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NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-21-019

Recommendation

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Ensure that checklists for all Capstone Program (phase 2) aircraft include verification that the Garmin GSL 71 control head selector knob is in the ON position and that the unit is in ALT mode before takeoff.

Safety Issue and Context

On May 13, 2019, about 1221 Alaska daylight time, a float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2 (Beaver) airplane, N952DB, and a float-equipped de Havilland DHC-3 (Otter) airplane, N959PA, collided in midair about 8 miles northeast of Ketchikan, Alaska. The DHC-2 pilot and four passengers sustained fatal injuries. The DHC-3 pilot sustained minor injuries, nine passengers sustained serious injuries, and one passenger sustained fatal injuries. The DHC-2 was destroyed and the DHC-3 sustained substantial damage.

The DHC-2 was registered to and operated by Mountain Air Service LLC, Ketchikan, Alaska, under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand sightseeing flight. The DHC-3 was registered to Pantechnicon Aviation LTD, Minden, Nevada, and operated by Venture Travel, LLC, dba Taquan Air, Ketchikan, Alaska, under the provisions of Part 135 as an on-demand sightseeing flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area at the time of the accident.

According to information provided by the operators, both airplanes had been conducting sightseeing flights and were both converging on a scenic waterfall before returning to the Ketchikan Harbor Seaplane Base (5KE), Ketchikan, Alaska, when the accident occurred. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) tracking data for both airplanes revealed that, at 1217:15, the DHC-3 was about level at 4,000 ft mean sea level (msl) on a track of 225°, and the DHC-2 was 4.2 nautical miles (nm) south of the DHC-3, climbing through 2,800 ft msl, on a track of 255°.1 About 1219, the DHC-3 started a descent from 4,000 ft, and the DHC-2 was at 3,175 ft and climbing.

During the next 1 minute 21 seconds, the DHC-3 continued to descend on a track between 224° and 237°, and the DHC-2 leveled out at 3,350 ft on a track of about 255°. The airplanes collided at 1221:14 at an altitude of 3,350 ft, 7.4 nm northeast of 5KE.

Response History

February 9, 2026 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

As discussed in our previous meeting, we are currently reviewing several FAA letters submitted during the previous administration and would like to confirm that those letters still reflect the FAA position.

We issued Safety Recommendations A-21-15 through -19 as a result of our investigation of the 2019 midair collision in Ketchikan Alaska.

A-21-15: Identify high-traffic air tour areas and require, through a special federal aviation regulation or other means, that Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 91 and 135 air tour operators that operate within those areas be equipped with an Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out- and In-supported traffic advisory system that 1) includes both visual and aural alerts, 2) is driven by an algorithm designed to minimize nuisance alerts, and 3) is operational during all flight operations.

A-21-16: In the high-traffic air tour areas identified in Safety Recommendation A-21-15, require that all non–air tour aircraft operating within the airspace be equipped with Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out.

A-21-17: Require the installation of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out- and In-supported airborne traffic advisory systems that include aural and visual alerting functions in all aircraft conducting operations under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135.

A-21-18: Review current and future supplemental type certificate installation instructions and flight manual supplements to ensure they provide provisions to prevent the inadvertent disabling of the broadcast of pressure altitude data, by design, where practicable.

In his November 6, 2024, letter, former Administrator Whitaker told us that the FAA actions on these recommendations were compete.

Read Recommendation

Recommendation Facts

Status
Open - Acceptable Response
Issued
May 13, 2021
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
FAA
Adopted
April 20, 2021
Related Investigation
CEN19MA141AB
Related Report
AAR-21-04
A-21-19: Ensure that checklists for all Capstone Program (phase 2) aircraft include verification that the Garmin GSL 71 control head selector knob is in the ON position and that the unit is in ALT mode before takeoff.

In his April 25, 2025, letter, former Acting Administrator Rocheleau told us that the FAA actions on these recommendations were compete.

Can you confirm whether FAA’s position on these recommendations has changed?

