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NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-21-055

Recommendation

TO THE SAAB GROUP: Redesign the wheel speed transducer wire harnesses for the Saab 2000 airplane to prevent the harnesses from being installed incorrectly during maintenance and overhaul.

Safety Issue and Context

This report discusses the October 17, 2019, accident involving a Saab SA-2000 airplane, operated by Peninsula Aviation Services Inc. d.b.a. PenAir flight 3296, which overran the end of runway 13 at Unalaska Airport, Unalaska, Alaska. The airplane was substantially damaged during the runway overrun; as a result, of the 3 crewmembers and 39 passengers aboard, 1 passenger sustained fatal injuries, and 1 passenger sustained serious injuries. Eight passengers sustained minor injuries, most of which occurred during the evacuation.

Safety issues identified in this report include the potential for cross-wiring of airplane antiskid brake systems; insufficient Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidance to identify safety risks for air carriers experiencing significant organizational changes, including bankruptcy, acquisition, and merger; lack of FAA consideration of runway safety area dimensions during the process of authorizing an air carrier to operate its aircraft at a specific Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139 certificated airport, and the benefits of safety management systems for design, manufacturing, and maintenance organizations.

As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes six new safety recommendations to the FAA, three new safety recommendations to the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and one new recommendation to the Saab Group.

Response History

November 14, 2023 · NTSB Correspondence · Saab Aircraft of America, Inc.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) notice of proposed rulemaking titled, “Airworthiness Directives; Saab AB, Support and Services (Formerly Known as Saab AB, Saab Aeronautics) Airplanes,” which was published at 88 Federal Register 69105 on October 5, 2023. The notice proposes a new airworthiness directive (AD) applicable to all Saab AB, Support and Services Model Saab 2000 airplanes.

This proposed AD was prompted by a fatal accident involving a Saab 2000 airplane that occurred on October 17, 2019, in Unalaska, Alaska. The NTSB determined the probable cause to be, in part, “the landing gear manufacturer’s incorrect wiring of the wheel speed transducer harnesses on the left main landing gear during overhaul. The incorrect wiring caused the antiskid system not to function as intended, resulting in the failure of the left outboard tire and a significant loss of the airplane’s braking ability, which led to the runway overrun.”

As a result, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation A-21-55 asking the Saab Group to redesign the wheel speed transducer wire harness for the Saab 2000 airplane to prevent the harness from being installed incorrectly during maintenance and overhaul.

On May 15, 2023, Saab issued Service Bulletin (SB) 2000-32-084 Revision 1, which includes instructions for installing color markings on the harnesses and the wheel axles to ensure proper installation and connection of the anti-skid harnesses. The proposed AD would require the modifications described in Saab’s SB. The FAA is proposing this AD to address this unsafe condition, which, if not detected and corrected, could lead to wrong inputs to the anti-skid function, whenever activated, with consequent reduced braking capability, possibly resulting in damage to the airplane.

The NTSB believes that this proposed AD will improve safety by reducing the likelihood that this type of accident is repeated; therefore, we agree with its intent and have no technical objections to the proposed design improvements.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this NPRM.

May 24, 2023 · NTSB Correspondence · Saab Aircraft of America, Inc.

We note that you are reviewing Heroux Devtek’s draft Service Bulletin AIR83132-32-03, which you received in February. The draft includes a modification that will introduce color code markings on the landing gear axle and the antiskid harness end connectors. We look forward to reviewing the published modification. Pending our receipt and review of this information, Safety Recommendation A-21-55 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

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Recommendation Facts

Status
Open - Acceptable Response
Issued
November 18, 2021
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
Saab Aircraft of America, Inc.
Adopted
November 2, 2021
Related Investigation
DCA20MA002
Related Report
AAR-21-05
March 21, 2023 · Recipient Response · Saab Aircraft of America, Inc.

-From Micael Johansson, President and Chief Executive Officer, SAAB: Thank you for your letter, and for once again following up on the progress regarding fulfillment of NTSB Safety Recommendation A-21-55 on the Saab 2000 aircraft type.

