Skip to Main Content
FlightPushFLIGHTPUSH
NTSB Safety Recommendations

Learn

Dashboard My Courses Mastery Map Practice Flight Bag

Resources

CFR & AIM FAA Orders Handbooks & Guides Certification Standards Pilot/Controller Glossary Advisory Circulars Legal Interpretations
Safety Center
Articles Trust Center
Help Center FAQ Status
  1. Safety Center
  2. NTSB Safety Recommendations
  3. NTSB A-16-034
Loading
flightpush.co home

NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-16-034

Recommendation

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators to install flight data recording devices capable of supporting a flight data monitoring program.

Safety Issue and Context

On November 10, 2015, about 1453 eastern standard time, Execuflight flight 1526, a British Aerospace HS 125-700A (Hawker 700A), N237WR, departed controlled flight while on a nonprecision localizer approach to runway 25 at Akron Fulton International Airport (AKR) and impacted a four-unit apartment building in Akron, Ohio. The captain, first officer, and seven passengers died; no one on the ground was injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The airplane was registered to Rais Group International NC LLC and operated by Execuflight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand charter flight.

Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight departed from Dayton-Wright Brothers Airport, Dayton, Ohio, about 1413 and was destined for AKR.

Response History

July 30, 2026 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-05 “In-Flight Loss of Control and Impact with Pack Ice Bering Air Flight 445 Textron Aviation 208B, N321BA, Near Nome, Alaska February 6, 2025” published on July 30, 2026:

2.4.1.2 Flight Data Monitoring

Repeated overweight flights at Bering Air invited unnecessary risk into the operation. Effective safety risk management (as part of a fully functional SMS) would have provided the opportunity to those responsible to identify and mitigate risks, such as the operation of its 208B airplanes outside of weight limitations, particularly those associated with flight in icing conditions. Even without an established SMS, safety risk management could have been accomplished by structured monitoring of the data recorded by the Garmin G1000 integrated flight deck installed on the accident airplane, which were available to the operator to be used in this way.

The NTSB has long recognized the value of a flight data monitoring (FDM) program for various Part 135 operations. In 2009, we issued Safety Recommendation A-09-90 asking the FAA to require helicopter air ambulance (HAA) operators to establish a structured FDM program and install recording devices capable of supporting it. Footnote: Safety Recommendation A-09-90 was classified Closed—Unacceptable Action on January 25, 2018. As a result of our investigation of the 2015 fatal accident in Akron, Ohio, we expanded the recommended action to apply to all Part 135 operations and asked the FAA to do the following:

Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators to install flight data recording devices capable of supporting a flight data monitoring program. (A-16-34)

After the action in Safety Recommendation A-16-34 is completed, require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations

Read Recommendation

Recommendation Facts

Status
Open - Unacceptable Response
Issued
November 3, 2016
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
FAA
Adopted
November 2, 2016
Related Investigation
CEN16MA036
Related Report
AAR-16-03
Part 135
operators to establish a structured flight data monitoring program that reviews all available data sources to identify deviations from established norms and procedures and other potential safety issues. (A-16-35) (NTSB 2016)

In response to these recommendations, the FAA informed us that, although it agreed with the benefits that additional flight data can provide, it encountered challenges in achieving a favorable cost-benefit analysis. On April 6, 2017, we replied that we disagreed with the FAA’s previous determination that a mandate for FDM equipment and programs would provide no quantifiable benefits, and we cited seven accidents that occurred from 2000 through 2015 that were relevant to this safety issue.

Footnote: When the FAA informed us in 2017 that it would conduct a review to determine the feasibility of requiring all Part 135 certificate holders to install FDM recording devices, it referenced the cost-benefit analysis it performed in 2014 when considering such a mandate for HAA operators. The FAA’s regulatory evaluation for the proposed HAA rule showed costs of about $20.4 million and a benefit of $0 for a 10-year period. As discussed in the NTSB’s 2024 special investigation report on Part 135 operations, typically, benefits estimates represent the statistical value of fatalities and injuries that may be averted by implementation of a proposed rule (NTSB 2024).

These accidents, which involved Part 135 operators, resulted in fatal injuries to 53 people and serious injuries to 4 people (NTSB 2022a). Both recommendations are currently classified Open—Unacceptable Response.

In the 10 years since we issued these recommendations, we have reiterated them five and six times, respectively, based on the findings from our investigations of other fatal accidents involving Part 135 operators relevant to this issue. The FAA identified monitoring-related mitigations for 12 of the 35 accidents cited in its evaluation to support SMS rulemaking for Part 135. Footnote: The FAA’s evaluation of accidents cited the safety assurance monitoring aspect of 14 CFR 5.71 for NTSB cases ANC18LA027, CEN18FA215, ANC18FA045, ANC17FA021, DCA17FA109, ANC16FA017, ERA16FA215, CEN16LA386, ANC17MA001, ANC15MA041, CEN16MA036, and WPR16FA037 (FAA 2022).

We continue to believe that implementation of an FDM program is one method by which operators can acquire and analyze the data necessary to support the safety assurance monitoring requirements of an SMS.

For example, as part of an FDM program, comparison of the airplane avionics system’s recorded data of actual fuel loads against archived load manifests would have shown the pattern of discrepancies with pilot-reported fuel loads. The operator would have been prompted to verify actual takeoff weights and would have had the opportunity to investigate the nature of the discrepancies. The patchwork of procedures and tools Bering Air had at the time of the accident, in an environment where pilots controlled the information documented in load manifests, could not detect the latent pattern.

The NTSB notes that lightweight flight recording systems are increasingly becoming standard equipment or available as retrofit options for new production general aviation and business aircraft. According to a General Aviation Manufacturers Association representative, about 70% to 80% of new production turbine-powered business airplanes were equipped with a lightweight flight data recording system, and about 10% to 20% had at least some data recording and download capability, such as through the avionics or other systems.

Standard and retrofit recorder equipment options for new production piston-powered airplanes have increased, driven, in part, by demand from customers wanting to participate in an FDM program (NTSB 2022c). Footnote: In October 2022, the NTSB moderated a roundtable discussion with experts from government and industry about the benefits and proven value added by FDM programs for any sized operation.

Although the FAA has not yet pursued rulemaking to address Safety Recommendations A-16-34 and A-16-35, we are encouraged that, in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, Congress directed the FAA to task an aviation rulemaking committee (ARC) to review and assess the need for changes to the safety requirements related to FDM for certain aircraft and operations. The Act directed the FAA to consider any applicable NTSB safety recommendations and the recommendations of previous ARC that reviewed FDM requirements for Part 135 operators.

Footnote: Specifically, section 333 of the Act directed the FAA to task a rulemaking advisory committee to review and assess FDM requirements for certain helicopters, and section 363 addressed FDM for commercial air tour operations. We continue to believe the need for the recommended action is well justified based on the findings in this and other investigations.

Therefore, the NTSB concludes that operational FDM programs can provide Part 135 operators with objective information regarding the way their pilots conduct flights, and a periodic review of such information could assist operators in detecting and correcting unsafe deviations from standard operating procedures. Therefore, the NTSB reiterates Safety Recommendations A-16-34 and 35.

