TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Designate an alternative helicopter route that can be used to facilitate travel between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when that segment of Route 4 is closed. (Urgent)
Safety Issue and Context
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is providing the following information to urge the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to take immediate action on the safety recommendations in this report concerning the potential for midair collisions between traffic on helicopter Route 4 and airplanes landing on runway 33 or departing runway 15 at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA).
We identified these issues during our ongoing investigation of the midair collision involving a Sikorsky UH-60L and PSA Airlines flight 5342, an MHI (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700) that occurred over the Potomac River in southwest Washington, DC, on January 29, 2025.
Response History
September 14, 2026 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA
We note that, in collaboration with the Department of Defense, the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police, and medical helicopter operators, you have reviewed the helicopter operations within DCA’s airspace. Based on your findings, you have created special DCA helicopter supplement notices to highlight cautionary areas within the airspace for operators, as well as implemented the following helicopter zone and route changes:
• removed helicopter Routes 4 and 6
• created the new Broad Creek Transition
• made lateral and vertical adjustments to helicopter zones 3, 4, 7, and 12
• made lateral adjustments to helicopter zones 1, 2, and 5
We believe these changes will provide helicopters a designated path between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge via Route 1, Route 2, Route 3, the Broad Creek Transition, and then back to Route 3. We also believe this will keep helicopters clear of arriving and departing traffic on runways 01/19 and 33/15, primarily through vertical separation of 1,000 feet or more.
Following your May 13 letter, our staff met with FAA staff on June 25, 2026, to discuss the safety risk management process behind the Broad Creek Transition and how stakeholder concerns were addressed.
FAA staff provided supporting documentation showing the FAA carried out a safety risk management process, including directly engaging with affected stakeholders, when developing the new route. We recognize that achieving the added separation required some reduction in helicopter operators’ areas of operation and routes.
These actions satisfy the intent of Safety Recommendation A-25-2. Accordingly, the Board has voted to classify the recommendation Closed—Acceptable Action.
May 13, 2026 · Recipient Response · FAA
-From Bryan Bedford, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) convened a collaborative work group to: 1) facilitate stakeholder engagement meetings with the Department of Defense, the D.C. Metropolitan Police, and medical helicopter operators; and 2) participate in Congressional and community engagement events to address and implement this recommendation.
After an in-depth review of the helicopter operations within DCA’s airspace, including the Special Flight Rules Area and the Flight Restricted Zone, we shared the progress of updating the DCA helicopter charts on June 12, 2025. Our statement can be found at:
Furthermore, FAA created Special DCA Helicopter Supplement Notices to highlight cautionary areas within the airspace for operators and implemented the following helicopter zone and route changes:
• Removal of helicopter routes 4 and 6
• Creation of the new Broad Creek Transition
• Lateral and vertical adjustments to helicopter zones 3, 4, 7, and 12
• Lateral adjustments to helicopter zones 1, 2, and 5
I believe FAA has effectively addressed the intent of Safety Recommendation A-25-2 and consider our actions complete.
February 17, 2026 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA
From the Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02, “Midair Collision over the Potomac River PSA Airlines Flight 5342, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) RJ Aviation CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700), and US Army Priority Air Transport Flight 25, Sikorsky UH-60L Washington, DC January 29, 2025”
2.4 Helicopter Route Design and Information
Preliminary investigative findings of this accident revealed that, when flown at the recommended maximum altitude of 200 ft, a helicopter operating over the eastern shoreline of the Potomac River on Helicopter Route 4 would have about 75 ft of vertical separation from an airplane approaching runway 33. This vertical separation decreases the farther west of the shoreline the helicopter is flown, or if the airplane is operating below the 3° visual glidepath provided by the runway 33 PAPI.
In an urgent safety recommendation report published on March 11, 2025, the NTSB concluded that the separation distances between helicopter traffic operating on Route 4 and aircraft landing on runway 33 that existed at the time of the accident were insufficient and posed an intolerable risk to aviation safety by increasing the chances of a midair collision. The NTSB also concluded that it was critical for public safety helicopter operators to have an alternate route available for operating in and around Washington, DC, without increasing controller workload.
