Skip to Main Content
FlightPushFLIGHTPUSH
NTSB Safety Recommendations

Learn

Dashboard My Courses Mastery Map Practice Flight Bag

Resources

CFR & AIM FAA Orders Handbooks & Guides Certification Standards Pilot/Controller Glossary Advisory Circulars Legal Interpretations
Safety Center
Articles Trust Center
Help Center FAQ Status
  1. Safety Center
  2. NTSB Safety Recommendations
  3. NTSB A-21-018
Loading
flightpush.co home

NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-21-018

Recommendation

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Review current and future supplemental type certificate installation instructions and flight manual supplements to ensure they provide provisions to prevent the inadvertent disabling of the broadcast of pressure altitude data, by design, where practicable.

Safety Issue and Context

On May 13, 2019, about 1221 Alaska daylight time, a float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2 (Beaver) airplane, N952DB, and a float-equipped de Havilland DHC-3 (Otter) airplane, N959PA, collided in midair about 8 miles northeast of Ketchikan, Alaska. The DHC-2 pilot and four passengers sustained fatal injuries. The DHC-3 pilot sustained minor injuries, nine passengers sustained serious injuries, and one passenger sustained fatal injuries. The DHC-2 was destroyed and the DHC-3 sustained substantial damage.

The DHC-2 was registered to and operated by Mountain Air Service LLC, Ketchikan, Alaska, under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand sightseeing flight. The DHC-3 was registered to Pantechnicon Aviation LTD, Minden, Nevada, and operated by Venture Travel, LLC, dba Taquan Air, Ketchikan, Alaska, under the provisions of Part 135 as an on-demand sightseeing flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area at the time of the accident.

According to information provided by the operators, both airplanes had been conducting sightseeing flights and were both converging on a scenic waterfall before returning to the Ketchikan Harbor Seaplane Base (5KE), Ketchikan, Alaska, when the accident occurred. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) tracking data for both airplanes revealed that, at 1217:15, the DHC-3 was about level at 4,000 ft mean sea level (msl) on a track of 225°, and the DHC-2 was 4.2 nautical miles (nm) south of the DHC-3, climbing through 2,800 ft msl, on a track of 255°.1 About 1219, the DHC-3 started a descent from 4,000 ft, and the DHC-2 was at 3,175 ft and climbing.

During the next 1 minute 21 seconds, the DHC-3 continued to descend on a track between 224° and 237°, and the DHC-2 leveled out at 3,350 ft on a track of about 255°. The airplanes collided at 1221:14 at an altitude of 3,350 ft, 7.4 nm northeast of 5KE.

Response History

February 9, 2026 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

As discussed in our previous meeting, we are currently reviewing several FAA letters submitted during the previous administration and would like to confirm that those letters still reflect the FAA position.

We issued Safety Recommendations A-21-15 through -19 as a result of our investigation of the 2019 midair collision in Ketchikan Alaska.

A-21-15: Identify high-traffic air tour areas and require, through a special federal aviation regulation or other means, that Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 91 and 135 air tour operators that operate within those areas be equipped with an Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out- and In-supported traffic advisory system that 1) includes both visual and aural alerts, 2) is driven by an algorithm designed to minimize nuisance alerts, and 3) is operational during all flight operations.

A-21-16: In the high-traffic air tour areas identified in Safety Recommendation A-21-15, require that all non–air tour aircraft operating within the airspace be equipped with Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out.

A-21-17: Require the installation of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out- and In-supported airborne traffic advisory systems that include aural and visual alerting functions in all aircraft conducting operations under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135.

A-21-18: Review current and future supplemental type certificate installation instructions and flight manual supplements to ensure they provide provisions to prevent the inadvertent disabling of the broadcast of pressure altitude data, by design, where practicable.

In his November 6, 2024, letter, former Administrator Whitaker told us that the FAA actions on these recommendations were compete.

Read Recommendation

Recommendation Facts

Status
Open - Unacceptable Response
Issued
May 13, 2021
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
FAA
Adopted
April 20, 2021
Related Investigation
CEN19MA141AB
Related Report
AAR-21-04
A-21-19: Ensure that checklists for all Capstone Program (phase 2) aircraft include verification that the Garmin GSL 71 control head selector knob is in the ON position and that the unit is in ALT mode before takeoff.

In his April 25, 2025, letter, former Acting Administrator Rocheleau told us that the FAA actions on these recommendations were compete.

Can you confirm whether FAA’s position on these recommendations has changed?

November 6, 2024 · Recipient Response · FAA

-Michael G. Whitaker, Administrator: On October 24, 2023, the Board issued an Open-Unacceptable response to the FAA’s previous closure letter concerning Safety Recommendation A-21-18.

The FAA reviewed nearly 100 existing Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) approvals for Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) installations across multiple product types. The results of this review found that all the Flight Manual Supplements (FMS) in these FAA STC approvals universally ensure the broadcast of pressure altitude data. This review gives us confidence that there is no evidence of a systemic certification safety issue with existing equipment design approvals which results in an unsafe condition.

Additionally, the FMS in the aircraft involved in the May 13, 2019, accident included provisions to prevent the inadvertent disabling of the broadcast of pressure altitude data, consistent with the NTSB’s recommendation. The DHC-3 Otter was originally equipped with a Garmin GDL-90 and Garmin GSL 71 UAT control panel as part of the original Capstone Program in Alaska. Following issuance of 14 CFR 91.225 and 91.227, the GDL-90 was subsequently upgraded with rule compliant Phase 2 equipment, specifically the FreeFlight Systems FDL-XVR-978 (RANGR 978). The GSL 71 was retained as a control panel for the ADS-B system.

The RANGR 978 FMS Limitations section states that, if the Garmin GSL 71 UAT Control Panel is installed, it must be in the ALT Mode during all phases of flight. 14 CFR 91.9(a), Civil aircraft flight manual, marking, and placard requirements, requires pilots and operators to comply with the operating limitations specified in the aircraft flight manual. The FAA believes, and reiterates, the existing regulations and our actions meet the intent of this NTSB recommendation.

I believe the FAA has effectively addressed Safety Recommendations A-21-15 through -18 and consider our actions complete.

October 24, 2023 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that you surveyed current ADS-B Out approvals and identified more than 280 existing design approvals for ADS-B installations through STC and approvals for the installation of equipment to support ADS-B Out. We also note that you examined a portion of those approvals and found that FMSs associated with them typically incorporate language that, if adhered to, supports operations with broadcast of pressure altitude data enabled. You reported that the FMS typically specifies that the transponder and global positioning system (GPS) must be enabled during all phases of flight and, if necessary, the ADS-B Out system may be disabled by selecting the standby mode on the transponder.

You also reported that Advisory Circular (AC) 20-165B, “Airworthiness Approval of Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast OUT Systems,” states that the FMS for ADS-B Out installations should include operating limitations, normal operating procedures, and a system description. We note that, based on the findings from your review, you do not intend to revise any existing or future approvals, or their associated FMSs.

The intent of Safety Recommendation A-21-18 is to determine if other nonstandard designs or configurations like those used in the Phase 2 Capstone Program exist and, if so, implement changes to mitigate the risk of inadvertent disabling of the broadcast of pressure altitude data. We are concerned that you only reviewed a portion of the more than 280 existing design approvals. We are also concerned that, for those designs that were reviewed, you did not indicate whether the designs and configurations were similar to those used in the Phase 2 Capstone Program.

In addition, you reported that many of the FMSs associated with the design approvals that were reviewed contained language to support operations with broadcast of pressure altitude data enabled. We point out, however, that this accident demonstrated that such language, alone, is not sufficient to prevent the inadvertent disabling of pressure altitude data broadcasting. Therefore, we encourage you to review all existing STC installation instructions and FMSs and inform us of your findings.

Regarding future approvals, we believe AC 20-165B includes guidance on what should be included in the FMS for ADS-B installations. Specifically, we note that Section 3.7.2.1, “System Status,” requires failure annunciations if the ADS-B equipment is unable to transmit ADS-B messages or if the position source or its interface with the ADS-B equipment fails. Although the AC was published before this recommendation was issued, it was not available in 2005, which is when the accident DHC-3 was equipped with the Chelton EFIS-2000 and Garmin GDL 90 transceiver as part of Phase 2 of the Capstone Program.

We believe the AC contains guidance that will ensure this safety issue is addressed for new designs in a way that is responsive to the part of Safety Recommendation A-21-18 that pertains to new designs. However, because you have not reviewed all existing approvals, Safety Recommendation A-21-18 is classified OPEN-- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE, pending completion of the recommended review and a plan for addressing your findings.

January 3, 2023 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Billy Nolen, Administrator, FAA: This letter is our final response to Safety Recommendation A-21-18, and in further response to Safety Recommendation A-21-19, issued by the Board on May 13, 2021, and supplements our previous letters. The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Aircraft Certification Service surveyed current ADS-B Out approvals and identified more than 280 existing design approvals for ADS-B installations through supplemental type certificates (STC).

