Skip to Main Content
FlightPushFLIGHTPUSH
NTSB Safety Recommendations

Learn

Dashboard My Courses Mastery Map Practice Flight Bag

Resources

CFR & AIM FAA Orders Handbooks & Guides Certification Standards Pilot/Controller Glossary Advisory Circulars Legal Interpretations
Safety Center
Articles Trust Center
Help Center FAQ Status
  1. Safety Center
  2. NTSB Safety Recommendations
  3. NTSB A-21-047
Loading
flightpush.co home

NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-21-047

Recommendation

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require the submission and consideration of system safety assessments addressing the landing gear antiskid system for the certification of future transport-category airplane designs. The certification should ensure that the system safety assessments are consistent with the intent of Advisory Circular 25.1309, System Design and Analysis, and that the assessments evaluate and mitigate the potential for human error that can lead to a cross-wiring error.

Safety Issue and Context

This report discusses the October 17, 2019, accident involving a Saab SA-2000 airplane, operated by Peninsula Aviation Services Inc. d.b.a. PenAir flight 3296, which overran the end of runway 13 at Unalaska Airport, Unalaska, Alaska. The airplane was substantially damaged during the runway overrun; as a result, of the 3 crewmembers and 39 passengers aboard, 1 passenger sustained fatal injuries, and 1 passenger sustained serious injuries. Eight passengers sustained minor injuries, most of which occurred during the evacuation.

Safety issues identified in this report include the potential for cross-wiring of airplane antiskid brake systems; insufficient Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidance to identify safety risks for air carriers experiencing significant organizational changes, including bankruptcy, acquisition, and merger; lack of FAA consideration of runway safety area dimensions during the process of authorizing an air carrier to operate its aircraft at a specific Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139 certificated airport, and the benefits of safety management systems for design, manufacturing, and maintenance organizations.

As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes six new safety recommendations to the FAA, three new safety recommendations to the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and one new recommendation to the Saab Group.

Response History

February 26, 2025 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

In our March 2, 2023, comments responding to your “System Safety Assessments” notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), we informed you that the NPRM, as proposed, would not satisfy this recommendation. Specifically, we expressed our concern that the guidance contained in draft AC 25.1309-1B only applied to analyzing some failures in the brake system, and that the NPRM did not propose any requirements for SSAs related to human error that could lead to cross-wiring of antiskid brake system components, including the wheel speed transducers.

We are aware that, on August 27, 2024, you published the SSA final rule and, on August 30, 2024, you published AC 25.1309-1B. We note, however, that the final rule and AC do not address the concerns we raised in our NPRM comments. Because you have not reported any additional plans to address this recommendation, the Board has classified Safety Recommendation A-21-47 CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION.

March 7, 2024 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Michael G. Whitaker, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) received the Board’s letter, dated April 19, 2023, offering the following notes: • The existing regulations, policies, and guidance were implemented prior to the PenAir accident.

• The system safety assessments (SSA) did not address the failure mode related to the cross-wiring of the wheel speed transducers during maintenance or overhaul, nor propose any requirements related to human error in these instances.

• Comments responding to the SSA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) state the guidance contained in draft Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1309-1B would apply to analyzing some failures in the brake system, but it doesn’t propose any requirements for SSAs related to human error that could lead to cross-wiring of antiskid brake system components.

The FAA intends to address the Board’s comments concerning the proposed rule as part of the final rule. We are unable to address these comments in this letter due to the restrictions in the Department of Transportation’s ex parte communication guidance. In the 2023 Fall Unified Agenda, the FAA noted that it expects to publish the final rule in May 2024. Additional information for this regulatory action is available at the following website:

Read Recommendation

Recommendation Facts

Status
Closed - Unacceptable Action
Issued
November 18, 2021
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
FAA
Adopted
November 2, 2021
Closed
February 26, 2025
Related Investigation
DCA20MA002
Related Report
AAR-21-05

https:/www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202310&RIN=2120-AJ99

April 19, 2023 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We point out that the regulations, policy, and guidance referenced in your letter were implemented prior to the PenAir accident. Although Saab’s SSA for the Saab 2000 was conducted in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulation/Joint Aviation Requirement 25.1309, Equipment, Systems, and Installations, our review of the SSA found that it did not address the failure mode related to the cross-wiring of wheel speed transducers during maintenance or overhaul and the effect that this failure mode could have on the flight crew and the airplane during landing.

We point out that the intent of this recommendation is to ensure that SSAs evaluate and mitigate the potential for human error that can lead to a cross-wiring error of wheel speed transducers for the landing gear antiskid brake system.

