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NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-99-080

Recommendation

THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION (ORIGINALLY ISSUED TO RSPA): WITH THE FAA, EVALUATE THE FIRE HAZARDS POSED BY LITHIUM BATTERIES IN AN AIR TRANSPORTATION ENVIRONMENT AND REQUIRE THAT APPROPRIATE SAFETY MEASURES BE TAKEN TO PROTECT AIRCRAFT AND OCCUPANTS.

THE EVALUATION SHOULD CONSIDER THE TESTING REQUIREMENTS FOR LITHIUM BATTERIES IN THE UNITED NATIONS'S TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS MANUAL OF TESTS AND CRITERIA, THE INVOLVEMENT OF PACKAGES CONTAINING LARGE QUANTITIES OF TIGHTLY PACKED BATTERIES IN A CARGO COMPARTMENT FIRE, AND THE POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF BATTERIES TO ROUGH HANDLING IN AN AIR TRANSPORTATION ENVIRONMENT, INCLUDING BEING CRUSHED OR ABRADED OPEN.

Safety Issue and Context

ON 4/28/99, A FIRE DESTROYED FREIGHT, INCLUDING LITHIUM BATTERIES, ON TWO AIRCRAFT CARGO PALLETS AT THE NORTHWEST AIRLINES CARGO FACILITY AT LOS ANGELES INT'L. AIRPORT. THE PALLETS HAD BEEN TAKEN OFF AN INBOUND PASSENGER-CARRYING FLIGHT FROM OSAKA, JAPAN. THE AIRCRAFT WAS A BOEING 747, OPERATED BY NORTHWEST AIRLINES AS FLIGHT 0026. THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S INVESTIGATION OF THIS INCIDENT REVEALED THAT LITHIUM BATTERIES LIKELY PRESENT A SERIOUS FIRE HAZARD TO AIR TRANSPORTATION REQUIRING IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.

CURRENTLY, LITHIUM BATTERIES OF THE TYPE INVOLVED IN THE APRIL 28 FIRE CAN BE TRANSPORTED ON BOTH PASSENGER-CARRYING AND CARGO-ONLY AIRCRAFT BUT ARE NOT CLASSIFIED AS A HAZARDOUS MATERIAL REQUIRING APPROPRIATE IDENTIFICATION, MARKING, LABELING, AND TESTING.

Response History

June 19, 2008 · NTSB Correspondence · RSPA

During the Safety Board’s December 4, 2007, meeting, Safety Recommendations A-99-80 and -82 were classified Closed Acceptable Action. Below is the portion of the Board’s report regarding this action:

On August 9, 2007, PHMSA issued new requirements that tightened the safety standards governing the air transportation of both primary and secondary lithium batteries. The final rule prohibits the transport of primary lithium batteries and cells as cargo on passenger carrying aircraft. Additionally, spare lithium batteries can only be transported as carry-on items. Further, the exemptions for medium primary and secondary lithium batteries were eliminated, and new marking paperwork requirements were added for those batteries transported as cargo by air or vessel.

The new requirements in the August 2007 rulemaking address the comments in the Safety Board’s September 26, 2002, letter to PHMSA regarding Safety Recommendations A-99-80 and -82. The rulemaking also addresses Safety Recommendation A-99-85 to the FAA. Under this rule, on the basis of the FAA’s initial testing of the fire risks posed by secondary lithium batteries and PHMSA’s elimination of many of the exemptions for primary and secondary lithium batteries, greater shipments of lithium batteries will be transported by air as declared hazardous materials that will be required to comply with enhanced packaging and identification standards.

Therefore, the Safety Board classifies Safety Recommendations A-99-80, -82, and -85 Closed Acceptable Action.

December 4, 2007 · NTSB Correspondence · RSPA

From Aircraft Accident Report: In-Flight Cargo Fire, United Parcel Service Company Flight 1307, McDonnell Douglas DC-8-71F, N748UP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, February 7, 2006

On August 9, 2007, PHMSA issued new requirements that tightened the safety standards governing the air transportation of both primary and secondary lithium batteries. The final rule prohibits the transport of primary lithium batteries and cells as cargo on passenger carrying aircraft. Additionally, spare lithium batteries can only be transported as carry-on items. Further, the exemptions for medium primary and secondary lithium batteries were eliminated, and new marking paperwork requirements were added for those batteries transported as cargo by air or vessel.

