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NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-22-015

Recommendation

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Develop guidance for small operators for scaling a safety management system that includes methods and techniques for implementation and specific examples applicable to several operational sectors, including air tours.

Safety Issue and Context

This report discusses the December 26, 2019, accident involving a seven-seat helicopter operated by Safari Aviation Inc. as a commercial air tour flight that encountered instrument meteorological conditions and collided into terrain in a remote, wooded area near Kekaha, Hawaii, on the island of Kauai. The pilot and the six passengers were fatally injured, and the helicopter was destroyed.

Safety issues identified in this report include limited ability of existing infrastructure to fully support some aviation safety-related functions needed for the safe operation of low-flying air tour flights, resulting in air tour pilots having to rely on their own in-flight visual weather assessments; absence of safety assurance processes to guide pilot decision-making; and ineffective monitoring and oversight of Hawaii air tour operators by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) makes eight new safety recommendations to the FAA, one new safety recommendation to the Vertical Aviation Safety Team, and one new safety recommendation to tour flight operators. NTSB also reiterates nine previously issued recommendations and two previously issued classified recommendations to the FAA.

Response History

August 9, 2024 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

From the Special Investigation Report (AIR-24-03) Safety and Industry Data Improvements for Part 135 Operations: 4.1 Safety Management System The NTSB has long advocated that the FAA require various Part 135 operations to implement an SMS, having issued the first associated safety recommendation, which applied to HAA operators, in 2009.59 Subsequently, as a result of our investigation into the 2015 crash of a Part 135 on-demand charter flight in which all nine persons on board sustained fatal injuries, we recommended that the FAA expand the applicability of SMS requirements, as follows:

Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators to establish safety management system programs. (A-16-36)[60] In the 7 years since we issued this recommendation, we reiterated it in the final reports of seven fatal accidents involving Part 135 operators that resulted in 39 fatalities and 9 serious injuries.61 Most of these accidents were also on the FAA’s list of 35 serious- and fatal-injury accidents involving Part 135 operators from 2015 to 2019 that the FAA determined could have been mitigated through the implementation of SMS (FAA 2023a, 1936).62

In addition to engaging in ongoing discussions with the FAA regarding the importance of an SMS requirement for

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Recommendation Facts

Status
Closed - Acceptable Action
Issued
May 26, 2022
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
FAA
Adopted
May 10, 2022
Closed
August 9, 2024
Related Investigation
ANC20MA010
Related Report
AIR-22-05
Part 135
operations, the NTSB conducted outreach to increase industrywide awareness. On March 2, 2020, we hosted a panel of representatives from various-sized
Part 135
operators to discuss improving the safety of the industry, and panel participants shared their perspectives on SMS.63 On May 11, 2023, we hosted a webinar that included a roundtable discussion with several small and midsized operators to explore how they implemented an SMS, the challenges they overcame, and the safety and economic benefits they were seeing (NTSB 2023b).

On January 11, 2023, the FAA issued an NPRM proposing to require an SMS for all Part 135 certificate holders (FAA 2023a, 1932). In our March 10, 2023, comments on the NPRM, we stated that we strongly supported the proposed expansion of SMS requirements to include Part 135 operations and noted that our investigations have consistently shown the need for aviation service providers to implement an SMS to ensure its benefits to the industry and the public are realized (NTSB 2023a, 3–4).

On April 26, 2024, the FAA issued its final rule to require all Part 135 operators to have an SMS, which is responsive to our recommendation. Thus, the NTSB concludes that the FAA’s SMS final rule, which requires all Part 135 operators to incorporate formal system safety methods into their internal oversight programs, will help these operators proactively identify and mitigate risks to prevent accidents. Therefore, the NTSB classifies Safety Recommendation A-16-36 "Closed-- Acceptable Action" in this report.

