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NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-22-016

Recommendation

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Issue a safety alert for operators to encourage air tour operators to establish safety assurance processes to routinely review recorded onboard videos and automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) flight tracking data, ideally as part of a safety management system with an integrated flight data monitoring program, for the purpose of identifying and addressing risky trends in weather-related operating practices, such as encounters or near encounters with instrument meteorological conditions-related hazards.

Safety Issue and Context

This report discusses the December 26, 2019, accident involving a seven-seat helicopter operated by Safari Aviation Inc. as a commercial air tour flight that encountered instrument meteorological conditions and collided into terrain in a remote, wooded area near Kekaha, Hawaii, on the island of Kauai. The pilot and the six passengers were fatally injured, and the helicopter was destroyed.

Safety issues identified in this report include limited ability of existing infrastructure to fully support some aviation safety-related functions needed for the safe operation of low-flying air tour flights, resulting in air tour pilots having to rely on their own in-flight visual weather assessments; absence of safety assurance processes to guide pilot decision-making; and ineffective monitoring and oversight of Hawaii air tour operators by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) makes eight new safety recommendations to the FAA, one new safety recommendation to the Vertical Aviation Safety Team, and one new safety recommendation to tour flight operators. NTSB also reiterates nine previously issued recommendations and two previously issued classified recommendations to the FAA.

Response History

July 3, 2024 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that you continue to believe the recommended SAFO is unnecessary because the FAA already routinely discusses safety assurance processes, including reviewing ADS-B data, during initial and recurrent operator training, annual commercial air tour safety meetings, and annual FAA surveillance.

We point out that the intent of this recommendation is for the FAA to encourage air tour operators to review recorded ADS-B data to identify and track occurrences, such as a flight’s descent below a required minimum altitude, and discuss the circumstances of the event with the pilot in a nonpunitive fashion. Despite your efforts to discuss safety assurance processes with operators, the accident operator did not have adequate safety assurance processes to assess if company strategies to reduce pilots’ risk of inadvertent encounters with instrument meteorological conditions were effective.

In addition, you have not responded to the part of this recommendation that asks you to ensure that operators establish safety assurance processes to routinely review recorded onboard videos.

We believe that air tour operators could systematically review onboard videos in conjunction with weather data and other information to identify and track risky trends in weather-related operating practices and review them in a nonpunitive fashion with their pilots. The accident operator in this case could have identified and mitigated some of the risks for continuing flight under visual flight rules into reduced-visibility conditions by periodically reviewing videos from the accident pilot’s flights prior to the accident. We also believe periodic reviews could reinforce continuous good decision-making.

Therefore, we continue to believe that issuing a SAFO on these topics is appropriate and needed. Pending the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-22-16 remains classified OPEN-- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

September 6, 2023 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

On August 4, 2023, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced the publication of draft Advisory Circular (AC) 136-B048, Supplemental Information for the Creation of Operating Procedures and Pilot Training Subjects Related to OpSpec [operations specification]/LOA [letter of authorization] B048, and invited public comment on the document. The NTSB has a longstanding interest in air tour safety in the state of Hawaii, having investigated numerous Hawaii air tour accidents and issued many related safety recommendations and we offer our comments below.

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Recommendation Facts

Status
Open - Unacceptable Response
Issued
May 26, 2022
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
FAA
Adopted
May 10, 2022
Related Investigation
ANC20MA010
Related Report
AIR-22-05

We note that, based on the contents of the draft AC, it appears that the FAA’s intent is that it will replace FAA document AWP13-136, the Hawaii Air Tour Common Procedures Manual (HATCPM), which the FAA issued in 2008 for use by operators that obtained authorization (through OpSpec B048 or LOA B548) to deviate from the minimum altitude specified in 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 136, Appendix A. For those operators that obtained authorization through OpSpec B048/LOA B548, compliance with the provisions of the HATCPM was mandatory.

In our 2022 report on our investigation of the December 26, 2019, fatal air tour helicopter accident in Kekaha, Hawaii, we noted that the HATCPM had not been revised since it was issued and that the FAA informed us that it had been working on a replacement for about 7 years.

