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NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-24-020

Recommendation

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Review all experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates issued to turbine-powered rotorcraft and ensure that their operating limitations meet the standards of the latest iteration of Federal Aviation Administration Order 8130.2, Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft.

Safety Issue and Context

This report discusses the June 22, 2022, accident that occurred during an event at which attendees could pay to fly or ride in a former military turbine-powered UH-1B helicopter. About 15 minutes after the flight departed, the pilot attempted a forced landing, but the helicopter impacted two powerlines and a rock face about 3.5 nautical miles east of the airport. The helicopter came to rest partially inverted on its right side on an asphalt road, and a postcrash fire ensued.

Postaccident examination of the helicopter engine found static damage in the compressor section; rotational damage in the gas-producer turbine; and additional damage to the exhaust diffuser, rear bearing cover, No. 2 bearing, and two power turbine blades. Safety issues discussed in this report include the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) inspection requirements for the UH-1B and other former military turbine powered aircraft, the operator’s maintenance of the accident helicopter, the operator’s management of the helicopter’s experimental airworthiness certificate, and the FAA’s oversight of the certificate.

As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board issues six new safety recommendations to the FAA and reiterates one recommendation to the FAA.

Response History

August 19, 2026 · Recipient Response · FAA

-Bryan Bedford, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has completed a thorough review of 14 CFR Parts 21, 43, and 91, in conjunction with the following FAA publications:

• FAA Order 1800.56Z, National Flight Standards Work Program Guidelines (NPG)

• FAA Order 8130.2L, Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft

• FAA Order 8900.1A, Flight Standards Information Management System (as it relates to these recommendations)

Because 14 CFR Parts 21, 43, and 91 are deemed minimum standards, we do not believe modifications are currently necessary. However, to enhance the operating limitations, provide more precise guidance on those limitations, and ensure more frequent surveillance of experimental aircraft requirements, FAA Orders 1800.56Z and 8130.2L were revised on September 22, 2025, and January 30, 2026, respectively.

You can access FAA Order 1800.56Z at the following website:

https://drs.faa.gov/browse/excelExternalWindow/DRSDOCID124612913420250923145317.0001

Read Recommendation

Recommendation Facts

Status
Open - Acceptable Response
Issued
August 27, 2024
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
FAA
Adopted
August 14, 2024
Related Investigation
ERA22FA279
Related Report
AIR-24-04

You can access FAA Order 8130.2L at the following website:

https://drs.faa.gov/browse/excelExternalWindow/DRSDOCID123181914520260202165959.0001

Although we determined FAA Order 8900.1A did not need to be modified due to this event, this order is periodically revised and includes essential aircraft surveillance and inspection guidelines outlined in the relevant volume, chapter, and sections.

I believe the FAA has effectively addressed Safety Recommendations A-24-20 through -25 and consider our actions complete.

May 15, 2025 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We understand that you have assigned these recommendations to the FAA’s Flight Standards Services Office for action. Specifically, we note that your Safety Management, Analytics & System Integration and Aircraft Maintenance Divisions are evaluating applicable FAA publications and verifying that airworthiness certificates and their associated operating limitations fully adhere to the specified regulations and all relevant FAA guidance.

We believe the review that you are conducting is a necessary first step to addressing these recommendations. Pending our review of your findings and a plan for addressing the specific concerns discussed in each of these recommendations, the Board has voted to classify Safety Recommendations A-24-20 through -25 OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

November 15, 2024 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Michael G. Whitaker, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is currently analyzing the NTSB’s Aviation Investigation Report AIR-24-04 containing these safety recommendations to determine and develop an appropriate action plan.

August 27, 2024 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The attached letter from the NTSB Chair provides information about the Collision with Powerlines and Terrain during Forced Landing MARPAT Aviation Bell Helicopter UH-1B, N98F Amherstdale, West Virginia June 22, 2022. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (for example, A-24-20 through -25). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

This letter provides information about the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) August 14, 2024, report Collision with Powerlines and Terrain during Forced Landing MARPAT Aviation Bell Helicopter UH-1B, N98F (NTSB/AIR-24-04). The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • the need to review all experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates issued to turbine-powered rotorcraft. • the need for periodic reviews for experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates.

