Safety Recommendation A-12-045

-From Bryan Bedford, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reviewed the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee’s Avionics Systems Harmonization Working Group report, along with current FAA policy guidance and regulations, and found inconsistencies with operating practices of recently certificated transport category airplanes that were not in line with the safety intent of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 25.1309, Equipment, Systems, and Installations.

On August 30, 2024, the FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1309-1B, System Design and Analysis, with amendment 25-152 revisions to 14 CFR 25.1309, to clarify the acceptable means of compliance for all airplane failure conditions, including system failures of the spoilers and speedbrakes to deploy during the landing rollout. In addition to addressing failures that require immediate pilot action, the AC also provides guidance for failures that have little or no immediate effect but may require subsequent flightcrew action and/or awareness.

The AC is available at the following website: https://drs.faa.gov/browse/excelExternalWindow/DRSDOCID185219404320240903190412.0001

Showing compliance with 14 CFR 25.1309(c), amendment 25-152, effective September 26, 2024, 14 CFR 25.1302(d), Installed systems and equipment for use by the flightcrew, amendment 25- 137, effective July 2, 2013, and 14 CFR 25.1322(a), Flightcrew Alerting, amendment 25-131, effective November 2, 2010, collectively require the airplane and its systems to provide information concerning unsafe operating conditions to the flightcrew so they are enabled to take corrective action in a timely manner.

The FAA reported that it has reviewed the aviation rulemaking advisory committee (ARAC) avionics systems harmonization working group’s (ASHWG’s) report and recommendations on the use of an alert for when ground spoilers are not armed for landing. The ASHWG recommended that the FAA adopt the European Union Aviation Safety Agency Certification Specifications 25.705, Runway Overrun Awareness and Alerting Systems, and associated Acceptable Means of Compliance 25.705, as well as issue a new Title 14 CFR rule (section 25.704) and advisory circular for aircraft that use ground spoilers as an aid to reduce landing and rollout distances.

We are encouraged that the ARAC ASHWG has completed its tasking and that you are considering its recommendations, including new rulemaking and updates to guidance. We reiterate that the intent of this recommendation is to ensure that pilots are alerted when the speedbrakes have not deployed (different than them not being armed) during landing. We remain hopeful that this concern will be addressed in the rulemaking and guidance that you are considering.

Pending issuance of a policy statement, or similar guidance, to clarify the FAA’s expectations for compliance with existing regulatory requirements and to emphasize the need for the recommended alert, the Board has voted to retain the classification of OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATE RESPONSE for Safety Recommendation A-12-45.

-From Michael G. Whitaker, Administrator: In our previous response dated November 28, 2022, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) indicated we were reviewing the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee’s Avionics Systems Harmonization Working Group (ASHWG) final report. The ASHWG recommended the FAA adopt the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Certification Specifications (CS) 25.705, Runway Overrun Awareness and Alerting Systems, and associated Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) 25.705, as well as issue a new 14 CFR rule (§ 25.704) with a new advisory circular (AC) for aircraft that utilize ground spoilers as an aid to reduce landing and rollout distances.

The ASHWG noted many current aircraft designs already include automation and alerting aligned with the intent of the proposed rule. The final report is available at the following website:

https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/docume nt/information?documentID=5785

The FAA has reviewed the ASHWG recommendations, and we are currently assessing options for implementation that align with the requirements of 14 CFR 25.1322, Flightcrew alerting. The options may include new rulemaking and guidance updates to harmonize with EASA CS 25.705 and AMC 25.705, along with the proposed new § 25.704 airworthiness requirement and associated AC.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA’s progress on Safety Recommendation A-12-45 and anticipate providing an update by May 31, 2025.

In 2020, your aviation rulemaking advisory committee (ARAC) avionics systems harmonization working group (ASHWG) was tasked with advising on the use of an alert for when ground spoilers are not armed for landing. We are aware that, on December 9, 2022, the ARAC ASHWG submitted its final report and that you are reviewing this information.

Pending your issuance of a policy statement that emphasizes the need for a clearly distinguishable and intelligible alert that warns pilots when the speedbrakes have not deployed, Safety Recommendation A-12-45 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATE RESPONSE.