During our investigation, an air tour subject matter expert from the FAA’s Air Transportation Division, [14 CFR] Part 135 Air Carrier Operations Branch, informed us that the FAA’s vision for the new document was for it to be up to date; incorporate NTSB safety recommendations, congressional input, and National Park Service input; and be simpler, safer, and easier to manage. They also said that the document would likely address the use of Hawaii weather camera systems and operator implementation of safety management systems (SMSs).

We have examined the draft AC and are providing comments related to these issues and open NTSB recommendations related to air tour safety in Hawaii. We note that, although ACs, generally, are not regulatory documents, we presume that operators that obtain authorization through OpSpec/LOA B048 will be required to comply with the AC’s provisions (similar to the mandatory compliance with the HATCPM for those operators that held deviation authority).

Safety Management Systems and Other Safety Assurance Processes

In 2016, we issued Safety Recommendation A-16-36, which urged the FAA to require all Part 135 operators to establish SMS.4 We were pleased to learn that on January 11, 2023, the FAA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) announcing its intent to require such systems for Part 135 operators and air tour operators operating under 14 CFR 91.147. We strongly support the FAA’s proposed expansion of SMS requirements, which would include all Hawaii air tour operators.

We note that the draft AC states that a certificate holder “should present to the Administrator the method they will utilize to analyze, mitigate, and manage risks while conducting commercial air tour operations under the authorization” and that the FAA will review each certificate holder’s application as a whole and may recommend changes before approval. This appears to lay the groundwork for FAA verification of future SMS requirements.

Therefore, although the draft AC is not directly responsive to Safety Recommendation A-16-36, its reporting provision would allow the FAA to evaluate operators’ risk management strategies, including the applicable components of SMS, once the proposed new rule is implemented.

Our 2022 investigation report on the Kekaha accident also highlighted the importance of the safety assurance aspect of SMS for preventing a drift toward risky weather-related operating practices among Hawaii air tour pilots.

In that report, we issued Safety Recommendation A-22-16, which urged the FAA to issue a safety alert for operators (SAFO) to encourage air tour operators to establish safety assurance processes to routinely review recorded onboard videos and ADS-B flight tracking data, ideally as part of an SMS with an integrated flight data monitoring program, for the purpose of identifying and addressing risky trends in weather-related operating practices, such as encounters or near encounters with instrument meteorological conditions (IMC)-related hazards.

In August 2022, the FAA replied that it disagreed that issuing a SAFO to establish a safety assurance process is in the best interest of promoting aviation safety. The FAA pointed out that a formal safety assurance procedure currently exists in OpSpec B048, which requires that certificate holders conduct one formal commercial air tour safety meeting each year to discuss safety trends and Part 136, Appendix A issues.

However, we do not believe that OpSpec B048 is responsive to this recommendation, as the intent of this recommendation is to encourage air tour operators to review recorded ADS-B data to identify and track occurrences, such as a flight’s descent below a required minimum altitude, and review the circumstances of the event with the pilot in a nonpunitive fashion to explore what happened and learn about the integrity and effectiveness of existing risk controls. This recommendation is currently classified Open—Unacceptable Response.

We note that the draft AC lists FAA AC 120-92, Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers, under a section titled “Related Reading Material” and that AC 120-92 includes information on all the major components of SMS. We also note that the draft AC encourages Hawaii air tour operators to engage in risk management. The draft AC states that the FAA may recommend that operators include additional safety risk analysis (a component of SMS), but it does not contain specific provisions that address the development of safety assurance processes like those described in Safety Recommendation A-22-16. Therefore, the draft AC is not responsive to Safety Recommendation A-22-16.

Safety Recommendation A-22-15, which was also issued as a result of the Kekaha investigation, urged the FAA to develop guidance for small operators for scaling an SMS that includes methods and techniques for implementation and specific examples applicable to several operational sectors, including air tours. Although the draft AC does not specifically discuss scaling an SMS for Hawaii air tour operators, we noted that the FAA has informed us that its ongoing SMS rulemaking effort will address this recommendation. Thus, Safety Recommendation A-22-15 is classified Open—Acceptable Response.

