NTSB · Safety Recommendation
Safety Recommendation A-70-037
Recommendation
BASED ON THIS ACCIDENT AND OTHERS WHICH HAVE OCCURRED UNDER SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES, THE SAFETY BOARD RECOMMENDS TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, THAT THROUGH HIS AIR CARRIER INSPECTORS, ALL OPERATORS OF THE CONVAIR 880 AND SIMILAR TYPE AIRCRAFT BE ASKED TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS: (1) RE-EMPHASIZE TO THE PILOT PERSONNEL THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THESE AIRCRAFT DURING CRITICAL-ENGINE-OUT MANEUVERS; (2) ASSURE THAT FLIGHT INSTRUCTORS, TRAINEES, AND LINE PILOTS ARE WELL AWARE OF SAFE AND PROPER CRITICAL-ENGINE-OUT PROCEDURES, THE LIMITS OF SIDESLIP ANGLES, RUDDER AVAILABILITY, AND YAW LIMITS FOR VERTICAL STABILIZER STALL; AND (3) CAUTION ALL INSTRUCTOR PERSONNEL TO EMPHASIZE THAT THEY MUSTBE MOST CAREFUL TO AVOID ANY TENDENCY TO DELAY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TOO LONG DURING CRITICAL TRAINING MANEUVERS EVEN THOUGH THE PURPOSE OF THE TRAINING FLIGHT IS TO CHECK THE ACTIONS OF TRAINEES WHO MUST HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND PROPERLY.
Safety Issue and Context
JAPAN AIR LINES TRAINING FLIGHT 90 OF JUNE 24, 1969, CRASHED AT 16031/ WHILE EXECUTING A TAKEOFF ON RUNWAY 32R. OF THE FIVE CREWMEMBERS AND TRAINEES ON BOARD, THREE RECEIVED FATAL INJURIES AND TWO SUSTAINED SERIOUS BURN INJURIES. THE TWO SURVIVORS WERE THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR AND THE FLIGHT ENGINEER. SHORTLY AFTER LIFT-OFF, THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR REDUCED POWER ON NO. 4 ENGINE TO CHECK THE TRAINEE'S EMERGENCY PROCEDURES, AND THE AIRCRAFT BEGAN TO YAW TO THERIGHT. THIS YAW CONTINUED TO INCREASE UNTIL, AT A POINT APPROXIMATELY 6,500 FEET DOWN THE RUNWAY, THE RIGHT WING WENT DOWN AND THE NO. 4 ENGINE POD MADE CONTACT WITH THE RUNWAY.
IN A SEVERE SIDESLIP TO THE RIGHT, THE AIRCRAFT SLID OFF THE RUNWAY AND THENCE IN A NORTHERLY DIRECTION THROUGH 2,600 FEET OF ROUGH TERRAIN, BREAKING UP AND BURSTING INTO FLAMES BEFORE IT CAME TO REST ON AN EASTERLY HEADING. FOUR CREWMEMBERS ESCAPED FROM THE BURNING AIRCRAFT THROUGH A BREAK IN THE FUSELAGE, BUT OF THESE FOUR, ONLY TWO SURVIVED. THE BODY OF ONE TRAINEE WAS LATER FOUND IN THE BURNED COCKPIT AREA. GROUND IMPACT AND FIRE AFTER IMPACT ALMOST COMPLETELY DESTROYED THE AIRPLANE.
Response History
September 2, 1970 · Recipient Response · FAA
9/2/70 THE FAA STATED THAT THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS HAVE BEEN MATTERS OF THEIR EMPHASIS FOR SOME TIME 1. ON 16 DECEMBER 1969, AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS BULLETIN 65-1, APPENDIX 3, OF THE AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS INSPECTOR'S HANDBOOK 8430.6A, WAS UPDATED AND REISSUED. IT SPEAKS TO THE ROLL CHARACTERISTICS OF SWEPTWING AIRCRAFT WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON ENGINE-OUT CONDITIONS OF BANK AND YAW.
IT SPECIFICALLY CALLS FOR CONTINUAL REVIEW OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SWEPTWING TRANSPORT WITH AIR CARRIER TRAINING PERSONNEL WITH EMPHASIS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF OBSERVING PROPER RECOVERY TECHNIQUES AND SAFEGUARDS DURING CONDUCT OF TRAINING MANEUVERS; AND EFFECTIVE 2/2/70, FAR PART 121 WAS REVISED IN PARAGRAPHS 411 AND 413 TO REQUIRE, BY REGULATION, BOTH INITIAL AND TRANSITION TRAINING FOR AIR CARRIER CHECK AIRMEN AND FLIGHT INSTRUCTORS. THE FLIGHT TRAINING PORTION OF WHICH MUST INCLUDE: 1.
ENOUGH INFLIGHT TRAINING AND PRACTICE IN CONDUCTING FLIGHT CHECKS FROM THE LEFT AND RIGHT PILOT SEATS IN THE REQUIRED NORMAL, ABNORMAL, AND EMERGENCY MANEUVERS TO ENSURE HIS COMPETENCE TO CONDUCT THE PILOT FLIGHT CHECKS AND FLIGHT TRAINING REQUIRED BY THIS PART. 2. THE APPROPRIATE SAFETY MEASURES TO BE TAKEN FROM EITHER PILOT SEAT FOR EMERGENCY SITUATIONS THAT ARE LIKELY TO DEVELOP IN TRAINING, AND 3. THE POTENTIAL RESULTS OF IMPROPER OR UNTIMELY SAFETY MEASURES DURING TRAINING. THESE ACTIONS, PROPERLY ADMINISTERED THROUGH OUR CARRIER INSPECTORS PROVIDE THE NECESSARY BASIC AWARENESS OF THE SAFETY ASPECTS OF CRITICAL ENGINE-OUT MANEUVERING.
ADDITIONALLY, THE CONTINUOUS MONITORING, FOLLOWING APPROVAL, OF AIR CARRIER TRAINING PROGRAMS PROVIDES FURTHER ASSURANCE THAT THE EMPHASIS IS MAINTAINED.