-From Billy Nolen, Administrator, FAA: As previously stated, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a new tasking to the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee’s Avionics Systems Harmonization Working Group (ASHWG) on December 11, 2020. The tasking directs the ASHWG to provide a report of specific recommendations regarding the use of alerts related to ground spoiler deployment. The ASHWG report has been delayed until December 31, 2022, from its original September 30, 2022 date, to allow for additional consensus building. Once received, the FAA will review the report and determine its next actions.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA’s progress on Safety Recommendation A-12-45 and anticipate providing an update by December 31, 2023.

We previously told you that, because Part 25.1309(c) already requires that the flightcrew be given warning information to alert them to unsafe system operating conditions, your plan to issue a new policy statement to clarify compliance with existing regulatory requirements was an acceptable alternate solution to this recommendation.

We note that, in 2020, your aviation rulemaking advisory committee (ARAC) avionics systems harmonization working group (ASHWG) was tasked with providing recommendations for a speedbrake alert. Specifically, the ARAC ASHWG was reviewing the use of alerts for unarmed speed brakes (in the air and on ground) and existing alerting requirements to determine if additional guidance is needed.

We continue to believe your ongoing efforts to address this safety issue are responsive to this recommendation. Pending completion of the ARAC ASHWG’s review and your issuance of a policy statement that emphasizes the need for a clearly distinguishable and intelligible alert that warns pilots when the speedbrakes have not deployed, Safety Recommendation A-12-45 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATE RESPONSE.

-From Steve Dickson, Administrator: In our previous letter to the Board dated January 24, 2020, we indicated our plan to issue a policy statement that will provide guidance for compliance with existing regulatory requirements and to emphasize the need for a clearly distinguishable and intelligible alert that warns pilots when the speed brakes have not deployed on landing or during a rejected takeoff. Additionally, we reported that the Flight Test Harmonization Working Group, under the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC), proposed revising the means of compliance to 14 (CFR) 25.1309 (c) for failures that can lead to runway excursions.

We determined that portions of the ARAC recommendations relative to this safety recommendation would not address the Board’s safety concern adequately.

A more effective approach to address this safety recommendation was to issue a new tasking to the ARAC’s Avionics Systems Harmonization Working Group (ASHWG) on December 11, 2020. The tasking requires the ASHWG to provide recommendations regarding the use of an alert when ground spoilers are not armed for landing. In addition, the tasking calls for revisiting the existing alerting requirements to see if more explicit guidance is needed for the failure of ground spoilers to deploy. The FAA expects to receive the ASHWG’s recommendations by September 2022, and we will determine if additional guidance is appropriate.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA’s progress on Safety Recommendation A-12-45 and anticipate providing an update by October 31, 2022.

In December 2014, you told us that, because Part 25.1309(c) already requires that the flightcrew be given warning information to alert them to unsafe system operating conditions, you planned to issue a new policy statement that would clarify compliance with existing regulatory requirements and emphasize the need for a clearly distinguishable and intelligible alert that warns pilots when the speedbrakes have not deployed on landing or during a rejected takeoff. We replied that the policy statement was an acceptable alternate solution that satisfied this recommendation.

You later informed us that your aviation rulemaking advisory committee (ARAC) was considering a proposal by the flight test harmonization working group to revise the means of compliance for Part 25.1309 for failures that can lead to runway excursions, including methods to determine the criticality of the failure condition. In your current letter, however, you reported that the ARAC recommendations would not have adequately addressed the intent of this recommendation and, as a result, you have decided to issue a new tasking to the ARAC avionics systems harmonization working group (ASHWG).

We note that the ASHWG tasking, which is currently being developed, would include alerts for unarmed speed brakes in the air in addition to on-ground alerts.

Pending your issuance of a policy statement that requires that a clearly distinguishable and intelligible alert warns pilots when the speedbrakes have not deployed during the landing roll, Safety Recommendation A-12-45 remains classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATE RESPONSE.

