The attached letter from the NTSB Chair provides information about the Collision with Powerlines and Terrain during Forced Landing MARPAT Aviation Bell Helicopter UH-1B, N98F Amherstdale, West Virginia June 22, 2022. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.
The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (for example, A-24-20 through -25). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.
This letter provides information about the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) August 14, 2024, report Collision with Powerlines and Terrain during Forced Landing MARPAT Aviation Bell Helicopter UH-1B, N98F (NTSB/AIR-24-04). The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.
As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues:
• the need to review all experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates issued to turbine-powered rotorcraft.
• the need for periodic reviews for experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates.
• the need for recurrent inspections of aircraft equipped with Ozark Aeroworks T53-series engines.
• the need for operators of experimental exhibition aircraft to submit a list all events at which the aircraft will be exhibited.
• the need for a method to ensure that operators of experimental exhibition aircraft meet their annual obligation to submit program letters.
• the need for inspector guidance that requires routine surveillance of operators of aircraft with experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates.
Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Additional information regarding these recommendations can be found in the noted sections of the report.
• Review all experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates issued to turbine-powered rotorcraft and ensure that their operating limitations meet the standards of the latest iteration of Federal Aviation Administration Order 8130.2, Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft. (A 24 20) (See section 2.4.)
• Establish periodic reviews for experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates to ensure that those aircraft are being inspected and maintained according to the latest iteration of Federal Aviation Administration Order 8130.2, Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft. (A-24-21) (See section 2.4.)
• Require operators of aircraft equipped with Ozark Aeroworks T53-series engines to perform recurrent inspections of the rear bearing cover and the exhaust diffuser inner cone and inner struts with the exhaust diffuser cover removed. (A-24-22)
(See section 2.5.)
• Remind operators of experimental exhibition aircraft about the requirement to submit, to the appropriate flight standards district office, program letters that list all events at which the aircraft will be exhibited. (A-24-23) (See section 2.6)
• Develop a method for ensuring that operators of experimental exhibition aircraft meet their annual obligation to submit program letters; such a method could include potential penalties for operators that do not meet this obligation. (A 24-24) (See section 2.6)
• Revise Federal Aviation Administration Order 8900.1, Flight Standards Information Management System, to include inspector guidance requiring routine surveillance of operators of aircraft with experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates. (A 24 25) (See section 2.6)
In addition, the NTSB reiterates the following recommendation to the FAA:
Develop national safety standards, or equivalent regulations, for revenue passenger-carrying operations that are currently conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, including, but not limited to, sightseeing flights conducted in a hot air balloon, intentional parachute jump flights, and living history flight experience and other vintage aircraft flights. These standards, or equivalent regulations, should include, at a minimum for each operation type, requirements for initial and recurrent training and maintenance and management policies and procedures. (A-21-9)
The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (Safety Recommendations A-24-20 through -25 and reiterated Safety Recommendation A-21-9.) We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents.
Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.
Aviation Investigation Report AIR-24-04 Collision with Powerlines and Terrain during Forced Landing MARPAT Aviation Bell Helicopter UH-1B, N98F Amherstdale, West Virginia June 22, 2022 report published on August 27, 2024:
Operator Management of Certificate and Federal Aviation Administration Oversight of Certificate
As part of the operating limitations for the helicopter’s latest experimental airworthiness certificate, the FAA required MARPAT Aviation to provide an annual program letter that described the events planned for the helicopter. The FAA stated that it considered that information when scheduling surveillance activities for the operator and the aircraft.
The MARPAT Aviation owner did not provide a program letter notifying the FAA about any of the reunion flights; the owner incorrectly assumed that he did not need to provide such notification because the flights would be conducted at the operator’s home base. The MARPAT Aviation owner should have been aware of the requirement to provide program letters to the Charleston FSDO because paragraph No. 4 in the helicopter’s most recent operating limitations addressed the program letters; the owner signed a statement in December 2014 acknowledging that he read and understood the operating limitations for the helicopter’s experimental airworthiness certificate.
Because MARPAT Aviation did not provide a program letter to the FAA about the operation of the accident helicopter at annual Huey reunion events, the Charleston FSDO was unaware that the operator was flying the helicopter at those events. It is important to note that the Charleston FSDO was also unaware of these helicopter flights because the FSDO had not performed routine surveillance of the operator (separate from its Part 145 repair station certificate) before the accident.
The NTSB concludes that program letters are a necessary tool to facilitate FAA surveillance of experimental exhibition aircraft, and operators of such aircraft need to provide those letters to comply with the aircraft’s operating limitations. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA remind operators of experimental exhibition aircraft about the requirement to submit, to the appropriate FSDO, program letters that list all events at which the aircraft will be exhibited. The NTSB also recommends that the FAA deve