The FAA has noted that, by design, SMS is scalable to allow the integration of safety management practices into a unique business model for operators of any size (FAA 2015b, 21–46). However, during our investigation of the 2019 accident involving the air tour helicopter that encountered IMC and crashed in Kekaha, Hawaii, fatally injuring seven people, we found that the operator’s president (who was also the director of operations) mistakenly believed that the operation was too small to maintain an SMS (NTSB 2022a, 73). As a result of our investigation and to help ensure that small operators can successfully implement SMS, we recommended that the FAA do the following:

Develop guidance for small operators for scaling a safety management system that includes methods and techniques for implementation and specific examples applicable to several operational sectors, including air tours. (A-22-15)

In its 2023 NPRM, the FAA acknowledged that smaller operators (because they have fewer people) have fewer opportunities for checks and balances on decisions that can affect safety and that SMS can help mitigate this by creating a structure for proactively monitoring decision-making processes and addressing deficiencies.65 The FAA stated that, with SMS, “a one-person operator would have a system for documenting their own hazard information, actions, mitigations, safety performance, etc., for future reference” (FAA 2023a, 1940).

The FAA has also acknowledged that implementing an SMS could help single-pilot and single-PIC operators identify and mitigate such issues as operational control deficiencies (FAA 2023a, 1953–4; FAA 2016b, 3). We believe this is an important observation because, as described in section 1, nearly one-third of Part 135 certificate holders are single-pilot or single-PIC operators. Further, as discussed in section 2.2, although we believe that a certificated dispatcher could enhance the safety of all Part 135 operations, we are aware that hiring additional personnel may not be practical for single-pilot and single-PIC operators due to their limited size and scope.

Thus, the NTSB concludes that, for Part 135 operators of limited size and scope for which the hiring of a certificated dispatcher may not be practical (such as single-pilot and single-PIC operators), implementation of an appropriately scaled SMS that includes planning tools to analyze and assess the inherent risks in operations can help in the development of effective operational control strategies, including methods for ensuring adequate preflight weather, route, and fuel planning.

In the NPRM, the FAA stated that it was revising AC 120-92, “Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers,” to include guidance and numerous examples for small operators on how to scale an SMS (FAA 2015b; FAA 2023a, 1953-4). However, in our comments on the NPRM, we noted that the FAA’s proposed revisions in the draft AC were too general. In the SMS final rule, the FAA excepted “certain single-pilot operators” from requirements that would be impractical for their operations, such as certain recordkeeping, communication, and disciplinary action requirements that would not be applicable in organizations of their size (FAA 2024c, 33076).

The FAA’s final rule stated that guidance (including ACs) to help single-pilot organizations navigate the exceptions would be available about 30 days after publication of the final rule in the Federal Register (FAA 2024c, 33075).

We note that, in section 308 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, which was signed into law on May 16, 2024, Congress directed the FAA to consider the scalability of SMS in any regulation requiring SMS implementation, regardless of the size or complexity of the operation. On May 21, 2024, the FAA issued revised AC 120-92D, which included an appendix that provided potential methods that smaller aviation organizations, including single-pilot and single-PIC operators, could use when developing an SMS scaled to the size and complexity of their organization.

The appendix included a table that discussed various SMS implementation strategies and provided examples of how practices such as performance monitoring and documenting and managing hazards can be scaled and applied by smaller operators (FAA 2024d). The NTSB believes that the inventory of methods and techniques contained in this guidance will help operators of all sizes implement an effective SMS. Therefore, the NTSB classifies Safety Recommendation A-22-15 CLOSED-- ACCEPTABLE ACTION in this report.

October 2, 2023 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

In our March 10, 2023, comments regarding your January 11, 2023, NPRM, we noted that the draft revision to Advisory Circular (AC) 120-92, “Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers,” included some information on scalability; however, it did not include methods and techniques for implementing SMSs, as recommended.

We pointed out that, based on the FAA’s experience working with operators who have voluntarily adopted SMSs before Part 5 was issued, overseeing Part 121 operators required to implement SMSs, and working with SMS Voluntary Program participants across Parts 135, 21, and 145, you are in the best position to create a detailed and usable inventory that includes methods and techniques used by operators of all sizes.

We point out that this additional guidance, which would be useful to smaller operators and FAA inspectors performing oversight, is needed to satisfy the intent of this recommendation, and we encourage you to include it in the final AC. In the meantime, pending our review of the published guidance and completion of the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-22-15 is classified OPEN-- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

September 6, 2023 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

On August 4, 2023, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced the publication of draft Advisory Circular (AC) 136-B048, Supplemental Information for the Creation of Operating Procedures and Pilot Training Subjects Related to OpSpec [operations specification]/LOA [letter of authorization] B048, and invited public comment on the document. The NTSB has a longstanding interest in air tour safety in the state of Hawaii, having investigated numerous Hawaii air tour accidents and issued many related safety recommendations and we offer our comments below.