• the need for recurrent inspections of aircraft equipped with Ozark Aeroworks T53-series engines. • the need for operators of experimental exhibition aircraft to submit a list all events at which the aircraft will be exhibited. • the need for a method to ensure that operators of experimental exhibition aircraft meet their annual obligation to submit program letters. • the need for inspector guidance that requires routine surveillance of operators of aircraft with experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates.

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Additional information regarding these recommendations can be found in the noted sections of the report.

• Review all experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates issued to turbine-powered rotorcraft and ensure that their operating limitations meet the standards of the latest iteration of Federal Aviation Administration Order 8130.2, Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft. (A 24 20) (See section 2.4.) • Establish periodic reviews for experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates to ensure that those aircraft are being inspected and maintained according to the latest iteration of Federal Aviation Administration Order 8130.2, Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft. (A-24-21) (See section 2.4.)

• Require operators of aircraft equipped with Ozark Aeroworks T53-series engines to perform recurrent inspections of the rear bearing cover and the exhaust diffuser inner cone and inner struts with the exhaust diffuser cover removed. (A-24-22) (See section 2.5.) • Remind operators of experimental exhibition aircraft about the requirement to submit, to the appropriate flight standards district office, program letters that list all events at which the aircraft will be exhibited. (A-24-23) (See section 2.6)

• Develop a method for ensuring that operators of experimental exhibition aircraft meet their annual obligation to submit program letters; such a method could include potential penalties for operators that do not meet this obligation. (A 24-24) (See section 2.6) • Revise Federal Aviation Administration Order 8900.1, Flight Standards Information Management System, to include inspector guidance requiring routine surveillance of operators of aircraft with experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates. (A 24 25) (See section 2.6)

In addition, the NTSB reiterates the following recommendation to the FAA:

Develop national safety standards, or equivalent regulations, for revenue passenger-carrying operations that are currently conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, including, but not limited to, sightseeing flights conducted in a hot air balloon, intentional parachute jump flights, and living history flight experience and other vintage aircraft flights. These standards, or equivalent regulations, should include, at a minimum for each operation type, requirements for initial and recurrent training and maintenance and management policies and procedures. (A-21-9)

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (Safety Recommendations A-24-20 through -25 and reiterated Safety Recommendation A-21-9.) We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents.

Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Aviation Investigation Report AIR-24-04 Collision with Powerlines and Terrain during Forced Landing MARPAT Aviation Bell Helicopter UH-1B, N98F Amherstdale, West Virginia June 22, 2022 report published on August 27, 2024: Federal Aviation Administration Inspection and Maintenance Standards

The FAA issued Order 8130.2G in August 2010 to provide inspectors with updated standards for the airworthiness certification of aircraft. Version G of the order stated that turbine-powered rotorcraft operated under an experimental exhibition airworthiness certificate were to be inspected under an FAA approved program that met the requirements of 14 CFR 91.409(f). The Memorandum of Deviation to chapter 4, section 10 of Order 8130G, which became effective in December 2011, then allowed such rotorcraft to be inspected according to the requirements of 14 CFR Part 43 Appendix D.

The inspection standards in Part 43 Appendix D did not have sufficient scope and depth for inspecting former military turbine-powered rotorcraft, especially given the complex design of typical former military rotorcraft. The NTSB’s review of these standards found that they were generic inspection criteria for aircraft systems and components undergoing annual and 100-hour inspections. These criteria did not comprise an appropriate inspection program for former military turbine-powered rotorcraft; such a program would be expected to have more comprehensive information than only a listing of inspection criteria.

For example, Appendix D stated that a reciprocating aircraft engine needed to be inspected for proper cylinder compression but did not specify critical turbine engine components for inspection, such as an engine compressor or turbine, and the necessary inspection steps to ensure the continued airworthiness for a complex turbine powered aircraft.

Further, Appendix D stated that flight and engine controls were to be inspected for “improper installation and improper operation” and that all systems were to be inspected for “improper installation, poor general condition, apparent and obvious defects, and insecurity of attachment.” However, Appendix D did not discuss the steps needed to properly assess the condition of flight and engine controls and system components. The NTSB concludes that the FAA erred when it allowed, via its 2011 Memora