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NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-17-042

Recommendation

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Analyze automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data from Ketchikan air tour operations on an ongoing basis and meet annually with Ketchikan air tour operators to engage in a nonpunitive discussion of any operational hazards reflected in the data and collaborate on mitigation strategies for any hazards identified.

Safety Issue and Context

On June 25, 2015, about 1215 Alaska daylight time, a single-engine, turbine-powered, float-equipped de Havilland DHC-3 (Otter) airplane, N270PA, collided with mountainous, tree-covered terrain about 24 miles east-northeast of Ketchikan, Alaska. The commercial pilot and eight passengers sustained fatal injuries, and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was owned by Pantechnicon Aviation, of Minden, Nevada, and operated by Promech Air, Inc., of Ketchikan.

The flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand sightseeing flight; a company visual flight rules flight plan (by which the company performed its own flight-following) was in effect. Marginal visual flight rules conditions were reported in the area at the time of the accident. The flight departed about 1207 from Rudyerd Bay about 44 miles east-northeast of Ketchikan and was en route to the operator’s base at the Ketchikan Harbor Seaplane Base, Ketchikan.

Response History

April 19, 2023 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that you do not intend to collect ADS-B data from Ketchikan-area air tour operators. You reported that reduced air tour activity in the Ketchikan area during 2020 and 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic limited your ability to collect this data. You also said it would be burdensome for operators to provide this information. You believe this recommendation is satisfied by the following:

• The FAA’s biannual air tour safety meetings with air tour operators in Alaska • The voluntary agreements those air tour operators have signed • The FAA rulemaking project that proposes updating and expanding the requirements for safety management systems (SMSs) and requiring certain certificate holders and commercial air tour operators to develop and implement an SMS

We believe the FAA can collect and review ADS-B data broadcast by aircraft in the Ketchikan area without operators submitting it; we point out that we were able to obtain and review such data from L3 Harris, the prime contractor for the FAA’s ADS-B program, during the Promech investigation.

The SMS rulemaking may result in individual air tour operators incorporating regular reviews of their ADS-B data as part of their SMS; however, the intent of this recommendation is to provide an opportunity for the FAA and Ketchikan-area air tour operators to openly discuss any safety issues identified in the collected ADS-B data and increase awareness among all operators of the operational hazards in that area. We do not believe your actions are responsive and, because you have not reported any plans to take the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-17-42 is classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION.

March 24, 2022 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Steve Dickson, Administrator: As described at our April 7, 2021, meeting with the National Transportation Safety Board staff, commercial air tour operations in Alaska have decreased significantly, and a large number of operators have suspended flight operations indefinitely, primarily due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, which forced cruise ships to discontinue operations to destinations in Alaska. There is very little air tour operator data available for 2020 and 2021, resulting in a limited ability to collect Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data during this specific period for aircraft flying in the Ketchikan, Alaska area.

Read Recommendation

Recommendation Facts

Status
Closed - Unacceptable Action
Issued
May 9, 2017
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
FAA
Adopted
April 25, 2017
Closed
April 19, 2023
Related Investigation
ANC15MA041
Related Report
AAR-17-02

Additionally, in order for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to obtain accurate data, a request for specific data from each operator would need to be made, then generated dependent on availability. Operators providing data would be burdened by an FAA request, as ADS-B data is normally requested on a case-by-case basis associated with an accident and not a larger concerted effort of all operations, which is not easily accomplished. For these reasons, the FAA will not request this data from operators.

However, the FAA’s Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) in Juneau, Alaska, continues to hold bi-annual air tour safety meetings with Alaska air tour operators, industry stakeholders, and leading aviation safety groups. The intent of these meetings is to address safety concerns specific to the air tour industry in Southeast Alaska, and to provide regular presentations around topics; such as airspace changes, ADS-B, Capstone equipment, mid-air collision avoidance via Letters of Agreement (LOA), safety cultures, and Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) awareness initiatives. These meetings are conducted in a nonpunitive manner.

The FAA has achieved positive results with voluntarily signed LOAs that establish clear limitations to procedures, methods, and areas by which they will abide. This voluntary action further improves aviation safety during the air tour season by avoiding both mid-air and CFIT accidents. We also encourage carriers to continue using updated terrain databases as they become available. We will continue to provide operator oversight to ensure systems software use is in accordance with each operator’s approved manuals and training programs.

We believe that our actions stated above and in our previous letter to the Board meet the intent of Safety Recommendation A-17-42. In addition to this recommendation, we would like to inform the Board of further actions that the FAA is taking specific to safety management systems (SMS), which we believe will have an overall improvement to aviation safety in Alaska, and primarily address Safety Recommendations A-16-36, A-19-28, A-21-13, and A-21-14.

We initiated a rulemaking project in the fall of 2020 titled SMS for Parts 21, 91.147, 135, and 145. The rulemaking project is considering a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to apply the existing regulatory requirements of 14 CFR Part 5, SMS, into new areas of industry. The NPRM may include all persons engaged in the design and production of aircraft, engines, or propellers; certificate holders that conduct common carriage operations under part 135; persons engaged in maintaining part 121 aircraft under part 145; and persons conducting specific types of air tour operations under part 91.147. The updated NPRM is anticipated to be published by September 30, 2022.

Commercial air tour operators are encouraged to use voluntary SMS to ensure safety. Operators impacted by the SMS rulemaking may be required to implement SMS. Two operators in the Juneau, Alaska FSDO area have voluntarily developed SMS, and more operators have expressed interest in taking advantage of these voluntary safety measures.

