NTSB · Safety Recommendation
Safety Recommendation A-93-093
Recommendation
THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: REQUIRE THAT, AS A CONDITION FOR LICENSE FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCHES, AS A MINIMUM, THE COMPANY APPLYING FOR THE LICENSE INCLUDE IN ITS LICENSE APPLICATION: FOR LAUNCHES FROM REMOTE SITES OR AIRCRAFT, A PLAN TO ASSURE THAT ESSENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS INTERRUPTIONS RESULTING FROM ANTENNA PATTERNS ARE IMPROBABLE. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN FOR TOLERABLE INTERRUPTIONS THAT MAY BE ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSIENT CONDITIONS, SUCH AS AIRCRAFT MANEUVERS.
Safety Issue and Context
ON FEBRUARY 9, 1993, ABOUT 0930 EASTERN STANDARD TIME, THE LAUNCH SEQUENCE FOR AN ORBITAL SCIENCES CORPORATION (OSC) PEGASUS EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE (ELV) WAS ABORTED BY THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA) RANGE SAFETY OFFICERS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED LAUNCH CONSTRAINT. SEVERAL SECONDS LATER, THE LAUNCH SEQUENCE WAS REINITIATED BY THE OSC TEST CONDUCTOR, AND THE MISSILE SEPARATED UNEVENTFULLY FROM ITS CARRIER AIRCRAFT. THE IGNITION AND STAGING OF THE PEGASUS AND ITS SUBSEQUENT DEPLOYMENT OF TWO SATELLITES INTO LOW EARTH ORBIT WERE ALSO UNEVENTFUL. THERE WERE NO INJURIES TO PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE MISSION AND NO DAMAGE TO MISSION ASSETS.
Response History
October 19, 1998 · NTSB Correspondence · DOT
THE BOARD NOTES THAT MISSION SAFETY HAS BEEN IMPROVED THROUGH THE NEW PROCEDURES CONCERNING COMMAND, CONTROL, & COMMUNICATION FOR SPACE LAUNCHES. CONVERSION TO THE L-1011 AIRCRAFT AS THE LAUNCH VEHICLE APPEARS TO HAVE IMPROVED THE AIR-TO-GROUND TELEMETRY LINKS WITH THE PEGASUS. IN REVIEWING ALL LAUNCHES SINCE 1993, THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTED INCIDENTS THAT WOULD DEMONSTRATE A PROBLEM WITH ANTENNA PATTERNS. BASED ON A REVIEW OF CURRENT PRACTICES & TECHNOLOGY, THE EVENTS THAT LED TO THIS RECOMMENDATION ARE NO LONGER APPLICABLE TO THE LAUNCH PROCESS. THEREFORE A-93-93 IS CLASSIFIED "CLOSED--NO LONGER APPLICABLE."
April 3, 1998 · Recipient Response · DOT
(Letter Mail Controlled 4/9/98 2:54:15 PM MC# 980452) THIS RECOMMENDATION DEALS WITH INTERRUPTIONS WITH TEMETRY COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE GROUND & THE AIRCRAFT PEGASUS. THE FAA BELIEVES THAT ADEQUATE PROCEDURES WERE IN PLACE TO DEAL WITH THE TESTING OF SUCH LINKS PRIOR TO THE LAUNCH. THESE PROCEDURES WERE APPROPRIATELY WAIVED BY THE RANGE, AT THE REQUEST OF ORBITAL, ON THE CONDITION THAT ANY INTERRUPTIONS IN THE TELEMETRY SIGNAL WOULD LEAD TO AN ABORT OF THE LAUNCH ATTEMPT, THUS SAFETY WOULD BE ENSURE. IT WAS THE ABORT PROCESS THAT ACTUALLY FAILED.
AS STATED IN OUR LETTER DATED 9/4/97, THE FAA HAS PUBLISHED A NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (NPRM) PROPOSING LICENSE APPLICATION PROCEDURES & OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CONDUCTING SPACE LAUNCHES. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS IN FAA'S LICENSING GUIDELINES, WHICH ARE ALSO REFLECTED IN 14 CFR 415.37(C) & 415.39 OF THE NPRM, ADDRESS ABORT & COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES TO ENSURE SAFETY & TO PRECLUDE ANY FUTURE OCCURRENCES OF COMMUNICATION BREAKDOWN. SUBSEQUENT LAUNCHES OF THE PEGASUS FROM WALLOPS FLIGHT FACILITY & OTHER RANGES HAVE UNDERGONE CLOSE MONITORING BY THE FAA. TELEMETRY LINKS ARE EXAMINED & ARE GENERALLY WELL UNDERSTOOD.
THIS, IN COMBINATION WITH THE INITIATIVES DESCRIBED ABOVE, HAS TAKEN CARE OF THE PROBLEM & THERE HAS BEEN NO RECURRENCE OF THE CONFUSION THAT OCCURRED WITH THE ABORT REQUIREMENT STEMMING FROM TRANSIENT COMMUNICATION INTERRUPTIONS. THE FAA ALSO INTENDS TO INCORPORATE TELEMETRY & RADAR LINK ANALYSES IN ITS REQUIREMENTS UNDER DEVELOPMENT FOR LAUNCHES FROM NON-FEDERAL RANGES. GOING BEYOND THIS TO REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF ABORTS OR MISSION HOLDS BECAUSE OF TELEMETRY INTERRUPTIONS MAY EXCEED FAA'S AUTHORITY, WHICH IS LIMITED TO PUBLIC SAFETY & NOT MISSION ASSURANCE.