In addition to these STCs, the installation of equipment to support ADS-B Out has also been approved via FAA Form 337, Major Repair & Alteration, per FAA Policy Memorandum – Installation Approval for ADS-B OUT Systems, dated March 2, 2016, and FAA Policy Paper AFS-360-2017-1, Installation of ADS-B OUT/IN Equipment. These policies allow certain equipment pairings that have previously received FAA approval to be installed on other aircraft not covered by a prior approval.

The FAA examined a portion of the approvals in existence currently across multiple product types and found that the associated flight manual supplement (FMS) typically incorporates language that, if adhered to, supports operations with broadcast of pressure altitude data enabled. Typical language used in the FMS specifies that the transponder and global positioning system must be enabled during all phases of flight and that, if necessary, the ADS-B Out system may be disabled by selecting the standby mode on the transponder.

The FMS is generally consistent with guidance in FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 20-165B, Airworthiness Approval of Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast OUT Systems, which outlines that the FMS for ADS-B Out installations include operating limitations, normal operating procedures, and a system description. Additionally, the FMS includes operating instructions describing how the ADS-B Out system can be disabled, a description of the effects of turning off the ADS-B Out system, and a description of the means by which the pilot can detect that the system has been disabled.

Guidance is provided in the FMS about when to enable the ADS-B Out system, typically during all phases of flight operation, including airport surface movement operations. The FAA’s review has not indicated a need to mandate revisions to existing approvals, including any associated FMS, or a need to make immediate changes for future approvals. I believe that the FAA has effectively addressed Safety Recommendation A-21-18 and consider our actions complete.

February 4, 2022 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that you are still determining how best to address these recommendations. Because you have not committed to taking the recommended actions and you have not informed us of the specific activities that you are taking to review these recommendations, we do not have enough information to determine if your actions are responsive. Therefore, pending our receipt of this additional information and completion of the recommended actions, Safety Recommendations A-21-18 and -19 remain classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.

July 21, 2021 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Steve Dickson, Administrator: The FAA is determining how best to address these recommendations and will provide an update to the Board in our next letter.

May 21, 2021 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s April 20, 2021, report Midair Collision over George Inlet, de Havilland DHC-2, N952DB, and de Havilland DHC-3, N959PA, Ketchikan, Alaska, May 13, 2019, NTSB/AAR-21-04. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (for example, A-21-15 thru -20 and A-16-36 ). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents.

Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

This letter provides information about the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) April 20, 2021, report Midair Collision over George Inlet, de Havilland DHC-2, N952DB, and de Havilland DHC-3, N959PA, Ketchikan, Alaska, May 13, 2019, AAR-21-04. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues:

• The inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid collision avoidance concept. • The benefit of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out- and In supported traffic advisory systems in high-traffic tour areas. • The lack of an ADS-B In requirement for Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operations. • The lack of cockpit display of traffic information alerting on both aircraft. • The loss of alerting capabilities with ADS-B systems installed as part of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) post-Capstone upgrade program. • An inadequate checklist used in Taquan Air’s operation. • Lack of a requirement for safety management systems in Part 135 operations.

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendations to the FAA. Additional information regarding these recommendations can be found in the noted sections of the report.

• Identify high-traffic air tour areas and require, through a special federal aviation regulation or other means, that Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 91 and 135 air tour operators that operate within those areas be equipped with an Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out- and In-supported traffic advisory system that 1) includes both visual and aural alerts, 2) is driven by an algorithm designed to minimize nuisance alerts, and 3) is operational during all flight operations. (A-21-15) (See section 2.4)

• In the high-traffic air tour areas identified in Safety Recommendation A-21-015, require that all non–air tour aircraft operating within the airspace be equipped with Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out. (A-21-16) (See section 2.4)

• Require the installation of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out- and In supported airborne traffic advisory systems that include aural and visual alerting functions in all aircraft conducting operations under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. (A-21-17) (See section 2.5)

• Review current and future supplemental type certificate installation instructions and flight manual supplements to ensure they provide provisions to prevent the inadvertent disabling of the broadcast of pressure altitude data, by design, where practicable. (A-21-18) (See section 2.6.2)

• Ensure that checklists for all Capstone Program (phase 2) aircraft include verification that the Garmin GSL 71 control head selector knob is in the ON position and that the unit is in ALT mode before takeoff. (A-21-19) (See section 2.7)

• Update the Aeronautical Information Manual and the Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge to include the limitations inherent in visual scans for traffic and the benefits and best practices of using cockpit displays of traffic information to supplement visual scans to help overcome these limitations. (A-21-20) (See section 2.8)

In addition, the NTSB reiterates the following recommendations to the FAA:

• Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators to establish safety management system programs. (A-16-36) (See section 2.9)

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (Safety Recommendations, A-21-15 through -20). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e mail us at the same address for instructions. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.