NTSB · Safety Recommendation
Safety Recommendation A-20-031
Recommendation
TO THE PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION: Propose to the International Civil Aviation Organization to remove its special provision A88 from its Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air allowing special permits for low-production or prototype lithium-ion cells or batteries shipped by airplane and eliminate any exceptions to the testing of United Nations Manual of Tests and Criteria, Part III, Sub-section 38.3 requirements for all lithium-ion batteries before transport by air.
Safety Issue and Context
On June 3, 2016, about 4:05 p.m. local time, a FedEx W900 local delivery truck and all its cargo were destroyed by a fire while delivering packages to a business in Brampton, Ontario, Canada; no injuries were reported. The fire began among a shipment of four, large-format lithium ion batteries, each of which were individually packaged in a fiberboard box. No other dangerous goods were on board. The shipment of the four lithium-ion batteries originated from Braille Battery, Inc. (Braille), a battery manufacturer located in Sarasota, Florida, and were destined for Toronto, Canada.
The batteries were initially transported by FedEx on two separate United States registered cargo aircraft before being loaded on the delivery truck. The fire occurred about 10 hours after the batteries were offloaded from an airplane in Toronto, Canada. Estimated damages were over $71,000. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) notified the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) of the accident over concerns that the accident could also occur during air transport.
Response History
April 19, 2021 · NTSB Correspondence · PHMSA
You indicated that the actions we recommended would not be an effective solution because the general program procedure for special permit applications contained in 49 CFR Part 107, subpart B would still allow offerors to transport prototype or low-production-run lithium batteries by air. In addition, you stated that safety would have been maintained had the batteries that were involved in this accident been packaged in accordance with the Department of Transportation’s Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs), and if the offeror had obtained and complied with the conditions of the approval, as required by 49 CFR 173.185(e)(7).
You also stated that, because specialized lithium batteries are not manufactured in sufficient quantities to provide enough samples for the entire testing scheme required by the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria, the existing approval and special permit processes provide an equivalent level of safety to the regulations while facilitating innovation and providing a safe alternative means of transportation.
We understand that these recommendations would not eliminate the procedure for special permit applications contained in 49 CFR Part 107, subpart B; however, it is our understanding that, by eliminating paragraph 7 of Part 173.185(e), offerors of prototype and low-production-run lithium batteries would no longer be able to obtain a special permit through Part 107 and would, therefore, be subject to UN 38.3 testing. We point out that the fire in this accident was caused by an electrical short circuit between the battery terminal bolt and the upper cells of the lithium-ion battery module, which resulted in a thermal runaway within the battery and ignited the battery and its packaging.
Although packaging the batteries with noncombustible cushioning, in accordance with the HMRs, would have reduced the severity and slowed the spread of the fire, it would not have prevented it. We also point out that 49 CFR 173.185(e) of the HMRs lacks detailed information for offerors regarding acceptable outer packaging, noncombustible cushioning, and other mitigations that would minimize the risks posed by low-production and prototype batteries moving during transport.