January 13, 2026 · Recipient Response · FAA

On January 13, 2026, NTSB staff received an informal update from FAA Staff stating that:

On February 18, 2025, the Investigative Technologies Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) released an interim response stating they are continuing to formulate recommendations to require Part 135 operators to install flight data recording devices capable of supporting a flight data monitoring program. Until the ARC concludes and recommendations related to A-16-34 and A-16-35 are known, the FAA is postponing a final response.

March 3, 2025 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

On January 8, 2025, former FAA Administrator Michael G. Whitaker informed us that the agency is continuing the work described in its previous letter regarding Safety Recommendations A-16-34 and -35. We look forward to receiving your next update.

January 8, 2025 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Michael G. Whitaker, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) chartered the Investigative Technologies Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) in June 2023. On September 21, 2023, the ARC began its committee activities, which included recommendations to require Part 135 operators to install flight data recording devices capable of supporting a flight data monitoring program and establish a structured flight data monitoring program that reviews all available data sources to identify deviations from established norms and procedures and other potential safety issues. The ARC will remain in effect until June 30, 2025, unless suspended earlier or extended by the FAA.

The FAA agrees that Flight Data Recording (FDR) and Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) information is beneficial for both accident investigation and detection of regulatory noncompliance. However, the FAA continues to believe existing FAA and industry programs, current industry practices, and the available commercial off-the-shelf technologies fulfill the objectives of these two safety recommendations. Moreover, achieving a favorable cost/benefit ratio to mandate FDR devices capable of supporting FDM programs for all Part 135 operations continues to be an FAA concern.

As mentioned above, existing industry commercial providers such as FlightAware, Flight Explorer, and Spidertracks currently offer flight following and monitoring systems for air carriers, operators, and individuals. The flight data from each flight operation is collected using the Iridium Satellite communication network and includes the following information: 1) Web-based tracking, 2) Two-way communication, 3) Automatic emergency alerting, 4) Multiple aircraft on one map, and 5) Variable position reporting and Automatic Flight Following.

Additionally, Part 135 operators, air carriers, and flight schools also have access to flight data from avionics equipment now installed in aircraft from companies such as Garmin and Jeppesen. Significant advances in flight monitoring provide the data and knowledge needed for ongoing, safer flight operations.

Additionally, since January 1, 2020, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) equipment has been required in designated parts of the national airspace system, unless otherwise authorized by air traffic control. The information derived from ADS-B data includes the aircraft identity, altitude, location, speed, heading, and rate of climb or descent, directly related to FDR and FDM information in the Board’s safety recommendations. ADS-B data has also been made available for use in NTSB and FAA aircraft accident and incident investigations.

Finally, the FAA currently manages multiple voluntary safety programs involving air carriers and air operators that are non-punitive and allow organizations to collect and manage data as well as report issues without fear of disciplinary action not associated with neglectful or reckless behavior. These non-punitive safety programs include:

• The Flight Operational Quality Assurance Program, which enhances aviation safety and operational efficiency through systematic collection and analysis of flight data. This is designed to identify safety trends, pilot performance, aircraft system operations, and potential issues before they lead to incidents, thereby proactively enhancing safety.

• The Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program, which provides voluntary reporting of safety issues, potential non-compliance, or occurrences by operators and employees without fear of penalties. This is designed to identify and address safety issues before they lead to accidents.

• The Aviation Safety Action Program, which allows voluntary reporting of safety issues and incidents. This is designed to identify and mitigate safety risks by collecting data on occurrences that might not otherwise be reported.

Non-punitive corrective action by the FAA incentivizes a culture of safety reporting by providing open communication and learning to prevent future aircraft accidents and incidents.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA’s progress on Safety Recommendations A-16-34 and -35 and anticipate providing an update by November 30, 2025.

August 9, 2024 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

Reiterated in the Special Investigation Report "Safety and Industry Data Improvements for Part 135 Operations" AIR-24-03, adopted on July 24, 2024 and issued on August 9, 2024

4.2 Flight Data Monitoring

The NTSB has long recognized the value of an FDM program for various Part 135 operations. In 2009, we recommended that the FAA require HAA operators to establish a structured FDM program and install recording devices capable of supporting it. Subsequently, as a result of our investigation of a 2015 fatal accident involving a jet airplane (operated as a Part 135 on-demand charter flight) that crashed while on an approach to an airport in Akron, Ohio, we expanded the recommended action to apply to all Part 135 operations and asked the FAA to do the following:

Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators to install flight data recording devices capable of supporting a flight data monitoring program. (A-16-34)

After the action in Safety Recommendation A-16-34 is completed, require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators to establish a structured flight data monitoring program that reviews all available data sources to identify deviations from established norms and procedures and other potential safety issues. (A-16-35) In response to these recommendations, the FAA informed us that, although it agreed with the benefits that additional flight data can provide, it encountered challenges in achieving a favorable cost-benefit analysis.

On April 6, 2017, we replied that we disagreed with the FAA’s previous determination that a mandate for FDM equipment and programs would provide no quantifiable benefits, and we cited seven accidents that occurred from 2000 through 2015 that were relevant to this safety issue. These accidents, which involved Part 135 operators, resulted in fatal injuries to 53 people and serious injuries to 4 people (NTSB 2022a, 74–75). In the 7 years since we issued these recommendations, we reiterated them four and five times, respectively, based on the findings from our investigations of other fatal accidents involving Part 135 operators relevant to this issue area.

The FAA identified monitoring related mitigations for 12 of the 35 accidents it cited in its evaluation to support SMS rulemaking for Part 135 (as discussed in section 4.1). We believe that implementation of an FDM program is one method by which operators can acquire and analyze the data necessary to support the safety assurance monitoring requirements of an SMS. For example, one of the fatal accidents cited by the FAA involved a Part 135 cargo flight that crashed in Charleston, West Virginia, during an unstable instrument approach in IMC in 2017.

Our investigation of that accident found evidence that, during the 3 months before the accident, the accident flight crew routinely performed visual approaches in a manner inconsistent with the operator’s standard operating procedures. The operator, which employed 38 pilots and operated 18 airplanes from 12 crew bases in the United States and Puerto Rico, had no formal safety and oversight program to assess compliance with procedures or monitor pilots with previous performance issues.

An effective FDM program with appropriately equipped aircraft (ideally implemented as part of an SMS) can enable an operator to proactively identify and mitigate these types of deviations in a nonpunitive way before an accident occurs. While the NTSB has continued to engage in discussions with the FAA regarding the importance of an FDM requirement for Part 135 operations, we have also included this topic in our industry outreach. During our 2020 panel for improving the safety of Part 135 (referenced in section 4.1), we asked participants to share their perspectives on the benefits and challenges of implementing FDM.

Participants discussed such experiences as proactively identifying and managing hazards and reducing maintenance and fuel costs by identifying and correcting nonstandard operations (such as flap overspeed events and sloppy approaches) and improving the efficiency of operations. One participant described the value of external sources of data, such as online flight tracking software and air traffic control communications recordings, to obtain objective data about how crews are conducting flights.

However, representatives from some smaller operators on the panel discussed challenges, including the costs of equipping smaller aircraft in their fleet or how to equip aircraft that they manage but do not own (NTSB 2020a).

To help address such concerns and other perceived impediments to FDM adoption, on October 20, 2022, the NTSB hosted a roundtable focused on practical FDM solutions for smaller operators. Participants from the NTSB, FAA, small operators, and other relevant stakeholders discussed FDM equipment solutions and other sources of data and provided best-practices examples of how an FDM program has benefitted the safety of their operations, improved pilots’ performance, and reduced maintenance and operations costs.

Further, we note that lightweight flight recording systems are increasingly becoming standard equipment or available as retrofit options for new production general aviation and business aircraft. According to a General Aviation Manufacturers Association representative, about 70% to 80% of new production turbine-powered business airplanes were equipped with a lightweight flight data recording system, and about 10% to 20% had at least some data recording and download capability, such as through the avionics or other systems.

The representative stated that standard and retrofit recorder equipment options for new production piston powered airplanes have increased, driven, in part, by demand from customers wanting to participate in an FDM program (NTSB 2022b).

The NTSB continues to believe that an effective FDM program can help all Part 135 operators identify and correct in a nonpunitive way issues with pilot performance and support mitigations that can prevent future accidents, particularly when incorporated into an SMS.

Further, although the FAA has not yet pursued rulemaking to address Safety Recommendations A-16-34 and A-16-35, we are encouraged that, in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, Congress directed the FAA to task an aviation rulemaking committee to review and assess the need for changes to the safety requirements related to FDM for certain aircraft and operations and, in doing so, consider any applicable NTSB safety recommendations and the recommendations of previous aviation rulemaking committees that reviewed FDM requirements for Part 135 operators. We continue to believe the need for the recommended action is well justified based on the findings of our investigations.

Thus, the NTSB concludes that operational FDM programs can provide Part 135 operators with objective information regarding the manner in which their pilots conduct flights, and a periodic review of such information could assist operators in detecting and correcting unsafe deviations from standard operating procedures. Therefore, the NTSB reiterates Safety Recommendations A-16-34 and A-16-35.

November 8, 2023 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that, due to challenges in achieving a favorable cost–benefit analysis for requiring these recommendations for all Part 135 operations, you have cancelled the rulemaking project that was related to these recommendations. We also note that you have asked an ARC to review these and other related NTSB safety recommendations. In our April 6, 2017, letter to the FAA about these recommendations, we discussed our review of our major aviation accident investigations involving Part 135 on-demand operators, which occurred during the period of 2000 through 2015.

The goal of our review was to identify accidents with findings related to pilot performance, and for which an effective FDM program could help an operator identify issues with pilot performance, such as noncompliance with standard operating procedures, and lead to mitigations to prevent future accidents. We found that we had investigated seven relevant accidents that killed a total of 53 people and seriously injured another 4. In the 7 years since we issued these recommendations, we have reiterated them five times in new investigations.

Although you cancelled the rulemaking project related to these recommendations due to challenges in achieving a favorable cost–benefit analysis, we continue to believe the need for the recommended action is well justified based on findings of our investigations.

Although we support the ARC’s planned review of these recommendations, we are concerned because they are 7 years old, and you appear to have made no progress in implementing them. Pending our review of a plan and completion of the recommended actions, Safety Recommendations A-16-34 and -35 remain classified OPEN-- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

September 18, 2023 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Kathryn B. Thomson, Deputy Administrator: As previously stated, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) initiated a rulemaking project in 2020 to address these recommendations. However, due to challenges in achieving a favorable cost-benefit analysis for all Part 135 operations, the FAA decided to cancel this rulemaking project and redirect limited rulemaking resources to more viable rulemaking projects.

In June 2023, the FAA issued the Investigative Technologies Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) Charter, which directs the ARC to discuss and make recommendations to the FAA concerning Safety Recommendations A-16-34 and -35. The charter is available at the following website:

https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/Charter_Inv estigative-Technologies-ARC_07312023_Posted.pdf

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA’s progress on Safety Recommendations A-16-34 and -35 and anticipate providing an update by September 30, 2024.

September 6, 2023 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

On August 4, 2023, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced the publication of draft Advisory Circular (AC) 136-B048, Supplemental Information for the Creation of Operating Procedures and Pilot Training Subjects Related to OpSpec [operations specification]/LOA [letter of authorization] B048, and invited public comment on the document. The NTSB has a longstanding interest in air tour safety in the state of Hawaii, having investigated numerous Hawaii air tour accidents and issued many related safety recommendations and we offer our comments below.

We note that, based on the contents of the draft AC, it appears that the FAA’s intent is that it will replace FAA document AWP13-136, the Hawaii Air Tour Common Procedures Manual (HATCPM), which the FAA issued in 2008 for use by operators that obtained authorization (through OpSpec B048 or LOA B548) to deviate from the minimum altitude specified in 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 136, Appendix A. For those operators that obtained authorization through OpSpec B048/LOA B548, compliance with the provisions of the HATCPM was mandatory.

In our 2022 report on our investigation of the December 26, 2019, fatal air tour helicopter accident in Kekaha, Hawaii, we noted that the HATCPM had not been revised since it was issued and that the FAA informed us that it had been working on a replacement for about 7 years.

During our investigation, an air tour subject matter expert from the FAA’s Air Transportation Division, [14 CFR] Part 135 Air Carrier Operations Branch, informed us that the FAA’s vision for the new document was for it to be up to date; incorporate NTSB safety recommendations, congressional input, and National Park Service input; and be simpler, safer, and easier to manage. They also said that the document would likely address the use of Hawaii weather camera systems and operator implementation of safety management systems (SMSs).

We have examined the draft AC and are providing comments related to these issues and open NTSB recommendations related to air tour safety in Hawaii. We note that, although ACs, generally, are not regulatory documents, we presume that operators that obtain authorization through OpSpec/LOA B048 will be required to comply with the AC’s provisions (similar to the mandatory compliance with the HATCPM for those operators that held deviation authority).

Safety Management Systems and Other Safety Assurance Processes

In 2016, we issued Safety Recommendation A-16-36, which urged the FAA to require all Part 135 operators to establish SMS.4 We were pleased to learn that on January 11, 2023, the FAA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) announcing its intent to require such systems for Part 135 operators and air tour operators operating under 14 CFR 91.147. We strongly support the FAA’s proposed expansion of SMS requirements, which would include all Hawaii air tour operators.

We note that the draft AC states that a certificate holder “should present to the Administrator the method they will utilize to analyze, mitigate, and manage risks while conducting commercial air tour operations under the authorization” and that the FAA will review each certificate holder’s application as a whole and may recommend changes before approval. This appears to lay the groundwork for FAA verification of future SMS requirements.

Therefore, although the draft AC is not directly responsive to Safety Recommendation A-16-36, its reporting provision would allow the FAA to evaluate operators’ risk management strategies, including the applicable components of SMS, once the proposed new rule is implemented.

Our 2022 investigation report on the Kekaha accident also highlighted the importance of the safety assurance aspect of SMS for preventing a drift toward risky weather-related operating practices among Hawaii air tour pilots.

