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  3. NTSB A-21-039
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NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-21-039

Recommendation

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Conduct a study of how aircraft accelerations vary along the length of the aircraft during turbulence encounters, including differences among aircraft types operated by Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 air carriers, and publish the study findings.

Safety Issue and Context

Turbulence-related accidents are the most common type of accident involving air carriers operating under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121. From 2009 through 2018, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that turbulence-related accidents accounted for more than a third of all Part 121 accidents; most of these accidents resulted in one or more serious injuries but no aircraft damage.

This NTSB safety research report examines the prevalence and risk factors of turbulence-related accidents in Part 121 air carrier operations; assesses the effectiveness of policies, programs, technologies, and other applicable safety countermeasures; and makes recommendations for improving turbulence avoidance and injury mitigation.

Response History

January 3, 2024 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that you do not plan to conduct the recommended study because you do not believe it would yield useful data for airplane operations in turbulence. You indicated that all aircraft are influenced significantly by fuselage flexibility and dynamic loading effects and that combining large transport aircraft into a common generic flexibility category that includes smaller transport aircraft data would not produce reliable or useful data on fuselage acceleration.

You also point out that the variations in airframe flexibility between different transport airplane models are already known to cause significant differences in acceleration magnitudes along the fuselage length from encounters with atmospheric turbulence.

We point out that, although flexibility characteristics can cause significant difference in acceleration along the length of the fuselage, we do not know how those characteristics can affect the variations noted in our study. We request that you submit any data you have on how flexibility characteristics factor in the variations in acceleration. We also point out that this recommendation does not ask for a generic study, but instead asks you to study how the accelerations vary, including differences among aircraft types operated under Part 121.

Little published data exist on load factor variations that occur within aircraft cabins in real-world turbulence encounters, and observed load factor differences may not be generalizable to other aircraft types. Therefore, we continue to believe this study is needed and we are in the process of scheduling a meeting with your staff to discuss the intent of this recommendation. In the meantime, pending our review of the requested information and a plan for taking the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-21-39 is classified OPEN-- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

July 20, 2023 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Polly Trottenberg, Acting Administrator: We understand the Board’s concern for aircraft turbulence and how it may affect occupants differently in different parts of the aircraft cabin. However, the FAA does not believe the recommended study would provide the generic turbulence effects and lead to policy changes. Not all aircraft are influenced significantly by fuselage flexibility and dynamic loading effects. Combining large transport aircraft into a common generic flexibility category that includes smaller transport aircraft data would lead to fuselage acceleration data that is too unreliable to be useful in airline operations.

Read Recommendation

Recommendation Facts

Status
Open - Unacceptable Response
Issued
September 7, 2021
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
FAA
Adopted
August 10, 2021
Related Investigation
DCA18SS003
Related Report
SS-21-01

The variations in airframe flexibility between different transport airplane models are known to cause significant differences in acceleration magnitudes along the fuselage length from encounters with atmospheric turbulence. Therefore, we do not expect that a new generic study of how accelerations vary along the length of the fuselage for turbulence encounters would yield useful data for airplane operations in turbulence.

I believe the FAA has effectively addressed Safety Recommendations A-21-28 and -39 and consider our actions complete.

May 4, 2022 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We did not find any information in your letter related to these recommendations. Pending our receipt and review of this additional information, Safety Recommendations A-21-39 through -41 remain classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.

November 19, 2021 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Steve Dickson, Administrator: The FAA is reviewing part 121 requirements and associated guidance material that pertains to aircraft turbulence and injury prevention. Our review will determine if updates to part 121 and/or current guidance material are necessary to address turbulence-related injuries.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA’s progress on these recommendations and anticipate providing an update by December 31, 2022.

September 7, 2021 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s August 10, 2021, report Preventing Turbulence-Related Injuries in Air Carrier Operations Conducted Under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, NTSB/SS-21/01. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (for example, A-21-25 through -42; Reiterated Recommendations A-17-21 and -22, A-17-26; Classified and Reiterated Recommendation A-17-25). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.

If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

This letter provides information about the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) August 10, 2021, report Preventing Turbulence-Related Injuries in Air Carrier Operations Conducted Under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, NTSB/SS-21/01. The details of this safety research and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

As a result of this research, we identified the following safety issues:

• Insufficient submission and dissemination of turbulence observations. • A lack of shared awareness of turbulence risks. • The need for mitigation of common turbulence-related injury circumstances. • The need for updated turbulence guidance.

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration. Additional information regarding these recommendations can be found in the noted sections of the report.