April 25, 2025 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Christopher J. Rocheleau, Acting Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revised Advisory Circular (AC) 90-48, Pilots’ Role In Collision Avoidance, on October 20, 2022. The AC now includes information from the accident event, which is at the center of safety recommendation A-21-19. Specifically, it directly addresses air tour operations and the advantage of utilizing Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) equipment in these operations, which can be flown in congested airspace due to the nature of tours visiting popular landmarks.

Furthermore, although not a regulatory requirement for air tour operations, the AC also highlights the Board’s recommendation that air tour operators install and use an ADS-B Traffic Awareness System (ATAS) during these flights (paragraph 7.3).

The AC is available at the following website: https://drs.faa.gov/browse/excelExternalWindow/DRSDOCID101287214720221026144324.0001

ADS-B equipment installed by the aircraft owners and operators must comply with the appropriate Technical Service Order and meet the 19 elements required by 14 CFR Part 91, Section 91.227(d), Minimum Broadcast Message Element Set for ADS-B Out.

The 19 elements are listed and available at the following website: https://drs.faa.gov/browse/excelExternalWindow/CFR_20231218_0091_C_91-227_00000.0001

Regarding the Board’s recommended practices associated with safety recommendation A-21-19, the FAA believes this may be too narrow and, as a result, would not sufficiently mitigate risks for aircraft operating with different ADS-B equipment. Rather, the existing regulatory requirement in 14 CFR 91.225(f), Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out equipment and use, broadly applies to all ADS-B equipped aircraft and mandates that each person operating an aircraft equipped with ADS-B Out must operate this equipment in the transmit mode at all times.

Section 91.225 can be reviewed at the following website: https://drs.faa.gov/browse/excelExternalWindow/CFR_20240429_0091_C_91-225_00000.0001

The FAA continues to stress the importance of and requires pilots to see and avoid as a primary mitigating safety risk strategy. The pilot’s role in actively looking outside the cockpit is critical, as discussed in AC 90-48. While new aircraft systems can provide pilots with a wealth of information, they can also cause fixation on the displays and draw a pilot’s attention inside the flight deck/cockpit and away from the outside environment.

We also believe communication is essential for pilots to maintain situational awareness. As discussed in AC 90-48, communication is identified as a required action in many areas of operation, including taxi and takeoff. The use of two-way communication is a direct safety mitigation to avoiding inflight collision hazards.

The FAA believes the revision of AC 90-48, the continued positive affirmation and oversight of mitigating factors which includes the pilot’s role in see and avoid strategy, the use of two-way communication, and the use of new and emerging technologies in collision avoidance (e.g., ADS-B In/Out, traffic alert systems), sufficiently addresses this matter.

I believe the FAA has effectively addressed Safety Recommendation A-21-19, and I consider our actions complete.

July 25, 2024 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that the FAA’s Flight Standards Service is determining the appropriate FAA message and industry communication outlet to reinforce the flightcrew’s responsibility to verify that Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) equipment controls are properly positioned and compliant with Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations section 91.227(d), “Minimum Broadcast Message Element Set for ADS-B Out.”

We look forward to learning more about how you intend to ensure that checklists for all Capstone Program aircraft include the recommended information. Pending our review of a detailed plan and completion of the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-21-19 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

March 4, 2024 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Michael G. Whitaker, Administrator: As previously stated, the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Aircraft Certification Service was initially assigned to respond to Safety Recommendation A-21-19. However, we determined the recommendation is more appropriately addressed by the FAA’s Flight Standards Service.

Currently, the FAA is collaborating internally to determine the appropriate FAA message and industry communication outlet to reinforce the flightcrew’s responsibility to verify that Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) equipment controls are properly positioned to ensure ADS-B OUT transmissions and also provide the 19 elements required in 14 CFR § 91.227(d), Minimum Broadcast Message Element Set for ADS-B Out. This regulation is available at drs.faa.gov.

