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NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-26-055

Recommendation

TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: Work with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator to convene an independent panel to conduct a comprehensive review of the safety culture within the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO), and use the findings to enhance the ATO’s existing safety management system and integrate it into all levels of the organization.

Safety Issue and Context

This report discusses the January 29, 2025, midair collision involving a Sikorsky UH-60L helicopter, operated by the US Army under the callsign PAT25, and a Mitsubishi Heavy Industries RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700) airplane, N709PS, operated by PSA Airlines as flight 5342, over the Potomac River in southwest Washington, DC, about 0.5 miles southeast of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia. The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers on board the airplane and all 3 crewmembers on board the helicopter died. Both aircraft were destroyed as a result of the accident. Safety issues discussed in this report include:

• helicopter route design surrounding DCA;

• the extensive use of pilot-applied visual separation and the inherent limitations of see-and-avoid, including when using night vision goggles;

• unclear and inconsistent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidance on helicopter route altitudes and boundaries and operators’ misinterpretation of those altitudes;

• limitations and gaps in the traffic awareness, alerting, and collision-avoidance technologies available to both aircraft;

• risks associated with separate helicopter and airplane radio frequencies and blocked transmissions;

• controller workload, position-combining, and communication practices;

• deficiencies in FAA safety culture, facility-level oversight, and postaccident drug- and alcohol-testing procedures; and

• shortcomings in FAA and US Army safety assurance and risk management processes, including lack of proactive data sharing and safety analysis to identify and mitigate midair collision risk in complex terminal environments.

As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes 33 recommendations to the FAA, 8 recommendations to the US Army, 5 recommendations to the Department of War Policy Board on Federal Aviation, 2 recommendations to the Department of Transportation (DOT), 1 recommendation to the DOT Office of the Inspector General, and 1 recommendation to the RTCA.

Response History

July 9, 2026 · NTSB Correspondence · DOT

We note that you are requesting that the DOT Office of Inspector General (OIG) complete the review recommended in Safety Recommendation A-26-55. We believe the OIG is sufficiently independent to conduct an unbiased review of the safety culture within the FAA’s ATO. We also believe this work will complement the OIG’s ongoing efforts related to Safety Recommendation A-26-56, which asks the OIG to audit the FAA ATO safety management system functions and data-sharing activities at all air traffic control facilities.

Pending future updates and completion of the recommended actions, the Board has voted to classify Safety Recommendation A-26-55 OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

July 6, 2026 · NTSB Correspondence · DOT

Please update us when the audit is complete.

July 1, 2026 · Recipient Response · DOT

The DOT OIG is launching its new audit engagement in response to Secretary Duffy's request to address this recommendation. Please see the DOT OIG announcement letter released yesterday. https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/47306

-From Marshall E. Jackson, Assistant Inspector General for Aviation Audits to Director, Audit and Evaluation: Subject: INFORMATION: Audit Announcement FAA Air Traffic Organization’s Safety Management System and Organizational Culture Project No. 26A3005A000 Federal Aviation Administration

On January 29, 2025, a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter collided with American Airlines flight 5342, operated by PSA Airlines, while the airliner was on approach to land at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). Tragically, all 67 individuals aboard both aircraft lost their lives. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigated the collision and identified gaps in the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Air Traffic Organization’s (ATO) application of its Safety Management System (SMS).

Read Recommendation

Recommendation Facts

Status
Open - Acceptable Response
Issued
February 17, 2026
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
DOT
Related Investigation
DCA25MA108
Related Report
AIR-26-02

According to NTSB, although FAA’s policy required each organization to establish and maintain the four components of SMS—safety policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion—the ATO did not identify and mitigate known risks in the DCA airspace nor effectively coordinate safety assurance and risk management activities with external stakeholders. In their report, NTSB concluded that deficiencies in ATO’s organizational safety culture also contributed to the accident. Footnote: NTSB Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02, January 27, 2026.

As a result of the investigation, NTSB recommended that we complete an audit of ATO’s SMS functions and data sharing activities at all air traffic control facilities and determine whether ATO conducts these activities in collaboration with all relevant external stakeholders. NTSB also recommended that the Department convene an independent panel and conduct a comprehensive review of ATO’s safety culture. To address this recommendation, the Secretary of Transportation requested we complete an independent review.

Given these requests and the importance of an effective SMS to maintain the safety of the National Airspace System, we are initiating this audit. Accordingly, our objectives are to assess ATO’s (1) SMS functions across air traffic control facilities and (2) organizational safety culture.

We plan to begin the audit in the coming weeks and will contact your audit liaison to schedule an entrance conference. We will conduct our work at FAA Headquarters in Washington, DC, and select air traffic control facilities across the United States. Please contact me or Brian Frist, Program Director, if you have any questions.

cc: DOT Audit Liaison, M-1 FAA Audit Liaison, AAE-001

May 14, 2026 · Recipient Response · DOT

-From Sean P. Duffy, Secretary of Transportation: DOT remains firmly committed to aviation safety. In response to recommendation A-26-55, the Office of the Secretary of Transportation is requesting that the DOT Office of Inspector General (OIG) complete the independent, comprehensive review of ATO's safety culture. 010 possesses the subject matter expertise and necessary independence to carry out the review to address recommendation A-26-55, and the engagement will complement the work OIG will be undertaking to address NTSB recommendation A-26-56 to audit the ATO safety management system functions and data sharing activities.

