TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: Require the Federal Aviation Administration to demonstrate at least annually that each air traffic control facility it operates has the routine capability to accomplish required postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing within the US Department of Transportation’s specified timeframes of 2 hours for alcohol and 4 hours for drugs, and implement a process to ensure that any facility without such capability will demonstrate timely remediation.
Safety Issue and Context
This report discusses the January 29, 2025, midair collision involving a Sikorsky UH-60L helicopter, operated by the US Army under the callsign PAT25, and a Mitsubishi Heavy Industries RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700) airplane, N709PS, operated by PSA Airlines as flight 5342, over the Potomac River in southwest Washington, DC, about 0.5 miles southeast of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia. The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers on board the airplane and all 3 crewmembers on board the helicopter died. Both aircraft were destroyed as a result of the accident. Safety issues discussed in this report include:
• helicopter route design surrounding DCA;
• the extensive use of pilot-applied visual separation and the inherent limitations of see-and-avoid, including when using night vision goggles;
• unclear and inconsistent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidance on helicopter route altitudes and boundaries and operators’ misinterpretation of those altitudes;
• limitations and gaps in the traffic awareness, alerting, and collision-avoidance technologies available to both aircraft;
• risks associated with separate helicopter and airplane radio frequencies and blocked transmissions;
• controller workload, position-combining, and communication practices;
• deficiencies in FAA safety culture, facility-level oversight, and postaccident drug- and alcohol-testing procedures; and
• shortcomings in FAA and US Army safety assurance and risk management processes, including lack of proactive data sharing and safety analysis to identify and mitigate midair collision risk in complex terminal environments.
As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes 33 recommendations to the FAA, 8 recommendations to the US Army, 5 recommendations to the Department of War Policy Board on Federal Aviation, 2 recommendations to the Department of Transportation (DOT), 1 recommendation to the DOT Office of the Inspector General, and 1 recommendation to the RTCA.
Response History
July 9, 2026 · NTSB Correspondence · DOT
We believe your planned annual reviews and commitment to establishing a remediation process are responsive at this stage. However, in addition to reviewing specific testing events, we point out that satisfying this recommendation requires demonstrating the routine, baseline capability of each facility. Pending our review of more detailed information about how the DOT’s reviews and remediation will be performed and completion of the recommended actions, the Board has voted to classify Safety Recommendation A-26-54 OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.
May 14, 2026 · Recipient Response · DOT
-From Sean P. Duffy, Secretary of Transportation: DOT remains firmly committed to aviation safety. In response to recommendation A-26-54, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration (OST-M) will work with the Federal Aviation Administration to address A-26-54. OST-M will conduct an annual review of post-accident and post-incident testing to ensure all facilities can respond to incidents within the required timeframes set forth in DOT Order 391 O. ID and will develop a process to remediate instances when a facility cannot do so.
Footnote: https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2020-08/DOT-ORDER-39 I 0.1D-01-30-2018.pdf OST-M will initiate the first of these annual reviews in calendar year 2026.
DOT requests that safety recommendations A-26-54 be classified as open-acceptable response. DOT will keep the Board informed of its progress on Safety Recommendation A-26-54, and anticipates providing an update within the next 12 months.
February 17, 2026 · NTSB Correspondence · DOT
This letter provides information about the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) January 27, 2026, report: Midair Collision Over the Potomac River, PSA Airlines Flight 5342, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries RJ Aviation CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700), and US Army Priority Air Transport Flight 25, Sikorsky UH-60L, (NTSB/AIR-26-02). The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at
As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues:
• the helicopter route design surrounding DCA;
• the extensive use of pilot-applied visual separation and the inherent limitations of see-and-avoid, including when using night vision goggles;
• unclear and inconsistent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidance on helicopter route altitudes and boundaries and operators’ misinterpretation of those altitudes;
• limitations and gaps in the traffic awareness, alerting, and collision-avoidance technologies available to both aircraft;
• risks associated with separate helicopter and airplane radio frequencies and blocked transmissions;
• controller workload, position-combining, and communication practices;
• deficiencies in FAA safety culture, facility-level oversight, and postaccident drug- and alcohol-testing procedures; and
• shortcomings in FAA and US Army safety assurance and risk management processes, including lack of proactive data sharing and safety analysis to identify and mitigate midair collision risk in complex terminal environments.
Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendations to the Department of Transportation. Additional information regarding these recommendations can be found in the noted sections of the report.
• Require the Federal Aviation Administration to demonstrate at least annually that each air traffic control facility it operates has the routine capability to accomplish required postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing within the US Department of Transportation’s specified timeframes of 2 hours for alcohol and 4 hours for drugs, and implement a process to ensure that any facility without such capability will demonstrate timely remediation. (A-26-54) (See Section 2.3.5)
• Work with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator to convene an independent panel to conduct a comprehensive review of the safety culture within the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO), and use the findings to enhance the ATO’s existing safety management system and integrate it into all levels of the organization. (A-26-55) (See Section 2.6.3)
The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (Safety Recommendations A-26-54 and -55). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.
From Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02 "Midair Collision over the Potomac River PSA Airlines Flight 5342, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) RJ Aviation CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700), and US Army Priority Air Transport Flight 25, Sikorsky UH-60L, Washington, DC January 29, 2025":
1.10.3 Controllers
1.10.3.1 Local Control Controller
The LC controller’s last ATC specialist medical clearance examination before the accident was August 15, 2024. At that time, he also was applying for second-class pilot medical certification. He reported no medication use and no active medical conditions. He received ATC specialist medical clearance, with a limitation that he must possess vision corrective lenses to meet the ATC Specialist Health Program standards and use those lenses as appropriate for ATC duties. He also was issued a second-class pilot medical certificate. His Department of Transportation (DOT) workplace postaccident urine drug testing was negative, as discussed in section 1.10.4.3.
1.10.3.2 Assistant Local Control Controller
The ALC controller’s last ATC specialist medical clearance examination before the accident was April 11, 2024. At that time, she reported no medication use and no active medical conditions. She received ATC specialist medical clearance without limitation. Her DOT workplace postaccident urine drug testing was negative, as discussed in section 1.10.4.3.
1.10.3.3 Operations Supervisor
The OS’s last ATC specialist medical clearance examination before the accident was February 8, 2024. At that time, he reported no medication use and no active medical conditions. He received ATC specialist medical clearance, with a limitation that he must possess vision corrective lenses to meet the ATC Specialist Health Program standards and use those lenses as appropriate for ATC duties. His DOT workplace postaccident urine drug testing was negative, as discussed in section 1.10.4.3.
1.10.4 Controller Postaccident Drug and Alcohol Testing
1.10.4.1 Testing Requirements
As the FAA is part of the DOT, FAA-employed air traffic controllers are subject to federal workplace drug and alcohol testing requirements for DOT employees as outlined in DOT Order 3910.1D, “Drug and Alcohol-Free Departmental Workplace Program.” According to the order, controllers must undergo postaccident drug and alcohol testing as soon as possible after a fatal accident if their performance at or about the time of the accident provides reason to believe that such performance may have contributed to the accident or if their job performance cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident.
In addition to accidents involving fatalities, accidents and incidents involving a need for medical treatment away from the accident site, substantial damage to aircraft or other vehicles/property, or other specifically defined unsafe practices trigger required postaccident or postincident drug and alcohol testing.
DOT Order 3910.1D states that, whenever possible, required postaccident drug testing must be completed within 4 hours after the accident and alcohol testing within 2 hours after the accident; however, the order allows for drug testing up to 5 days after the accident and alcohol testing up to 8 hours after the accident. Footnote: DOT Order 3910.1D, chapter III, paragraphs 6.i(6) and 6.i(7). A controller who may be subject to postaccident testing, but who has not yet been tested, must remain available for testing and may not use alcohol for 8 hours following the accident.
The order also specifies requirements for FAA reporting of postaccident testing information, including notification timeline and reasons why any testing did not occur within required timeframes, to the DOT Departmental Drug Office.
1.10.4.2 Testing Determination Process and Implementation
FAA Order JO 1030.3B, “Initial Event Response,” specifies Air Traffic Organization (ATO) procedures and responsibilities for notification and response to accidents and other significant events (FAA, 2014a). According to the order, a drug and alcohol testing determination review should normally be held concurrently with a services rendered telephone conference (SRT). Footnote: An SRT is a management review to assess the ATO services associated with an event. The SRT is intended to give all participants a snapshot of the conditions surrounding the event, and for managers to be able to openly discuss critical operational information associated with the event.
An SRT is typically convened the “administrative da