We note that, based on the contents of the draft AC, it appears that the FAA’s intent is that it will replace FAA document AWP13-136, the Hawaii Air Tour Common Procedures Manual (HATCPM), which the FAA issued in 2008 for use by operators that obtained authorization (through OpSpec B048 or LOA B548) to deviate from the minimum altitude specified in 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 136, Appendix A. For those operators that obtained authorization through OpSpec B048/LOA B548, compliance with the provisions of the HATCPM was mandatory.

In our 2022 report on our investigation of the December 26, 2019, fatal air tour helicopter accident in Kekaha, Hawaii, we noted that the HATCPM had not been revised since it was issued and that the FAA informed us that it had been working on a replacement for about 7 years.

During our investigation, an air tour subject matter expert from the FAA’s Air Transportation Division, [14 CFR] Part 135 Air Carrier Operations Branch, informed us that the FAA’s vision for the new document was for it to be up to date; incorporate NTSB safety recommendations, congressional input, and National Park Service input; and be simpler, safer, and easier to manage. They also said that the document would likely address the use of Hawaii weather camera systems and operator implementation of safety management systems (SMSs).

We have examined the draft AC and are providing comments related to these issues and open NTSB recommendations related to air tour safety in Hawaii. We note that, although ACs, generally, are not regulatory documents, we presume that operators that obtain authorization through OpSpec/LOA B048 will be required to comply with the AC’s provisions (similar to the mandatory compliance with the HATCPM for those operators that held deviation authority).

Safety Management Systems and Other Safety Assurance Processes

In 2016, we issued Safety Recommendation A-16-36, which urged the FAA to require all Part 135 operators to establish SMS.4 We were pleased to learn that on January 11, 2023, the FAA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) announcing its intent to require such systems for Part 135 operators and air tour operators operating under 14 CFR 91.147. We strongly support the FAA’s proposed expansion of SMS requirements, which would include all Hawaii air tour operators.

We note that the draft AC states that a certificate holder “should present to the Administrator the method they will utilize to analyze, mitigate, and manage risks while conducting commercial air tour operations under the authorization” and that the FAA will review each certificate holder’s application as a whole and may recommend changes before approval. This appears to lay the groundwork for FAA verification of future SMS requirements.

Therefore, although the draft AC is not directly responsive to Safety Recommendation A-16-36, its reporting provision would allow the FAA to evaluate operators’ risk management strategies, including the applicable components of SMS, once the proposed new rule is implemented.

Our 2022 investigation report on the Kekaha accident also highlighted the importance of the safety assurance aspect of SMS for preventing a drift toward risky weather-related operating practices among Hawaii air tour pilots.

In that report, we issued Safety Recommendation A-22-16, which urged the FAA to issue a safety alert for operators (SAFO) to encourage air tour operators to establish safety assurance processes to routinely review recorded onboard videos and ADS-B flight tracking data, ideally as part of an SMS with an integrated flight data monitoring program, for the purpose of identifying and addressing risky trends in weather-related operating practices, such as encounters or near encounters with instrument meteorological conditions (IMC)-related hazards.

In August 2022, the FAA replied that it disagreed that issuing a SAFO to establish a safety assurance process is in the best interest of promoting aviation safety. The FAA pointed out that a formal safety assurance procedure currently exists in OpSpec B048, which requires that certificate holders conduct one formal commercial air tour safety meeting each year to discuss safety trends and Part 136, Appendix A issues.

However, we do not believe that OpSpec B048 is responsive to this recommendation, as the intent of this recommendation is to encourage air tour operators to review recorded ADS-B data to identify and track occurrences, such as a flight’s descent below a required minimum altitude, and review the circumstances of the event with the pilot in a nonpunitive fashion to explore what happened and learn about the integrity and effectiveness of existing risk controls. This recommendation is currently classified Open—Unacceptable Response.