In our March 2, 2023, comments responding to your “System Safety Assessments” NPRM, we noted that the guidance contained in draft AC 25.1309-1B would apply to analyzing some failures in the brake system; however, the NPRM did not propose any requirements for SSAs related to human error that could lead to cross-wiring of antiskid brake system components, including the wheel speed transducers. We informed you that the NPRM, as proposed, would not satisfy Safety Recommendation A-21-47.

Pending our review of a plan for taking the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-21-47 is classified OPEN-- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

March 2, 2023 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled, “System Safety Assessments,” which was published at 87 Federal Register 75424 on December 8, 2022. We welcome the opportunity to provide comments on this NPRM, in which the FAA proposes to amend certain airworthiness regulations to standardize the criteria for conducting safety assessments for systems, including flight controls and powerplants, installed on transport-category airplanes.

According to the NPRM, the proposed action addresses a congressional mandate, safety recommendations from the NTSB, industry working groups safety analyses, and updates to regulations and provides insight to new regulations related to system safety. The NPRM also moves the United States closer to harmonizing Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 25.1309 with European Aviation Safety Agency Certification Specification-25. The intended effect of this proposed action is to improve aviation safety by making system safety certification requirements more comprehensive and consistent. The NTSB has long recognized the need for system safety assessments to improve safety in aircraft design.

The following comments discuss 10 safety recommendations issued to the FAA regarding issues addressed in the NPRM and accompanying draft advisory circulars (ACs).

System Safety Analyses for Landing Gear

Safety Recommendation A-21-46 asked the FAA to identify all currently certificated transport-category airplanes for which system safety assessments for landing gear systems did not consider human error that could lead to cross-wiring of antiskid brake system components, including the wheel speed transducers. It also asked that manufacturers of airplanes without such assessments perform the assessments and then implement mitigations to prevent cross-wiring of antiskid brake system components.

Footnote: Following the October 17, 2019, accident involving PenAir flight 3296, a Saab 2000, we issued Safety Recommendations A-21-46 and -47, which are classified, respectively, Open—Await Response and Open—Initial Response Received. For more information about our findings in this investigation, see NTSB. 2021. Runway Overrun During Landing, Peninsula Aviation Services Inc. d.b.a. PenAir Flight 3296, Saab 2000, N686PA, Unalaska, Alaska, October 17, 2019, AAR-21/05. Washington, DC: NTSB.

Safety Recommendation A-21-47 asked the FAA to require the submission and consideration of system safety assessments addressing the landing gear antiskid system for the certification of future transport-category airplane designs. The certification should ensure that the system safety assessments are consistent with the intent of AC 25.1309 and that the assessments evaluate and mitigate the potential for human error that can lead to a cross-wiring error.

We note that draft AC 25.1309-1B includes guidance that would apply to analyzing some failures in the brake system. However, the NPRM does not address requiring system safety assessments related to human error that could lead to cross wiring of antiskid brake system components, including the wheel speed transducers. As proposed, the NPRM would not satisfy Safety Recommendations A 21-46 and -47.

January 18, 2023 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Billy Nolen, Acting Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) currently requires the submission and consideration of system safety assessments (SSA) for critical systems, including the landing systems, for the certification of transport-category airplanes. Specifically, 14 CFR §§ 25.1309, 25.1709, 25.1711, and 25.1729 were effective through amendment 25-123 in the Enhanced Airworthiness Program for Airplane Systems/Fuel Tank Safety Final Rule, on December 10, 2007 (72 FR 63364), and provide the foundation for the submission and consideration of an SSA, as follows:

• § 25.1309 – Equipment, Systems, and Installations, provides the fail-safe design regulations for systems and associated components.

• § 25.1709 – System Safety: Electrical Wire Interconnection System (EWIS), contains the EWIS safety regulations (companion to § 25.1309), addressing both functional and physical failures.

• § 25.1711 – Component Identification: EWIS, provides regulations for EWIS associated with systems that require redundancy to be specifically identified with component part number, function, and separation requirements for bundles.

• § 25.1729 – Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA): EWIS, requires the identification method of § 25.1711 to be included in the airplane’s ICA. This information, which identifies the systems associated with a specific wire or bundle, is readily available to individuals who maintain or modify the aircraft.

Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1309-1A, System Design and Analysis, and AC 25.1701-1, Certification of Electrical Wiring Interconnection Systems on Transport Category Airplanes, provide guidance for showing compliance to §§ 25.1309 and 25.1709, to include development of an SSA. The SSA should identify all cross-wire type design or installation errors that may occur during manufacturing, production assembly, and maintenance via a common cause analysis. All potential cross-wiring design or maintenance deficiencies identified during the analysis should require corrective actions to determine acceptability of the resultant design.