As a result of our findings, we issued two urgent safety recommendations to the FAA. Urgent Safety Recommendation A-25-1 asked the FAA to prohibit operations on Helicopter Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when runways 15 and 33 were being used for departures and arrivals, respectively, at DCA. Urgent Safety Recommendation A-25-2 asked the FAA to designate an alternative helicopter route that could be used to facilitate travel between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when that segment of Route 4 was closed.
Immediately following the accident, the FAA implemented temporary airspace restrictions around DCA. On March 14, 2025, the FAA removed from helicopter route charts the section of Helicopter Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge. Additionally, the FAA prohibited use of runways 15/33 and 4/22 at DCA during “specific, limited helicopter operations” in the vicinity of DCA. The NTSB responded that these actions exceeded the intent of Safety Recommendation A-25-1 and classified it Closed—Exceeds Recommended Action.
May 2, 2025 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA
You reported that you are collaborating with stakeholders to develop a new helicopter route that will connect the Wilson Bridge to the Anacostia River and support national security, law enforcement, and medical helicopter flight operations. We believe this work is responsive to Safety Recommendation A-25-2 and we look forward to reviewing additional details regarding the new route. Pending completion of the recommended action, the Board has voted to classify Safety Recommendation A-25-2 OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.
March 26, 2025 · Recipient Response · FAA
-From Christopher J. Rocheleau, Acting Administrator: Thank you for your March 11, 2025, letter regarding the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) report Deconflict Airplane and Helicopter Traffic in the Vicinity of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (NTSB/AIR-25-01) and the associated urgent safety recommendations A-25-1 and A-25-2.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) shares the NTSB's commitment to preventing accidents and saving lives. We have taken prompt action to address the safety issues identified in your report concerning the risk of midair collisions between helicopters on Route 4 and airplane traffic using runways 15 and 33 at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA).
Below is an outline of the FAA' s response to each recommendation, detailing the actions we have taken or intend to take to implement them fully. These actions align with the measures proposed and approved within the FAA's Air Traffic Organization (ATO) as documented in the attached Action Memorandum from Timothy L. Arel, Chief Operating Officer (COO), ATO, dated March 13, 2025.
This letter is our initial response to Safety Recommendations A-25-1 and -2. The Board issued these urgent safety recommendations as a result of the accident that occurred on January 29, 2025, at about 2048 Eastern Standard Time (EST), when a Sikorsky UH-60L, operated by the US Army under the callsign PAT25, and PSA Airlines flight 5342, an MHI RJ Aviation CL-600-2Cl0, N709PS, collided in flight about 0.5 nautical miles (nm) southeast of runway 33 at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia, and impacted the Potomac River in southwest Washington, DC.
The two pilots, two flight attendants, and 60 passengers aboard the airplane and all three crewmembers aboard the helicopter were fatally injured. Both aircraft were destroyed as a result of the accident. Flight 5342 was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 as a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport (ICT), Wichita, Kansas, to DCA, departing ICT at 1839 EST. PAT25 originated from Davison Army Airfield (DAA), Fort Belvoir, Virginia, at 1845 EST on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan for the pilot's annual standardization evaluation with the use of night vision goggles.
March 11, 2025 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA
The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the March 7, 2025, report Deconflict Airplane and Helicopter Traffic in the Vicinity of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport NTSB/AIR-25-01. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.
The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 30 days of the date of this letter detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (for example, A-25-1 and A-25-2). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.
This letter provides information about the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) March 7, 2025, report Deconflict Airplane and Helicopter Traffic in the Vicinity of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (NTSB/AIR-25-01). The details of this ongoing accident investigation and the resulting urgent safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.
As a result of the NTSB’s preliminary findings in this investigation, we identified the following safety issue:
• the risk of midair collisions between helicopters on Route 4 and airplane traffic using runways 15 and 33 at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.
Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following urgent safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration:
• Prohibit operations on Helicopter Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when runways 15 and 33 are being used for departures and arrivals, respectively, at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). (A-25-1) (Urgent)
In correspondence dated March 26, 2025, the FAA stated that it would collaborate with stakeholders to develop a new helicopter route connecting the Wilson Bridge to the Anacostia River and would provide updates on the alternative route designation process as it progresses. The NTSB stated that this planned work was responsive to Safety Recommendation A-25-2 and, pending its completion, the recommendation was classified Open—Acceptable Response.
