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NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-24-022

Recommendation

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require operators of aircraft equipped with Ozark Aeroworks T53 series engines to perform recurrent inspections of the rear bearing cover and the exhaust diffuser inner cone and inner struts with the exhaust diffuser cover removed.

Safety Issue and Context

This report discusses the June 22, 2022, accident that occurred during an event at which attendees could pay to fly or ride in a former military turbine-powered UH-1B helicopter. About 15 minutes after the flight departed, the pilot attempted a forced landing, but the helicopter impacted two powerlines and a rock face about 3.5 nautical miles east of the airport. The helicopter came to rest partially inverted on its right side on an asphalt road, and a postcrash fire ensued.

Postaccident examination of the helicopter engine found static damage in the compressor section; rotational damage in the gas-producer turbine; and additional damage to the exhaust diffuser, rear bearing cover, No. 2 bearing, and two power turbine blades. Safety issues discussed in this report include the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) inspection requirements for the UH-1B and other former military turbine powered aircraft, the operator’s maintenance of the accident helicopter, the operator’s management of the helicopter’s experimental airworthiness certificate, and the FAA’s oversight of the certificate.

As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board issues six new safety recommendations to the FAA and reiterates one recommendation to the FAA.

Response History

August 19, 2026 · Recipient Response · FAA

-Bryan Bedford, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has completed a thorough review of 14 CFR Parts 21, 43, and 91, in conjunction with the following FAA publications:

• FAA Order 1800.56Z, National Flight Standards Work Program Guidelines (NPG)

• FAA Order 8130.2L, Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft

• FAA Order 8900.1A, Flight Standards Information Management System (as it relates to these recommendations)

Because 14 CFR Parts 21, 43, and 91 are deemed minimum standards, we do not believe modifications are currently necessary. However, to enhance the operating limitations, provide more precise guidance on those limitations, and ensure more frequent surveillance of experimental aircraft requirements, FAA Orders 1800.56Z and 8130.2L were revised on September 22, 2025, and January 30, 2026, respectively.

You can access FAA Order 1800.56Z at the following website:

https://drs.faa.gov/browse/excelExternalWindow/DRSDOCID124612913420250923145317.0001

Read Recommendation

Recommendation Facts

Status
Open - Acceptable Response
Issued
August 27, 2024
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
FAA
Adopted
August 14, 2024
Related Investigation
ERA22FA279
Related Report
AIR-24-04

You can access FAA Order 8130.2L at the following website:

https://drs.faa.gov/browse/excelExternalWindow/DRSDOCID123181914520260202165959.0001

Although we determined FAA Order 8900.1A did not need to be modified due to this event, this order is periodically revised and includes essential aircraft surveillance and inspection guidelines outlined in the relevant volume, chapter, and sections.

I believe the FAA has effectively addressed Safety Recommendations A-24-20 through -25 and consider our actions complete.

May 15, 2025 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We understand that you have assigned these recommendations to the FAA’s Flight Standards Services Office for action. Specifically, we note that your Safety Management, Analytics & System Integration and Aircraft Maintenance Divisions are evaluating applicable FAA publications and verifying that airworthiness certificates and their associated operating limitations fully adhere to the specified regulations and all relevant FAA guidance.

We believe the review that you are conducting is a necessary first step to addressing these recommendations. Pending our review of your findings and a plan for addressing the specific concerns discussed in each of these recommendations, the Board has voted to classify Safety Recommendations A-24-20 through -25 OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

November 15, 2024 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Michael G. Whitaker, Administrator: The FAA’s Aircraft Maintenance Division (AMD) will examine these NTSB recommendations in order to review and evaluate applicable FAA publications. They include, but are not limited to, FAA Orders 8130.2, Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft; 8900.1, Flight Standards Information Management System; and 1800.56, National Flight Standards Work Program Guidelines. This comprehensive review aims to verify that the airworthiness certificate and its associated operating limitations fully adhere to the specified regulations of 14 CFR Part 21, 43, and 91, and all relevant guidance provided by the FAA.

Conversely, it will help us refine and close any gaps in our publications that may affect aviation safety.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA’s progress on these safety recommendations and anticipate providing an update by November 30, 2025.

August 27, 2024 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The attached letter from the NTSB Chair provides information about the Collision with Powerlines and Terrain during Forced Landing MARPAT Aviation Bell Helicopter UH-1B, N98F Amherstdale, West Virginia June 22, 2022. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (for example, A-24-20 through -25). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

This letter provides information about the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) August 14, 2024, report Collision with Powerlines and Terrain during Forced Landing MARPAT Aviation Bell Helicopter UH-1B, N98F (NTSB/AIR-24-04). The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • the need to review all experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates issued to turbine-powered rotorcraft. • the need for periodic reviews for experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates.