In that report, we issued Safety Recommendation A-22-16, which urged the FAA to issue a safety alert for operators (SAFO) to encourage air tour operators to establish safety assurance processes to routinely review recorded onboard videos and ADS-B flight tracking data, ideally as part of an SMS with an integrated flight data monitoring program, for the purpose of identifying and addressing risky trends in weather-related operating practices, such as encounters or near encounters with instrument meteorological conditions (IMC)-related hazards.

In August 2022, the FAA replied that it disagreed that issuing a SAFO to establish a safety assurance process is in the best interest of promoting aviation safety. The FAA pointed out that a formal safety assurance procedure currently exists in OpSpec B048, which requires that certificate holders conduct one formal commercial air tour safety meeting each year to discuss safety trends and Part 136, Appendix A issues.

However, we do not believe that OpSpec B048 is responsive to this recommendation, as the intent of this recommendation is to encourage air tour operators to review recorded ADS-B data to identify and track occurrences, such as a flight’s descent below a required minimum altitude, and review the circumstances of the event with the pilot in a nonpunitive fashion to explore what happened and learn about the integrity and effectiveness of existing risk controls. This recommendation is currently classified Open—Unacceptable Response.

We note that the draft AC lists FAA AC 120-92, Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers, under a section titled “Related Reading Material” and that AC 120-92 includes information on all the major components of SMS. We also note that the draft AC encourages Hawaii air tour operators to engage in risk management. The draft AC states that the FAA may recommend that operators include additional safety risk analysis (a component of SMS), but it does not contain specific provisions that address the development of safety assurance processes like those described in Safety Recommendation A-22-16. Therefore, the draft AC is not responsive to Safety Recommendation A-22-16.

Safety Recommendation A-22-15, which was also issued as a result of the Kekaha investigation, urged the FAA to develop guidance for small operators for scaling an SMS that includes methods and techniques for implementation and specific examples applicable to several operational sectors, including air tours. Although the draft AC does not specifically discuss scaling an SMS for Hawaii air tour operators, we noted that the FAA has informed us that its ongoing SMS rulemaking effort will address this recommendation. Thus, Safety Recommendation A-22-15 is classified Open—Acceptable Response.

Safety Recommendation A-22-18 (also from our report on the Kekaha accident) urged the FAA to issue and periodically update a special airworthiness information bulletin (SAIB) that lists newly manufactured helicopters that are equipped with features likely to reduce accidents resulting from inadvertent encounters with IMC, describes retrofit options for helicopters that do not have such equipment, and encourages the voluntary integration of these safety features. This recommendation is classified Open—Await Response. Although this recommendation specifically called for the publication of an SAIB, we note that the draft AC does not encourage voluntary integration of such safety features.

It does, however, state that an operator should include in its application a description of any supplemental type certificates related to aircraft instrumentation and equipment. Therefore, although the draft AC is not responsive to Safety Recommendation A-22-18, we are pleased that it may increase the FAA’s awareness of any such equipment that may be installed.

November 22, 2022 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that, although you initiated rulemaking in 2020 to address these recommendations, it has been delayed due to other, higher priority rulemakings. You also reported that FDRs are currently required for some Part 135 operations, and that operators have access to a variety of flight-tracking and FDM solutions. We point out that these recommendations apply to all Part 135 operations. We also point out that there is no requirement for Part 135 operations to establish an FDM program, which is needed to identify deviations from established norms and procedures, and to identify other potential safety issues.

In October 2022, at the National Business Aviation Association’s Business Aviation Convention and Exhibition in Orlando, Florida, we hosted a roundtable about practical FDM solutions for smaller operators that included members from FAA and industry. We were encouraged to learn about the growing number of affordable FDM solutions that are available; however, we believe that a requirement is still needed to ensure that all Part 135 operators establish an FDM program. We continue to believe the rulemaking you initiated in 2020 is positive; however, we are concerned because these recommendations are 6 years old, and you appear to have made no progress in implementing them.

We recognize that you have many competing priorities, and the required cost–benefit analysis will be challenging; however, we encourage you to make this safety issue a priority and act now. Pending the FAA taking the recommended actions, Safety Recommendations A-16-34 and -35 remain classified OPEN--UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

September 22, 2022 · Recipient Response · FAA

From Billy Nolen, Acting Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) agrees that additional flight data information benefits accident investigation and detecting operator noncompliance with approved procedures. However, achieving a favorable cost-benefit for flight data recorder (FDR) devices capable of supporting a flight data monitoring (FDM) program mandated for all Part 135 operations is challenging. As previously stated, the FAA initiated a rulemaking effort in 2020 to address these safety recommendations; however, other rulemaking efforts have since taken precedence.

We will provide further information on this rulemaking when our priorities allow. In addition, the FAA currently requires FDR/FDM for specific operations:

• Section 135.152, FDR: (a) Requires all multiengine, turbine-powered airplanes and rotorcraft having a passenger seating configuration, excluding any required crewmember seat, of 10 to 19 seats to be equipped with approved FDRs. (b) Requires all multiengine, turbine-powered airplanes with a passenger seating configuration of 20 to 30 seats and all multiengine, turbine-powered rotorcraft with a passenger seating configuration of 20 or more seats to be equipped with approved FDRs.

• The FAA Modernization and Reform Act (Pub. L. 112-095), enacted on February 14, 2012, contained an FDM system rulemaking requirement for helicopter air ambulance (HAA) services that the FAA implemented through the following rulemaking: o The HAA, Commercial Helicopter, and Part 91 Helicopter Operations Final Rule (79 FR 9931), effective April 22, 2014, requires commercial operations with medical personnel on board to be conducted under Part 135 operating rules and introduces new weather minimums and visibility requirements.

It mandates flight planning, preflight risk analyses, safety briefings for medical personnel, and the establishment of operations control centers for certain operators to help with risk management and flight monitoring. The rule also includes provisions to encourage flight operations to be conducted under instrument flight rules operations. It requires HAA to be equipped with both helicopter terrain awareness and warning systems and FDM systems (§§ 135.605 and 135.607).

• The Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out Performance Requirements To Support Air Traffic Control (ATC) Service Final Rule (75 FR 30159), effective August 11, 2010, with compliance required by January 1, 2020, requires aircraft to be equipped with ADS-B in order to conduct flight operations in designated parts of the National Airspace System unless otherwise authorized by ATC. Information from ADS-B includes aircraft identity, altitude, location, speed, heading, and rate of climb or descent. ADS-B data is available for FAA use in aircraft accident and incident investigations.

In addition, aviation service providers, such as FlightAware, Flight Explorer, and Spidertracks, offer web-based tracking, two-way communication, automatic emergency alerting, multiple aircraft displays, variable position reporting, and worldwide automated flight following. General aviation operators have access to FDM avionics equipment from Garmin Ltd. Garmin avionics systems are available for flight parameter recorders with high-speed Wi-Fi transceivers for transmitting data collected from the G1000 for trend monitoring and maintenance planning FDM equipment and services continue to provide aircraft data for safer flight operations.

I will keep the Board informed of our progress on Safety Recommendations A-16-34 and -35 and anticipate providing an update by September 30, 2023.

May 26, 2022 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

From Aviation Investigation Report AIR-22-05 “Collision into Terrain Safari Aviation Inc. Airbus AS350 B2, N985SA Kekaha, Hawaii, December 26, 2019” published on May 26, 2022: 2.5.3 Benefits of a Flight Data Monitoring Program

Safari did not have and was not required to have an FDM program, which involves the recording and analysis of flight-related data to help pilots, instructors, and operators improve performance and safety. An FDM program, which can be integrated into an SMS, has the potential to provide important information regarding trends in operational deviations during flights. This may be particularly beneficial for air tour operators (like Safari) that conduct single-pilot operations; thus, they have little opportunity to directly observe their pilots in the operational environment.

FDM programs typically involve the use of an onboard device that can record various flight parameters installed on each aircraft in an operator’s fleet. Periodic review of the recorded data enables an operator to identify operational exceedances, deviations from company procedures, and other potential safety issues; operators can then explore in a nonpunitive way the reasons why these events occurred and what can be done to avoid them in the future.

For example, data reviews from company flights may help a company identify deviations (such as descents below specified minimum tour altitudes), gather information to better understand the context of those deviations, and take proactive measures to implement mitigations to help prevent an accident from occurring.

The NTSB has long recognized the value of an FDM program, starting in 2009, when we recommended that the FAA require helicopter air ambulance operators to establish a structured FDM program and install recording devices capable of supporting it.63 The FAA’s final rule for helicopter air ambulance operators required such operators to equip their fleet with recording devices but did not require them to establish an FDM program. In our September 11, 2014, letter to the FAA, we noted that a mandate for FDM programs was needed to identify procedural deviations and other potential safety issues, and we asked the FAA to provide details of its plans for addressing this part of the recommendation.

In its November 1, 2017, response to us, the FAA expressed concerns that, because the protections of 14 CFR Part 193, “Protection of Voluntarily Submitted Information,” are available only if the data are collected by operators as part of a voluntary FAA-approved program, it did not intend to mandate the programs. We emphasized in our response to the FAA that the intent of our recommendation was for operators to establish internal FDM programs, which would not share collected data with the FAA, and, thus, the data would not need protections. However, the FAA refused to mandate FDM programs.”

In 2016, as a result of our investigation of an accident involving a business jet that departed controlled flight while on an approach to an airport and collided into an apartment building in Akron, Ohio, we recommended that the FAA do the following (NTSB 2016):

Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators to install flight data recording devices capable of supporting a flight data monitoring program. (A-16-34)

After the action in Safety Recommendation A-16-34 is completed, require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators to establish a structured flight data monitoring program that reviews all available data sources to identify deviations from established norms and procedures and other potential safety issues. (A-16-35)

In response to Safety Recommendation A-16-34, on January 9, 2017, the FAA said it would conduct a review to determine the feasibility of requiring all Part 135 certificate holders to install FDM recording devices on their aircraft. Regarding the FAA’s review for Safety Recommendation A-16-34, the FAA noted that a key focus would be to determine the feasibility of achieving a favorable cost-benefit ratio.

On April 6, 2017, we noted that the regulatory evaluation for the helicopter air ambulance final rule showed costs of approximately $20.4 million over a 10-year period and that we were surprised to see that the benefits amounted to $0. We issued Safety Recommendation A-16-34 because an FDM program, which requires that aircraft be equipped with appropriate recording systems, offers an opportunity for operators to improve the safety of their operations and avoid accidents. A review of NTSB major aviation accident investigations involving Part 135 on-demand operators during the period of 2000 through 2015 found seven accident investigations with findings related to pilot performance.

In these seven accidents, 53 people were fatally injured and another 4 were seriously injured. We believe that an effective FDM program can help an operator identify issues with pilot performance and, through an SMS, can lead to mitigations that will prevent future accidents. As a result, we do not believe it is appropriate to indicate that there are no quantifiable benefits from a mandate for FDM equipment and programs.

In response to Safety Recommendation A-16-35, on January 9, 2017, the FAA replied that it previously considered mandating FDM programs as a part of the development of the February 21, 2014, helicopter air ambulance final rule and determined that its voluntary programs were successful for monitoring and evaluating operational practices and procedures. The FAA also said it believed that maintaining a voluntary nature was paramount to the success of FDM programs and that it planned to review the level of participation of Part 135 certificate holders in the FAA’s voluntary FDM programs.

In the 6 years since we issued these recommendations, we have reiterated them repeatedly based on the findings from our investigations of other fatal accidents involving Part 135 operators (NTSB 2018, 2019, 2020a, and 2021a).65 On September 29, 2020, the FAA described to us that it was considering rulemaking related to recording devices (including those capable of supporting an FDM program) but that it had decided to delay issuing a notice to its aviation safety inspectors (initially planned for 2018) to determine how many operators had voluntarily installed such devices on their fleets.66 We note that, although the FAA administrator spoke favorably of FDM during his October 27, 2020, speech at the FAA’s Rotorcraft Safety Conference and encouraged operators to adopt and use it (FAA 2020), the FAA has not provided any further information regarding the findings of its evaluations and reviews or its progress on planned actions to address the recommendations.

Currently, Safety Recommendations A-16-34 and -35 are classified “Open—Unacceptable Response.”

These safety recommendations also appear on our current Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements under the issue areas, “Install Crash-Resistant Recorders and Establish Flight Data Monitoring Programs” and “Require and Verify the Effectiveness of SMS in all Revenue Passenger-Carrying Aviation Operations.”

Thus, the NTSB concludes that an FDM program, which can enable an operator to identify and mitigate factors that may influence pilots’ deviations from safe operating procedures, can be particularly beneficial for operators like Safari that conduct single-pilot operations and have little opportunity to directly observe their pilots. Therefore, the NTSB reiterates Safety Recommendations A-16-34 and -35.

April 20, 2021 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

Although your September 29, 2020, letter did not discuss this recommendation, we believe that the actions you discussed in your response to Safety Recommendations A-13-12 and -13, including the rulemaking that you are considering and the notice that you have delayed issuing to your aviation safety inspectors, are also responsive to Safety Recommendation A-16-34.

We point out that since 2017, Safety Recommendation A-16-34 has been reiterated three times, most recently, on February 9, 2021, in our Calabasas accident report, where it was classified “Open—Unacceptable Response.”

Pending your taking the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-16-34 remains classified OPEN-- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

February 25, 2021 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

Reiterated and reclassified in NTSB Aviation Accident Report AAR-21-01 “Rapid Descent Into Terrain Island Express Helicopters Inc. Sikorsky S-76B, N72EX Calabasas, California January 26, 2020.” Published on February 25, 2021.

Safety Recommendation A-16-34 is classifying it OPEN-- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE in this report.

February 25, 2021 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

Reiterated and reclassified in NTSB Aviation Accident Report AAR-21-01 “Rapid Descent Into Terrain Island Express Helicopters Inc. Sikorsky S-76B, N72EX Calabasas, California January 26, 2020.” Published on February 25, 2021.