FAA Order JO 7210.3DD listed criteria and procedures for the development and modification of helicopter route charts. One of the listed criteria was, “Care should be exercised to avoid recommending altitudes or flight ceilings/floors which would cause helicopters operating on a designated route to encounter inflight wake turbulence generated by large, fixed-wing traffic.” The order stated that Terminal Operations Service Area Directors were responsible for reviewing and approving new or revised helicopter route chart proposals and assuring that they complied with all prescribed criteria.
These directors were also responsible for conducting annual reviews of existing VFR helicopter route charts to determine their accuracy and continued utility; however, the FAA was unable to provide documentation of the required annual reviews for the Baltimore-Washington Helicopter Route Chart.
As of the date of this report, no information has been provided regarding annual reviews conducted, including criteria used if such reviews were conducted. The NTSB concludes that annual reviews of helicopter route charts as required by FAA Order 7210.3DD would have provided an opportunity to identify the risk posed by the proximity of Route 4 to the runway 33 approach path, but there is no evidence to support that these reviews were being performed at DCA. The NTSB is concerned that the lack of documentation of annual reviews for the Baltimore-Washington Helicopter Route Chart may be an indication that these annual reviews are not occurring at other locations throughout the NAS.
Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA ensure that annual reviews of helicopter route charts are being conducted throughout the NAS as required by FAA Order.
Although the FAA took immediate action following this accident to remove the portion of Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge, the NTSB remains concerned about the potential for other areas of conflict within this airspace. Following the accident, the FAA published a NAS Helicopter Operations Helicopter Route Analysis, which summarized the ATO’s safety analysis of domestic airports with charted helicopter routes. Using PDARS, TCAS events, and NMAC data, the FAA reviewed charted routes and high-traffic-volume areas for possible conflicts with traffic patterns and reviewed the descriptions for charted and agreement-established routes.
The analysis identified hazards in the airspace encompassing the routes and proposed actions to address priority concerns. This analysis, however, did not include DCA.
The NTSB reviewed PDARS data provided by the FAA regarding encounters between fixed-wing airplanes and helicopters operating on Routes 1 or 4 from January 2018 to February 2025. During this time, there were 4,067 encounters (65.6 encounters per month) in which separation was less than or equal to 1,000 ft and 348 encounters (5.6 encounters per month) in which separation was less than or equal to 500 ft.
A heat map depicting the frequency of these events showed several areas where encounters between helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft were concentrated, including the area of the accident site, as well as north of DCA, consistent with encounters with aircraft on approach to runway 19, and south of DCA, consistent with encounters with aircraft on approach to runway 1.
In unofficial correspondence dated January 16, 2026, the FAA reported that it had conducted an in-depth analysis of the helicopter operations within DCA's airspace and made additional changes to the Baltimore-Washington Helicopter Route Chart. As of the date of this report, that analysis has not been provided to the NTSB. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA conduct an SRM process to evaluate whether modifications to the remaining helicopter route structure in the vicinity of DCA are necessary to safely deconflict helicopter and fixed-wing traffic and provide the results to the NTSB.
In addition, the NTSB recommends that the FAA amend their helicopter route design criteria and approval process to ensure that current and future route designs or design changes provide vertical separation from airport approach and departure paths. Once the criteria and approval process referenced in Safety Recommendation A-26-26 are developed and implemented, review all existing helicopter routes to ensure alignment with these updated criteria.
According to testimony provided by personnel from the FAA’s Aeronautical Information Services office during the NTSB’s investigative hearing, the routes depicted on a helicopter chart do not have lateral limitations unless explicitly outlined on the chart’s route description. The routes were described as “recommended paths” that served to streamline traffic flow and facilitate easier communication between pilots and controllers regarding expected flight paths, reporting points, and area ingress and egress locations. According to the FAA, helicopter routes were not specifically designed to provide separation between helicopters and fixed-wing traffic.
Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area of DCA at the time of the accident.
The FAA will collaborate with stakeholders to develop a new helicopter route that supports national security, law enforcement, and medical helicopter flight operations. Once published, this route, connecting the Wilson Bridge to the Anacostia River, will enhance efficiency for critical missions while maintaining the highest safety standards.
The FAA has acted decisively to implement recommendations A-25-1 and A-25-2 and has enhanced these efforts with additional safety measures. We will provide updates on the alternative route designation process as it progresses.