We note that the draft AC lists FAA AC 120-92, Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers, under a section titled “Related Reading Material” and that AC 120-92 includes information on all the major components of SMS. We also note that the draft AC encourages Hawaii air tour operators to engage in risk management. The draft AC states that the FAA may recommend that operators include additional safety risk analysis (a component of SMS), but it does not contain specific provisions that address the development of safety assurance processes like those described in Safety Recommendation A-22-16. Therefore, the draft AC is not responsive to Safety Recommendation A-22-16.

Safety Recommendation A-22-15, which was also issued as a result of the Kekaha investigation, urged the FAA to develop guidance for small operators for scaling an SMS that includes methods and techniques for implementation and specific examples applicable to several operational sectors, including air tours. Although the draft AC does not specifically discuss scaling an SMS for Hawaii air tour operators, we noted that the FAA has informed us that its ongoing SMS rulemaking effort will address this recommendation. Thus, Safety Recommendation A-22-15 is classified Open—Acceptable Response.

Safety Recommendation A-22-18 (also from our report on the Kekaha accident) urged the FAA to issue and periodically update a special airworthiness information bulletin (SAIB) that lists newly manufactured helicopters that are equipped with features likely to reduce accidents resulting from inadvertent encounters with IMC, describes retrofit options for helicopters that do not have such equipment, and encourages the voluntary integration of these safety features. This recommendation is classified Open—Await Response. Although this recommendation specifically called for the publication of an SAIB, we note that the draft AC does not encourage voluntary integration of such safety features.

It does, however, state that an operator should include in its application a description of any supplemental type certificates related to aircraft instrumentation and equipment. Therefore, although the draft AC is not responsive to Safety Recommendation A-22-18, we are pleased that it may increase the FAA’s awareness of any such equipment that may be installed.

April 11, 2023 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Billy Nolen, Acting Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published the Safety Management Systems (SMS) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on January 11, 2023 (88 FR 1932). The FAA is proposing to update and expand the requirements for SMS and require certain certificate holders and commercial air tour operators to develop and implement an SMS.

This proposed rule would extend the requirement for an SMS to all certificate holders operating under the rules for commuter and on-demand operations, commercial air tour operators, production certificate holders that are holders or licensees of a type certificate (TC) for the same product, and holders of a TC who license out that TC for production.

This rulemaking effort and subsequent supporting guidance and FAA oversight will satisfy the intent of these safety recommendations.

I anticipate providing an update to Safety Recommendations A-16-36, A-19-28, A-19-30, A-19-31, A-21-48, and A-22-15 by March 31, 2024.

March 30, 2023 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We are aware that, on January 11, 2023, you published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled, “Safety Management Systems,” which proposes expanding the applicability of Part 5 SMSs to include Part 135 operators, air tour operators under 91.147, and certain certificate holders under Part 21. The NPRM references a draft revision to AC 120 92, “Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers,” which includes some information on scalability. We note, however, that the draft guidance does not include methods and techniques for implementing SMSs, as recommended.

Based on the FAA’s experience working with operators who voluntarily adopted SMSs before Part 5 was issued, overseeing Part 121 operators required to implement SMSs, and working with SMS Voluntary Program participants across Parts 135, 21, and 145, we believe you are in the best position to create a detailed and usable inventory that includes methods and techniques used by operators of all sizes. We point out that this additional guidance would be useful to smaller operators and FAA inspectors performing oversight and is needed to satisfy the intent of this recommendation. Therefore, we encourage you to include this additional information in the final AC.

Pending our review of the published guidance and completion of the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-22-15 is classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

March 10, 2023 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled, “Safety Management Systems,” which was published at 88 Federal Register 1932 on January 11, 2023. The NPRM proposes to expand the applicability of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 5 Safety Management Systems (SMSs) beyond 14 CFR Part 121 operators to include 14 CFR Part 135 operators, air tour operators under 14 CFR 91.147, and certain certificate holders under 14 CFR Part 21.

The FAA states that the successful use of SMSs by Part 121 operators suggests that expanding SMS requirements can benefit other sectors of the aviation system. According to the NPRM, the proposed action addresses a congressional mandate and NTSB safety recommendations and moves the United States closer to harmonizing with International Civil Aviation Organization Annex 19 on SMSs for aviation service providers. The FAA analyzed our accident investigations to support this rulemaking project and demonstrate the benefits of SMSs.

