NTSB · Safety Recommendation
Safety Recommendation A-16-024
Recommendation
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: If the systems described in Safety Recommendation A-16-23 are shown to be technically and operationally feasible, work with operators and the system manufacturers to develop procedures that ensure that airplane-based braking ability results can be readily conveyed to, and easily interpreted by, arriving flight crews, airport operators, air traffic control personnel, and others with a safety need for this information. (Safety Recommendations A-16-023 and A-16-024 supersede Safety Recommendation A-07-064)
Safety Issue and Context
On March 5, 2015, at 1102 eastern standard time, Delta Air Lines flight 1086, a Boeing MD-88, N909DL, was landing on runway 13 at LaGuardia Airport (LGA), New York, New York, when it departed the left side of the runway, contacted the airport perimeter fence, and came to rest with the airplane’s nose on an embankment next to Flushing Bay. The 2 pilots, 3 flight attendants, and 98 of the 127 passengers were not injured; the other 29 passengers received minor injuries. The airplane was substantially damaged.
Flight 1086 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight from Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia, operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. An instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
Response History
October 9, 2024 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA
We note that you oversaw the validation of Aviation Safety Technologies (AST’s) aircraft braking action reports (ABARs), which are transmitted automatically to the flight deck of the reporting aircraft and can be forwarded by the flight crew to ATC to be relayed to other approaching aircraft for landing. We also note that the Society of Aircraft Performance and Operations Engineers (SAPOE) and the American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) have developed standards to improve ABARs that are specified in ASTM E3188, Standard Terminology for Aircraft Braking Performance, and E3266, Standard Guide for Friction-Limited Aircraft Braking Measurements and Reporting.
We further note that, on August 28, 2023, you published Advisory Circular (AC) 91-79B, Aircraft Landing Performance and Runway Excursion Mitigation, which includes guidance that is based on these standards and the SAPOE and the ASTM’s work related to this safety issue.
We point out that AC 91-79B, Appendix A, Paragraph A.2.3, states that ABAR systems must demonstrate compliance with ASTM E3266 and that any ABAR system whose intended function entails timely recognition from the flight crew should comply with AC 25.1322-1, Flight Crew Alerting. We would like to know how you intend to ensure that this guidance is being followed. Also, since the guidance in AC 91-79B is directed at pilots and operators, we would like to know if the FAA is developing similar guidance for airport personnel and controllers to ensure they have the necessary procedures to facilitate ABAR reporting.
We believe your work overseeing the validation of and improving ABARs, the guidance contained in AC 91-79B, and the SAPOE and the ASTM’s work in support of these efforts are responsive to this recommendation. Pending our receipt and review of the information we’ve requested, Safety Recommendation A-16-24 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.
October 5, 2023 · Recipient Response · FAA
-From Kathryn B. Thomson, Deputy Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) previously stated it oversaw the validation of Aviation Safety Technologies (AST) Aircraft Braking Action Reports (ABARs) with two Part 121