The new requirements in the August 2007 rulemaking address the comments in the Safety Board’s September 26, 2002, letter to PHMSA regarding Safety Recommendations A-99-80 and -82. The rulemaking also addresses Safety Recommendation A-99-85 to the FAA. Under this rule, on the basis of the FAA’s initial testing of the fire risks posed by secondary lithium batteries and PHMSA’s elimination of many of the exemptions for primary and secondary lithium batteries, greater shipments of lithium batteries will be transported by air as declared hazardous materials that will be required to comply with enhanced packaging and identification standards.

Therefore, the Safety Board classifies Safety Recommendations A-99-80, -82, and -85 "Closed-Acceptable Action."

July 31, 2007 · Recipient Response · RSPA

Letter Mail Controlled 8/8/2007 2:24:08 PM MC# 2070395: In December 2004, we issued an interim final rule (IFR) to ban the transportation of primary or non-rechargeable lithium batteries as cargo on passenger aircraft. In addition, in a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) published in April 2002, we proposed to tighten other standards for the testing, handling, and packaging of lithium batteries, in each case to reduce the likelihood or consequence of a lithium battery-related fire in transportation. We will publish a final rule to finalize the proposals in the April 2002 NPRM and the provisions of the December 2004 IFR by mid-August of this year.

We continue to evaluate the fire hazards posed by the transportation of secondary or rechargeable lithium batteries; with FAA, we are currently evaluating a report on this issue prepared by FAA’s Technical Center. We are also working with the United Nations Sub-committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods and the International Civil Aviation Organization to develop additional enhanced safety measures for the transportation of lithium batteries. More generally, we have initiated a comprehensive strategy aimed at reducing the transportation risks posed by batteries of all types. This strategy reflects an approach we call

"Enterprise Government" - bringing together public and private sector stakeholders on all sides of an issue to identify and advance governmental and private sector solutions. Together we identified a series of immediate and longer-term actions that participants in this enterprise are taking or will take to enhance safety. These actions will include comprehensive reporting and investigation of battery-related incidents; improved battery, consumer product, and software design; development and implementation of a technical standards agenda;

consideration and implementation of improved regulatory standards; focused enforcement; and development and implementation of a public outreach and education campaign. For example, PHMSA co-hosted a meeting with national standards organizations (UL, IEC, IEEE) on May 24-25, 2007 in Herndon, VA to review current lithium battery standards workand stimulate discussions on actions that can be taken to enhance safety. Through an integrated and cooperative approach, we can be most successful in reducing incidents, enhancing safety, and protecting the public.

April 14, 2006 · Recipient Response · RSPA

In its 4/14/2006 report to Congress, "National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and DOT Office of Inspector General (OIG): Open Safety Recommendations on Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety," the DOT wrote:An Interim Final Rule was issued on December 10,2004 prohibiting- the transportation of primary lithium batteries and cells as cargo on passenger aircraft. As of December 29, 2004, primary lithium batteries and cells may not be transported as cargo on foreign or domestic passenger-carrying aircraft operating into or within the U.S. FAA is conducting tests on secondary lithium batteries. DOT officials observed demos on August 3,2005 in Atlantic City, NJ.

PHMSA and FAA will continue to evaluate the hazards associated with these batteries. Based on results, additional regulatory action may be necessary.

July 6, 2005 · NTSB Correspondence · RSPA

The Safety Board notes that on December 29, 2004, RSPA issued an interim final rule to prohibit the shipment of primary lithium batteries as cargo on board passenger-carrying aircraft. The interim final rule also establishes restrictions for shipping on board passenger-carrying aircraft equipment containing or packed with primary lithium batteries. Under the interim final rule, the number of lithium batteries contained or packed in such equipment cannot exceed the number of batteries needed to power the equipment, and the lithium content of each battery cannot exceed a specified threshold.

Further, the gross weight of the package containing the equipment item cannot exceed 5 kg (11 lbs). The ban applies to all U.S. carrier flights and those of foreign carriers into and out of the United States. The Board further notes that this ban was based on a study documented in a June 2004 report published by the FAA titled Flammability Assessment of Bulk-Packed, Nonrechargeable Lithium Primary Batteries in Transport Category Aircraft, DOT/FAA/AR-04/28 by Harry Webster. This report documents the results of a study conducted at the FAA's William J. Hughes Technical Center that evaluated the fire risk posed by shipment on airplanes of primary lithium batteries.

