NTSB · Safety Recommendation
Safety Recommendation A-15-030
Recommendation
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Identify nonfrangible structures outside of a runway safety area during annual 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139 inspections and place increased emphasis on replacing nonfrangible fittings of any objects along the extended runway centerline up to the perimeter fence with frangible fittings, wherever feasible, during the next routine maintenance cycle.
Safety Issue and Context
On May 31, 2014, about 2140 eastern daylight time, a Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation G-IV, N121JM, registered to SK Travel, LLC, and operated by Arizin Ventures, LLC, crashed after it overran the end of runway 11 during a rejected takeoff at Laurence G. Hanscom Field (BED), Bedford, Massachusetts. The airplane rolled through the paved overrun area and across a grassy area, collided with approach lights and a localizer antenna, passed through the airport’s perimeter fence, and came to a stop in a ravine. The two pilots, a flight attendant, and four passengers died. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire.
The corporate flight, which was destined for Atlantic City International Airport, Atlantic City, New Jersey, was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. An instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the flight crewmembers’ failure to perform the flight control check before takeoff, their attempt to take off with the gust lock system engaged, and their delayed execution of a rejected takeoff after they became aware that the controls were locked.
Contributing to the accident were the flight crew’s habitual noncompliance with checklists, Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation’s failure to ensure that the G-IV gust lock/throttle lever interlock system would prevent an attempted takeoff with the gust lock engaged, and the Federal Aviation Administration’s failure to detect this inadequacy during the G-IV’s certification.
Response History
July 29, 2026 · Recipient Response · FAA
-From Bryan Bedford, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) acknowledges that a significant runway overrun beyond the runway safety area (RSA) prompted the subject NTSB Recommendation, and while the excursion was severe, it represents a low-probability, high consequence scenario. The FAA recognizes the seriousness of the outcome; however, the event does not justify establishing a new systemwide practice to inventory and replace all non frangible structures outside of the RSA.
Instead, we will continue to address rare exceedance events through targeted, site-specific mitigations informed by incorporating lessons learned through established safety risk management practices and management of the FAA’s RSA Inventory Database and RSA Phase 2 program for situational awareness and proactive safety management.
The FAA does not routinely replace non-frangible structures outside the RSA with frangible ones, even at 14 CFR 139 airports, because the FAA standards limit prescriptive requirements to high-risk areas, and while the FAA prioritizes National Airspace System (NAS) reliability and durability, we must ensure eligibility and programmatic justification. Safety resources must be allocated where they reduce the greatest risk; systemwide replacement outside the RSA would not meet this threshold. Absent a highly probable, documented hazard or project trigger, such equipment retrofits are not regulatory, operationally prudent, or fiscally supportable.
Frangibility is a safety benefit only where the collision probability is high; outside of which, durability and operational continuity are of focus in balancing both safety and engineering. Replacing infrastructure outside of the RSA is not programmatically or fiscally justifiable in the absence of a high-probability hazard.
Consequently, the FAA did not consider the replacement of non-frangible equipment located outside the RSA along the extended runway centerline to be a requirement of the RSA program and therefore was not planned or funded. The program was intentionally scoped to address objects within the RSA. Extending replacement beyond the RSA would require substantial investment. In addition, some equipment beyond the RSA supports critical operational functions and cannot be replaced with frangible alternatives without degrading system performance.