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NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-21-023

Recommendation

TO AVIATION INDUSTRY GROUPS (AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOTS ASSOCIATION, EXPERIMENTAL AIRCRAFT ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL BUSINESS AVIATION ASSOCIATION, TOUR OPERATORS PROGRAM OF SAFETY, TONGASS AIRCRAFT PILOTS ASSOCIATION, AND HELICOPTER ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL): Inform your members about the circumstances of this accident and encourage them to take the following actions: (1) become familiar with the traffic display equipment installed in their aircraft; (2) if their equipment does not provide an aural alert concerning proximate targets that might pose a collision threat, encourage pilots/operators to supplement the equipment with devices that provide both an aural and visual alert; and (3) remind pilots to include the traffic display when scanning for traffic through the aircraft’s windows.

Safety Issue and Context

On May 13, 2019, about 1221 Alaska daylight time, a float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2 (Beaver) airplane, N952DB, and a float-equipped de Havilland DHC-3 (Otter) airplane, N959PA, collided in midair about 8 miles northeast of Ketchikan, Alaska. The DHC-2 pilot and four passengers sustained fatal injuries. The DHC-3 pilot sustained minor injuries, nine passengers sustained serious injuries, and one passenger sustained fatal injuries. The DHC-2 was destroyed and the DHC-3 sustained substantial damage.

The DHC-2 was registered to and operated by Mountain Air Service LLC, Ketchikan, Alaska, under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand sightseeing flight. The DHC-3 was registered to Pantechnicon Aviation LTD, Minden, Nevada, and operated by Venture Travel, LLC, dba Taquan Air, Ketchikan, Alaska, under the provisions of Part 135 as an on-demand sightseeing flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area at the time of the accident.

According to information provided by the operators, both airplanes had been conducting sightseeing flights and were both converging on a scenic waterfall before returning to the Ketchikan Harbor Seaplane Base (5KE), Ketchikan, Alaska, when the accident occurred. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) tracking data for both airplanes revealed that, at 1217:15, the DHC-3 was about level at 4,000 ft mean sea level (msl) on a track of 225°, and the DHC-2 was 4.2 nautical miles (nm) south of the DHC-3, climbing through 2,800 ft msl, on a track of 255°.1 About 1219, the DHC-3 started a descent from 4,000 ft, and the DHC-2 was at 3,175 ft and climbing.

During the next 1 minute 21 seconds, the DHC-3 continued to descend on a track between 224° and 237°, and the DHC-2 leveled out at 3,350 ft on a track of about 255°. The airplanes collided at 1221:14 at an altitude of 3,350 ft, 7.4 nm northeast of 5KE.

Response History

July 16, 2025 · Recipient Response · Experimental Aircraft Association

-From Jack J. Pelton, CEO and Chairman of the Board: For more than 70 years, the Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA) has contributed significantly to the continual improvement of the general aviation safety record. When the NTSB approached us in 2011 with the intent to study the root causes of experimental amateur-built aircraft fatal accidents, we agreed to support the effort. We assisted the NTSB by completing survey work that resulted in the 2012 Safety Study: The Safety of Experimental Amateur-Built Aircraft. In the past 13 years, EAA has been actively working to address the recommendations designated to us in this study and additional recommendations directed to us in 2021.

We have made significant progress and are continually working to improve the experimental safety record, as demonstrated by the reduction in experimental aircraft fatal accidents. To wit, in FAA Fiscal Year 2012 there were 73 fatal accidents in experimental aircraft. In Fiscal Year 2024, there were 37 accidents. This is despite the hours flown in experimental aircraft increasing by more than 350,000 from Calendar Years 2012 to 2023. We are not resting on our laurels by any means. There is ongoing involvement with the General Aviation Joint Safety Committee (GAJSC) to find non-regulatory solutions to improving safety records in general aviation.

EAA has created, promoted, and helped to implement the usage of multiple safety improvement tools in the past five years, including the EAA Flight Test Manual 2.0, which creates a framework for flight testing a homebuilt aircraft and is now part of a formal task-based flight testing program incorporated, optionally, into homebuilt operating limitations.

Additionally, EAA has published a guide for non-builder owners of experimental aircraft, to assist prospective buyers and owners of experimental amateur-built aircraft. This non-builder, or “second owner” demographic, was identified as a significant opportunity for improvement in the 2012 NTSB safety study. There is ongoing involvement with the GAJSC to find non-regulatory solutions to improving general aviation safety records.

In this communication, we respond to the safety recommendations and provide updates on the progress to address the recommendations since they were issued:

Read Recommendation

Recommendation Facts

Status
Open - Acceptable Response
Issued
May 13, 2021
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Experimental Aircraft Association, National Business Aviation Association, Tour Operators Program of Safety, Helicopter Association International, Tongass Aircraft Pilots Association
Adopted
April 20, 2021
Related Investigation
CEN19MA141AB
Related Report
AAR-21-04

Recipient Responses

Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association: Closed - Acceptable Action

Experimental Aircraft Association: Open - Initial Response Received

National Business Aviation Association: Closed - Acceptable Action

Tour Operators Program of Safety: Closed - Acceptable Action

Helicopter Association International: Open - Await Response

Tongass Aircraft Pilots Association: Open - Await Response

In direct response to this recommendation, EAA has taken a multifaceted approach to educating pilots on the use of traffic display systems and the critical importance of comprehensive traffic scanning techniques. EAA has already published an article titled “One Last Look,” which highlights the persistent risks associated with midair collisions and underscores the limitations of visual scanning alone. The article emphasizes the necessity of maintaining vigilant see-and-avoid practices while also acknowledging that blind spots and workload can limit their effectiveness.

To further support this safety message, EAA has completed a new article focused specifically on the midair collision, in Ketchikan, Alaska, the basis of A-21-023, which is scheduled for publication in the next six months. This article provides additional guidance on the effective use of ADS-B In and Out, understanding traffic display functionality, and integrating cockpit tools with visual traffic scans for a more layered approach to situational awareness.

Finally, EAA has hosted multiple webinars that address traffic display functionality, the importance of aural and visual alerts, and real-world strategies to improve pilot vigilance. These webinars emphasize that while see-and-avoid remains a foundational safety principle, it must be supplemented with a thorough understanding of cockpit systems and a conscious effort to scan for traffic both electronically and visually. EAA remains committed to delivering safety education in varied formats to ensure pilots are equipped with both the knowledge and tools necessary to mitigate collision risks. We believe that the above actions fulfill this safety recommendation.

Conclusion

During the past 15 years, EAA has worked closely with the FAA and industry on many safety initiatives not only for the amateur-built community, but for all of general aviation. EAA is highly involved in the General Aviation Joint Safety Committee (GAJSC) as an industry co-chair and as a subject matter expert in various working groups. On this committee we have met and exceeded our goals for improving the safety of the general aviation community.

EAA continues to commit to improving the safety of recreational aviation activities in all of its forms, particularly experimental amateur-built aircraft. We appreciate our unique ability to work collaboratively with the National Transportation Safety Board members, as well as your staff. This relationship has allowed us to make meaningful improvements in safety. EAA will continue to foster improvements to safety in the experimental flying community.

We thank you for your interest in the safety and vitality of the amateur-built sector of aviation. We stand ready to continue to work with you, your fellow board members, and your dedicated staff now and in the future.

February 22, 2022 · NTSB Correspondence · Tour Operators Program of Safety

We note that all TOPS members were audited in 2021, and, as part of those audits, you included a review of this recommendation. We also note that you included a presentation about this recommendation at your October 2021 membership meeting. We believe the actions you described satisfy the intent of Safety Recommendation A-21-23, which is classified CLOSED-- ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

January 7, 2022 · NTSB Correspondence · National Business Aviation Association

We note that, on July 30, 2021, you published an article on the NBAA website titled, “NTSB Urges Familiarization with Traffic Alerting System Operation in Wake of Alaska Midair,” which discusses the circumstances of this accident and encourages your members to review the article we provided (“Reducing the Risk of Midair Collisions”). We also note that your website includes links to the article, our accident report, and the investigative docket.

We are pleased to learn that you also plan to highlight this accident and recommendation in a future NBAA webinar; however, because the actions you have already completed satisfy the intent of Safety Recommendation A-21-23, it is classified CLOSED-- ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

January 5, 2022 · NTSB Correspondence · Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association

We note that, on September 16, 2021, the AOPA ASI delivered a nationwide webinar on midair collision avoidance titled, What Went Wrong? Beaver vs. Otter, which discussed the circumstances of this accident and encouraged your members to take the recommended actions. We also note that the AOPA ASI’s Safety Spotlight: Collision Avoidance, has been updated and includes information for your members about using technology installed in the cockpit to enhance situational awareness and traffic avoidance, proper scanning techniques for identifying potential collision threats, vision physiology, and crew resource management.

These actions satisfy the intent of Safety Recommendation A 21-23, which is classified CLOSED-- ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

We appreciate your efforts to improve aviation safety.

September 27, 2021 · Recipient Response · Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association

-From Richard McSpadden, Senior Vice President, AOPA Air Safety Institute: I am writing to inform the NTSB that in response to NTSB Safety Recommendation A-21-23, the AOPA Air Safety Institute (ASI) has followed through on the NTSB’s safety recommendations by accomplishing the following:

1) On Thursday evening, September 16, ASI delivered a nation-wide webinar on midair collision avoidance titled, What Went Wrong? Beaver vs. Otter,. The webinar’s discussion centered on the May 13, 2019, midair collision over the George Inlet northeast of Ketchikan, Alaska, and included the following reminders for pilots in attendance: a. In-cockpit traffic displays and/or alerts can enhance situational awareness to help mitigate the limitations of “see-and-avoid.” b. Become familiar with the traffic display equipment installed in their aircraft and ensure its proper operation. c.

If equipment does not provide an aural alert concerning proximate targets that might pose a collision threat, supplement the equipment with devices that provide both an aural and visual alert. d. Include the traffic display with a visual scan for conflicting traffic.

2) Additionally, ASI updated its Collision Avoidance Safety Spotlight to include techniques on using in-cockpit ADS-B displays as an effective means of enhancing situational awareness and traffic avoidance. The spotlight also explains how to identify potential collision threats through proper scanning techniques, vision physiology, cockpit resource management, and use of cockpit technology to enhance see-and-avoid capabilities. ASI promoted the updated spotlight to AOPA members on Friday, September 24.

We trust these efforts have satisfactorily met the NTSB’s requests in its letter to AOPA on May 13, 2021, and therefore consider it closed. ASI will, however, continue to develop and promote analysis, outreach, and education on all areas of general aviation safety and looks forward to cooperating with the NTSB on future issues and recommendations.

August 24, 2021 · Recipient Response · Tour Operators Program of Safety

-From Christopher Young, Executive Director, Tour Operators Program of Safety (TOPS): Let me first start by congratulating you on becoming the 15th Chair of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The Tour Operators Program of Safety (TOPS) and our members look forward to your keen leadership with continuing to improve transportation safety. I am responding to the NTSB letter dated May 13, 2021 in which your predecessor, the Honorable Robert Sumwalt, urged TOPS to act on Safety Recommendation A-21-23 by implementing the recommendation contained in the referenced letter. To that effort I am providing you the actions taken or are being proposed by TOPS:

“Inform your members about the circumstances of this accident and encourage them to take the following actions:” All TOPS Member organizations have been informed of Safety Recommendation A-21-23 to help raise awareness and encourage vigilance. (1) “Become familiar with the traffic display equipment installed in their aircraft;” Initial and recurrent training is provided to all pilots and mechanics regarding traffic display equipment.

(2) “If their equipment does not provide an aural alert concerning proximate targets that might pose a collision threat, encourage pilots/operators to supplement the equipment with devices that provide both an aural and visual alert;” All TOPS Member aircraft incorporate an aural and/or visual alert capability for potential collisions threats.

(3) “Remind pilots to include the traffic display when scanning for traffic through the aircraft’s windows. (A-21-23) (See section 2.8.)” Initial and recurrent training is provided to all pilots and mechanics regarding inclusion of traffic display equipment in their scanning.

In addition to the specific recommendations above, the following actions by TOPS are also included: • The TOPS Program of Safety Standards that all Regular Members must conform to currently stipulates: “D. Visibility and situational awareness of air tour aircraft is essential for assured avoidance of collisions. Aircraft will be required to have the following anti-collision equipment installed: 1) Alternating avoidance lights. 2) High-visibility rotor blades. 3) Minimum of one strobe light.

4) All air tour aircraft operating at night in areas with high background lighting and/or ground light clutter (specifically, but not limited to, Las Vegas or New York City) must be equipped with high conspicuity lighting to improve recognition by other aircraft nearby. 5) The use of collision avoidance technology solutions.” • Safety Recommendation A-21-23 will be discussed/reviewed during the TOPS Member 2021 audits. • Safety Recommendation A-21-23 will be presented at the next TOPS Member Meeting in October 2021. • Most aircraft operated by TOPS Members make use of the ADS-B In and Out functionality with alert capability.

• Some TOPS Members use Letters of Agreement among their local operators and ATC for standardized traffic avoidance procedures.

Lastly, the next TOPS Member Meeting is being tentatively planned for October 26, 2021. We cordially invite a member of the NTSB to attend this event and provide a presentation about Safety Recommendation A-21-23.

TOPS appreciates the NTSB’s resilient efforts to help reduce accidents in the air tour industry. Thank you for specifically reaching out to TOPS regarding Safety Recommendation A-21-23. Please know that TOPS considers this a very important issue and we will continue to make efforts with implementing risk mitigation strategies for this and other potential hazards.

August 20, 2021 · Recipient Response · National Business Aviation Association

-From Edward M. Bolen, President and CEO: NBAA Actions to Respond to NTSB Recommendation A-21-23

The following actions outline NBAA’s approach in responding to the recommendation. 1. On July 30, 2021, NBAA published a web article “NTSB Urges Familiarization with Traffic Alerting System Operation in Wake of Alaska Midair” on its website along with the draft article “Reducing the Risk of Midair Collisions” provided by the NTSB with its conveyance of this recommendation to NBAA.

2. NBAA will host a webinar that will further highlight the circumstances of this accident. The webinar will encourage attendees to become familiar with the traffic display equipment in their aircraft, to have onboard and use equipment that provides an aural and visual alert of proximate targets that may pose a collision threat, remind pilots to include the traffic display in their overall scan of flight instruments and the outside traffic scan, and cover risk mitigations for return to service.

NBAA estimates that it will complete all work outlined in this plan within 4 months. We will update our response when the planned work is complete. NBAA remains committed to actively engaging and reminding our operators of the importance of safety and the need to address the risk associated with midair collisions, including the specific issues identified in NTSB Recommendation A-21-23, as additional opportunities arise.

June 21, 2021 · Recipient Response · Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association

-From Richard McSpadden, Senior Vice President, AOPA Air Safety Institute: Thank you for your letter dated May 13, 2021, to Mr. Mark Baker, AOPA CEO and President, regarding NTSB Safety Recommendation A-21-23 that arose from the midair collision over George Inlet near Ketchikan, Alaska, involving a de Havilland DHC-2, N952DB, and de Havilland DHC-3, N959PA, on May 13, 2019. The AOPA Air Safety Institute (ASI) will adopt the NTSB’s safety recommendations. This Fall, ASI will host a webinar on mid-air collision avoidance and use the Ketchikan, AK accident as one case study. ASI will highlight the points of emphasis in the NTSB recommendations and advise pilots:

1) In-cockpit traffic displays and/or alerts can enhance situational awareness to help mitigate the limitations of “see-and-avoid.” 2) Become familiar with the traffic display equipment installed in their aircraft and ensure its proper operation. 3) The benefits of devices that provide both an aural and visual alert of traffic conflicts. 4) Include the traffic display with a visual scan for conflicting traffic.

Furthermore, ASI will continue recommending to AOPA members its Collision Avoidance Safety Spotlight, which explains how to identify potential collision threats through proper scanning techniques, vision physiology, cockpit resource management, and use of cockpit technology to enhance see-and-avoid capabilities. ASI will update the Safety Spotlight to include techniques on using in-cockpit ADS-B displays as an effective means of enhancing situational awareness and traffic avoidance. That update will be complete in early September 2021. We appreciate the opportunity to team with the NTSB in reducing accidents and improving safety for all general aviation.

May 21, 2021 · NTSB Correspondence · Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.

The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s April 20, 2021, report Midair Collision over George Inlet, de Havilland DHC-2, N952DB, and de Havilland DHC-3, N959PA, Ketchikan, Alaska, May 13, 2019, NTSB/AAR-21-04. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, A 21 23). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.