I anticipate providing an update to Safety Recommendation A-21-19 by September 30, 2024.

October 24, 2023 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that the FAA’s Aircraft Certification Service is developing a plan for addressing this recommendation and that you will provide additional information in your next response. Pending our review of a detailed plan and completion of the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-21-19 is classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

January 3, 2023 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Billy Nolen, Administrator, FAA: This letter is our final response to Safety Recommendation A-21-18, and in further response to Safety Recommendation A-21-19, issued by the Board on May 13, 2021, and supplements our previous letters. The FAA’s Aircraft Certification Service is currently developing a plan for addressing this recommendation and will provide additional information in our next response. I anticipate providing an update to Safety Recommendation A-21-19 by October 31, 2023.

February 4, 2022 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that you are still determining how best to address these recommendations. Because you have not committed to taking the recommended actions and you have not informed us of the specific activities that you are taking to review these recommendations, we do not have enough information to determine if your actions are responsive. Therefore, pending our receipt of this additional information and completion of the recommended actions, Safety Recommendations A-21-18 and -19 remain classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.

July 21, 2021 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Steve Dickson, Administrator: The FAA is determining how best to address these recommendations and will provide an update to the Board in our next letter.

May 21, 2021 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s April 20, 2021, report Midair Collision over George Inlet, de Havilland DHC-2, N952DB, and de Havilland DHC-3, N959PA, Ketchikan, Alaska, May 13, 2019, NTSB/AAR-21-04. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (for example, A-21-15 thru -20 and A-16-36 ). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents.

Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

This letter provides information about the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) April 20, 2021, report Midair Collision over George Inlet, de Havilland DHC-2, N952DB, and de Havilland DHC-3, N959PA, Ketchikan, Alaska, May 13, 2019, AAR-21-04. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues:

• The inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid collision avoidance concept. • The benefit of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out- and In supported traffic advisory systems in high-traffic tour areas. • The lack of an ADS-B In requirement for Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operations. • The lack of cockpit display of traffic information alerting on both aircraft. • The loss of alerting capabilities with ADS-B systems installed as part of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) post-Capstone upgrade program. • An inadequate checklist used in Taquan Air’s operation. • Lack of a requirement for safety management systems in Part 135 operations.

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendations to the FAA. Additional information regarding these recommendations can be found in the noted sections of the report.

• Identify high-traffic air tour areas and require, through a special federal aviation regulation or other means, that Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 91 and 135 air tour operators that operate within those areas be equipped with an Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out- and In-supported traffic advisory system that 1) includes both visual and aural alerts, 2) is driven by an algorithm designed to minimize nuisance alerts, and 3) is operational during all flight operations. (A-21-15) (See section 2.4)

• In the high-traffic air tour areas identified in Safety Recommendation A-21-015, require that all non–air tour aircraft operating within the airspace be equipped with Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out. (A-21-16) (See section 2.4)

• Require the installation of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out- and In supported airborne traffic advisory systems that include aural and visual alerting functions in all aircraft conducting operations under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. (A-21-17) (See section 2.5)

• Review current and future supplemental type certificate installation instructions and flight manual supplements to ensure they provide provisions to prevent the inadvertent disabling of the broadcast of pressure altitude data, by design, where practicable. (A-21-18) (See section 2.6.2)

• Ensure that checklists for all Capstone Program (phase 2) aircraft include verification that the Garmin GSL 71 control head selector knob is in the ON position and that the unit is in ALT mode before takeoff. (A-21-19) (See section 2.7)

• Update the Aeronautical Information Manual and the Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge to include the limitations inherent in visual scans for traffic and the benefits and best practices of using cockpit displays of traffic information to supplement visual scans to help overcome these limitations. (A-21-20) (See section 2.8)

In addition, the NTSB reiterates the following recommendations to the FAA:

• Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators to establish safety management system programs. (A-16-36) (See section 2.9)

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (Safety Recommendations, A-21-15 through -20). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e mail us at the same address for instructions. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.