Open NTSB Safety Recommendations on SMS

Six of our safety recommendations on SMSs issued to the FAA remain open. The oldest, Safety Recommendation A 16 36, asked the FAA to require that all Part 135 operators establish SMSs. We issued this safety recommendation from the investigation into the 2015 crash of a Part 135 on demand charter flight in which all nine persons onboard the airplane died. Footnote: We issued Safety Recommendation A 16 36 on November 3, 2016, as part of the final report of the investigation into a November 10, 2015, accident in Akron, Ohio.

The Hawker 700A airplane operating as an on demand charter flight under 14 CFR Part 135 departed controlled flight while on approach to the airport and impacted an apartment building. For more information, see NTSB. 2016. Crash During Nonprecision Instrument Approach to Landing, Execuflight Flight 1526, British Aerospace HS 125 700A, N237WR, Akron, Ohio, November 10, 2015. AAR-16-03. Washington, DC: NTSB. In the years since, we reiterated this safety recommendation in the final reports of seven Part 135 accidents resulting in 39 fatalities and nine serious injuries, and it is currently classified Open—Unacceptable Response.

Footnote: These accidents involved HEMS, air tours, and on demand charter operations. See NTSB accident reports AAR-17-02, AAR-18-02, AAR-19-02, AAR-20-01, AAR-21-01, AAR-21-04, and AIR-22-05. For a history of reiterations and correspondence with the FAA about this safety recommendation, see Safety Recommendation A 16 36. In 2019, Safety Recommendation A 19 28 asked the FAA to require all commercial air tour operators, regardless of their operating rule, to implement an SMS. This safety recommendation resulted from the investigation of an air tour accident conducted under 14 CFR 91.147 in New York, New York, in which the five passengers on board died.

Footnote: For more information on this March 11, 2018, accident involving an Airbus Helicopters AS350 which lost engine power during cruise flight, see NTSB. 2019. Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON Doors Off Flight, Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New York, March 11, 2018. AAR-19-04. Washington, DC: NTSB.

In March 2021, we reiterated Safety Recommendation A 19 28 in our investigation report on the safety of revenue passenger-carrying operations conducted under Part 91; the safety recommendation is currently classified Open—Acceptable Response. We also issued two new safety recommendations in that report: Safety Recommendations A 21 13 and -14 expanded our call for SMSs to include all Part 91 revenue passenger carrying operations such as sightseeing flights conducted in hot air balloons, intentional parachute jump flights, living history flight experience and other vintage aircraft flights, among others. Both recommendations are currently classified Open—Acceptable Response.

Footnote: Safety Recommendation A 21 13 asked the FAA require SMSs for the revenue passenger-carrying operations conducted under Part 91 or 14 CFR 119.1(e) exceptions, and Safety Recommendation A 21 14 asked that the FAA provide ongoing oversight of each operator’s SMS once established. For more information, see NTSB. 2021. Enhance Safety of Revenue Passenger Carrying Operations Conducted Under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. AAR-21-03. Washington, DC: NTSB.

In November 2021, following an accident involving the cross-wiring of the airplane’s antiskid brake systems that resulted in one fatality, we issued Safety Recommendation A 21 48 asking the FAA to require organizations that design, manufacture, and maintain aircraft to establish an SMS. Safety Recommendation A 21 48 is currently classified Open—Await Response. Footnote: For more information, see NTSB. 2021. Runway Overrun During Landing, Peninsula Aviation Services Inc., d.b.a. PenAir flight 3296, Saab 2000, N686PA, Unalaska, Alaska, October 17, 2019. AAR 21-05. Washington, DC: NTSB.

Most recently, in May 2022, we issued Safety Recommendation A 22 15 asking the FAA to develop guidance for small operators for scaling an SMS that includes methods and techniques for implementation and specific examples applicable to several operational sectors, including air tours. Footnote: Safety Recommendation A 22 15 is currently classified Open—Initial Response Received. For more information, see NTSB. 2022. Collision into Terrain, Safari Aviation Inc., Airbus AS350 B2, N985SA, Kekaha, Hawaii, December 26, 2019. AIR-22-05. Washington, DC: NTSB.