• Work with stakeholders to standardize the distribution of pilot weather reports (PIREPs) across and within air traffic control facilities to ensure they are disseminated to only those facilities and air traffic controller positions for which each PIREP applies. (A-21-25) (See section 4.1.1.)

• As a condition of enhanced weather information system approval, require Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 air carriers to disseminate all turbulence observations to the National Airspace System as pilot weather reports, as well as reports of smooth ride conditions. (A-21-26) (See section 4.1.1.)

• Determine how to harmonize current and future eddy dissipation rate algorithm performance in operational environments and publish the results of this determination. (A 21-27) (See section 4.1.2.)

• Incorporate the automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast weather capability in the next version of the automatic dependent surveillance broadcast technical standard order. (A 21 28) (See section 4.1.2.)

• After the automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) technical standard order is revised as recommended in Safety Recommendation A 21 28, require that aircraft flown in Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 air carrier operations be retrofitted with automatic dependent surveillance broadcast weather capable ADS-B equipment. (A 21 29) (See section 4.1.2.)

• Require automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast weather (ADS-B Wx)-equipped aircraft to broadcast ADS-B Wx information when operating in airspace requiring automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast capability as defined by Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations 91.225. (A-21-30) (See section 4.1.2.)

• In collaboration with the National Weather Service, modify airmen’s meteorological information (AIRMET) advisory issuing practices to include graphical AIRMET advisories with higher granularity, taking into account the effect it would have on all National Airspace System users. (A-21-31) (See section 4.2.1.)

• Distribute graphical airmen’s meteorological information advisories, significant meteorological information advisories, and center weather advisories to air traffic controllers as controller-selectable layers on current and future controller radar displays in air route traffic control centers and terminal radar approach control facilities. (A 21 32) (See section 4.2.1.)

• Work with local safety councils to develop training on the use of the advisories developed for Safety Recommendation A-21-32. (A-21-33) (See section 4.2.1.)

• In collaboration with the National Weather Service, operationalize a turbulence nowcast, such as the graphical turbulence guidance nowcast. (A-21-34) (See section 4.2.2.)

• Develop air traffic control guidelines for use of the turbulence nowcast operationalized in accordance with Safety Recommendations A-21-34 and A-21-44. (A-21-35) (See section 4.2.2.)

• Incorporate total lightning and hail information as selectable layers on air traffic controller radar displays in air route traffic control centers and terminal radar approach control facilities. (A-21-36) (See section 4.2.3.)

• After the action in Safety Recommendation A-21-36 is completed, provide training to air traffic controllers on the use of the controller-selectable total lightning and hail information. (A-21-37) (See section 4.2.3.)

• Based on National Transportation Safety Board data on turbulence-related Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 accidents, include in the revisions to Advisory Circular 120-88A, “Preventing Injuries Caused by Turbulence,” in Safety Recommendation A-21-42 the phases of flight and associated altitudes at which flight attendants should be secured in their seats during Part 121 air carrier operations, including in particular the descent phase of flight. (A 21 38) (See section 4.3.1.)

• Conduct a study of how aircraft accelerations vary along the length of the aircraft during turbulence encounters, including differences among aircraft types operated by Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 air carriers, and publish the study findings. (A 21 39) (See section 4.3.2.)

• Conduct a study to determine the factors that affect caregivers’ decisions about the use of child restraint systems (CRSs) when traveling on a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 air carrier airplane with children under the age of 2 and to understand the challenges associated with using CRSs; publish the study findings. (A-21-40) (See section 4.3.3.)

• After the action in Safety Recommendation A-21-40 is completed, use the study findings to direct the Federal Aviation Administration’s efforts to increase child restraint system usage. (A-21-41) (See section 4.3.3.)

• Revise Advisory Circular 120-88A, “Preventing Injuries Caused by Turbulence,” to reflect current best practices and the findings of this research report, such as new turbulence forecasting and warning technologies; training methods; in-flight communications between pilots and flight attendants, procedures, and available information for predicting turbulence; and altitudes at which flight attendants should be secured in their seats. (A 21 42) (See section 4.4.)

In addition, the NTSB reiterates the following recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration:

• Provide air traffic controllers with automated pilot weather report (PIREP) data-collection tools that incorporate design elements to prevent input errors, increase quantity, and improve the timeliness of PIREPs disseminated to the National Airspace System. (A 17 21) (See section 4.1.1.)

• Incorporate automation technology that captures data elements from air traffic controllers’ displays,