPERATORS OF THE CONVAIR 880 AND SIMILAR TYPE AIRCRAFT BE ASKED TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS: (1) RE-EMPHASIZE TO THE PILOT PERSONNEL THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THESE AIRCRAFT DURING CRITICAL-ENGINE-OUT MANEUVERS; (2) ASSURE THAT…
Study Focus: Review surface awareness and decisions during taxi, takeoff and landing.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Nov 19, 1969
From the Document
N142D, A DOUGLAS DC-3, WAS BEING OPERATED BY MR. WILLIAM JACKSON OF TRAVEL ASSOCIATES, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, FOR THE PURPOSE OF TRANSPORTING SPORTSMEN TO BELIZE, BRITISH HONDURAS. THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED AND BURNED ON NEW ORLEANS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT FOLLOWING AN INSTRUMENT LANDING SYSTEM (ILS) APPROACH TO RUNWAY 10. THE CRASH OCCURRED AT 0655 C.S.T. 1/ ON MARCH 20, 1969. OF THE 27 PERSONS ON BOARD, 11 SURVIVED. THE CREW OF THREE WAS AMONG THOSE…
Requested Action: (1) THAT SECTION 91.116 OF THE F.A.R. BE CHANGED TO AGREE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 121.653 AND THE SIMILAR REQUIREMENTS OF PARTS 123 AND 135 IN ORDER THAT THE APPROACH BE RESTRICTED AS WELL AS THE LANDING. (2) THAT SECTION 91.117 BE AMENDED TO THE EFFECT THAT IN NO EVENT SHALL DESCENT BELOW 200 FEET BE PERFORMED UNLESS LANDING MINIMA ARE PRESENT. (3) THAT WHILE SECTION 91.116 (B) CLEARLY STATES THAT A LANDING MAY NOT BE MADE UNLESS THE…
Study Focus: Review surface awareness and decisions during taxi, takeoff and landing.
Response Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Oct 11, 1969
From the Document
PAN AMERICAN CLIPPER, N799PA, A BOEING 707-321C, CARGO/MAIL FLIGHT BOUND FOR VIETNAM VIA TOKYO, JAPAN, CRASHED ON TAKEOFF FROM RUNWAY 23, ELMENDORF AFB, ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, AT APPROXIMATELY 0615 A.S.T. 1 ON DECEMBER 26, 1968. THE AIRCRAFT WAS DESTROYED. THE ACCIDENT WAS FATAL TO ALL THREE CREWMEMBERS, WHO WERE THE ONLY OCCUPANTS ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT.
Requested Action: 1. THE PROVISIONS OF BOEING SERVICE BULLETIN NO. 2384, WHICH CALLS FOR MODIFICATION OF THE THRUST LEVER ADVANCEMENT FROM 42 DEGREES (OR 33 DEGREES) TO 25 DEGREES TRAVEL, BE REQUIRED BY ISSUANCE OF AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE TO ALL OPERATORS OF B-707/720 AIRCRAFT. 2. AIR CARRIER COCKPIT CHECKLISTS BE REVIEWED IN AN EFFORT TO INSURE THAT EACH LIST PROVIDES A MEANS OF REMINDING THE CREW, IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO TAKEOFF, THAT ALL ITEMS CRITICAL FOR…
Study Focus: Review surface awareness and decisions during taxi, takeoff and landing.
Response Status: Closed--No Longer Applicable
Recipient: FAA
Jan 17, 1969
From the Document
THE AIRCRAFT HAD DEPARTED FROM DETROIT METROPOLITAN AIRPORT AT ABOUT 0135 EST FOR AN INTENDED CHICAGO DESTINATION. SHORTLY AFTER TAKE-OFF AND WHILE IN A LEFT TURN THE PILOT RADIOED THAT HE HAD LOST AN ENGINE. THE TOWER THEN GAVE THE PILOT RUNWAY 21R TO RETURN TO. THERE WERE NO FURTHER TRANSMISSIONS.
Requested Action: (1) IMMEDIATE INSPECTION OF SET SCREW OF FUEL SELECTOR HANDLE IN ALL PA-30 AIRCRAFT, AND THAT (2) A MORE DEPENDABLE METHOD OF ATTACHING THE FUEL SELECTOR HANDLE TO THE SELECTOR VALVE BE DESIGNED.
Study Focus: Review surface awareness and decisions during taxi, takeoff and landing.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Jul 27, 1967
From the Document
DURING THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS THE PIPER PA-30 TWIN COMMANCHE HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN THIRTEEN SPIN-TYPE ACCIDENTS THAT HAVE RESULTED IN THIRTY FATALITIES. INVESTIGATION DISCLOSED THAT A NUMBER OF THE AIRPLANES INVOLVED SPUN AND IMPACTED IN AN UNUSUALLY FLAT ATTITUDE. THIS TOGETHER WITH THE RELATIVELY HIGH EXPERIENCE AND/OR PROFICIENCY LEVEL OF A NUMBER OF THE PILOTS INVOLVED SHARPENS OUR CONCERN OVER THESE ACCIDENTS.