We are providing the following information to urge the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.

This letter also includes information about our April 20, 2021, report Midair Collision over George Inlet, de Havilland DHC-2, N952DB, and de Havilland DHC-3, N959PA, Ketchikan, Alaska, May 13, 2019, NTSB/AAR-21-04. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues:

• The inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid collision avoidance concept. • The benefit of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out- and In supported traffic advisory systems in high-traffic tour areas. • The lack of an ADS-B In requirement for Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operations. • The lack of cockpit display of traffic information alerting on both aircraft. • The loss of alerting capabilities with ADS-B systems installed as part of the Federal Aviation Administration’s post Capstone upgrade program. • An inadequate checklist used in Taquan Air’s operation. • Lack of a requirement for safety management systems in Part 135 operations.

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to AOPA. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report.

• Inform your members about the circumstances of this accident and encourage them to take the following actions: (1) become familiar with the traffic display equipment installed in their aircraft; (2) if their equipment does not provide an aural alert concerning proximate targets that might pose a collision threat, encourage pilots/operators to supplement the equipment with devices that provide both an aural and visual alert; and (3) remind pilots to include the traffic display when scanning for traffic through the aircraft’s windows. (A 21 23) (See section 2.8)

To aid you in implementing this recommendation, we are also attaching an article regarding our investigation of this accident that you may use, either in its entirety or modified to fit the length and style considerations of your publication and/or website. We ask that you publish it, or similar content, in the next issue of your newsletter and/or website, and that you send us a copy of the newsletter or a link to the website article once it has been published.

The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (Safety Recommendation A 21 23). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

All communications regarding safety recommendations are stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. In the likely event that your company uses auto generated and/or preformatted confidentiality statements on letterhead or outgoing e-mails, please include a statement in your letter indicating that the information can be publicly released. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.

May 21, 2021 · NTSB Correspondence · Experimental Aircraft Association

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.

The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s April 20, 2021, report Midair Collision over George Inlet, de Havilland DHC-2, N952DB, and de Havilland DHC-3, N959PA, Ketchikan, Alaska, May 13, 2019, NTSB/AAR-21-04.The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, A 21 23). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.

We are providing the following information to urge the Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA) to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.

This letter also includes information about our April 20, 2021, report Midair Collision over George Inlet, de Havilland DHC-2, N952DB, and de Havilland DHC-3, N959PA, Ketchikan, Alaska, May 13, 2019, NTSB/AAR-21-04. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues:

• The inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid collision avoidance concept. • The benefit of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out- and In supported traffic advisory systems in high-traffic tour areas. • The lack of an ADS-B In requirement for Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operations. • The lack of cockpit display of traffic information alerting on both aircraft. • The loss of alerting capabilities with ADS-B systems installed as part of the Federal Aviation Administration’s post Capstone upgrade program. • An inadequate checklist used in Taquan Air’s operation. • Lack of a requirement for safety management systems in Part 135 operations.

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to EAA. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report.

• Inform your members about the circumstances of this accident and encourage them to take the following actions: (1) become familiar with the traffic display equipment installed in their aircraft; (2) if their equipment does not provide an aural alert concerning proximate targets that might pose a collision threat, encourage pilots/operators to supplement the equipment with devices that provide both an aural and visual alert; and (3) remind pilots to include the traffic display when scanning for traffic through the aircraft’s windows. (A 21 23) (See section 2.8)

To aid you in implementing this recommendation, we are also attaching an article regarding our investigation of this accident that you may use, either in its entirety or modified to fit the length and style considerations of your publication and/or website. We ask that you publish it, or similar content, in the next issue of your newsletter and/or website, and that you send us a copy of the newsletter or a link to the website article once it has been published.

The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (Safety Recommendation A 21 23). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

All communications regarding safety recommendations are stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. In the likely event that your company uses auto generated and/or preformatted confidentiality statements on letterhead or outgoing e-mails, please include a statement in your letter indicating that the information can be publicly released. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.

May 21, 2021 · NTSB Correspondence · National Business Aviation Association

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.

The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s April 20, 2021, report Midair Collision over George Inlet, de Havilland DHC-2, N952DB, and de Havilland DHC-3, N959PA, Ketchikan, Alaska, May 13, 2019, NTSB/AAR-21-04.The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, A 21 23). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.