Safety Recommendation A-22-18 (also from our report on the Kekaha accident) urged the FAA to issue and periodically update a special airworthiness information bulletin (SAIB) that lists newly manufactured helicopters that are equipped with features likely to reduce accidents resulting from inadvertent encounters with IMC, describes retrofit options for helicopters that do not have such equipment, and encourages the voluntary integration of these safety features. This recommendation is classified Open—Await Response. Although this recommendation specifically called for the publication of an SAIB, we note that the draft AC does not encourage voluntary integration of such safety features.

It does, however, state that an operator should include in its application a description of any supplemental type certificates related to aircraft instrumentation and equipment. Therefore, although the draft AC is not responsive to Safety Recommendation A-22-18, we are pleased that it may increase the FAA’s awareness of any such equipment that may be installed.

August 31, 2023 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Kathryn B. Thomson, Deputy Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) continues to find that issuing a safety alert for operators (SAFO) to encourage the recommended safety assurance process is unnecessary. Safety assurance processes, including reviewing Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data, are routinely discussed during operator initial and recurrent training sessions, annual commercial air tour safety meetings as required by Operations Specifications B048, and annual FAA surveillance. Issuing a SAFO to further encourage reviewing ADS-B data will likely have little to no effect on the already widely understood benefits of ADS-B data review.

March 30, 2023 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that you do not plan to issue the recommended SAFO because you do not believe it is in the best interest of promoting aviation safety. You point out that OPSPEC B048 includes a formal safety assurance procedure and requires that certificate holders conduct one formal commercial air tour safety meeting annually to discuss safety trends.

We do not believe OPSPEC B048 is responsive to this recommendation. We point out that the intent of this recommendation is for the FAA to encourage air tour operators to review recorded ADS-B data to identify and track occurrences, such as a flight’s descent below a required minimum altitude, and review the circumstances of the event with the pilot in a nonpunitive fashion. In conjunction with weather data and other information, such reviews could allow air tour operators to explore what happened and learn about the integrity and effectiveness of existing risk controls.

For operators that have an FDM program or an SMS, or both, these reviews can be integrated into the safety assurance functions. We encourage you to reconsider your position and issue the recommended SAFO. In the meantime, pending our review of a plan for taking the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-22-16 is classified OPEN-- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

August 3, 2022 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Billy Nolen, Acting Administrator: The FAA disagrees that issuing a safety alert for operators to establish a safety assurance process is in the best interest of promoting aviation safety. A formal safety assurance procedure currently exists in OPSPEC B048. OPSPEC B048 requires that certificate holders conduct one formal commercial air tour safety meeting each 12 calendar months to discuss safety trends and 14 CFR Part 136, Appendix A issues. Safety issues are also discussed during operator initial and recurrent training sessions.

May 26, 2022 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The attached letter from the NTSB Chair provides information about the NTSB’s May 10, 2022, report, Collision into Terrain, Safari Aviation Inc., Airbus AS350 B2, N985SA, Kekaha, Hawaii, December 26, 2019, NTSB AIR-22-05. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (for example, new Safety Recommendations A-22-11 through -18, Reiterated Recommendations A 13 13, A-13-25, A-13-27, A-16-34 through -36, A 21 5, A-21-6, and A-21-15)

We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

This letter provides information about the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) May 10, 2022, report, Collision into Terrain, Safari Aviation Inc., Airbus AS350 B2, N985SA, Kekaha, Hawaii, December 26, 2019, NTSB AIR-22-05. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues:

• Aviation safety infrastructure limitations in Hawaii, including the need for aviation weather cameras, improved air-to-ground radio communications, and improved automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) capabilities to enable flight tracking and other safety services for low-flying air tour flights.

• Lack of effective cue-based weather training for air tour pilots in Hawaii.

• Need for trained company flight support personnel with operational control authority to support pilots’ en route, weather-related decision making.

• Need for safety management systems and flight data monitoring programs for Part 135 operators and the incorporation of recorded onboard videos and ADS B flight tracking data into safety assurance reviews.