The current status is that Saab received Heroux Devtek's draft Service Bulletin No. AIR83132-32-03 for review, the week commencing February 27. Some adjustments regarding the interface between the two Service Bulletins remain together with a final approval of the color type for its intended use. Thereafter, an on-aircraft kit-proofing will take place to verify the final procedures and materials. Saab regrets the extended coordination process between Heroux Devtek and Saab. Saab is continuing its efforts to have the Service Bulletins, addressing the additional safety barrier in accordance with NTSB Safety Recommendation released with high priority.

Saab will inform the NTSB when the subject Service Bulletins are released.

March 10, 2023 · NTSB Correspondence · Saab Aircraft of America, Inc.

We note that you have been working with the landing gear manufacturer to develop a modification that will introduce color code markings on the landing gear axle and the antiskid harness end connectors. You reported plans to introduce this modification in two service bulletins (SBs), which were expected to be published by the end of 2022. We also note that, after the SBs have been published, the European Aviation Safety Agency intends to issue an airworthiness directive to require the modification.

On February 9, 2023, Mr. Jan Erik Andersson, Head of Air Safety and Investigations, Saab, informed my staff that the SBs have been delayed due to additional coordination that was needed between Saab and the landing gear manufacturer. Pending our receipt and review of the published SBs, Safety Recommendation A-21-55 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

August 30, 2022 · Recipient Response · Saab Aircraft of America, Inc.

-From Micael Johansson, President and Chief Executive Officer, Saab: Thank you for your letter, and the follow-up on our progress regarding the NTSB Safety Recommendation A-21-55.

Saab has since our initial response from January 13 2022, been working in close coordination with both the landing gear manufacturer Heroux Devtek and with EASA as state of design.

The outcome of this work has resulted in a design change that introduces color code markings on the landing gear axle and the anti-skid harness end connectors. This has been done in order to add an additional safety layer in addition to the previous incorporated safety barriers for prevention of future cross-installation of the anti-skid harness installation, and to thereby meet the NTSB Safety Recommendation A-21-55.

This modification will be introduced via a mandatory Service Bulletin with planned issue date before the end of 2022. This Service Bulletin will be subject to an Airworthiness Directive by EASA.

August 23, 2022 · NTSB Correspondence · Saab Aircraft of America, Inc.

We note that you are working with the landing gear manufacturer to address the safety issue discussed in this recommendation. Pending our receipt of future updates and completion of the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-21-55 is classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

January 13, 2022 · Recipient Response · Saab Aircraft of America, Inc.

-From Micael Johansson, President and CEO, Saab: In response to the safety recommendation, Saab has initiated a dialogue with the landing gear manufacturer in order to address the NTSB's recommendations set forth in the Board's Report MR-21-05. Identified measures will be closely coordinated with relevant civil aviation authorities, also with regard to the outcome of the related safety recommendations to the EASA and FM in the NTSB Report.

November 18, 2021 · NTSB Correspondence · Saab Aircraft of America, Inc.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.

The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s November 2, 2021, report Runway Overrun During Landing, Peninsula Aviation Services Inc. d.b.a. PenAir Flight 3296, Saab 2000, N686PA, Unalaska, Alaska, October 17, 2019, NTSB/AAR 21/05. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, A-21-55). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.

We are providing the following information to urge Saab to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.

This letter also includes information about our November 2, 2021, report Runway Overrun During Landing, Peninsula Aviation Services Inc. d.b.a. PenAir Flight 3296, Saab 2000, N686PA, Unalaska, Alaska, October 17, 2019, NTSB/AAR 21/05. The details of this investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov/.

As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issue: the potential for cross wiring of airplane antiskid brake systems. Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to Saab. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted sections of the report.

• Redesign the wheel speed transducer wire harnesses for the Saab 2000 airplane to prevent the harnesses from being installed incorrectly during maintenance and overhaul. (A-21-55) (See section 2.3.4.)

The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (Safety Recommendation A-21-55). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

All communications regarding safety recommendations are stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. In the likely event that your company uses autogenerated and/or preformatted confidentiality statements on letterhead or outgoing e-mails, please include a statement in your letter indicating that the information can be publicly released. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.