The study found that such shipments pose a significant fire risk. The RSPA rulemaking and the FAA study complete this recommendation with respect to primary lithium batteries.

However, the risks posed by the shipment of secondary (rechargeable) lithium batteries remains unclear. Different chemistry is involved with operation of these batteries, and both the RSPA regulation and the FAA study excluded secondary lithium batteries. However, in the new regulation, RSPA stated in Section IV D, "Secondary Lithium (Rechargeable/Lithium Ion) Batteries and Cells," that RSPA and the FAA have concerns with secondary lithium batteries, but the risks of shipping these batteries with respect to their ability to burn in an atmosphere containing Halon (the fire extinguishing agent used in aircraft cargo holds) are unclear.

That section also states that RSPA and the FAA will continue to study the hazards associated with shipment of secondary lithium batteries. The Safety Board is currently investigating an incident involving a fire in a package of secondary lithium ion batteries that occurred August 7, 2004, at the FedEx terminal in Memphis, Tennessee.

Although RSPA and the FAA have fully responded to this recommendation with respect to primary lithium batteries, the question of the fire risk posed by secondary lithium batteries remains. Pending investigation of the fire risks posed by the shipment of secondary lithium batteries, and appropriate rulemaking as a result, Safety Recommendation A-99-80 remains classified

February 28, 2005 · Recipient Response · RSPA

In its 2/28/2005 report to Congress, "Open Statutory Mandates Regarding Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety," the DOT wrote: Advisory notice issued in September 2000, followed by NPRM in April 2002 and interim final rule on December 15, 2004. FAA issued a close-out letter requesting classification as "closed,acceptableaction."

September 26, 2002 · NTSB Correspondence · RSPA

On April 2, 2002, RSPA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled "Hazardous Materials: Transportation of Lithium Batteries," which proposes changes to test methods for lithium batteries; revisions to exceptions for small batteries, including new marking requirements; elimination of certain exceptions for larger batteries; and other modifications. RSPA reports that it is continuing to reevaluate the hazards posed by lithium batteries in transportation by collecting information from lithium battery manufacturers, shippers, and federal agencies with extensive experience in testing and use of lithium batteries.

On June 14, 2002, the Safety Board submitted comments to the docket for the NPRM. The Board's comments noted that although the measures proposed in the NPRM are responsive to element (1) of Safety Recommendation A-99-80-the testing requirements in the UN recommendations-the NPRM does not propose standards that fully address elements (2) and (3)-the involvement of packages containing large quantities of tightly packed batteries in a cargo compartment fire, and the possible exposure of batteries to rough handling in an air transportation environment, including being crushed or abraded open.

The Board notes that RSPA states it is continuing to evaluate the hazards posed by lithium batteries and will initiate additional actions as deemed necessary upon completion of the evaluation. The Board urges RSPA to expedite its evaluation. Pending issuance of a final rule based on the NPRM and development and issuance of appropriate standards that consider the potential involvement of packages with large quantities of lithium batteries in a cargo compartment fire on an airplane and the potential exposure of lithium batteries to rough handling during air transportation, Safety Recommendation A-99-80 remains classified "Open--Acceptable Response."

June 14, 2002 · NTSB Correspondence · RSPA

Notation 7187A: The National Transportation Safety Board has reviewed the Research and Special Programs Administration’s (RSPA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) “Hazardous Materials: Transportation of Lithium Batteries,” Docket No. RSPA-02-11989 (HM-224C), which was published at 67 FR 15510 on April 2, 2002.

RSPA is proposing in the NPRM to amend the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) hazardous materials regulations regarding the transportation of lithium batteries in all modes. Under the NPRM, recent revisions to the United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (UN Recommendations) would also be incorporated in the hazardous materials regulations. The revisions to the UN Recommendations include changes to the lithium battery testing criteria that were developed to minimize the possibility that lithium cells or batteries would become an ignition source during transport.

The NPRM states that the revisions to the UN Recommendations were developed in response to an incident involving lithium batteries at Los Angeles International Airport on April 28, 1999. Two pallets containing 120,000 small lithium batteries caught fire and burned after they were offloaded from a Northwest Airlines airplane from Osaka, Japan. Extinguishing the fire was difficult. Because of their small size and low lithium content, the batteries involved in this incident were excepted from the performance packaging, marking, and labeling requirements of the hazardous materials regulations and were not required to meet the testing criteria of the UN Recommendations.