2.6 Benefits of Flight Data Monitoring Program Island Express did not have and was not required to have an FDM program, which involves the recording and analysis of flight-related information to help pilots, instructors, and operators improve performance and safety. An FDM program, which can be integrated into an SMS, has the potential to provide important information regarding pilot performance during flights, which may be particularly beneficial for operators like Island Express that conduct single-pilot operations and, thus, have little opportunity to directly observe their pilots in the operational environment.

FDM programs typically involve the use of an onboard device that is capable of recording various flight parameters or video installed on each aircraft in an operator’s fleet. Periodic review of the recorded data enables an operator to identify deviations from company procedures, established norms, and other potential safety issues. For example, data reviews from company flights may help a company identify deviations, gather information to better understand the context of those deviations, and take proactive measures to implement mitigations and corrective action before an accident occurs.

The NTSB has long recognized the value of an FDM program, starting with Safety Recommendation A-09-90, issued in 2009, which recommended that the FAA require helicopter air ambulance operators to establish a structured FDM program and install recording devices capable of supporting it. The FAA’s February 21, 2014, final rule, “Helicopter Air Ambulance, Commercial Helicopter, and Part 91 Helicopter Operations,” required helicopter air ambulance

67 A review of NTSB aircraft accident investigation data revealed that, during 2010 through 2019, we investigated 198 aircraft accidents—184 of which were fatal—in which spatial disorientation played a role or was cited in the investigative findings. Helicopters were involved in 24 of these accidents, 20 of which were fatal. (Note: These totals include only accidents that occurred in the United States and for which the investigations were completed as of January 14, 2021.)

operators to equip their fleet with recording devices but did not require them to establish an FDM program. In our September 11, 2014, letter to the FAA, we noted that a mandate for FDM programs was needed to identify deviations from established norms and procedures and to identify other potential safety issues, and we asked the FAA to provide details of its plans for addressing this part of the recommendation.

In its November 1, 2017, response, the FAA expressed concerns that, because the protections of Part 193, “Protection of Voluntarily Submitted Information,” are available only if the data are collected by operators as part of a voluntary FAA-approved program, it did not intend to mandate the programs. In our response to the FAA, we emphasized that the intent of our recommendation was for operators to establish internal FDM programs, which would not share collected data with the FAA, and, thus, the data would not need protections.

However, based on the FAA’s response that it would not mandate FDM programs as we recommended, we classified Safety Recommendation A-09-90 “Closed—Unacceptable Action.”68

68 In our January 25, 2018, reply to the FAA, we noted that Safety Recommendation A-09-90 did not intend for the FAA to require helicopter air ambulance operators to establish a safety program that shares data with the FAA and for which the Part 193 protections do not apply (such as the flight operations quality assurance program for Part 121 operators, which share de-identified aggregate information with the FAA). The intent of the recommendation was for helicopter air ambulance operators to establish an internal program by which they analyze their recorded FDM data and monitor trends within their operations.

We informed the FAA that, because the collected data would not need to be shared with the FAA, we did not see the need for protecting it. We classified Safety Recommendation A-09-90 “Closed—Unacceptable Action” on January 25, 2018. See appendix C for more information.

69 See appendix C for more information.

On November 3, 2016, we issued Safety Recommendation A-16-34, which recommended that the FAA require all Part 135 operators to install flight data recording devices capable of supporting an FDM program (NTSB 2016).

On the same date, we issued Safety Recommendation A-16-35, which recommended that the FAA, after the action in Safety Recommendation A-16-34 is completed, require all Part 135 operators to establish a structured FDM program that reviews all available data sources to identify deviations from established norms and procedures and other potential safety issues.69 Due to our ongoing interest in this area and the importance of these recommendations, we included them in the NTSB’s 2019-2020 Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements for the issue area, “Improve the Safety of Part 135 Aircraft Flight Operations.”

In response to Safety Recommendation A-16-34, on January 9, 2017, the FAA said it would conduct a review to determine the feasibility of requiring all Part 135 certificate holders to install FDM recording devices on their aircraft. The FAA noted that it had conducted a similar review when considering the development of the helicopter air ambulance final rule and determined that a requirement for such devices did not meet the cost-benefit requirements for safety.

However, Congress mandated the equipment requirement in Section 306(a) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, which stated that revised regulations should apply only to Part 135 certificate holders providing air ambulance services. As a result of the Congressional mandate, the February 21, 2014, helicopter air ambulance final rule contained the mandate for the FDM equipment on helicopter air ambulances. Regarding the FAA’s new review for Safety Recommendation A-16-34, the FAA noted that a key focus would be to determine the feasibility of achieving a favorable cost-benefit ratio.

On April 6, 2017, we replied that we reviewed the regulatory evaluation of the February 21, 2014, final rule. We noted that the regulatory evaluation showed costs of approximately $20.4 million over a 10-year period and that we were surprised to see that the benefits amounted to $0. We issued Safety Recommendation A-16-34 because an FDM program, which requires that aircraft be equipped with appropriate recording systems, offers a great opportunity for operators to improve the safety of their operations and avoid accidents.

A review of NTSB major aviation accident investigations involving Part 135 on-demand operators during the period of 2000 through 2015 found seven accident investigations with findings related to pilot performance. In these seven accidents, 53 people were fatally injured and another 4 were seriously injured. The NTSB believes that an effective FDM program can help an operator identify issues with pilot performance and, through an SMS, lead to mitigations that will prevent future accidents. As a result, the NTSB does not believe it is appropriate to indicate that there are no quantifiable benefits from a mandate for FDM equipment and programs.

In response to Safety Recommendation A-16-35, on January 9, 2017, the FAA replied that it previously considered mandating FDM programs as a part of the development of the February 21, 2014, helicopter air ambulance final rule and determined that its voluntary programs were successful for monitoring and evaluating operational practices and procedures. The FAA also said it believed that maintaining a vo

March 28, 2019 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

From the Aircraft Accident Report: “Departure from Controlled Flight Trans-Pacific Air Charter, LLC, Learjet 35A, N452DA, Teterboro, New Jersey, May 15, 2017.” Report Number AAR-19-02, Notation 58039, adopted March 12, 2019 and published March 28, 2019, PB2019-100271: Section 2.4 Flight Data Monitoring As discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3, the flight crew repeatedly deviated from company policy and procedures. If the flight had not ended in an accident, Trans-Pacific would not have a way to identify this crew’s deviations from policy and SOPs, and the company had no way to determine whether this (or any) crew’s previous operations were conducted in accordance with company policy and SOPs.

As discussed in the NTSB’s report on a 2014 accident involving a Gulfstream G-IV at BED, procedural drift and normalization of procedural deviance can pose a significant threat to the safety of flight operations, particularly for small operators (including Trans-Pacific) with limited operational oversight and consistent crew pairings (NTSB 2015). Flight data monitoring (FDM) can be a very useful tool for combating these problems.52

As a result of an increase in fatal helicopter air ambulance (HAA) accidents in 2008, the NTSB recommended that the FAA “require helicopter emergency medical services operators to install flight data recording devices and establish a structured flight data monitoring program that reviews all available data sources to identify deviations from established norms and procedures and other potential safety issues” (Safety Recommendation A-09-90). On February 21, 2014, the FAA issued a comprehensive final rule, “Helicopter Air Ambulance, Commercial Helicopter, and Part 91 Helicopter Operations” (79 Federal Register 9932), addressing many aspects of these operations.