In addition to the regulations and the above ACs, FAA policy statement PS-ANM-25-18, Post-Maintenance Checks and Tests, issued February 16, 2016, emphasizes the development of appropriate post-maintenance checks and tests as part of the maintenance instructions for a type certificate (TC), amended TC, or supplemental TC to comply with § 25.1529, ICA, § 25.1729, and appendix H to 14 CFR Part 25. To meet the intent of these Part 25 regulations, applicants should identify necessary checks and tests and include them in the ICA.

The applicant should select post-maintenance checks and tests using a process that considers the safety impact of maintenance, including potential errors, based on data in an SSA or other equivalent analyses.

The FAA believes that it currently meets the safety intent of Safety Recommendation A-21-47 and requests closure based on the above existing regulations, policy, and guidance, which are all available at https://drs.faa.gov/browse. We recognize that recurrent outreach and education is important in ensuring that subject matter experts in government and industry alike are knowledgeable in properly meeting regulations and following guidance. Therefore, the FAA will continue to provide such education on the subject of SSAs in the future.

I believe that the FAA has effectively addressed Safety Recommendation A-21-47 and consider our actions complete.

September 1, 2022 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that you are reviewing these safety recommendations and determining an appropriate plan of action; however, you did not indicate if you intend to take the recommended actions or describe how you will make this determination. Therefore, we are unable to determine if your actions are responsive to these recommendations. Consequently, pending our receipt of this additional information, Safety Recommendations A-21-46 through -48 remain classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.

January 25, 2022 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Steve Dickson, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is currently reviewing these safety recommendations and determining an appropriate plan of action.

November 18, 2021 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s November 2, 2021, report Runway Overrun During Landing, Peninsula Aviation Services Inc. d.b.a. PenAir Flight 3296, Saab 2000, N686PA, Unalaska, Alaska, October 17, 2019, NTSB/AAR 21/05. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (for example, A-21-46 through -51). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

This letter provides information about the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) November 2, 2021, report Runway Overrun During Landing, Peninsula Aviation Services Inc. d.b.a. PenAir Flight 3296, Saab 2000, N686PA, Unalaska, Alaska, October 17, 2019, NTSB/AAR-21/05. The details of this investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov/.

As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues:

• Potential for cross-wiring of airplane antiskid brake systems • Insufficient Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidance to identify safety risks for air carriers experiencing significant organizational changes, including bankruptcy, acquisition, and merger • Lack of FAA consideration of runway safety area dimensions during the process of authorizing an air carrier to operate its aircraft at a specific Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139-certificated airport • Safety management systems for organizations that design, manufacture, and maintain aircraft.

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendations to the FAA. Additional information regarding these recommendations can be found in the noted sections of the report.

• Identify all currently certificated transport-category airplanes for which system safety assessments for landing gear systems did not consider human error that could lead to cross-wiring of antiskid brake system components, including the wheel speed transducers, and require manufacturers of transport-category airplanes without such assessments to perform the assessments and then implement mitigations to prevent cross-wiring of antiskid brake system components. (A-21-46) (See section 2.3.4.1.)

• Require the submission and consideration of system safety assessments addressing the landing gear antiskid system for the certification of future transport-category airplane designs. The certification should ensure that the system safety assessments are consistent with the intent of Advisory Circular 25.1309, System Design and Analysis, and that the assessments evaluate and mitigate the potential for human error that can lead to a cross wiring error. (A 21-47) (See section 2.3.4.1.)

• Require organizations that design, manufacture, and maintain aircraft to establish a safety management system. (A-21-48) (See section 2.3.4.2.)

• Notify principal operations inspectors and frontline managers about the circumstances of this accident and emphasize the importance of existing Federal Aviation Administration guidance for detecting and mitigating the safety risks that can result when certificate holders experience significant organizational change, such as high personnel turnover, a reduction to route structures or flight schedules, bankruptcy, acquisition, and merger. (A-21-49) (See section 2.5.1.)

• Revise Order 8900.1, Flight Standards Information Management System, to include a formalized transition procedure to be used during a changeover of certificate management team personnel responsible for overseeing a certificate holder that is undergoing significant organizational change (for a reason described in volume 6, chapter 2, section 18 of the order) to ensure that incoming personnel are fully aware of potential safety risks. (A-21-50) (See section 2.5.1.)

• Include the runway design code for runways of intended use among the criteria assessed when authorizing a scheduled air carrier to operate its airplanes on a regular basis at an airport certificated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139. (A-21-51) (See section 2.5.2.)

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (Safety Recommendations A-21-46 through -51). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.