RSPA also notes in the NPRM that the incident at Los Angeles International Airport “highlighted the need for some kind of hazard communication to appear on the outside of the packages and on shipping documents and to increase the integrity of packages containing lithium batteries and cells.”

The NPRM proposes that all lithium batteries, including small lithium batteries that are currently excepted from the hazardous materials regulations, be tested in accordance with the UN Recommendations and be designed or packed to prevent short circuits during transportation. The NPRM also proposes to replace current exceptions with more restrictive exceptions.

Specifically, for small batteries and cells (as determined by lithium content), RSPA proposes that each package containing more than 24 cells or 12 batteries must (1) be marked to indicate that it contains lithium batteries; (2) be accompanied by a document indicating that the package contains lithium batteries; (3) weigh no more than 30 kilograms (66 pounds); and (4) be capable of withstanding a 1.2- meter (4-foot) drop test in any orientation without shifting its contents in a way that would allow short-circuiting and without releasing its contents.

June 10, 2002 · Recipient Response · RSPA

Letter Mail Controlled 06/20/2002 3:13:33 PM MC# 2020614 We recently published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) entitled "Hazardous Materials: Transportation of Lithium Batteries." A copy of the NPRM is enclosed. In the NPRM, we propose changes to test methods for lithium batteries; revisions to exceptions for small batteries, including new marking requirements; elimination of certain exceptions for larger batteries; and other modifications.

These proposed changes are intended to enhance the safe transportation of lithium batteries and harmonize our domestic requirements with changes recently made to international transportation standards in the United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. We are continuing to reevaluate the hazards posed by lithium batteries in transportation. We are collecting information from lithium battery manufacturers, shippers, and Federal agencies with extensive experience in testing and use of lithium batteries. When we complete our evaluation, we will initiate any additional actions necessary to assure that lithium batteries are transported safely.

We will keep you informed of our progress. If you have any questions, please contact me or Suzanne TeBeau, Associate Administrator for Policy and Congressional Affairs, at (202) 366-4831

June 13, 2001 · NTSB Correspondence · RSPA

The Safety Board notes that although publishing the Advisory Notice is a commendable activity, it does not address the intent of these recommendations. The Board's June 27, 2000, response to RSPA's March 29, 2000, letter about these recommendations discussed the specific actions necessary to satisfy Safety Recommendations A-99-80, -82, and -83.

In its March 29, 2000, letter, RSPA informed the Board that in coordination with the FAA, it is re-evaluating the hazards posed by lithium batteries in air transport and the safety measures necessary to protect an aircraft and its occupants, including an evaluation of the current testing requirements of the United Nations' Transport of Dangerous Goods Manual of Tests and Criteria and current regulatory requirements.

Pending the results of RSPA's evaluation of the hazards and safety measures necessary for lithium battery shipment in air transport, including damage from rough handling such as being crushed or abraded open, Safety Recommendation A-99-80, remains classified "Open-Acceptable Response."

October 24, 2000 · Recipient Response · RSPA

Letter Mail Controlled 10/30/2000 1:38:06 PM MC# 2001605 On September 7, 2000 RSPA published an Advisory Notice, a copy of which is enclosed for your information, that: (1) Informed persons of the incident and the potential hazards that shipments of lithium batteries may present while in transportation, (2) Recommended actions to offerors and transporters to ensure the safety of such shipments, (3) Provided information concerning the current requirements for the transportation of lithium batteries,

(4) Informed persons of recommendations that we received from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) on the transportation of lithium batteries and our response to those recommendations, (5) Informed persons of the actions we have taken to date and plan to take in the future to address the hazards of these batteries, and (6) Provided information concerning initiatives being taken by members of the battery manufacturing and distribution industry to address concerns these batteries. relating to transportation of these batteries.

June 27, 2000 · NTSB Correspondence · RSPA

THE SAFETY BOARD APPRECIATES RSPA'S ACTIONS THUS FAR. HOWEVER, THE BOARD IS CONCERNED THAT THESE ACTIONS DO NOT INCLUDE TESTING OR CONSIDERATION OF ROUGH HANDLING, INCLUDING BEING CRUSHED OR ABRADED OPEN. THIS CONDITION WAS SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IN THE RECOMMENDATION AND WAS A FACTOR IN THE INCIDENT THAT PROMPTED THE RECOMMENDATION. PENDING THE RESULTS OF RSPA'S EVALUATION OF THE HAZARDS AND SAFETY MEASURES NECESSARY FOR LITHIUM BATTERY SHIPMENT IN AIR TRANSPORT, INCLUDING DAMAGE FROM ROUGH HANDLING SUCH AS BEING CRUSHED OR ABRADED OPEN, A-99-80 IS CLASSIFIED "OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE."