DOT will stay in close coordination with NTSB regarding my request to DOT OIG for its assistance to address recommendation A-26-55. Please contact Juli Huynh, Director of Policy Coordination and Development.

February 17, 2026 · NTSB Correspondence · DOT

This letter provides information about the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) January 27, 2026, report: Midair Collision Over the Potomac River, PSA Airlines Flight 5342, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries RJ Aviation CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700), and US Army Priority Air Transport Flight 25, Sikorsky UH-60L, (NTSB/AIR-26-02). The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues:

• the helicopter route design surrounding DCA;

• the extensive use of pilot-applied visual separation and the inherent limitations of see-and-avoid, including when using night vision goggles;

• unclear and inconsistent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidance on helicopter route altitudes and boundaries and operators’ misinterpretation of those altitudes;

• limitations and gaps in the traffic awareness, alerting, and collision-avoidance technologies available to both aircraft;

• risks associated with separate helicopter and airplane radio frequencies and blocked transmissions;

• controller workload, position-combining, and communication practices;

• deficiencies in FAA safety culture, facility-level oversight, and postaccident drug- and alcohol-testing procedures; and

• shortcomings in FAA and US Army safety assurance and risk management processes, including lack of proactive data sharing and safety analysis to identify and mitigate midair collision risk in complex terminal environments.

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendations to the Department of Transportation. Additional information regarding these recommendations can be found in the noted sections of the report.

• Require the Federal Aviation Administration to demonstrate at least annually that each air traffic control facility it operates has the routine capability to accomplish required postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing within the US Department of Transportation’s specified timeframes of 2 hours for alcohol and 4 hours for drugs, and implement a process to ensure that any facility without such capability will demonstrate timely remediation. (A-26-54) (See Section 2.3.5)

• Work with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator to convene an independent panel to conduct a comprehensive review of the safety culture within the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO), and use the findings to enhance the ATO’s existing safety management system and integrate it into all levels of the organization. (A-26-55) (See Section 2.6.3)

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (Safety Recommendations A-26-54 and -55). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

From Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02 "Midair Collision over the Potomac River PSA Airlines Flight 5342, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) RJ Aviation CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700), and US Army Priority Air Transport Flight 25, Sikorsky UH-60L, Washington, DC January 29, 2025":

1.13.5.1.2 FAA ATO Safety Culture

FAA AC 120-92D—though directed to entities required to implement an SMS under 14 CFR Part 5 and not binding on the ATO—offers a detailed explanation of how the agency conceptualizes a positive safety culture. The circular stated that:

The culture of an organization is demonstrated through the organization’s values, traits, and behaviors. The term “safety culture” is used to describe those aspects of the organization’s culture relating to its safety performance. An organization that has a positive safety culture embraces open communication and continuous improvement. Management’s consistent attention, commitment, involvement, and visible leadership are essential in guiding an organization toward a positive safety culture. A positive safety culture matures as safety management skills are learned, practiced, and become second nature across the entire organization. (FAA, 2024b)

The AC then described the following practices and characteristics that fostered a positive safety culture within an organization:

Open reporting: An organization’s policies and processes should foster open reporting, encourage the disclosure of error without fear of reprisal (as long as the reported issue was not the result of intentional misconduct or gross negligence), and demand accountability on the part of both employees and management.

Just culture: A just culture can be defined as a values-centered model of shared accountability that involves personnel at all levels of an organization, the effective use of relevant information to inform decision making, vigilance in identifying risks, flexibility in making changes necessary to reduce risk, learning from failures and process and performance data, and a code of ethics that requires honesty, integrity, and safety at the core of all decisions.

Management involvement: Effective safety management is accomplished by individuals who “own” the processes in which risk resides. Safety cultures cannot be “created” or “implemented” by management decree, no matter how sincere their intentions. An organization’s safety culture is embodied in the way the organization and its members approach safety in their jobs. If positive aspects of culture are to emerge, the organization’s senior management must set up the policies and processes that create a working environment that fosters safe behavior, and they should lead by example.

FAA Order 8000.369C, which provided guidance regarding the FAA’s internal SMSs, stated:

All levels of management must actively promote and provide leadership to foster a positive safety culture. A safety culture consists of the shared values, actions, and behaviors that demonstrate a commitment to safety over competing goals and demands. In the desired safety culture, people acknowledge their accountability and act on their individual responsibility for safety. They trust, use, and rely on the organization’s processes for managing safety. Individuals report/raise safety issues without fear of reprisal, supporting the implementation of a non-punitive safety reporting system.

Decision makers promote continual safety improvement through timely action, when appropriate, and provide feedback to the reporters. There is good communication in the organization, and personnel continue to learn and develop through training and coaching. The ways in which an organization works to improve its safety culture are best determined by the organization’s management.

During the NTSB’s investigative hearing, the FAA ATO’s acting deputy COO was asked to describe a positive safety culture. He stated that:

A positive safety culture would be non-punitive, educational, continuous learning from systemic issues. When a safety event occurs, we should learn from it as a whole national aerospace system…But ultimately, a healthy safety culture is one where employees don’t feel like there’s punitive measures, that they can feel free to come up and report safety issues to management…and then collectively, we work on improving safety system together as safety professionals.

When asked how expectations for safety management were communicated throughout the ATO, the acting deputy COO stated that they conducte