Requested Action: WE RECOMMEND THAT FAA CONDUCT TESTS, EITHER SINGLY OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH NASA TO: 1. DETERMINE THE AIRPLANE CONFIGURATION AND PILOT INPUT REQUIRED TO PRECIPITATE THE FLAT-SPIN MODE. 2. DETERMINE IF ADEQUATE RECOVERY CONTROL IS AVAILABLE TO CHECK AN INADVERTENT ENTRY AND ANY SPECIALIZED PROCEDURE NECESSARY TO EFFECT RECOVERY. DEPENDING ON THE TEST RESULTS AND ULTIMATE RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM, CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TOWARD PLACARDING THE…
Study Focus: Review aircraft-control risks and recognition of developing hazards.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Apr 17, 1967
From the Document
RECENTLY WE HAVE RECEIVED SEVERAL LETTERS FROM AIRLINE PASSENGERS PERTAINING TO AIRCRAFT EVACUATION HAZARDS THEY HAVE OBSERVED ON DIFFERENT FLIGHTS. THE LETTER FROM MR. T. D. COLLINS IS AN EXAMPLE AND IS ENCLOSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. ONE PROBLEM MENTIONED IS THAT QUITE OFTEN A SEAT IS LOCATED DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF THE OVER-WING WINDOW EXITS. THE EMERGENCY INFORMATION CARDS DO NOT INDICATE AND FLIGHT ATTENDANTS DO NOT EXPLAIN WHAT SHOULD BE DONE…
Requested Action: IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT ALL PASSENGERS BE MADE AWARE OF THE PROCEDURES REQUIRED TO MOVE THE SEATS OUT OF THE WAY OF THE WINDOW EXITS. FURTHER, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT AIRLINES UTILIZING MOVABLE PARTITIONS BETWEEN PASSENGER COMPARTMENTS ASSURE THAT THE OVERHEAD SIGNS ARE PROPERLY PLACED TO DEPICT THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE WINDOW EXITS AND THAT THE FLIGHT ATTENDANTS BE REQUIRED TO INDICATE WHERE EACH EMERGENCY EXIT IS LOCATED DURING THE PRE-TAKEOFF…
Study Focus: Review preparation and response to abnormal or emergency situations.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Mar 30, 1967
From the Document
THE RESULTS OF THE BOARD'S INVESTIGATION OF TWO FATAL PIPER CHEROKEE(PA-28-32) ACCIDENTS AND THE SUBSEQUENT VISUAL INSPECTION OF OVER FIFTY MORE MODEL PA-28-32 AIRCRAFT DISCLOSED, IN WELL OVER 50 PERCENT OF THE CASES, A DETERIORATION OF THE FUEL TANK SEALING COMPOUND ON THE INTERNAL WALLS OF THESE TANKS. THERE WAS NOTED IN SOME INSTANCES THE PEELING-OFF IN LARGE SHEETS AND IN OTHER CASES THE FLAKING OF SMALLER PARTICLES OF THIS COMPOUND.
Requested Action: THE BOARD RECOMMENDS THAT AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE BE PUBLISHED REQUIRING AN INTERNAL INSPECTION OF THE MAIN INTEGRAL TYPE FUEL TANKS ON PIPER PA-28/PA-32 AIRCRAFT FOR ANY EVIDENCE OF PEELING OR FLAKING OF THE SEALANT COMPOUND. THOSE TANKS FOUND FAULTY SHOULD BE REPAIRED OR REPLACED AS DIRECTED BY THE MANUFACTURER PRIOR TO FURTHER PASSENGER OR COMMERCIAL FLIGHT. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT THIS INSPECTION BE CONTINUALLY REQUIRED ON ALL…
Study Focus: Review aircraft-system operation, limitations and failure awareness.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA
Mar 27, 1967
From the Document
THE BOARD'S ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION RECORDS REVEAL SEVEN HILLER MODELUH-12 HELICOPTER ACCIDENTS SINCE DECEMBER 1963, ALL OCCURRING SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF AND ALL WERE ATTRIBUTED BY THE SURVIVING PILOTS AS HAVING BEEN CAUSED BY LOSS OF POWER TO THE MAIN ROTOR DRIVE SYSTEM. DETAILED EXAMINATION IN EACH CASE DISCLOSED THAT THE LOSS OF POWER TO THE MAIN ROTOR DRIVE SYSTEM WAS CAUSED BY SLIPPING OF THE MECHANICAL CLUTCH ASSEMBLY. THE SLIPPAGE, WHICH…
Requested Action: BOARD RECOMMENDS THAT THE PRESENT FLIGHT MANUALS FOR ALL HILLER UH-12 HELICOPTERS SHOULD BE REVISED TO INCLUDE THE PROPER PROCEDURES FOR ENGAGING THE MERCURY DRIVE CLUTCH ALONG WITH A FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF ITS OPERATION. THE BOARD WOULD LIKE TO SEE, IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, A PLACARD MOUNTED NEAR THE ENGINE/ROTOR TACHOMETER WHICH WOULD SPECIFY MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE ENGAGEMENT TIMES.
Study Focus: Review aircraft-system operation, limitations and failure awareness.
Response Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recipient: FAA