We are providing the following information to urge the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA) to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.

This letter also includes information about our April 20, 2021, report Midair Collision over George Inlet, de Havilland DHC-2, N952DB, and de Havilland DHC-3, N959PA, Ketchikan, Alaska, May 13, 2019, NTSB/AAR-21-04. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues:

• The inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid collision avoidance concept. • The benefit of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out- and In supported traffic advisory systems in high-traffic tour areas. • The lack of an ADS-B In requirement for Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operations. • The lack of cockpit display of traffic information alerting on both aircraft. • The loss of alerting capabilities with ADS-B systems installed as part of the Federal Aviation Administration’s post Capstone upgrade program. • An inadequate checklist used in Taquan Air’s operation. • Lack of a requirement for safety management systems in Part 135 operations.

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to NBAA. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report.

• Inform your members about the circumstances of this accident and encourage them to take the following actions: (1) become familiar with the traffic display equipment installed in their aircraft; (2) if their equipment does not provide an aural alert concerning proximate targets that might pose a collision threat, encourage pilots/operators to supplement the equipment with devices that provide both an aural and visual alert; and (3) remind pilots to include the traffic display when scanning for traffic through the aircraft’s windows. (A 21 23) (See section 2.8)

To aid you in implementing this recommendation, we are also attaching an article regarding our investigation of this accident that you may use, either in its entirety or modified to fit the length and style considerations of your publication and/or website. We ask that you publish it, or similar content, in the next issue of your newsletter and/or website, and that you send us a copy of the newsletter or a link to the website article once it has been published.

The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (Safety Recommendation A 21 23). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

All communications regarding safety recommendations are stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. In the likely event that your company uses auto generated and/or preformatted confidentiality statements on letterhead or outgoing e-mails, please include a statement in your letter indicating that the information can be publicly released. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.

May 21, 2021 · NTSB Correspondence · Tour Operators Program of Safety

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.

The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s April 20, 2021, report Midair Collision over George Inlet, de Havilland DHC-2, N952DB, and de Havilland DHC-3, N959PA, Ketchikan, Alaska, May 13, 2019, NTSB/AAR-21-04.. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, A 21 23). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.

We are providing the following information to urge the Tour Operators Program of Safety (TOPS) to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.

This letter also includes information about our April 20, 2021, report Midair Collision over George Inlet, de Havilland DHC-2, N952DB, and de Havilland DHC-3, N959PA, Ketchikan, Alaska, May 13, 2019, NTSB/AAR-21-04. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues:

• The inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid collision avoidance concept. • The benefit of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out- and In supported traffic advisory systems in high-traffic tour areas. • The lack of an ADS-B In requirement for Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operations. • The lack of cockpit display of traffic information alerting on both aircraft. • The loss of alerting capabilities with ADS-B systems installed as part of the Federal Aviation Administration’s post-Capstone upgrade program. • An inadequate checklist used in Taquan Air’s operation. • Lack of a requirement for safety management systems in Part 135 operations.

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to TOPS (additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report):

• Inform your members about the circumstances of this accident and encourage them to take the following actions: (1) become familiar with the traffic display equipment installed in their aircraft; (2) if their equipment does not provide an aural alert concerning proximate targets that might pose a collision threat, encourage pilots/operators to supplement the equipment with devices that provide both an aural and visual alert; and (3) remind pilots to include the traffic display when scanning for traffic through the aircraft’s windows. (A 21 23) (See section 2.8.)

To aid you in implementing this recommendation, we are also attaching an article regarding our investigation of this accident that you may use, either in its entirety or modified to fit the length and style considerations of your publication and/or website. We ask that you publish it, or similar content, in the next issue of your newsletter and/or on your website, and that you send us a copy of the newsletter or a link to the website article once it has been published.

The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (Safety Recommendation A- 1 23). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

All communications regarding safety recommendations are stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this/these recommendation(s). Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. In the likely event that your company uses auto generated and/or preformatted confidentiality statements on letterhead or outgoing e-mails, please include a statement in your letter indicating that the information can be publicly released. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.

May 21, 2021 · NTSB Correspondence · Helicopter Association International

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.