March 29, 2000 · Recipient Response · RSPA

Letter Mail Controlled 04/06/2000 3:33:05 PM MC# 2000498 RSPA, IN COORDINATION WITH FAA, IS RE-EVALUATING BOTH THE HAZARDS POSED BY LITHIUM BATTERIES IN AIR TRANSPORT AND THE SAFETY MEASURES NECESSARY TO PROTECT AN AIRCRAFT AND ITS OCCUPANTS. OUR EVALUATION ENCOMPASSES THE CURRENT TESTING REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS MANUAL OF TESTS AND CRITERIA AS WELL AS CURRENT REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS. IN RECENT MEETINGS WITH BATTERY INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES, WE HAVE REQUESTED INFORMATION ON BATTERY RESISTANCE TO MECHANICAL AND HEAT DAMAGE AND THE HAZARDS PRESENTED BY DAMAGED BATTERIES.

Read Recommendation

Recommendation Facts

Status
Closed - Acceptable Action
Issued
November 16, 1999
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
RSPA
Adopted
November 1, 1999
Closed
December 4, 2007
Related Investigation
DCA99MZ005
Related Report
None
"Open--Acceptable Response."

The markings on the package and a shipping document would also have to indicate the special procedures to be followed if the package is damaged. Such shipments still would not be subject to the requirements for labeling, performance packaging, and shipping papers under the hazardous materials regulations.

The Safety Board investigated the lithium battery fire at the Los Angeles International Airport and issued five safety recommendations as a result. Safety Recommendation A-99-80 addresses the need to reduce the fire hazards from shipments of lithium batteries during air transportation, and Safety Recommendation A-99-82 addresses the need to alert cargo handlers to the hazards posed by lithium batteries.

Safety Recommendation A-99-80 urged RSPA, with the Federal Aviation Administration, to evaluate the fire hazards posed by lithium batteries in an air transportation environment and to require that appropriate safety measures be taken to protect aircraft and occupants. Further, the Safety Board specified that the evaluation should consider (1) the testing requirements in the UN Recommendations, (2) the involvement of packages containing large quantities of tightly packed batteries in a cargo compartment fire, and (3) the possible exposure of batteries to rough handling in an air transportation environment, including being crushed or abraded open.

The Safety Board supports the proposals to require that all lithium batteries, including small batteries and cells that are currently excepted from the hazardous materials regulations, be tested in accordance with the revised UN Recommendations, and that packages containing more than 12 small batteries or 24 cells pass a drop test. Although these measures are responsive to element (1) of Safety Recommendation A-99-80, the NPRM does not propose standards that fully address elements (2) and (3) of the recommended evaluation.

The Safety Board notes that RSPA is continuing its ongoing evaluation of the hazards posed by lithium batteries and will initiate additional actions as deemed necessary upon completion of the evaluation. The Safety Board urges RSPA to expedite its evaluation, giving specific attention to the potential involvement of packages with large quantities of lithium batteries in a cargo compartment fire on an airplane and to the potential exposure of lithium batteries to rough handling during air transportation.

Safety Recommendation A-99-82 asked RSPA to require that packages containing lithium batteries be identified as hazardous materials, including appropriate marking and labeling of the packages and proper identification in shipping documents when transported on aircraft. The NPRM proposes requirements that would enhance the identification of packages of lithium batteries and provide guidance if a package were damaged. However, the proposed requirements do not address the Safety Board’s primary concern: that cargo handlers need to be properly alerted to the dangers posed by lithium batteries.

If cargo handlers can see from shipping documents and the marking and labeling on the package that the contents contain a hazardous material, they are more likely to handle the package carefully. The Safety Board believes that the NPRM can be improved by proposing that a package containing more than 12 small lithium batteries or 24 lithium cells be classified as a DOT class 9 miscellaneous hazardous material, which is subject to the requirements in the hazardous materials regulations for labeling of the package and shipping papers.

The Safety Board appreciates the opportunity to comment on this NPRM.