The final rule included 14 CFR 135.607, “Flight Data Monitoring System,” which required that helicopters used for Part 135 HAA operations be equipped with an approved FDM system capable of recording flight performance data (FAA 2014). However, the final rule did not require that all HAA operators establish an FDM program.

In a November 1, 2017, response to Safety Recommendation A-09-90, the FAA said that it endorsed using voluntary flight operational quality assurance programs to continuously monitor and evaluate operational practices and procedures. However, because the protections provided in Part 193, “Protection of Voluntarily Submitted Information,” pertain only if data are collected by operators as part of a voluntary FAA-approved program, the FAA did not intend to initiate rulemaking to mandate that HAA operators establish FDM programs.

In a January 25, 2018, response, the NTSB pointed out that the intent of Safety Recommendation A-09-90 was for HAA operators to establish an internal program that analyzes recorded FDM system data and monitors trends in their operations. Because the data collected would not need to be shared with the FAA, there would be no need to protect the data. Because the FAA did not intend to take any additional actions regarding this recommendation, the NTSB classified Safety Recommendation A-09-90 “Closed—Unacceptable Action.”

During our investigation of the November 10, 2015, accident involving an Execuflight Hawker 700A that departed controlled flight while on an instrument approach to Akron Fulton International Airport, Akron, Ohio, the NTSB found that operational FDM programs could provide Part 135 operators with objective information regarding the manner in which their pilots conduct flights (NTSB 2016). Our investigation also found that a periodic review of such information could assist operators in detecting and correcting unsafe deviations from company SOPs (NTSB 2016).

Therefore, the NTSB recommended that the FAA “require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators to install flight data recording devices capable of supporting a flight data monitoring program” (Safety Recommendation A-16-34). We also recommended that the FAA, “after the action in Safety Recommendation A-16-34 is completed, require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators to establish a structured flight data monitoring program that reviews all available data sources to identify deviations from established norms and procedures and other potential safety issues” (Safety Recommendation A-16-35).

In a January 9, 2017, response addressing Safety Recommendation A-16-34, the FAA stated that it would evaluate the costs and benefits of requiring all Part 135 operators to install flight data recording devices. The FAA also stated that, in advance of the 2014 rule change to 14 CFR 135.607, it conducted a similar study of the costs and benefits to require data recording devices for HAA operators. The FAA determined, through a financial analysis, that the proposed rule change “did not meet the cost-benefit requirements for safety” but noted that the proposed change, as mandated, applied only to Part 135 operators providing air ambulance services.

In an April 6, 2017, response to the FAA, the NTSB expressed surprise that the FAA’s published regulatory evaluation of the rule change to 14 CFR 135.607 showed costs of about $20.4 million over a 10-year period but that the benefits determination amounted to $0. The NTSB’s response provided the results of our review of major aviation accident investigations from 2000 to 2015 involving Part 135 on-demand operators to identify accidents with findings related to pilot performance. The review identified seven such accidents in which a total of 53 people died and 4 people were seriously injured.

Our response restated that an effective FDM program could help an operator identify issues with pilot performance (such as noncompliance with SOPs) and, through an SMS, could lead to mitigations that would prevent future accidents. The NTSB asked that the FAA, in its review of Safety Recommendation A-16-34, consider likely benefits from such a mandate instead of determining that there would be no quantifiable benefit. Pending completion of the FAA’s review and actions, the NTSB classified Safety Recommendation A-16-34 “Open—Acceptable Response.”

In its January 9, 2017, response concerning Safety Recommendation A-16-35, the FAA stated that it planned to review Part 135 operators’ level of participation in voluntary programs and evaluate additional actions needed to increase the level of participation; however, the FAA also stated that “maintaining a voluntary nature is paramount to the success of [FDM] programs.” In our April 6, 2017, response, the NTSB stated that, based on our review of major aviation accident investigations involving Part 135 on-demand operators (as discussed above), FDM programs are not common among Part 135 operators; as a result, we disagreed that the implementation of voluntary programs was successful.

The NTSB further stated that the FAA’s planned review might be a basis for an acceptable alternate action to satisfy Safety Recommendation A-16-35 if the review identified additional actions to encourage and periodically evaluate the level of Part 135 operators’ voluntary compliance. However, the NTSB cautioned that any acceptable response must measure the level of voluntary participation in FDM programs and must find widespread participation among Part 135 operators.

Pending completion of the FAA’s review of its voluntary FDM programs and the identification and implementation of additional activities to encourage and measure Part 135 operators’ level of voluntary participation in FDM programs, the NTSB classified Safety Recommendation A-16-35 “Open—Acceptable Alternate Response.”

Another recent accident investigation that demonstrated the benefits of FDM programs for Part 135 operators involved a Cessna 208B operated by Hageland Aviation Services, which collided with terrain in low-visibility conditions near Togiak, Ala

April 26, 2018 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The following is from the NTSB Aviation Accident Report “Collision with Terrain Hageland Aviation Services, Inc. dba Ravn Connect Flight 3153 Cessna 208B, N208SD, Togiak, Alaska October 2, 2016.” Report number AAR-18-02. Adopted on April 17, 2018 and published on April 26, 2018. As a result of the Akron investigation (as well as others cited in that accident report), on November 7, 2016, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation A-16-34 to recommend that the FAA require all Part 135 operators to install flight data recording devices capable of supporting an FDM program (NTSB 2016).

The NTSB also issued Safety Recommendation A-16-35, which recommended that the FAA, after the action in Safety Recommendation A-16-34 was completed, require all Part 135 operators to establish a structured FDM program that reviews all available data sources to identify deviations from established norms and procedures and other potential safety issues (NTSB 2016). On January 9, 2017, the FAA said that it would conduct a review to determine the feasibility of requiring all Part 135 certificate holders to install FDM recording devices on their aircraft.

The FAA noted that, in 2014, a similar review was conducted as part of the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in the regulatory review associated with proposed rule changes to 14 CFR 135.607, “Flight Data Monitoring System,” associated with a final rule to improve the safety of HAA operations. In that review, the FAA determined that the proposed rule change did not meet the cost-benefit requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for federal safety regulations.

However, because the proposed change was mandated by Congress in Section 306(a) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2013, which specifically restricted the revised regulations to only Part 135 certificate holders providing air ambulance services, on February 21, 2014, the FAA published the “[HAA], Commercial Helicopter, and Part 91 Helicopter Operations” final rule, which contained 14 CFR 135.607 requiring FDM equipment for Part 135 HAAs to be equipped with an FDM system.

In its January 9, 2017, letter, the FAA said that a key focus of its review for Safety Recommendation A-16-34 would be to determine the feasibility of achieving a favorable cost/benefit ratio if FDM recording devices were mandated for all Part 135 operators. On April 6, 2017, the NTSB responded that it had reviewed the FAA’s CBA in its regulatory evaluation associated with changes to 14 CFR 135.607. That review showed costs of about $20.4 million over a 10-year period; however, the NTSB was surprised to see that the benefits determination amounted to $0.