In the 15 years since our first aviation safety recommendation for SMSs in 2007, our investigations have consistently shown the need for aviation safety providers to implement SMSs to ensure its benefits to industry and the public are realized.

Our specific comments on areas of the NPRM relevant to these open safety recommendations follow.

Title 14 CFR Parts 135 and 91.147 SMS

We strongly support the proposed expansion of SMS requirements to include Part 135 operations without exceptions for the size of the operator. Safety Recommendation A-16-36 applies to all Part 135 operators because our investigations demonstrated that catastrophic accidents in Part 135 operations occur across a wide range of operator sizes. We believe that the safety of all Part 135 operations can be improved through implementation of SMSs. If the FAA issues a final rule requiring SMS for all Part 135 operations, it will likely satisfy the intent of Safety Recommendation A 16 36.

We appreciate that the FAA has recognized the need for SMS for HEMS operations, as we have previously recommended.

We also strongly support the proposed expansion of SMS requirements to include all operators conducting air tours under 14 CFR 91.147. As with our discussion on Part 135, we note that Safety Recommendation A-19-28 applied to all operators conducting air tour operations under 14 CFR 91.147 regardless of size. If this aspect of the NPRM were adopted as presented, it would likely satisfy the intent of Safety Recommendation A 19 28.

We appreciate that the diversity of Part 135 operators requires the FAA to consider how the rule can be effectively interpreted and heeded by operators spanning a wide range of characteristics, including their size and type of operations and available resources; this also applies to air tour operators under 14 CFR 91.147. In the NPRM, the FAA sought feedback (Question 2) from industry on whether the requirement for SMS should be limited to a certain subset of 14 CFR Part 135 and 91.147 operators, and what alternatives would achieve the same safety objectives as SMSs for operators not included under an SMS rule.

However, the value of an SMS to an operator comes from proactive management of safety through implementation of its four clearly defined and interdependen

August 3, 2022 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Billy Nolen, Acting Administrator: The FAA is analyzing this safety recommendation to develop an appropriate action plan. Additionally, the FAA has taken the following safety management system (SMS) actions:

• Published AC 120-92B, “SMS for Aviation Service Providers,” on January 8, 2015; revised and published FAA Order 8900.1, “Flight Standards Information Management System,” CHG 785, National Policy, effective April 25, 2022;

• Promotes and manages the SMS Voluntary Program; and

• A rulemaking project was initiated in the fall of 2020 titled “SMS for Parts 21, 91.147, 135, and 145.”

This rulemaking project is considering a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to apply the existing regulatory requirements of 14 CFR Part 5, SMS, into new areas of industry. The NPRM may include certain persons engaged in the design and production of aircraft, engines, or propellers; certificate holders that conduct common carriage operations under part 135; persons engaged in maintaining part 121 aircraft under part 145; and persons conducting specific types of air tour operations under § 91.147. The NPRM is anticipated to be published by fall 2022.

May 26, 2022 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The attached letter from the NTSB Chair provides information about the NTSB’s May 10, 2022, report, Collision into Terrain, Safari Aviation Inc., Airbus AS350 B2, N985SA, Kekaha, Hawaii, December 26, 2019, NTSB AIR-22-05. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (for example, new Safety Recommendations A-22-11 through -18, Reiterated Recommendations A 13 13, A-13-25, A-13-27, A-16-34 through -36, A 21 5, A-21-6, and A-21-15)

We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

This letter provides information about the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) May 10, 2022, report, Collision into Terrain, Safari Aviation Inc., Airbus AS350 B2, N985SA, Kekaha, Hawaii, December 26, 2019, NTSB AIR-22-05. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues:

• Aviation safety infrastructure limitations in Hawaii, including the need for aviation weather cameras, improved air-to-ground radio communications, and improved automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) capabilities to enable flight tracking and other safety services for low-flying air tour flights.

• Lack of effective cue-based weather training for air tour pilots in Hawaii.

• Need for trained company flight support personnel with operational control authority to support pilots’ en route, weather-related decision making.