September 4, 1997 · Recipient Response · DOT
It was previously reported to the Board that changes were incorporated into the launch applications guidelines. The FAA has now published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register proposing to clarify license application procedures and requirements for conducting space launches. This NPRM addresses the requirements for launch operations at federally operated launch ranges. I have enclosed a copy of the NPRM for the Board's information. Additionally, the FAA is initiating a separate rulemaking action proposing similar requirements to address launches from non-Federal sites.
I will provide the Board with a copy of the final regulatory document as soon as it is issued.
April 22, 1994 · NTSB Correspondence · DOT
THE BOARD NOTES THAT THE OCST, AS A PART OF ITS LICENSING PROCESS, REQUIRES APPLICANTS TO SUBMIT A DESCRIPTION OF THEIR SAFETY ORGANIZATION & PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS. THE OCST IS ALSO STUDYING THE NEED TO EXPLICITY REQUIRE THAT APPLICANTS PROVIDE CLEARLY DELIENATED STATEMENTS OF AUTHORITY FOR ALL PARTIES & KEY INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN THE LAUNCH. THE BOARD NOTES THAT THE OCST REQUIRES, THROUGH THE LICENSING PROCESS, ALL APPLICANTS TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT SAFE LAUNCH OPERATIONS.
DUE TO THE APPARENT DEFICIENCIES IN PRELAUNCH OPERATIONS FOR THE PEGASUS/SCD-1 LAUNCH, THE OCST IS EVALUATING WHETHER TO REQUIRE THAT LAUNCH LICENSE APPLICANTS PROVIDE MORE SPECIFIC DETAILS & CRITERIA FOR LAUNCH READINESS REVIEWS & DRESS REHEARSALS, & THAT THOSE CRITERIA BE INCORPORATED AS CONDITIONS OF LICENSING. THE BOARD NOTES THAT ALTHOUGH THE OCST'S LICENSING PROCESS INCLUDES A REVIEW OF CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING READINESS TO LAUNCH, THE OCST IS STUDYING THE NEED TO REQUIRE THAT APPLICANTS EXPLICITLY DESCRIBE THEIR PROCESS FOR APPROVING CHECKLISTS FOR A LAUNCH, & TO INCLUDE A PROVISION FOR ENSURING THE CURRENCY & CONSISTENCY OF EACH PARTICIPANT'S CHECKLIST DURING DRESS REHEARSALS.
THE BOARD NOTES THAT THE OCST IS STUDYING THE NEED TO EXPLICITLY REQUIRE, AS A CONDITION FOR A LICENSE, THE MANDATORY REST PERIODS DESCRIBED ABOVE. ADDITIONALLY, IF THE OCST DETERMINES THAT SUCH A CONDITION IS NECESSARY, IT WILL USE HUMAN PERFORMANCE EXPERTS TO DEVELOP QUANTITATIVE CRITERIA FOR SUCH REST PERIODS TO ENSURE APPLICABILITY TO THE ASSIGNED TASKS. THE BOARD NOTES THAT THE OCST IS STUDYING THOSE LAUNCH SCENARIOS & TECHNOLOGIES WHERE IT WOULD BE APPRORPIRATE TO REQUIRE FROM APPLICANTS, AS A CONDITION FOR A LICENSE, A COMMUNICATION PLAN INCLUDING THE TWO PROVISIONS IDENTIFIED IN A-93-091.
THE BOARD NOTES THE AT THE OCST IS INCORPORATING INTO ITS LICENSING REVIEW PROCESS THE REQUIREMENT FOR SAFETY DIRECTIVE HAVING STRICT CONFIGURATION CONTROL REQUIREMENTS THAT CLEARLY LISTS AND CONSOLIDATES ALL OPERATIONS INVOLVING THE SAFETY OF THE LAUNCH. THE BOARD NOTES THE OCST IS RESEARCHING THE COMMUNICATION ISSUE IN GENERAL & IS ALSO ASSESSING OPERATIONAL ISSUES IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ORBITAL SCIENCES CORPORATION PROPOSAL TO LAUNCH THE PEGASUS FROM COMMERICAL L-1011 AIRCRAFT.
THE BOARD APPRECIATES YOUR RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS A-93-87 THROUGH -93 & HAS PLACED THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN AN "OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONE" STATUS PENDING COMPLETION OF THE ACTIONS INITIATED BY THE OCST AS DESCRIBED IN YOUR JANUARY 11, 1994, LETTER.
January 11, 1994 · Recipient Response · DOT
BECAUSE THE PEGASUS LAUNCH VEHICLE WAS CONNECTED TO AN AIRPLANE IN FLIGHT, COMMUNICATION INTERRUPTIONS OCCURRED BETWEEN THE GROUND & THE FLIGHT TERMINATION SYSTEM RECEIVER. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE CONSEQUENCE OF POTENTIAL COMMUNICATION INTERRUPTIONS DUE TO ANTENNA PATTERNS WAS SUFFICIENTLY UNDERSTOOD OR PLANNED FOR BY THE LAUNCH TEAM. MANY OPERATIONAL ISSUES ARISE WITH LAUNCHES FROM REMOTE SITES OR AIRCRAFT. COMMUNICATION INTERRUPTIONS ARE ONE EXAMPLE. IN ADDITION TO RESEARCHING THESE ISSUES GENERALLY, OCST IS ASSESSING OPERATIONAL ISSUES IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OSC PROPOSAL TO LAUNCH THE PEGASUS FROM A COMMERCIAL L-1011 AIRCRAFT.