The NTSB stated that it believed that an FDM program offers a great opportunity for operators to improve the safety of their operations and avoid accidents. A review of major NTSB investigations of accidents involving Part 135 on-demand operators between 2000 through 2015 (discussed above regarding Safety Recommendation A-16-36) identified seven accidents that killed 53 people and seriously injured 4. The NTSB believes that an effective FDM program can help an operator identify issues with pilot performance, such as noncompliance with SOPs, and, through an SMS, can lead to mitigations that will prevent future accidents.

The NTSB does not believe that the FAA’s indication that there were no quantifiable benefits from a mandate for FDM equipment and programs is appropriate. In its response, the NTSB asked the FAA to consider in its planned review the likely benefits from such a mandate. Pending the FAA’s completion of the review and responsive actions, the NTSB classified Safety Recommendation A-16-34 “Open—Acceptable Response.” With regard to Safety Recommendation A-16-35, the FAA said in its January 9, 2017, letter that it planned to review Part 135 operators’ level of participation in voluntary programs and evaluate additional actions needed to increase it.

On April 6, 2017, the NTSB replied that, based on the FAA’s review of Part 135 on-demand major accident investigations, the FAA believed that FDM programs were not common among Part 135 operators; the NTSB disagreed that the FAA’s voluntary programs were successful. The NTSB stated that, if the FAA identified additional actions to encourage and periodically evaluate the level of voluntary compliance, this might be the basis for an acceptable alternate action to satisfy this recommendation. The NTSB cautioned that any acceptable response must measure the level of voluntary participation in FDM programs and must find that there is widespread participation among Part 135 operators.

Pending completion of the FAA’s review and the identification and implementation of additional activities to encourage and measure Part 135 operators’ level of voluntary participation in FDM programs, the NTSB classified Safety Recommendation A-16-35 “Open—Acceptable Alternate Response.” Hageland stated that it expected that its planned use of FOQA-type flight data recording devices and planned data monitoring department will “further enable [the company] to review compliance with company procedures through data analysis, similar to a Part 121 operation.”

The use of flight data recording devices capable of supporting an FDM program, along with active participation in such a program, can enable a company to identify shortcomings and address them through training and additional procedural guidance before an accident occurs. FDM programs can be supported by a variety of flight data recording devices, including, but not limited to, the quick-access recorder and lightweight aircraft recording system, both of which can provide operators access to recorded flight data. These types of flight recording devices, when part of an operator program to review and analyze the data collected, can contribute to improvements in operational safety.

The NTSB notes that some flight data recording devices include cockpit imaging and audio recording capabilities, which could help an operator identify hazards and develop risk mitigations associated with operating VFR flights in dynamic and/or deteriorating weather conditions, CRM challenges in the operational environment, and the use of the TAWS inhibit switch. Thus, the NTSB concludes that operational FDM programs can provide Part 135 operators with objective information on how their pilots conduct flights, and a periodic review of such information can assist operators in detecting and correcting unsafe deviations from company SOPs.

Therefore, due the relevance of FDM programs (and flight data recording devices capable of supporting them) to the circumstances of this accident, the NTSB reiterates Safety Recommendations A-16-34 and -35.

October 2, 2017 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

Although your July 20, 2017, letter did not discuss this recommendation, we believe that the notice that you plan to issue next year to your aviation safety inspectors, discussed in regard to Safety Recommendations A-13-12 and -13, will also provide you with valuable information that will help you satisfy Safety Recommendation A-16-34. When your effort to collect this information is complete, please let us know how the results will be used in your response.

April 6, 2017 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We reviewed the regulatory evaluation of the final rule, “Helicopter Air Ambulance, Commercial Helicopter, and Part 91 Helicopter Operations,” that you published on February 21, 2014. The rule revised section 135.607, Flight Data Monitoring System, to require that FDM systems be installed in helicopters used for air ambulance service. In the regulatory evaluation, you determined that the proposed rule change to require FDM systems did not meet the cost-benefit requirements for any new federal regulation to be enacted.

As discussed in your letter, the proposed change was mandated by Congress in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2013; however, that Congressional requirement specifically stated that the revised regulations should apply only to Part 135 operators providing air ambulance services. As a result, although you were not able to show the FDM requirement to be cost beneficial, the final rule that you published on February 21, 2014, contained the requirement in section 135.607 for an FDM system on helicopters used in air ambulance service.

Your regulatory evaluation showed costs of approximately $20.4 million over a 10 year period, but we were surprised to see that the benefits amounted to $0. We believe that an FDM program, which requires that aircraft be equipped with appropriate recording systems, offers a great opportunity for operators to improve the safety of their operations and avoid accidents. We reviewed our major aviation accident investigations involving Part 135 on-demand operators, which occurred during the period of 2000 through 2015. The goal of our review was to identify accidents with findings related to pilot performance.

We found that we had investigated seven relevant accidents that killed a total of 53 people and seriously injured another 4 (see enclosure). We believe that an effective FDM program can help an operator identify issues with pilot performance, such as noncompliance with standard operating procedures (SOPs), and, through a safety management system (SMS), can lead to mitigations that will prevent future accidents. As a result, we do not believe it is appropriate to indicate that there are no quantifiable benefits from a mandate for FDM equipment and programs.

We note that, to satisfy this recommendation, you plan to review the feasibility of requiring the recommended action, and that a key focus of your review will be achieving a favorable cost–benefit ratio for any new or revised federal regulation. In your review, we ask that you consider and include likely benefits from such a mandate, and that you do not again determine, as you did in your regulatory evaluation of the final rule issued on February 21, 2014, that there is no quantifiable benefit. Pending completion of your review and of actions to satisfy Safety Recommendation A-16-34, it is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

January 9, 2017 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will conduct a review to determine the feasibility of requiring all Title 14. Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 135 certificate holders to install flight data recording devices on their aircraft. In 2014, a similar review was conducted in advance of proposed rule changes to § 135.607. Flight Data Monitoring System. In that review. it was determined through a financial analysis that the proposed rule change did not meet the cost-benefit requirements for safety.

However, the proposed change was mandated by Congress in Section 306(a) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of20 13 (PL 112-95) and it specifically stated that revised regulations should apply only to part 135 certificate holders providing air ambulance services, whenever medical personnel arc onboard the aircraft. As a result, on February 21, 2014, the FAA published the Helicopter Air Ambulance. Commercial Helicopter and Part 91 Helicopter Operations final rule (helicopter final rule). Section 135.607, flight Data Monitoring System, now requires part 135 helicopter air ambulances to be equipped with a flight data monitoring system. Additionally.

After April 23, 2018, no person may operate a helicopter in air ambulance operations unless it is equipped with an approved flight data monitoring system capable or recording flight performance data. These are areas where part 135 operations arc now required to have a flight data monitoring system. A key focus of our review for this safety recommendation will be to determine the feasibility of achieving a favorable cost/benefit ratio if flight data recording devices capable of supporting a flight data monitoring program are mandated for all part 135 operators. We will update the Board on our progress.