NTSB · Safety Recommendation
Safety Recommendation A-24-030
Recommendation
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: If you determine the Collins Aerospace SVO 730 rudder rollout guidance actuators with incorrectly assembled bearings should be removed, notify international regulators that oversee operators of Boeing 737 airplanes about the safety issues involving the SVO-730 rudder rollout guidance actuator and encourage them to require the removal of actuators with incorrectly assembled bearings from 737NG and 737MAX airplanes until an acceptable replacement actuator becomes available for installation. (Urgent)
Safety Issue and Context
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is providing the following information to urge The Boeing Company and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to take immediate action on the safety recommendations in this report concerning the potential for a jammed or restricted rudder control system on certain Boeing 737 airplanes. We identified these issues during our ongoing investigation of the rudder pedal anomaly involving a Boeing 737-8, N47280, while landing at Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey, on February 6, 2024.
On the basis of the results of postincident testing conducted in July 2024 and information from Boeing and Collins Aerospace, the NTSB is concerned that Boeing’s mitigation to overcome a jammed or restricted rudder control system during landing could also result in a large input to the rudder pedals and a sudden, large and undesired rudder deflection sufficient to cause loss of control or departure from the runway.
A jammed or restricted rudder scenario could become even more concerning if a high crosswind or an engine-out condition were simultaneously occurring with a jammed or restricted rudder, not only because the amount of rudder available to respond to these conditions might be insufficient to maintain control of the airplane if the jam is not cleared—but also because excessive rudder input may result if the jam is cleared by responding with Boeing’s mitigation. As a result, the NTSB is issuing two urgent safety recommendations to The Boeing Company and two urgent safety recommendations to the FAA.
Response History
March 30, 2026 · Recipient Response · FAA
The FAA continues to support the NTSB's ongoing investigation. The FAA will evaluate any new information and determine if additional actions are necessary.
June 17, 2025 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA
We understand that the FAA corrective action review board (CARB) reviewed available technical data and performed a safety risk analysis. The CARB concluded that this safety issue does not warrant short-term mandatory action at this time. We also note that, on October 7, 2024, the FAA published the following documents: • Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 24006, Potential for Jammed or Restricted Rudder on Boeing Model 737 Series Airplanes Equipped with Optional Collins Aerospace SVO-730 RRGA, which is intended to raise operator and flight crew awareness about this safety issue.
• Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community (CANIC), which notified international regulators that oversee operators of affected Boeing 737 airplanes about this safety issue.
Additionally, the FAA said it is reviewing data from a simulator evaluation that Boeing conducted on October 10, 2024, along with any new data that might be discovered during our ongoing investigation, to determine if mandatory actions are warranted.
On May 8, 2025, FAA staff informed NTSB staff that the CARB had reviewed the data from the October 2024 simulator evaluation and, as a result, the FAA did not intend to conduct any additional reviews. However, we remain concerned about this safety issue, which is also the subject of one of our open investigations. Because we are still reviewing information to determine if the FAA has sufficiently addressed these recommendations, we will reevaluate the FAA’s actions and classify these recommendations in our final report. In the meantime, the Board has voted to keep Safety Recommendations A-24-29 and -30 classified OPEN-- INITIAL RESPONSE RECEIVED.