• Need for improved Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) surveillance of air tour operations in Hawaii.

• Value of crash-resistant flight recorder systems in providing information critical for enabling the identification of the most effective measures to prevent similar accidents. • Emerging technologies to help prevent accidents resulting from inadvertent encounters with instrument meteorological conditions, including helicopter safety technologies and simulation devices used in pilot training. Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendations to the FAA. Additional information regarding these recommendations can be found in the noted sections of the report.

• Install the necessary infrastructure in Hawaii to enable continuous radio communication between the pilots of low-flying tour flights and ground support personnel, such as flight service station specialists and company flight support personnel, along the most heavily trafficked air tour routes. (A-22-11) (See section 2.4.2.1)

• Implement automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) infrastructure improvements in Hawaii, such as additional ADS B ground stations, that provide adequate coverage to enable real-time flight tracking and traffic advisory services for ADS-B Out- and In-equipped, low-flying air tour aircraft throughout their entire tour routes. (A-22-12) (See section 2.4.2.2)

• As an interim measure until completion of the action to satisfy Safety Recommendation A 21-15 [previously issued on May 13, 2021], require Hawaii air tour operators to install Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out equipment in their aircraft to enable real time flight position tracking. (A-22-13) (See section 2.4.2.2)

• Require air tour operators to have flight support personnel who are trained to exercise operational control authority, participate in preflight risk analysis, provide pilots with weather briefings, monitor the progress of the flights, and participate in two-way communications with pilots to alert them of any weather hazards. (A-22-14) (See section 2.5.1)

• Develop guidance for small operators for scaling a safety management system that includes methods and techniques for implementation and specific examples applicable to several operational sectors, including air tours. (A 22 15) (See section 2.5.2)

• Issue a safety alert for operators to encourage air tour operators to establish safety assurance processes to routinely review recorded onboard videos and automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast flight tracking data, ideally as part of a safety management system with an integrated flight data monitoring program, for the purpose of identifying and addressing risky trends in weather related operating practices, such as encounters or near encounters with instrument-meteorological-conditions-related hazards. (A-22-16) (See section 2.5.4)

• Improve the surveillance of air tour operations in Hawaii through the use of technologies and innovative approaches, including but not limited to comparing automatic dependent surveillance broadcast flight position data from air tour flights with weather camera imagery for the route and periodically reviewing onboard video recordings, to detect and correct operating practices that may lead to unacceptable weather-related risky behavior. (A 22 17) (See section 2.6)

• Issue and periodically update a special airworthiness information bulletin that lists newly manufactured helicopters that are equipped with features likely to reduce accidents resulting from inadvertent encounters with instrument meteorological conditions, describes retrofit options for helicopters that do not have such equipment, and encourages the voluntary integration of these safety features. (A-22-18) (See section 2.8.1)

In addition, the NTSB reiterates the following recommendations to the FAA:

• Require all existing turbine-powered, nonexperimental, nonrestricted-category aircraft that are not equipped with a flight data recorder or cockpit voice recorder and are operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 91, 121, or 135 to be retrofitted with a crash-resistant flight recorder system. The crash resistant flight recorder system should record cockpit audio and images with a view of the cockpit environment to include as much of the outside view as possible, and parametric data per aircraft and system installation, all as specified in Technical Standard Order C197, “Information Collection and Monitoring Systems.” (A-13-13) (See section 2.7)

• Initiate an aviation weather camera program in Hawaii that includes the installation and maintenance of aviation weather cameras at critical locations in Hawaii. Establish public access to these aviation weather cameras’ real-time imagery. (A-13-25) (See section 2.4.1) • Equip flight service station specialists responsible for Hawaii and the continental United States with the technical capabilities and training to provide verbal preflight and en route briefings using aviation weather camera imagery. (A-13-27) (See section 2.4.1) • Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators to install flight data recording devices capable of supporting a flight data monitoring program.

(A-16-34) (See section 2.5.3) • After the action in Safety Recommendation A-16-34 is completed, require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators to establish a structured flight data monitoring program that re