Attachments:
Action Memorandum to the AOA from Timothy L. Arel, COO, ATO, dated March 13, 2025
FAA Helicopter Route Chart (Revisions)
• Designate an alternative helicopter route that can be used to facilitate travel between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when that segment of Route 4 is closed. (A-25-2) (Urgent)
The NTSB is vitally interested in these urgent recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 30 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these urgent recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (Safety Recommendations A 25 1 and A 25 2). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents.
Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.
From the Aviation Investigation Report AIR-25-01 "Deconflict Airplane and Helicopter Traffic in the Vicinity of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport" regarding the accident on January 29, 2025 and report published on March 11, 2025.
Introduction
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is providing the following information to urge the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to take immediate action on the safety recommendations in this report concerning the potential for midair collisions between traffic on helicopter Route 4 and airplanes landing on runway 33 or departing runway 15 at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA).
We identified this issue during our ongoing investigation of the midair collision involving a US Army Sikorsky UH-60L and PSA Airlines flight 5342, a Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700) that occurred over the Potomac River in southwest Washington, DC, on January 29, 2025.
Background and Analysis
On January 29, 2025, about 2048 eastern standard time (EST), a Sikorsky UH 60L, operated by the US Army under the callsign PAT25, and PSA Airlines flight 5342, an MHI RJ Aviation CL-600-2C10, N709PS, collided in flight about 0.5 nautical miles (nm) southeast of runway 33 at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia, and impacted the Potomac River in southwest Washington, DC.
The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers aboard the airplane and all 3 crewmembers aboard the helicopter were fatally injured. Both aircraft were destroyed as a result of the accident. Flight 5342 was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 as a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport (ICT), Wichita, Kansas, to DCA, departing ICT at 1839 EST. PAT25 originated from Davison Army Airfield (DAA), Fort Belvoir, Virginia, at 1845 EST on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan for the pilot’s annual standardization evaluation with the use of night vision goggles.
Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area of DCA at the time of the accident.
Preliminary air traffic control (ATC) information provided by the FAA revealed that, at 2033:41, PAT25 was about 15 nautical miles (nm) northwest of DCA and requested helicopter Route 1 to Route 4 to DAA. The DCA local controller approved this request.
At 2043:06, when the airplane was about 10.5 nm south of the airport, flight 5342 contacted DCA tower and checked in on the Mount Vernon visual approach to runway 1. The controller asked the crew of flight 5342 if they could accept runway 33 for landing, and the flight crew accepted. At this time, PAT25 was traveling south along the Potomac River and flight 5342 was traveling north.
At 2046:01, the controller advised PAT25 that traffic just south of the Wilson Bridge was a CRJ (flight 5342) at 1,200 ft circling to runway 33. PAT25 confirmed 7 seconds later that they had the traffic in sight and requested visual separation, which the controller approved. About this time, PAT25 was crossing the Tidal Basin and continuing southbound. The controller cleared other jet traffic on runway 1 for departure with no delay at 2046:47.
At 2047:39, with the helicopter south of Hains Point (located at the confluence of the Potomac and Anacostia rivers and a “noncompulsory” reporting point, as indicated on the Baltimore-Washington Helicopter Route Chart), the controller asked the crew of PAT25 to confirm that they had the CRJ in sight. An aural conflict alert in the tower can be heard in the background of the ATC recording at this time. About 4 seconds later, the controller instructed PAT25 to pass behind the CRJ; PAT25 immediately confirmed that the traffic was in sight and again requested visual separation, which the controller approved.
The collision occurred at 2047:59, at an altitude about 300 ft, while flight 5342 was on final approach to land on runway 33 (see figure 1).
DCA is equipped with three runways: runway 1/19, runway 15/33, and runway 4/22. In general, when DCA is conducting north operations (as was the case when the collision occurred), traffic lands and departs on runway 1 with intermittent arrivals to runway 33 based on traffic demands and separation requirements. Conducting northbound operations with simultaneous operations to runways 1 and 33 is a routine ATC procedure in compliance with FAA Order 7110.65BB. Use of runway 33 is typically limited to smaller aircraft, which are able to land on its relatively shorter surface.
Runway 33 is equipped with a four-light precision approach path indicator (PAPI) that uses light cues to provide a 3° glidepath indication to pilots of approaching aircraft. The PAPI was operational at the time of the accident.
PAT25’s VFR flight plan entailed transiting Washington, DC, airspace following standard helico