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NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-21-037

Recommendation

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: After the action in Safety Recommendation A-21-36 is completed, provide training to air traffic controllers on the use of the controller-selectable total lightning and hail information.

Safety Issue and Context

Turbulence-related accidents are the most common type of accident involving air carriers operating under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121. From 2009 through 2018, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that turbulence-related accidents accounted for more than a third of all Part 121 accidents; most of these accidents resulted in one or more serious injuries but no aircraft damage.

This NTSB safety research report examines the prevalence and risk factors of turbulence-related accidents in Part 121 air carrier operations; assesses the effectiveness of policies, programs, technologies, and other applicable safety countermeasures; and makes recommendations for improving turbulence avoidance and injury mitigation.

Response History

March 3, 2025 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

On November 5, 2024, former FAA Administrator Michael G. Whitaker informed us that the agency is continuing the work described in its previous letter regarding Safety Recommendations A-21-25 and -32 through -37. We look forward to receiving your next update.

November 5, 2024 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Michael G. Whitaker, Administrator: As previously stated, the draft Air Traffic Operations Manual will be published and will accompany the roll-out at a later stage once the AWD Web Server development phase concludes. The implementation of future NextGen NWS weather products, such as lightning and hail detection, will be introduced as operational requirements are met.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA’s progress on Safety Recommendations A-21-25 and -32 through -37, and provide an update by July 31, 2025.

January 3, 2024 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that you continue to develop the AWD and believe it should be located at the operational supervisors’ and traffic management unit’s workstations for dissemination to operational personnel instead of on controllers’ radar displays, as recommended. We also note that you are drafting an air traffic operations manual that will be used to train controllers on the different aspects of AWD, such as available weather products, display, and system functionality.

You previously told us that you believe lightning and hail should not be displayed on ATC radar displays because doing so would provide no safety benefit, result in a deterioration of safety services, erode controller situational awareness, and increase aircraft delays and potential FAA liability. However, we are not aware of any data that supports these concerns. In fact, our research report determined these concerns to be unfounded and indicated that controllers uniformly stated that having lightning data available on their radar displays would be beneficial if it were implemented as a controller-selectable layer.

Pending our review of a plan for providing the recommended information to controllers and training them on how to access the information on their radar displays, Safety Recommendations A-21-36 and -37 remain classified OPEN-- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

Read Recommendation

Recommendation Facts

Status
Open - Unacceptable Response
Issued
September 7, 2021
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
FAA
Adopted
August 10, 2021
Related Investigation
DCA18SS003
Related Report
SS-21-01
August 21, 2023 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Kathryn Thomson, Deputy Administrator: The FAA continues working towards the development of the new NWS product to operationalize, expand, and enhance the situational awareness of air traffic controllers in relation to all hazardous weather conditions, such as lightning detection and areas of hail.

The AWD Web Server includes all the aforementioned weather products. We believe the best location for the AWD is at the operational supervisors’ and traffic management unit’s workstations for dissemination to operational personnel for planning support and situational awareness.

The draft Air Traffic Operations Manual, aimed at training the air traffic control workforce on the different aspects of AWD, such as available weather products, display, and system functionality, will be published at a later stage once the AWD Web Server development phase concludes, and will accompany the roll-out. The implementation of future NextGen NWS weather products, such as lightning detection and hail, will be introduced as operational requirements are met.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA’s progress on Safety Recommendations A-21-25 and -32 through -37 and provide an update by June 30, 2024.

May 4, 2022 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that you continue to believe that lightning and hail should not be displayed on ATC radar displays. You reported that, in your previous response to A 12-18, you determined that adding this information to controllers’ displays would provide no safety benefit, result in a deterioration of safety services, erode controller situational awareness, and increase aircraft delays and potential FAA liability.

Our research report determined that these concerns are unfounded. For example, the erosion of situational awareness due to display clutter could be addressed by configuring lightning data as a controller-selectable layer on displays. In stakeholder interviews, some controllers voiced concerns about additional weather data leading to display clutter, but controllers uniformly stated that having lightning data available on their radar displays would be beneficial if it were implemented as a controller-selectable layer.

Concerns about the interpretation, use, and communication of lightning data should be addressed through training and the development of appropriate policies, procedures, and phrasing. Liability issues concerning lightning data that are displayed to controllers but not communicated to pilots are already present with other weather data that are available to controllers, and they could be dealt with similarly. Further, we continue to investigate accidents for which ATC access to lightning data could have been beneficial.

In addition to lightning strikes, encounters with hail aloft can be damaging to aircraft and often occur in or near an environment characterized by strong convective activity, such as thunderstorms. Weather forecasters often look specifically for the potential for deep convection when forecasting for hail, and the NWS defines hail as ice falling from a cumulonimbus cloud. Like lightning, hail can act as a proxy for regions of deep or vigorous convection or thunderstorms, and the hazards associated with them. Regions of hail must also be avoided to prevent damage to aircraft by the hail itself and mitigate encounters with severe turbulence and other hazards associated with convection.

We continue to believe controllers would benefit from having this additional safety information available to them as selectable layers on their radar displays, and we encourage you to reconsider your position. In the meantime, Safety Recommendations A-21-36 and -37 are classified OPEN-- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

November 19, 2021 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Steve Dickson, Administrator: Once AWD and associated weather products have been approved for use, ATC technical training specialists with the FAA will collaborate with stakeholders to develop training that familiarizes the workforce with the display, weather products, and system functionality.

September 7, 2021 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s August 10, 2021, report Preventing Turbulence-Related Injuries in Air Carrier Operations Conducted Under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, NTSB/SS-21/01. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (for example, A-21-25 through -42; Reiterated Recommendations A-17-21 and -22, A-17-26; Classified and Reiterated Recommendation A-17-25). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.

If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

This letter provides information about the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) August 10, 2021, report Preventing Turbulence-Related Injuries in Air Carrier Operations Conducted Under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, NTSB/SS-21/01. The details of this safety research and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

As a result of this research, we identified the following safety issues:

• Insufficient submission and dissemination of turbulence observations. • A lack of shared awareness of turbulence risks. • The need for mitigation of common turbulence-related injury circumstances. • The need for updated turbulence guidance.

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration. Additional information regarding these recommendations can be found in the noted sections of the report.

• Work with stakeholders to standardize the distribution of pilot weather reports (PIREPs) across and within air traffic control facilities to ensure they are disseminated to only those facilities and air traffic controller positions for which each PIREP applies. (A-21-25) (See section 4.1.1.)

• As a condition of enhanced weather information system approval, require Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 air carriers to disseminate all turbulence observations to the National Airspace System as pilot weather reports, as well as reports of smooth ride conditions. (A-21-26) (See section 4.1.1.)

• Determine how to harmonize current and future eddy dissipation rate algorithm performance in operational environments and publish the results of this determination. (A 21-27) (See section 4.1.2.)

• Incorporate the automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast weather capability in the next version of the automatic dependent surveillance broadcast technical standard order. (A 21 28) (See section 4.1.2.)

• After the automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) technical standard order is revised as recommended in Safety Recommendation A 21 28, require that aircraft flown in Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 air carrier operations be retrofitted with automatic dependent surveillance broadcast weather capable ADS-B equipment. (A 21 29) (See section 4.1.2.)

• Require automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast weather (ADS-B Wx)-equipped aircraft to broadcast ADS-B Wx information when operating in airspace requiring automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast capability as defined by Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations 91.225. (A-21-30) (See section 4.1.2.)

• In collaboration with the National Weather Service, modify airmen’s meteorological information (AIRMET) advisory issuing practices to include graphical AIRMET advisories with higher granularity, taking into account the effect it would have on all National Airspace System users. (A-21-31) (See section 4.2.1.)

• Distribute graphical airmen’s meteorological information advisories, significant meteorological information advisories, and center weather advisories to air traffic controllers as controller-selectable layers on current and future controller radar displays in air route traffic control centers and terminal radar approach control facilities. (A 21 32) (See section 4.2.1.)

• Work with local safety councils to develop training on the use of the advisories developed for Safety Recommendation A-21-32. (A-21-33) (See section 4.2.1.)

• In collaboration with the National Weather Service, operationalize a turbulence nowcast, such as the graphical turbulence guidance nowcast. (A-21-34) (See section 4.2.2.)

• Develop air traffic control guidelines for use of the turbulence nowcast operationalized in accordance with Safety Recommendations A-21-34 and A-21-44. (A-21-35) (See section 4.2.2.)

• Incorporate total lightning and hail information as selectable layers on air traffic controller radar displays in air route traffic control centers and terminal radar approach control facilities. (A-21-36) (See section 4.2.3.)

• After the action in Safety Recommendation A-21-36 is completed, provide training to air traffic controllers on the use of the controller-selectable total lightning and hail information. (A-21-37) (See section 4.2.3.)

• Based on National Transportation Safety Board data on turbulence-related Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 accidents, include in the revisions to Advisory Circular 120-88A, “Preventing Injuries Caused by Turbulence,” in Safety Recommendation A-21-42 the phases of flight and associated altitudes at which flight attendants should be secured in their seats during Part 121 air carrier operations, including in particular the descent phase of flight. (A 21 38) (See section 4.3.1.)

• Conduct a study of how aircraft accelerations vary along the length of the aircraft during turbulence encounters, including differences among aircraft types operated by Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 air carriers, and publish the study findings. (A 21 39) (See section 4.3.2.)

• Conduct a study to determine the factors that affect caregivers’ decisions about the use of child restraint systems (CRSs) when traveling on a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 air carrier airplane with children under the age of 2 and to understand the challenges associated with using CRSs; publish the study findings. (A-21-40) (See section 4.3.3.)

• After the action in Safety Recommendation A-21-40 is completed, use the study findings to direct the Federal Aviation Administration’s efforts to increase child restraint system usage. (A-21-41) (See section 4.3.3.)

• Revise Advisory Circular 120-88A, “Preventing Injuries Caused by Turbulence,” to reflect current best practices and the findings of this research report, such as new turbulence forecasting and warning technologies; training methods; in-flight communications between pilots and flight attendants, procedures, and available information for predicting turbulence; and altitudes at which flight attendants should be secured in their seats. (A 21 42) (See section 4.4.)

In addition, the NTSB reiterates the following recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration:

• Provide air traffic controllers with automated pilot weather report (PIREP) data-collection tools that incorporate design elements to prevent input errors, increase quantity, and improve the timeliness of PIREPs disseminated to the National Airspace System. (A 17 21) (See section 4.1.1.)

• Incorporate automation technology that captures data elements from air traffic controllers’ displays,