-From Steve Dickson, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) plans to issue a new policy statement, as previously stated. This policy statement will provide guidance for compliance with existing regulatory requirements and to emphasize the need for a clearly distinguishable and intelligible alert that warns pilots when the speedbrakes have not deployed on landing or during a rejected takeoff.

This new policy statement will address the determination or failure condition criticality regarding whether an alert is required or not. This topic also became part of the Flight Test Harmonization Working Group (FTHWG) tasking, under the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC). FTHWG recently completed their recommendations, and created a proposal to revise the means of compliance to Title 14, code of Federal regulations section 25.1309 (c), for failures that can lead to runway excursions. The FAA determined that the portions of the ARAC recommendations relevant to this safety recommendation would not adequately address the Board's safety concern.

The FAA determined that a more effective approach to address this recommendation is to issue a new tasking to the ARAC's Avionics Systems Harmonization Working Group (ASHWG) to provide recommendations for a speedbrake alert. This will result in a delay in issuing the previously discussed policy. The ASHWG tasking will build on a separate recommendation from the FTHWG, accepted by the FAA, to require alerting if ground spoilers are not armed when operating on wet runways. The ASHWG tasking will broaden and generalize this recommendation to include alerting of unarmed speed brakes in the air in addition to on-ground alerting.

The ASHWG tasking statement for automatic speedbrake arming is currently being developed. We originally anticipated development to be completed by June 2019; instead, we opted to utilize the committee request process. Our revised tasking statement completion date is now February 2020. The ASHWG is scheduled to complete its ARAC-approved recommendations report by June 2021.

We acknowledge the Board's caution against long delays addressing this recommendation and considered issuing an Airworthiness Directive (AD). We determined the fleet risk does not meet the level necessary to warrant an AD mandating retrofit of alerts for speed brake non-deployment during landing or roll on affected aircraft.

In your December 23, 2014, letter about this recommendation, you said that you reviewed the relevant regulations and guidance, including amendments made to Part 25 on November 2, 2010, that included new requirements for flightcrew alerting. Prior to that date, the speedbrake lever’s lack of movement was considered adequate to notify the crew that it had failed to deploy. In our investigation of the American Airlines flight 2253 incident, we found that the only indication available to the pilot that the speedbrakes had not deployed was the speedbrake lever position; however, when the airplane initially touched down, the handle began to move, giving a misleading cue regarding its deployment.

Your December 23, 2014, letter also indicated that Part 25.1309(c) requires that the flightcrew be given warning information to alert them to unsafe system operating conditions. As a result, you believed that current regulatory requirements, especially recent additions to Part 25.1309, addressed Safety Recommendation A 12-45. You planned to issue a new policy statement that would clarify compliance with existing regulatory requirements and emphasize the need for a clearly distinguishable and intelligible alert that warns pilots when the speedbrakes have not deployed on landing or during a rejected takeoff.

In your December 23, 2014, letter, you said that you expected to publish this proposed policy statement for public comment by December 31, 2014. We replied that the policy statement was an acceptable alternate solution that satisfied the recommendation; however, we cautioned against long delays in issuing it.

In your current letter, you write that the policy statement will address methods to determine when the failure condition requires an alert. We note that you were developing guidance on this subject when your Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Flight Test Harmonization Working Group (FTHWG) determined that it should address it. We further note that the ARAC is considering a proposal by the FTHWG to revise the means of compliance for

-Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: ln our previous letter to the Board dated May 12, 20 16. the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reiterated that we plan to issue a new policy statement that will clarify the FAA’s expectations for compliance with existing regulatory requirements and emphasize the need for a clearly distinguishable and intelligible alert that warns pilots when the speedbrakes have not deployed on landing or during a rejected takeoff.

One significant item that will be addressed in this new policy statement is the determination or failure condition criticality regarding whether an alert is required or not. The FAA was in the process or developing guidance on this subject when the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Flight Test Harmonization Working Group (FTHWG) determined that they should address this concern. The FAA will consider recommendations from the FTHWG in order to develop an approach that reflects industry-wide input and harmonization with other authorities. The FTHWG created a proposal to revise the means of compliance to Title 14.

Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 25.1309 for failures that can lead to runway excursions. to include methods for determining the criticality of the failure condition.

