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NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-18-025

Recommendation

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Establish a requirement for airplanes landing at primary airports within Class B and Class C airspace to be equipped with a system that alerts pilots when an airplane is not aligned with a runway surface.

Safety Issue and Context

This report discusses the July 7, 2017, incident involving Air Canada flight 759, an Airbus A320-211, Canadian registration C-FKCK, which was cleared to land on runway 28R at San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California, but instead lined up with parallel taxiway C. Four air carrier airplanes were on taxiway C awaiting clearance to take off from runway 28R. The incident airplane descended to an altitude of 100 ft above ground level and overflew the first airplane on the taxiway. The incident flight crew initiated a go-around, and the airplane reached a minimum altitude of about 60 ft and overflew the second airplane on the taxiway before starting to climb.

None of the 5 flight crewmembers and 135 passengers aboard the incident airplane were injured, and the incident airplane was not damaged.

Safety issues identified in this report include the need for consistent flight management system autotuning capability within an air carrier’s fleet, the need for more effective presentation of flight operations information to optimize pilot review and retention of relevant information, the need for airplanes landing at primary airports within Class B and Class C airspace to be equipped with a system that alerts pilots when an airplane is not aligned with a runway surface, the need for modifications to airport surface detection equipment systems to detect potential taxiway landings and provide alerts to air traffic controllers, the need for a method to more effectively signal a runway closure to pilots when at least one parallel runway remains in use, and the need for revisions to Canadian regulations to address the potential for fatigue for pilots on reserve duty who are called to operate evening flights that would extend into the pilots’ window of circadian low.

As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration and Transport Canada.

Response History

July 28, 2026 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Bryan Bedford, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has completed an alternative action to address the intent of this recommendation in place of conducting rulemaking to update aircraft equipage requirements.

As we continue our efforts to advance mitigations to potential runway events, the FAA’s Runway Safety team has successfully installed Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC) Taxiway Arrival Prediction (ATAP) at all our 43 surface surveillance facilities. ATAP is an enhancement to the ASDE-X and ASSC alerting capabilities that warn air traffic controllers that an aircraft is aligned with a taxiway rather than the assigned runway.

While recommendation A-18-25 aimed at alerting pilots, ATAP will assist in mitigating wrong surface alignments to taxiways by alerting air traffic controllers.

The FAA provided information on the ASDE-X and ASSC airports in the United States with ATAP enabled. Details on this effort were published January 18, 2024, on the Runway Safety Fact Sheet, under ASDE-X and ASSC Taxiway Arrival Prediction (ATAP), available at:

https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/runway-safety-fact-sheet

I believe the FAA has effectively addressed the intent of Safety Recommendation A-18-25 and plan no further action on this safety recommendation.

July 31, 2024 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

You reported that the Commercial Aviation Safety Team’s (CAST’s) Approach and Landing Misalignment (ALM) Joint Safety Analysis and Implementation Team (JSAIT) has published its final report and proposed safety enhancements (SEs). We note that SE 231, “Aircraft-Based Technologies,” and SE 235, “Aircraft-Based Technologies (Research and Development),”

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Recommendation Facts

Status
Open - Acceptable Response
Issued
October 11, 2018
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
FAA
Adopted
October 9, 2018
Related Investigation
DCA17IA148
Related Report
AIR-18-01
recommend that industry and manufacturers, respectively, develop and make available enhanced aircraft design features that increase flightcrew awareness of runway, taxiway, and aerodrome ALM.

We also note that you are collecting data related to these SEs to determine the availability of these technologies, eligibility for incorporation on the existing transport category aircraft fleet based on current equipage, and current original equipment manufacturer efforts to incorporate these technologies on new transport category aircraft. We further note that you have tasked the Investigative Technologies Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) with providing recommendations on how to require cockpit alerting technologies designed to reduce runway safety events.

We believe your plan to collect data related to the CAST’s ALM JSAIT’s SEs and the ARC’s tasking are responsive to both recommendations. Pending a requirement for the recommended technology, Safety Recommendations A-18-25 and -26 remain classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

October 2, 2023 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Kathryn B. Thomson, Deputy Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) continues to collaborate with the Commercial Aviation Safety Team’s (CAST) Approach and Landing Misalignment (ALM) Joint Safety Analysis and Implementation Team (JSAIT). On December 2, 2021, the ALM JSAIT sent its Final Report to CAST. This report is located at the following website: https://skybrary.aero/sites/default/files/bookshelf/32892.pdf

In the ALM JSAIT’s Final Report, an analysis of aggregate industry data was included to understand and characterize the factors that lead to surface misalignments. As a result of this analysis, Safety Enhancement (SE) 231 was adopted by CAST. SE 231 states:

CAST recommends the industry develop and make available, on new transport category aircraft and major derivatives, enhanced aircraft design features, as feasible, that increase flightcrew awareness of runway/taxiway/aerodrome ALM. Applicable new aircraft programs include:

• New type certificate programs and • Major derivative, amended type certificate programs involving redesign of flightdeck avionics.

SE 231 was developed for aircraft-based technologies and includes two specific objectives:

1. Original equipment manufacturer should evaluate their current production fleet and/or avionics suites and new type design aircraft, as well as incorporate these technologies as appropriate.

2. Aircraft operators should evaluate available technology against their fleets and decide what technology they will incorporate into their fleet.

SE 231 is located at the following website:

https://skybrary.aero/sites/default/files/bookshelf/32405.pdf

The FAA reviewed the ALM JSAIT’s Final Report and associated recommendations. As a result, the FAA updated Advisory Circular (AC) 90-48E, Pilots’ Role in Collision Avoidance, on October 20, 2022. This AC incorporates additional information regarding pilot actions, procedures, Notices to Air Missions, and aircraft technology to mitigate the risk of a pilot causing or being involved in a ground collision, in-flight collision, or near midair collision.

