Safety Recommendation A-20-036

We note that you disagree with this recommendation because you believe an FAA database that contains deidentified pilot selection data would add or withhold a second-level FAA endorsement of an FAA-certificated pilot. You believe the recommended database should be implemented by a different agency, such as the Department of Labor.

We point out that this recommendation does not ask for an FAA database. Instead, it asks you to establish a program, like ASIAS, that includes airline pilot selection data instead of safety data. Although ASIAS was initiated by the FAA and the aviation community, it is not an FAA database. The ASIAS procedures, operations, and analysis activities are governed by the ASIAS Executive Board, which includes aircraft operators, labor groups, manufacturers, government agencies, participating airlines, and air traffic operations.

We also point out that ASIAS nonpublic data sources, such as airline safety data, are safeguarded by the MITRE Corporation in a deidentified manner to foster broad participation and engagement.

We continue to believe that establishing a program like ASIAS for collecting and analyzing deidentified airline pilot selection data would provide air carriers important aviation safety information for use in their hiring decisions. We also believe the FAA has the needed knowledge of aviation operations and safety to establish such a program. However, because you have not taken any action to address this recommendation, Safety Recommendation A-20-36 is classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION.

-From Polly Trottenberg, Acting Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) emphasized in its previous responses to the Board its disagreement with this recommendation due to the unintended consequences of an FAA-provided database adding (or withholding) a second-level FAA endorsement of an FAA-certificated pilot. While the Board states in its July 26, 2022, letter that the primary purpose of this recommended database is related to aviation safety issues, the Board has not addressed the FAA’s underlying concern that we may unintentionally disenfranchise otherwise fully-qualified FAA-certificated pilots.

The FAA continues to believe that the recommended database is best implemented by a separate Federal department, such as the Department of Labor (DOL). Specifically, the Bureau of Labor and Statistics, an agency in DOL, measures labor market activity, working conditions, price changes, and productivity in the U.S. economy to support public and private decision-making, including the economic impact on the aviation industry.

Further, on June 10, 2021, the FAA published the Pilot Records Database (PRD) Final Rule (86 FR 31006) that implemented statutory requirements to facilitate electronic sharing of pilot records among air carriers and other operators. By rule, air carriers and operators are required to upload pilot records to the PRD and access the PRD to evaluate the available data for each pilot prior to making a hiring decision. The PRD is intended to help ensure that no records about a pilot’s performance with previous employers, which could influence a future employer’s decision, go unidentified.

For the above reasons and reasons contained in our previous letters, I believe the FAA has effectively addressed Safety Recommendation A-20-36 and consider our actions complete, with no further actions planned.

You reported that the FAA does not have the statutory authority to set pilot selection criteria; however, an ASIAS-like resource for operators that compares how pre-employment screening measures correlate with training and job performance would result in an FAA database that could be used by operators to base their pilot selection decisions. You also believe that such a resource, if provided by the FAA, would add, or withhold, a second-level FAA endorsement of an FAA-certificated pilot and could undermine the FAA’s minimum selection requirements for pilot certification.

We believe that the information in the recommended data clearinghouse is primarily related to aviation safety issues, and not to the economic issues of pay, benefits, union considerations, and pilot surpluses or shortages, discussed in the FAA’s January 7, 2022, letter. We do not believe that an organization such as the Department of Labor has the needed knowledge of aviation operations and safety to create the recommended data clearinghouse. We continue to believe that establishing a confidential voluntary data clearinghouse of deidentified pilot selection data will provide air carriers important aviation safety information for use in their hiring decisions and ask you to reconsider.

Pending our receipt and review of a plan to develop the recommended program, Safety Recommendation A-20-36, remains classified OPEN-- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

-From Steve Dickson, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) previously noted that its authority to establish minimum certification requirements for pilot certificates and ratings, the conditions under which those certificates and ratings are necessary, and the privileges and limitations of those certificates and ratings under Title 14, CFR Part 61, “Certification: Pilots, Flight Instructors, and Ground Instructors.” The FAA issues certificates and ratings to those who meet specific requirements and have taken FAA-approved training.

The FAA sets minimum selection requirements for certification, not selection criteria, as the FAA does not have the statutory authority to set pilot selection criteria.

The FAA also understands the Board’s position that “the intent of this recommendation is to develop an Aviation Safety Information and Analysis Sharing (ASIAS)-like resource that operators can use to compare how pre-employment screening measures correlate with training and job performance. This recommendation is not asking [the FAA] to set pilot selection criteria.”

However, while the Board believes this recommendation is not asking the FAA to set pilot selection criteria, the very creation of the above-described ASIAS-like resource will eventually result in an FAA database capable of providing operators with values from which they may base their selection decisions. A candidate pilot may be selected based on being above or below a certain value, which may or may not describe that candidate’s potential based on future experience and training. The unintended consequence of this proposed ASIAS-like resource is that an FAA-provided database adds (or withholds) a second-level FAA endorsement of an FAA-certificated pilot.