• Need for safety management systems and flight data monitoring programs for Part 135 operators and the incorporation of recorded onboard videos and ADS B flight tracking data into safety assurance reviews.

• Need for improved Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) surveillance of air tour operations in Hawaii.

• Value of crash-resistant flight recorder systems in providing information critical for enabling the identification of the most effective measures to prevent similar accidents. • Emerging technologies to help prevent accidents resulting from inadvertent encounters with instrument meteorological conditions, including helicopter safety technologies and simulation devices used in pilot training. Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendations to the FAA. Additional information regarding these recommendations can be found in the noted sections of the report.

• Install the necessary infrastructure in Hawaii to enable continuous radio communication between the pilots of low-flying tour flights and ground support personnel, such as flight service station specialists and company flight support personnel, along the most heavily trafficked air tour routes. (A-22-11) (See section 2.4.2.1)

• Implement automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) infrastructure improvements in Hawaii, such as additional ADS B ground stations, that provide adequate coverage to enable real-time flight tracking and traffic advisory services for ADS-B Out- and In-equipped, low-flying air tour aircraft throughout their entire tour routes. (A-22-12) (See section 2.4.2.2)

• As an interim measure until completion of the action to satisfy Safety Recommendation A 21-15 [previously issued on May 13, 2021], require Hawaii air tour operators to install Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out equipment in their aircraft to enable real time flight position tracking. (A-22-13) (See section 2.4.2.2)

• Require air tour operators to have flight support personnel who are trained to exercise operational control authority, participate in preflight risk analysis, provide pilots with weather briefings, monitor the progress of the flights, and participate in two-way communications with pilots to alert them of any weather hazards. (A-22-14) (See section 2.5.1)

• Develop guidance for small operators for scaling a safety management system that includes methods and techniques for implementation and specific examples applicable to several operational sectors, including air tours. (A 22 15) (See section 2.5.2)

• Issue a safety alert for operators to encourage air tour operators to establish safety assurance processes to routinely review recorded onboard videos and automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast flight tracking data, ideally as part of a safety management system with an integrated flight data monitoring program, for the purpose of identifying and addressing risky trends in weather related operating practices, such as encounters or near encounters with instrument-meteorological-conditions-related hazards. (A-22-16) (See section 2.5.4)

• Improve the surveillance of air tour operations in Hawaii through the use of technologies and innovative approaches, including but not limited to comparing automatic dependent surveillance broadcast flight position data from air tour flights with weather camera imagery for the route and periodically reviewing onboard video recordings, to detect and correct operating practices that may lead to unacceptable weather-related risky behavior. (A 22 17) (See section 2.6)

• Issue and periodically update a special airworthiness information bulletin that lists newly manufactured helicopters that are equipped with features likely to reduce accidents resulting from inadvertent encounters with instrument meteorological conditions, describes retrofit options for helicopters that do not have such equipment, and encourages the voluntary integration of these safety features. (A-22-18) (See section 2.8.1)

In addition, the NTSB reiterates the following recommendations to the FAA:

• Require all existing turbine-powered, nonexperimental, nonrestricted-category aircraft that are not equipped with a flight data recorder or cockpit voice recorder and are operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 91, 121, or 135 to be retrofitted with a crash-resistant flight recorder system. The crash resistant flight recorder system should record cockpit audio and images with a view of the cockpit environment to include as much of the outside view as possible, and parametric data per aircraft and system installation, all as specified in Technical Standard Order C197, “Information Collection and Monitoring Systems.” (A-13-13) (See section 2.7)

• Initiate an aviation weather camera program in Hawaii that includes the installation and maintenance of aviation weather cameras at critical locations in Hawaii. Establish public access to these aviation weather cameras’ real-time imagery. (A-13-25) (See section 2.4.1) • Equip flight service station specialists responsible for Hawaii and the continental United States with the technical capabilities and training to provide verbal preflight and en route briefings using aviation weather camera imagery. (A-13-27) (See section 2.4.1) • Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators to install flight data recording devices capable of supporting a flight data monitoring program.

(A-16-34) (See section 2.5.3) • After the action in Safety Recommendation A-16-34 is completed, require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators to establish a structured flight data monitoring program that re