Additionally, the FAA is in the initial phases of determining if rulemaking or other guidance is the best path for requiring airplanes landing at primary airports within Class B and Class C airspace to be equipped with a system that alerts pilots when an airplane is not aligned with a runway surface.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA’s progress on Safety Recommendation A-18-25 and anticipate providing an update by August 31, 2024.

April 21, 2022 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that the Commercial Aviation Safety Team’s (CAST’s) Approach and Landing Misalignment (ALM) Joint Safety Analysis and Implementation Team (JSAIT) is assessing the mitigations that resulted from the Wrong Surface Landing Safety Risk Management report to determine if rulemaking is needed. We also note that these efforts were delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Pending our review of the findings from the ALM JSAIT’s assessment, and completion of the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-18-25 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

June 17, 2021 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Steve Dickson, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) continues to collaborate with the Commercial Aviation Safety Team’s Approach and Landing Misalignment (ALM) Joint Safety Analysis and Implementation Team (JSAIT). As previously stated, the ALM JSAIT will provide a report to discuss whether the 2018 Wrong Surface Landing Safety Risk Management mitigations meet the intent of this recommendation, or if the FAA should pursue rulemaking.

The COVID-19 pandemic has delayed the delivery of the ALM JSAIT report. However, we now anticipate the report to be published by October 31, 2021. Once approved by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team, the FAA will review the report and determine the best course of action.

I will keep the Board informed of our progress on this safety recommendation and anticipate providing an update by June 30, 2022.

September 18, 2020 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

You previously informed us that, in March 2018, a safety risk management (SRM) team published a report on wrong-surface landings, which contained 31 safety mitigations—7 of which address the issue of identifying incorrect runway alignment using technology. We note that a Commercial Aviation Safety Team-sponsored Approach and Landing Misalignment (ALM) Joint Safety Analysis and Implementation Team (JSAIT) is considering the mitigations contained in the SRM’s report to determine if any should be implemented or if rulemaking would be more appropriate.

Pending our review of the ALM JSAIT’s recommendations and completion of the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-18-25 remains classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov on your progress toward implementing this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

April 30, 2020 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

-From Steve Dickson, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration is (FAA) collaborating with industry to identify methods of mitigating wrong-surface events. Specifically, the Commercial Aviation Safety Team-sponsored Approach and Landing Misalignment (ALM) Joint Safety Analysis and Implementation Team (JSAIT) is evaluating Safety Recommendation A-18-25 to determine if the Safety Risk Management (SRM) Wrong Surface Landing (WSL) mitigations meet the Board’s intent, or if rulemaking should be implemented. The ALM JSAIT is industry co-chaired with the FAA, and has wide representation from air carriers, manufacturers, other industry groups, and various FAA offices.

The SRM WSL report of March 29, 2018, is enclosed for the Board’s review. The ALM JSAIT is scheduled to provide their recommendations to the FAA by December 2020.

I will keep the Board informed of our progress on this safety recommendation and anticipate providing an update by February 2021.

May 10, 2019 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

You indicated that a safety risk management (SRM) team, which includes stakeholders from several FAA lines of business and industry groups, analyzed the hazards associated with wrong-surface landings throughout the National Airspace System. We note that, in March 2018, the SRM team published a report on wrong-surface landings, which contained 31 safety mitigations—7 of which address the issue of identifying incorrect runway alignment using technology—and that you plan to work with industry to implement these mitigations. Although we are optimistic about your plan, you did not provide a list of the mitigations or a copy of the report.

Pending our receipt and review of this information, and completion of the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-18-25 is classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

February 7, 2019 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Daniel K. Elwell, Acting Administrator: The FAA took initial responsive action regarding the July 7, 2017. Air Canada incident, by establishing a Safety Management System (SMS) committee to complete an analysis of wrong-surface events. Subsequently, this Safety Risk Management (SRM) team met in September 20 17 to perform an analysis of the hazards associated with wrong-surface landings throughout the National Airspace System (NAS).

The SRM team, which included stakeholders from several FAA lines of business and industry groups, published its Wrong Surface Landing (WSL) report in March 2018. This report contained 31 safety mitigations, 7 of which address the issue of identifying incorrect runway alignment using technology. We assigned 6 of these mitigations to the appropriate FAA lines of business using the Hazard Identification and Risk Management Tracking tool and we are conducting research to determine the possible requirements of a new rule necessitating mandatory use of these mitigations.

The WSL report predicted that implementing all 31 mitigations would reduce the residual risk of wrong-surface landings by 7% for general aviation. and 6% for commercial operations. This changes the risk of a catastrophic wrong-surface landing event from extremely improbable to extremely remote for both general aviation and commercial operations. Based on this prediction, the FAA will work collaboratively with industry to implement these mitigations, although we will also evaluate this safety recommendation as a possible rulemaking project.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA ·s progress on these safety recommendations and anticipate providing an update by February 2020.

October 11, 2018 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

On September 25, 2018, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) adopted its aircraft incident report, Taxiway Overflight, Air Canada Flight 759, Airbus A320-211, C-FKCK, San Francisco, California, July 7, 2017 (AIR 18/01). The details of the incident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

Among the safety recommendations are six issued to the Federal Aviation Administration, which can be found on pages 69-70 of the report.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement the recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number. We encourage you to submit your response to correspondence@ntsb.gov. If it exceeds 10 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.