• the need for recurrent inspections of aircraft equipped with Ozark Aeroworks T53-series engines. • the need for operators of experimental exhibition aircraft to submit a list all events at which the aircraft will be exhibited. • the need for a method to ensure that operators of experimental exhibition aircraft meet their annual obligation to submit program letters. • the need for inspector guidance that requires routine surveillance of operators of aircraft with experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates.

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Additional information regarding these recommendations can be found in the noted sections of the report.

• Review all experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates issued to turbine-powered rotorcraft and ensure that their operating limitations meet the standards of the latest iteration of Federal Aviation Administration Order 8130.2, Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft. (A 24 20) (See section 2.4.) • Establish periodic reviews for experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates to ensure that those aircraft are being inspected and maintained according to the latest iteration of Federal Aviation Administration Order 8130.2, Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft. (A-24-21) (See section 2.4.)

• Require operators of aircraft equipped with Ozark Aeroworks T53-series engines to perform recurrent inspections of the rear bearing cover and the exhaust diffuser inner cone and inner struts with the exhaust diffuser cover removed. (A-24-22) (See section 2.5.) • Remind operators of experimental exhibition aircraft about the requirement to submit, to the appropriate flight standards district office, program letters that list all events at which the aircraft will be exhibited. (A-24-23) (See section 2.6)

• Develop a method for ensuring that operators of experimental exhibition aircraft meet their annual obligation to submit program letters; such a method could include potential penalties for operators that do not meet this obligation. (A 24-24) (See section 2.6) • Revise Federal Aviation Administration Order 8900.1, Flight Standards Information Management System, to include inspector guidance requiring routine surveillance of operators of aircraft with experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates. (A 24 25) (See section 2.6)

In addition, the NTSB reiterates the following recommendation to the FAA:

Develop national safety standards, or equivalent regulations, for revenue passenger-carrying operations that are currently conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, including, but not limited to, sightseeing flights conducted in a hot air balloon, intentional parachute jump flights, and living history flight experience and other vintage aircraft flights. These standards, or equivalent regulations, should include, at a minimum for each operation type, requirements for initial and recurrent training and maintenance and management policies and procedures. (A-21-9)

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (Safety Recommendations A-24-20 through -25 and reiterated Safety Recommendation A-21-9.) We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents.

Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Aviation Investigation Report AIR-24-04 Collision with Powerlines and Terrain during Forced Landing MARPAT Aviation Bell Helicopter UH-1B, N98F Amherstdale, West Virginia June 22, 2022 report published on August 27, 2024: Operator Inspection and Maintenance of Helicopter

From December 5, 2014, to the date of the accident, the helicopter was certificated under a special experimental exhibition airworthiness certificate. During that time, MARPAT Aviation performed inspections of the helicopter according to the generic inspection criteria for aircraft systems and components in Appendix D to 14 CFR Part 43, as required.

However, when the accident helicopter was operated under a restricted-category airworthiness certificate (before December 2014), MARPAT Aviation was required, by the associated operating limitations, to maintain the helicopter according to more comprehensive inspection standards, which were reflected in the checklist that the operator developed for those inspections. Table 3 compares the requirements of Part 43 Appendix D with the operator’s checklist when the helicopter was operated under a restricted-category certificate.

A comparison of the inspection requirements for the engine components that failed on the accident helicopter showed that, unlike Appendix D paragraphs (d)(3) and (d)(8), MARPAT Aviation checklist numbers 9 and 10 required inspections of the specific components with progressive damage that preceded the engine failure.

Table 3. Comparison of engine inspection requirements for the accident helicopter’s experimental- and restricted-category certificates. Title 14 CFR Part 43 Appendix D requirements for helicopter while under an experimental-category certificate MARPAT Aviation 100-hour/annual inspection requirements for helicopter while under a restricted category certificate (d) Each person performing an annual or [a] 100-hour inspection shall inspect (where applicable) components of the engine and nacelle group as follows:

(1) Engine section—for visual evidence of excessive oil, fuel, or hydraulic leaks, and sources of such leaks. (2) Studs and nuts—for improper torquing and obvious defects. (3) Internal engine—for cylinder compression and for metal particles or foreign matter on screens and sump drain plugs. If there is weak cylinder compression, for improper i