The FTHWG proposal is currently wi th ARAC for consideration, and we expect ARAC to approve it by December 20 17. We plan to review the final FTHWG proposal and. if necessary. revise our current policy to align with it.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on this recommendation and provide an update by August 2018.

We note that you continue to develop a policy statement on speedbrake deployment that will clarify your expectations for compliance with existing regulatory requirements and that will emphasize the need for a clearly distinguishable and intelligible alert to warn pilots when the speedbrakes have not deployed during the landing roll. We consider this to be an acceptable alternate solution to the recommendation; however, we caution that long delays pose unacceptable ongoing risks. Accordingly, pending timely issuance of this policy statement, Safety Recommendation A-12-45 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATE RESPONSE.

-From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: Due to competing priorities, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has experienced delays in issuing the policy statement (PS) on speedbrake deployment: PS-ANM-25-25, Guidance for Compliance with Type Certification Requirements Pertaining to Failure of Speedbrakes/Spoilers to Deploy During Landing or Rejected Takeoff. As stated in our last letter, the PS will clarify the FAA's expectations for compliance "with existing regulatory requirements and emphasize the need for a clearly distinguishable and intelligible alert that warns pilots when the speedbrakes have not deployed on landing or during rejected takeoff.

We expect to issue the PS for public comment by December 2016.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on this safety recommendation and provide an update by May 31, 2017.

We note that you reviewed relevant FAA regulations and guidance, including amendments made to Part 25 on November 2, 2010. Prior to this date, lack of movement of the speed brake lever was considered adequate notice to the crew of the failure of the speedbrake to deploy. In our report on the American Airlines flight 2253 incident, we found that the only indication available to the pilot that the speedbrakes had not deployed was the speedbrake lever position, but that, when the airplane initially touched down, the handle began to move, resulting in a misleading cue regarding speedbrake deployment.

You believe that current regulatory requirements adequately address this recommendation, and as a result of your review, you plan to issue a new certification policy statement that will clarify what constitutes compliance with existing regulatory requirements. The policy statement will emphasize the need for a clearly distinguishable and intelligible alert that warns pilots when the speedbrakes have not deployed. Pending your issuance of this statement, Safety Recommendation A-12-45 remains classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

-Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) agrees that it is important to have clearly distinguishable and intelligible alerts to warn pilots of failure conditions that are necessary to take corrective action. We examined current regulations and guidance material and reviewed how a broad range of transport category airplane designs complied with these regulations. We have determined the following: 1. The effect of speedbrake non-deployment on stopping distance varies by airplane type and operating conditions; 2.

Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 25.1 309(c) requires warning information to be provided to alert the flightcrew of unsafe system operating conditions; 3. Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1309-lA, System Design and Analysis, states that a system's failure warning or indication should be timely, rousing, obvious, clear, and unambiguous.

This AC also states that the warning should occur when the capability of the airplane and flightcrew is sufficient for appropriate action; 4. Effective November 2, 2010, Part 25, as amended by Amendment 25-131, was revised to include new requirements for flightcrew alerting. Specifically, § 25.1322(a)(2) requires that flightcrew alerts are readily and easily detectable and intelligible, and § 25. 1322( c )(2) requires that warning and caution level alerts provide timely attention-getting cues through at least two different senses by a combination of aural, visual, or tactile indications; and 5. Past practices used to alert the flightcrew of speedbrake failure to deploy have varied.

In some cases, the determination for failure condition criticality determination included consideration of landing distance safety margins required by air carrier operating rules that may not be present at the time of landing, and that are not applicable to other types of operations. In many cases, lack of movement of the speed brake lever was considered adequate indication of speedbrake non-deployment.

The FAA is investigating the issue addressed by this recommendation and is evaluating potential solutions. Pending completion of the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A 12 45 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

-From Michael P. Huerta, Acting Administrator: We share the Board's concern that clear information should be available to the flightcrew when speedbrakes have not deployed during the landing roll. We will investigate the issue and evaluate potential solutions to determine the best approach, considering current alerting requirements, system integrity, and reliability.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on this safety recommendation and provide an update by October 31, 2013.