Pilot selection by an operator occurs after FAA certification. This process is inherently economic as operators must consider pay, benefits, union considerations, pilot surpluses or shortages, and other business-related factors that impact an operator’s ability to attract and maintain its pilot workforce. For these reasons, the FAA continues to believe that another agency can more appropriately address this recommendation, such as the Department of Labor.

The FAA supports operators through the Pilot Records Database, where operators can review the careers of pilot candidates and make decisions that they feel are consistent with the operator’s business needs. The FAA also continually monitors the training requirements necessary for various certification levels, and if warranted, will continue to expand these requirements to maintain safety in the National Airspace System.

We note that the FAA considered addressing this recommendation as part of the PRD rulemaking; however, you determined that including voluntary data, such as air carrier hiring decisions, would be inappropriate. In addition, you believe this recommendation would be a conflict of interest because you would be recommending that operators not hire pilots who meet your minimum levels of safety as part of their FAA certification.

We point out that the intent of this recommendation is to develop an ASIAS-like resource that operators can use to compare how pre-employment screening measures correlate with training and job performance. This recommendation is not asking you to set pilot selection criteria. In our Trinity Bay accident report, we discuss a 2019 report on airline selection practices in which FAA researchers urged airlines to share data about the utility of different selection methods for predicting pilot success, and encouraged airlines improve the quality of the predictive and performance measures used to assess pilots, both in training and in the operational environment.

To facilitate identifying such measures, FAA researchers encouraged airlines to share information through a clearinghouse of deidentified pilot selection data, modeled after other confidential safety data sharing initiatives like the ASIAS and FOQA programs.

We continue to believe that such a clearinghouse could allow airlines to pool resources to conduct studies to identify effective, scientifically based pilot selection strategies while protecting the anonymity of the pilots upon whom the research is based. Although you indicated that the FAA’s actions are complete, we encourage you to reconsider your response to this recommendation based on the information we have provided. In the meantime, pending our receipt and review of a plan to develop the recommended program, Safety Recommendation A-20-36 is classified OPEN-- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

-From Steve Dickson, Administrator: The FAA establishes minimum certification requirements for pilot certificates and ratings, the conditions under which those certificates and ratings are necessary, and the privileges and limitations of those certificates and ratings. The FAA’s established requirements are published in Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations Part 61, Certification: Pilots, Flight Instructors, and Ground Instructors. The FAA issues certificates and ratings to those who meet requirements and who have taken FAA approved courses.

The FAA sets minimum selection requirements for certification, not selection criteria, as the FAA does not have the statutory authority to set pilot selection criteria.

The FAA does collect voluntary data, but that data is strictly protected under Title 49 of the United States Code § 44735, Limitation on Disclosure of Safety Information. Section 44735 subsection (a) provides the administrator with statutory authority to protect a report, data, or other information described in subsection (b) from public disclosure - pursuant to Section 552 (b)(3)(B) of Title 5, if the report, data, or other information is submitted to the FAA voluntarily, and is not required to be submitted to the administrator under any other provision of law. This subsection describes these protected voluntary data as:

(1) Reports, data, or other information developed under the Aviation Safety Action Program. (2) Reports, data, or other information produced or collected under the Flight Operational Quality Assurance Program. (3) Reports, data, or other information developed under the Line Operations Safety Audit Program. (4) Reports, data, or other information produced or collected for purposes of developing and implementing a safety management system acceptable to the administrator.

(5) Reports, analyses, and directed studies, based in whole or in part on reports, data, or other information described in paragraphs (1) through (4), including those prepared under the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing Program (or any successor program).

The FAA also considered implementing this recommendation through the PRD. As described above, the FAA published the PRD NPRM proposing to require the use of an FAA-managed electronic PRD made up of pilot records and mandated by statutory requirements. This proposal identifies all air carriers, fractional-ownerships, and other operators or entities that would be required to input data into and access the PRD to evaluate the available data for each pilot candidate prior to making a hiring decision. The PRD should contain information about a pilot’s history, which would be used by a hiring air carrier to assess that pilot’s suitability.

The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s July 14, 2020, report Rapid Descent and Crash into Water, Atlas Air Inc. Flight 3591, Boeing 767-375BCF, N1217A, Trinity Bay, Texas, February 23, 2019, AAR 20/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (for example, Safety Recommendations A-20-33 through -38, A-15-7 and -8, A-05-1, and A-10-17, -19, and -20). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents.

Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

This letter provides information about the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) July 14, 2020, report, Rapid Descent and Crash into Water, Atlas Air Inc. Flight 3591, Boeing 767-375BCF, N1217A, Trinity Bay, Texas, February 23, 2019, AAR 20/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues:

• Inadvertent activation of the go-around mode; • Flight crew performance; • Atlas Air Inc.’s (Atlas’) evaluation of the first officer (FO); • Industry pilot hiring process deficiencies; • Awareness information for Boeing 767 and 757 pilots; • Adaptations of automatic ground collision avoidance technology; and • Cockpit image recorders.