The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s April 20, 2021, report Midair Collision over George Inlet, de Havilland DHC-2, N952DB, and de Havilland DHC-3, N959PA, Ketchikan, Alaska, May 13, 2019, NTSB/AAR-21-04.The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, A 21 23). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.

We are providing the following information to urge the Helicopter Association International (HAI) to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.

This letter also includes information about our April 20, 2021, report Midair Collision over George Inlet, de Havilland DHC-2, N952DB, and de Havilland DHC-3, N959PA, Ketchikan, Alaska, May 13, 2019, NTSB/AAR-21-04. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues:

• The inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid collision avoidance concept. • The benefit of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out- and In supported traffic advisory systems in high-traffic tour areas. • The lack of an ADS-B In requirement for Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operations. • The lack of cockpit display of traffic information alerting on both aircraft. • The loss of alerting capabilities with ADS-B systems installed as part of the Federal Aviation Administration’s post Capstone upgrade program. • An inadequate checklist used in Taquan Air’s operation. • Lack of a requirement for safety management systems in Part 135 operations.

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to HAI. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report.

• Inform your members about the circumstances of this accident and encourage them to take the following actions: (1) become familiar with the traffic display equipment installed in their aircraft; (2) if their equipment does not provide an aural alert concerning proximate targets that might pose a collision threat, encourage pilots/operators to supplement the equipment with devices that provide both an aural and visual alert; and (3) remind pilots to include the traffic display when scanning for traffic through the aircraft’s windows. (A 21 23) (See section 2.8)

To aid you in implementing this recommendation, we are also attaching an article regarding our investigation of this accident that you may use, either in its entirety or modified to fit the length and style considerations of your publication and/or website. We ask that you publish it, or similar content, in the next issue of your newsletter and/or website, and that you send us a copy of the newsletter or a link to the website article once it has been published.

The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (Safety Recommendation A 21 23). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

All communications regarding safety recommendations are stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. In the likely event that your company uses auto generated and/or preformatted confidentiality statements on letterhead or outgoing e-mails, please include a statement in your letter indicating that the information can be publicly released. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.

May 21, 2021 · NTSB Correspondence · Tongass Aircraft Pilots Association

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.

The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s April 20, 2021, report Midair Collision over George Inlet, de Havilland DHC-2, N952DB, and de Havilland DHC-3, N959PA, Ketchikan, Alaska, May 13, 2019, NTSB/AAR-21-04.The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, A 21 23). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.

We are providing the following information to urge the Tongass Aircraft Pilots Association (TAPA) to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.

This letter also includes information about our April 20, 2021, report Midair Collision over George Inlet, de Havilland DHC-2, N952DB, and de Havilland DHC-3, N959PA, Ketchikan, Alaska, May 13, 2019, NTSB/AAR-21-04. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues:

• The inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid collision avoidance concept. • The benefit of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out- and In supported traffic advisory systems in high-traffic tour areas. • The lack of an ADS-B In requirement for Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operations. • The lack of cockpit display of traffic information alerting on both aircraft. • The loss of alerting capabilities with ADS-B systems installed as part of the Federal Aviation Administration’s post Capstone upgrade program. • An inadequate checklist used in Taquan Air’s operation. • Lack of a requirement for safety management systems in Part 135 operations.

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to TAPA. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report.

• Inform your members about the circumstances of this accident and encourage them to take the following actions: (1) become familiar with the traffic display equipment installed in their aircraft; (2) if their equipment does not provide an aural alert concerning proximate targets that might pose a collision threat, encourage pilots/operators to supplement the equipment with devices that provide both an aural and visual alert; and (3) remind pilots to include the traffic display when scanning for traffic through the aircraft’s windows. (A 21 23) (See section 2.8)

To aid you in implementing this recommendation, we are also attaching an article regarding our investigation of this accident that you may use, either in its entirety or modified to fit the length and style considerations of your publication and/or website. We ask that you publish it, or similar content, in the next issue of your newsletter and/or website, and that you send us a copy of the newsletter or a link to the website article once it has been published.

The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (Safety Recommendation A 21 23). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

All communications regarding safety recommendations are stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. In the likely event that your company uses auto generated and/or preformatted confidentiality statements on letterhead or outgoing e-mails, please include a statement in your letter indicating that the information can be publicly released. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.