July 22, 2020 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

You reported that the FAA’s Juneau Flight Standards District Office meets with Ketchikan Air Tour operators twice a year to discuss a variety of safety concerns specific to the air tour industry in southeast Alaska. You also reported that ADS-B is one of the topics discussed at these meetings and that operators review ADS-B data to help better plan their routes.

Although NTSB staff have attended these meetings, they do not recall any discussion about ADS-B data. In addition, you previously told us that you planned to identify operational hazards using track data provided by air carriers, and that certificate management team members would then work with industry to approve operator-developed mitigation strategies for any hazards identified. At the time, we considered your plan to be responsive; however, we have not received any information on the outcome of these efforts.

Although you indicated that you are finished responding to this recommendation, we would appreciate receiving additional information about your efforts to analyze ADS-B data. Specifically, we would like to know what operational hazards have been identified and the mitigation strategies that resulted. In the meantime, pending our receipt of this information and completion of the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-17-42 is classified OPEN--UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

February 18, 2020 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Steve Dickson, Administrator: While ADS-B is discussed with the Ketchikan Air Tour Industry, the FAA does not use ADS-B data to educate the participants. However, operators are reviewing this data to help better plan the routes they use and make turn back decisions. The FAA's Juneau Flight Standards District Office conducts two formal meetings a year with the Ketchikan Air Tour operators. These bi-annual meetings are held before the spring air tour season begins and after the fall air tour season ends. These meetings involve the FAA, industry stakeholders, leading aviation safety groups, and, when applicable, staff from the National Transportation Safety Board.

The intent of these meetings is to address safety concerns specific to the air tour industry in Southeast Alaska and to regularly conduct presentations on topics that include: airspace changes, automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast, capstone equipment. mid-air avoidance via Letters of Agreement, safety cultures, and lessons learned. The FAA concluded that through these nonpunitive discussions, open for all operators to express ideas amongst themselves as well as the FAA, additional safety insight and best practices will be developed and shared with the entire aviation community.

I believe that the FAA has effectively addressed these safety recommendations and consider our actions complete.

October 26, 2017 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

You wrote that you have identified several portions of Ketchikan air tour flight paths where ADS-B data is not available. You also indicated that, although commercial GPS tracking tools are available, full flight path coverage is only available to air carriers. We note, however, that air carriers have been sharing their track data with certificate management team (CMT) members, and that this information has also been routinely incorporated into your bi-annual air tour safety meetings.

We also note that you plan to include a specific presentation on the operational hazards that you have identified in track data during upcoming air tour safety meetings, and that CMTs intend to work collaboratively with industry to approve operator-developed mitigation strategies for any hazards identified.

We are encouraged by your actions thus far to collect and analyze track data and your plan to work collaboratively with industry to approve operator-developed hazard mitigation strategies. Pending the completion of these collaborative efforts and our review of any mitigation strategies that may result, Safety Recommendation A-17-42 is classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

July 21, 2017 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: The FAA is addressing these recommendations through bi-annual Air Tour Safety Meetings held in both Juneau and Ketchikan, Alaska. These bi-annual meetings are held before the spring and after the fall air tour seasons and involve FAA, industry stakeholders, leading aviation safety groups, and the Board on occasion.

The intent of these meetings is to address safety concerns specific to the air tour industry in Southeast Alaska and to conduct regular presentations around topics such as: airspace changes, automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B), CAPSTONE equipment, mid-air avoidance via Letters of Agreement (LOA), safety cultures, and the CFJT Awareness Initiative. At the 2016 post-season and 2017 pre-season air tour safety meetings the use of updated terrain databases and current software was discussed as requested by this recommendation.

As for concerns over legacy Chelton Avionics Systems, the FAA found that operators are using the most current electronic flight instrument system software available. We encourage carriers to continue using updated terrain databases as they become available and will continue to provide operator oversight to ensure systems software use is in accordance with each operator's approved manuals and training programs. We will address this topic again during the 2017 post-season air tour safety meeting.

The FAA believes that by ensuring ADS-B data-driven discussions are a focus of future bi-annual safety meetings, additional safety insights will be developed. In evaluating this recommendation we determined there are several po11ions of Ketchikan air tour flight paths where ADS-B data is not available. However. discussions with industry stakeholders indicate that their use of "Spider Tracks" technology, a commercially available GPS tracking tool, allows the air carriers to have full coverage of the entire flight path.

Although this coverage is available to the air carriers only, this information has been openly shared with Certificate Management Team (CMT) members and is routinely incorporated into the bi-annual air tour safety meetings. The FAA has also achieved successful results in this area through user/operator LO As, where air carriers operating in a given area voluntarily sign agreements establishing clear procedures, methods, and areas by which they will abide. This voluntary action further enhances aviation safety during the air tour season through the avoidance of both mid-air and CFiT accidents.

We will ensure that a specific presentation during both the 2017 post-season and 2018 pre-season air tour safety meetings is focused on any operational hazards reflected in track data. Additionally, the CMTs will work collaboratively with industry to approve operator developed mitigation strategies for any hazards identified.

I believe the FAA has effectively addressed these safety recommendations and consider our actions complete.

May 9, 2017 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

On April 25, 2017, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) adopted its report concerning the June 25, 2015, accident in which a single-engine, turbine-powered, float-equipped de Havilland DHC-3 (Otter) airplane, N270PA, collided with mountainous, tree-covered terrain about 24 miles east-northeast of Ketchikan, Alaska.1 Additional information about this accident and the resulting recommendations may be found in the report of the investigation, which can be accessed at our website, http://www.ntsb.gov, under report number NTSB/AAR-17/02.

As a result of this investigation, we issued 10 new recommendations, including 1 to the Cruise Lines International Association and the following 9 recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration.