Safety Recommendation A-14-105

We understand that NSP air operations do not use an SMS. Therefore, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and -106 remain classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION.

We understand that the SLED developed and implemented an SMS for its aircraft operations. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation A-14-105 is classified CLOSED-- ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

We understand that the MSP has not yet fully implemented a comprehensive SMS, but plans to do so by April 1, 2022. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation A-14-105 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We understand that the THP has implemented standard operating procedures that address key elements of an SMS, and that it plans to implement a comprehensive SMS in the future. However, because the THP has not yet completed the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-14-105 is classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION.

Captain Gutierrez wrote that a trained NMSP safety officer is working with the Airborne Law Enforcement Association to create an SMS, and that the NMSP will arrange for recurring audits through the Airborne Law Enforcement Association after the SMS is implemented. Although these are positive steps toward addressing these recommendations, because the NMSP has not yet implemented an SMS, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and -106 remain classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION.

We note that, in 2012, the VSP revised its policies related to an SMS and subscribed to an SMS system through the Virginia Department of Aviation. Because the VSP was in compliance with Safety Recommendation A-14-105 prior to the recommendation being issued, it is classified CLOSED-- RECONSIDERED.

We understand that the MHP’s newly certified aviation safety officer intends to implement a comprehensive SMS and is currently researching SMS providers; however, because this action is not yet complete, Safety Recommendation A-14-105 is classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION.

We note that the ISP’s anonymous hazard/occurrence reporting system allows ISP employees to report any safety hazards or occurrences to the safety officer, who can then share the report with the bureau chief. The ISP provides an alternative reporting chain of command if the report involves the safety officer or the bureau chief. Prior to takeoff, a pilot or crew member completes a flight risk assessment tool (FRAT) form that provides a numerical value for the total flight risk. If the value is between 0 and 5, the crew makes the go/no-go decision.

If the value is greater than five, the flight requires supervisor approval from the safety officer, chief pilot, or bureau chief prior to takeoff. The ISP’s flight risk assessment tool (FRAT) holds ISP management accountable by requiring a management go/no-go decision for FRAT results greater than five.

We note that the ISP addresses the second element of this recommendation through its use of a safety resource bulletin board, where the ISP’s standard operating procedures, FRAT, safety brochures, safety statistics, mission statement, values, core competencies, and vision are posted.

Finally, we note that the ISP’s SMS addresses the third element of Safety Recommendation A-14-105 by incorporating industry best practices in multiple areas, including the following:

• Focusing on preflight activities • Using a FRAT that includes both static and dynamic factors • Giving each flight a numerical risk value based on the FRAT form • Providing an anonymous safety-related hazard/occurrence reporting procedure • Performing a preflight personal assessment of the pilot’s physical and emotional states

These policies and procedures satisfy Safety Recommendation A-14-105, which is classified CLOSED-- ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

-From Commissioner Jeff Long, Commissioner & Governor’s Homeland Security Advisor: The Tennessee Highway Patrol aviation division has standard operating procedures in place that address the key elements of a Safety Management System (SMS). In the future the Tennessee Highway Patrol will implement a more comprehensive SMS that includes the recommendations established by the Airborne Law Enforcement Association.

-From Colonel Matthew C. Langer, Chief, Minnesota State Patrol: Open; In Progress - MSP continues formalization of its safety management system, including the use of outside expert resources to assist with information flow and analysis. The MSP is currently researching vendors to provide software solutions to assist with the system. The MSP has a timeline for implementation of a formalized SMS program no later than April 1, 2022.

-From Captain Emmanuel T. Gutierrez, New Mexico State Police, Special Operations Bureau: On September 28, 2021, the National Transportation Safety Board issued Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 to the State of New Mexico as a result of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety that impacted terrain while conducting a search and rescue flight.

The following pages outline what New Mexico State Police is doing in response to the issued safety recommendations. Furthermore, attached are specific requested documents.

Please review and inform us if we are addressing these recommendations appropriately.

Thank you and we look forward to hearing back.

A. The NMSP Aircraft Section currently has a safety program with a school trained safety officer. The current safety officer is working with Airborne Law Enforcement Association (APSA) to create and institute a comprehensive SMS program.

From Brian L. Petersen, Sergeant, Special Operations Division/ Aviation, Nebraska State Patrol: This correspondence is written in response to your letter dated September 29th, 2021 to the Honorable Pete Ricketts, Governor, State of Nebraska, with regard to Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through - 106. The writing encompasses formalized training and evaluation for safety of flight conditions germane to Law Enforcement operations and the environment of such operations.

1. In response to a-14-100; the agency references SOP 40-1, 05-03-01, Flight Requirements/Restrictions. The Nebraska State Patrol shall follow Federal Aviation regulations for visibility requirements, flight communications, prefight inspections and logbook requirements. Enumerated under document is VFR Ceiling and Visibility Requirements for flight operations. This document was revised on September of 2010 and again on July 2021, increasing the visibility and ceiling requirements for day and night time operations.

2. A-14-101. Our aviation unit is largely dispatched internally by our agency. Upon the assignment of a flight the Pilot in Command is responsible for flight condition evaluation and assesses those conditions with the assigned second pilot/TFO. Flight in the eastern geographic part of the state is covered by Omaha Approach TRACON facility. Flight in the lesser populated parts of the state are done under flight following where applicable. Flight operations are in contact with dispatchers internal to the agency in all cases.

3. A-14-102. All pilots who are NVG qualified and perform NVG operations maintain flight currency under FAR 61.57, NVG pilot currency requirements as well as conduct a NVG training/proficiency flight at the Bell Helicopter Training academy as part of annual refresher/emergency procedures.

4. A-14-103. All pilots who are rotorcraft pilots receive scenario based simulator training at the Bell Helicopter Training Academy as part of refresher/emergency procedures in the applicable model of helicopter to be operated.

5. A-14-104. The agency has implemented a formal TFO program, 02-04-01, effective March, 2019. Further the program has evolved into specific requirements of TFO selection and training in 2020.

Colonel Gary T. Settle, Superintendent, Virginia State Police: In 2012, the Division revised the Aviation Division Manual to incorporate various policies related to a safety management system. This includes such things as a defined safety policy, specified weather minimums, a risk assessment policy, a fatigue management policy, maintenance operations, and an accident/incident plan to name a few. The Division was utilizing an SMS system called PRISM that was subscribed to by the Virginia Department of Aviation (VDOAV). -As of recent, the VDQA V has discontinued the use of PRISM. We are currently researching several options to implement a formal SMS system using an outside vendor.

-From Mark A. Keel, Chief, South Carolina Law Enforcement Division: The South Carolina Law Enforcement Division has a proud history of utilizing a variety of aviation resources dating back to 1953. Currently, the SLED Aviation Unit operates two MD 500E helicopters and one Bell 407 helicopter in providing 24-hour a day aviation assets to all of the law enforcement agencies within the State of South Carolina.

The Aviation Unit has assisted throughout the state in searching for missing persons, conducting fugitive searches, narcotics operations, an array of surveillance missions, personnel and asset transport, tactical operations/SWAT support, natural disaster response, executive protection details, national security operations, and port security operations.

In 2017, the SLED Aviation Unit began to put safety measures and policies in place that mirrored recommendations from the NTSB and Airborne Public Safety Association. Since that time, SLED has implemented a Safety Management System, aircraft tracking procedures, Emergency Response Plan, and regularly scheduled safety stand-down training for all pilots. Pre-Covid, SLED also worked to provide annual training for all public safety aviation units located in South Carolina. SLED has also installed furnished sleeping quarters that are available for pilots to utilize when needed. SLED pilots receive factory training from MD Helicopter and Bell Helicopter.

In addition, SLED utilizes a FAA repair station for all aircraft maintenance and inspections.

The Aviation Unit strives to work towards meeting recommendations from the Airborne Public Safety Accreditation Commission (APSAC) guidelines. SLED is committed to providing a safety-oriented environment for all pilots and personnel associated with the Aviation Unit to continue to provide professional aviation services to the state of South Carolina.

SLED implemented a Safety Management System in 2018. The SMS outline was provided by the APSA and has been previously approved by the APSAC to meet aviation unit accreditation standards.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued, and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years; however, it has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to West Virginia, and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years; however, it has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to the commonwealth of Virginia, and we have not received any information regarding your actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

On December 28, 2017, we noted that the Aero Bureau was developing an SMS. Please tell us if the Aero Bureau has developed and is using an SMS that includes an audit requirement. Pending our receipt and review of this information, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and -106 remain classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years; however, it has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to the state of Tennessee, and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response. I

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years; however, it has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to the state of South Carolina, and we have not received any information regarding your actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

On June 10, 2015, we noted that the PRPD had incorporated some safety management processes, but that it did not have a formal SMS. We encouraged the PRPD to develop a formal SMS that is appropriate for its size. Please tell us if the PRPD has implemented a formal SMS that includes an audit requirement. Pending our receipt and review of the answer to this question, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and -106 remain classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

On January 19, 2018, we noted that, although the PSP had incorporated some safety management processes, it did not have a formal SMS. We encouraged the PSP to develop a formal SMS that is appropriate for its size and operations and includes an audit requirement. Please tell us if the PSP has implemented a formal SMS that includes an audit requirement. Pending our receipt and review of this information, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and -106 remain classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years; however, it has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to the state of Oregon, and we have not received any information regarding Oregon’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

On December 15, 2017, we noted that the OHP had incorporated some safety management processes and was considering becoming accredited by the Airborne Law Enforcement Association; however, it did not have a formal SMS. We are interested in learning about any completed or planned actions to address these recommendations. Pending our receipt and review of this information, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and -106 remain classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

On March 17, 2015, we noted that you were in the process of developing an SMS, but that you were still trying to find an SMS best suited for your operation. Pending development of your SMS, Safety Recommendation A-14-105 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years; however, it has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to the state of North Dakota, and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years; however, it has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to the state of New York, and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to the state of New Mexico, and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to the state of New Hampshire, and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years; however, it has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to the state of Nevada, and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years; however, it has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to the state of Missouri, and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

-From Captain Jason Seal, Director, Mississippi Highway Patrol, Air Operations: As stated earlier, our newly certified Aviation Safety Officer has plans to implement a comprehensive safety management system that addresses all of these topics. He has already been looking at safety management programs available for purchase on the market.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years; however, it has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to the state of Mississippi, and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

On May 4, 2015, we noted that the MSP did not have an SMS, but was planning to implement one. We encouraged the MSP to develop a basic, formal, and appropriate SMS program that includes the recommended elements. Pending information on whether the MSP has implemented an SMS that includes regular audits, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and -106 remain classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement them. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Minnesota has completed or planned to address these recommendations. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov on your progress toward implementing these recommendations, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years; however, it has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to Massachusetts, and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCETPABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years; however, it has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to the state of Maine, and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov on your progress toward implementing these recommendations, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years; however, it has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to the state of Louisiana, and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to the commonwealth of Kentucky, and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

On May 4, 2015, we noted that you did not have an SMS, and that you believed individual operators should be allowed to tailor an SMS to their own operations. We agreed; however, we believe that every SMS should include, at a minimum, the basic elements listed in Safety Recommendation A-14-105. We encouraged you to develop a basic, formal SMS appropriate for the state of Kansas that includes the recommended elements. Pending updates on your progress and completion of the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-14-105 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years; however, it has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to the state of Indiana, and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

On April 26, 2017, we noted that you were developing a formal SMS. We would like to know if you have implemented the recommended SMS. Pending our receipt and review of this information, Safety Recommendation A 14-105 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

-From M/Sgt. Damian Zimmerman, Illinois State Police- AirOps: The ISP AOB has developed and implemented a comprehensive safety management system (SMS) for aircraft operations. Our SMS is tailed to the specific missions of the ISP AOB and is based on industry best practices. The ISP AOB SMS is a multi-tiered approach to safety with a focus on preflight activities, a flight risk assessment tool including both static and dynamic factors, a safety board in a common area of the ISP AOB central office, and a safety-related hazard/occurrence reporting procedure.

First, safety of the flight starts with a personal assessment of each pilot. We use the acronym I’M SAFE which includes a personal assessment of the following factors affecting the overall safety of the pilot: I-Illness M-Medication S-Stress A-Attitude F-fatigue E-Emotion Following the personal assessment, a thorough preflight inspection and run-up is conducted before each flight.

Secondly, prior to takeoff, a pilot or crew member will complete a flight risk assessment tool (FRAT) form located on the back of each daily flight log. The FRAT includes static factors (i.e. illness, medication, fatigue, time in type, last flight, IMC, crew time, last maintenance, squawks, weight, and center of gravity) and dynamic factors (i.e. hours on duty, time of day, ceiling, visibility, winds, convective activity in the area, forecast, terrain, fog, icing, mission brief, and external pressure). After the form is completed, a total flight risk is assigned a numerical value. If the value is 0-5, the crew makes the go/no-go decision.

If the value is greater than 5, the flight requires supervisor approval from the ISP AOB Safety Officer, Chief Pilot, or Bureau Chief prior to takeoff. FRAT values can be mitigated by taking additional steps to ensure safety of flight with examples of mitigation listed on the FRAT form.

Thirdly, the safety board displays the safety section of the standard operating procedures, the FRAT tool, safety brochures, safety statistics, ISP AOB Mission statement, Values, Core Competencies, and Vision. The safety board is also where pilots can obtain an aircraft discrepancy log for use in the aircraft, as well as a Hazard/Occurrence report. The Hazard/Occurrence report is an anonymous way for pilots to be able to report any safety hazard or safety related occurrence to the Safety Officer. The Safety Officer can report the Hazard or Occurrence to the Bureau Chief for further review.

If the report involves the Safety Officer, then the report should be sent directly to the Bureau Chief. If the report involves the Bureau Chief, the report can be sent directly to the Chief Pilot and then to the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Captain, if necessary.

On May 4, 2015, we noted that the FWC was in the process of implementing an SMS. Pending our receipt of updates regarding your progress, Safety Recommendation A-14-105 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years; however, it has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to the District of Columbia and we have not received any information regarding the district’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years; however, it has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to the state of Connecticut and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years; however, it has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued to the state of California, and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

On December 16, 2014, we noted that your Department of Public Safety was in the process of developing an SMS. We would like to know if your SMS has been fully implemented, as recommended. Pending our receipt and review of this information, Safety Recommendation A 14 105 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over 6 years since these recommendations were issued, and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement them. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED-- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

If you inform us, in a timely manner, of any responsive actions that you have taken or planned to address these recommendations, we may consider changing their classifications. Please e-mail us any relevant updates at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

In our May 4, 2015, letter, we noted that your agency has incorporated some safety management processes; however, we asked if you had a formal SMS. Pending our receipt and review of this additional information, Safety Recommendation A 14-105 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

On March 26, 2018, Major Christopher Grotton, MSP, informed our staff that the MSP operates two fixed wing aircraft, mostly for law enforcement missions. Major Grotton reported that the MSP does not operate any helicopters, but that the Maine Forest Service operates helicopters. On April 5, 2018, Mr. John Crowley, Maine Forest Service, informed our staff that the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife is the state organization responsible for conducting SAR missions; however, because the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife does not operate any helicopters, the Maine Forest Service assists with SAR missions that require the use of helicopters.

Because these recommendations were specifically aimed at public operators who conduct helicopter SAR operations, we believe that the Maine Forest Service is the appropriate state organization to respond to Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, and Mr. Crowley informed us that he is in the process of developing a response. Pending our receipt of this information, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 remain classified OPEN--AWAIT RESPONSE.

On January 16, 2018, Mr. Ron Hauck, Aviation Service, South Dakota Department of Transportation, infomed our staff that the South Dakota Highway Patrol operates fixed wing aircraft for law enforcement missions; however, the state does not operate any helicopters. We believe that all air operations could benefit from the safety improvements specified in these recommendations, and we urge the state of South Dakota to make the recommended safety improvements to its air operations. However, because these recommendations were specifically aimed at public operators who conduct helicopter SAR operations, Safety Recommendations A 14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED--RECONSIDERED.

-From Major Christopher Grotton, Maine State Police, Support Services Division: This letter is in response to the NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13-21 and A-14-100 through -106 issued to the State of Maine in an August 2017 letter to Governor LePage.

The Maine State Police Air Wing has a small profile within the overall scope of aviation operations conducted within the State of Maine. We have two fixed wing aircraft in our inventory with no rotary wing asset.

Our core mission is primarily traffic related flights which are conducted during the daylight and in VFR conditions only. Any night VFR or day/night IFR flights that are requested would typically be administrative in nature and would be conducted operating under part 91 regulations.

When requested, we assist other aviation assets and agencies within the state under the conditions that the flight can be done within the confines of our Standard Operating Procedures Manual and our General Orders that pertains to the Air Wing.

Any search and rescue mission that we would be involved in would be conducted during daylight VFR only conditions. Our aircraft are equipped with wheels only and are not allowed to perform "off-site" landings.

We are restricted to published airports only. Those flights would also be conducted utilizing part 91 regulations.

I am in hopes that this information provides some context for our air operations and the applicability of the recommendations in your August 2017 letter. Our responses (below) to each of your recommendations are crafted within the context of our mission.

The Air Wing SOP and General Order addresses this recommendation.

We note that, although the PSP has incorporated some safety management processes, it does not currently have a formal SMS program. The International Helicopter Safety Team has developed the Safety Management System Toolkit to aid in the development of such a program, and the aid can be downloaded, free of charge, at http://ihst.org/Portals/54/SMS-Toolkit.pdf. The FAA’s Advisory Circular 120 92A, “Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers,” is another useful resource. We encourage the PSP to review this guidance and to develop a formal SMS program that is appropriate for its size and operations.

Pending our receipt of future updates regarding the PSP’s progress in implementing an SMS and, once implemented, the regular auditing of the program, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and -106 are classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We note that, in 2013, the AZDPS implemented a formal SMS program that is consistent with the Airborne Law Enforcement Association’s standards. Because this program was in place before we issued Safety Recommendation A-14-105, the recommendation is classified CLOSED-RECONSIDERED.

We note that the Colorado Army National Guard operates helicopters to conduct SAR missions, and that the Colorado State Police does not operate helicopters. We believe that all air operations could benefit from the safety improvements specified in these recommendations, and we urge the state of Colorado to make the recommended safety improvements to all its air operations. However, because these recommendations were specifically aimed at public operators

who conduct helicopter SAR operations, Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED--RECONSIDERED.

We are encouraged to learn that the Aero Bureau is currently developing an SMS program, and that it intends to have an outside organization audit the program periodically. Pending our receipt of updates regarding the Aero Bureau’s progress in implementing the system, and information about the organization that will be auditing it, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and -106 are classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We note that, although the OHP has incorporated some safety management processes and is considering becoming accredited by the Airborne Law Enforcement Association, it does not currently have a formal SMS program. We point out that the International Helicopter Safety Team has developed the Safety Management System Toolkit to aid in the development of such a program. This aid can be downloaded free of charge at http://ihst.org/Portals/54/SMS Toolkit.pdf. Another resource you may find helpful is the FAA’s Advisory Circular 120 92A, “Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers.”

We encourage you to review this guidance and to develop a formal SMS program that is appropriate for the OHP. Pending our receipt of future updates regarding the OHP’s progress in

implementing an SMS and, once implemented, the regular auditing of the program, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and -106 are classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We note that, in 2013, the ASP implemented a formal SMS program that includes tools to maintain awareness and assess the progress of the program and its components. Because this program was implemented before Safety Recommendation A-14-105 was issued, the recommendation is classified CLOSED-RECONSIDERED.

-From Dennis Daugaard, Governor of South Dakota: As to recommendations A-13-21 and A-14-100 through -106, the South Dakota Highway Patrol has reviewed the recommendations, as well as the NTSB accident report, NTSB/AAR-14/03 PB2014-108877, including the findings, probable cause, and recommendations contained in that report. All flight operations conducted by the state of South Dakota are conducted under FAR Part 91 Rules and all FAR 91 Rules are currently being complied with. South Dakota will continue to conduct all flight operations in accordance with all federal aviation regulations.

-Leslie S. Richards, Secretary Department of Transportation, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: PSP currently has a safety management system in place that formalizes our standard operating procedures (SOP), risk assessment and Department Regulations. PSP SOP's and risk assessment matrix are reviewed annually with the objective of increasing the safety and efficiency of our aviation section. Safety concerns, maintenance issues and deviations from our SOP's are documented on Operational Hazard Reports. These reports are prepared by the individuals involved, reviewed by the safety office and discussed with all pilots.

We note that the Montana Highway Patrol (MHP) operates two aircraft for law enforcement missions; however, as Mr. John Spencer, MHP, informed our staff on October 4, 2017, SAR operations are not the MHP’s primary mission, but fall under the purview of the county sheriff’s offices. We believe that all air operations could benefit from the safety improvements specified in these recommendations, and we urge the state of Montana to make the recommended safety improvements to all its air operations.

However, because these recommendations were specifically aimed at public operators who conduct helicopter SAR operations, Safety Recommendations A 14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED--RECONSIDERED.

We note that the state of Iowa does not conduct helicopter SAR operations; however, we believe that all air operations could benefit from the safety improvements specified in these recommendations. Accordingly, we urge the state of Iowa to make the safety improvements discussed in these recommendations to all its air operations. Because these recommendations were specifically aimed at public operators who conduct helicopter SAR operations, though, Safety Recommendations A 14-100 through -106 are classified CLOSED--RECONSIDERED.

-From Keith D. Squires, Commissioner, Department of Public Safety: The Aero Bureau has taken this recommendation and is implementing a SMS based on the HAI template. It will be fully implanted by September 2017. A-14-106: The Aero Bureau will plan on an outside audit of the SMS after full implementation and a sufficient period of working within that system for evaluation.

-From John W. Hickenlooper, Governor: We have enacted recommendation A-13- 21 through legislation, when we signed House Bill 14-1216 into law in 2014. This bill requires safety markings for certain towers over 50 feet in height that are located in unincorporated areas of the state, and has been incorporated into Colorado Revised Statutes (CRS) section 43-10-117.

Specifically, CRS 43-10- 117 requires: (2) Where the appearance of a tower is not otherwise governed by state or federal law, rule, or regulation, any tower over fifty feet in height that is located outside the boundaries of an incorporated city or town on land that is primarily rural or undeveloped or used for agricultural purposes must be marked and painted or otherwise constructed to be visible in clear air during daylight hours from a distance of not less than two thousand feet.

Towers must also comply with the following additional requirements: (a) A tower must be painted in equal alternating bands of aviation orange and white, beginning with orange at the top of the tower; (b) One marker ball must be attached to the top third of each outside guy wire; and (c) Guy wires must have a seven-foot- long safety sleeve at each anchor point that extends from the anchor point along each guy wire attached to the anchor point. (3) Any tower that was erected prior to August 6, 2014, must be marked as required by the provisions of this section within one year of August 6, 2014.

Any tower that is erected on or after August 6, 2014, must be marked as required by this section at the time it is erected. The Colorado Army National Guard operates helicopters that are used in search and rescue missions, and they report that compliance with all recommendations as outlined in your document of August 3, 2017, as it pertains to the operation of helicopters. Finally, the Colorado State Patrol currently implements recommendation A-14-101, using procedures and avionics that allow for up-to-date weather information and assistance with flight risk assessment decisions.

While they do not operate helicopters in search and rescue missions, they are considering implementing recommendations A-14-100, A-14-105, and A-14-106 following an independent and unrelated safety audit they are conducting. Once completed, we will incorporate regulations that are in compliance with the NTSB recommendation, at a minimum. Again, thank you for your correspondence regarding this issue. Please don’t hesitate to reach out to my Office should you have any further questions.

Terry S. Miyauchi, Aviation Administrator, Arizona Department of Public Safety: The purpose of this letter is to respond to your safety recommendations letter addressed to Governor Doug Ducey, dated August 3, 2017. In that letter, NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13-21 (meteorological evaluation towers) andA-14-100 through 106 (search-and-rescue flight) were provided to the State of Arizona. The Arizona Department of Public Safety (AZDPS) conducts flights across the entire state of Arizona, to include areas where meteorological towers have been erected. Approximately 25% percent of all flights for AZDPS and the State are in support of search and rescue operations.

We value the goal of aviation safety as the number one priority for all of our aviation activity and your recommendations are well received. We offer the following specific responses to each of your NTSB recommendations:

AZ DPS has a well-established safety management system (SMS) in place, to include the four associated components. Because of this, AZDPS was provided with a "Closed-Acceptable Action" by the NTSB on May 22, 2014 in regards to the prior NTSB recommendation A-09-98. The above mentioned SMS program is still in place and utilized today by AZDPS. AZDPS is operated in a paramilitary fashion to include strict chain-of-command accountability. Whereas responsibility is placed at multiple levels, the hands-on safety management oflaw enforcement helicopters is placed on the AZDPS Aviation Administrator position.

It is important to point out that AZDPS utilizes tenured aviation managers and supervisors that exceed the FAA Part 135 requirements. Whereas this is not commonplace in law enforcement aviation, it is written into the legal job description for aviation management at AZDPS. The current AZDPS Aviation Administrator holds 32 years of professional aviation experience and does not come from a law enforcement background. He is directly responsible for the AZDPS SMS program.

In regards to tailoring an SMS to the Departments mission, it is important to point out that the current SMS is not a contractor provided or an off-the-shelf SMS program. It was written and integrated by the AZDPS aviation management so as to be tailored to the AZDPS mission. It receives regular review and is further managed by an AZDPS Aviation Safety Officer.

-From Asa Hutchinson, Governor: Arkansas has in place a safety management system to include an appointed safety officer, and this safety management system meets or exceeds NTSB recommendations.

-From Mike Tooley, Director, Montana Department of Transportation: The State of Montana appreciates the leadership your agency has provided to enhance and promote the safety of law enforcement public aircraft operations across the nation. The Montana Highway Patrol (MHP) operates a 1971 Bell OH-58A helicopter and a 1978 Cessna 182-RG airplane in its law enforcement mission, with a single officer responsible for all flying duties. Total flight hours are less than 100 hours per year.

The MHP flight department has considered the NTSB Safety Recommendations and has implemented them in the following manner:

Details of the safety management system are included in the published flight operations manual.

-From Michael C. Thompson, Commissioner, Oklahoma Department of Public Safety: No formal safety management system exists. The agency relies on past training provided by the Airborne Law Enforcement Association (ALEA) and internal safety protocols concerning equipment, weather and personal limitations but has plans to pursue a safety accreditation from ALEA if funding pe1mits within the next 24 months. Department policies hold senior personnel accountable for safety practices and audits.

-From Tim McClung, Iowa DOT, Office of Aviation: Thank you for the NTSB’s August 3, 2017 letter to Iowa Governor Kim Reynolds regarding NTSB safety recommendations A-14-100 through -106. The letter indicates the recommendations were issued as a result of the investigation into an accident involving a Eurocopter AS350 B3 owned and operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety. Iowa does not own or operate helicopters for use in public safety efforts and therefore does not engage in Night Vision Goggle operations, off airport landings, or operations in mountainous areas.

Accordingly, the recommendations would not apply. This communication is intended to provide information needed to close the response status for Iowa on these recommendations. Please let me know if you need additional information.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the commonwealth of Virginia on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the commonwealth of Virginia on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 2 years ago.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106. We issued these recommendations to the state of Oklahoma on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 2 years ago.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of “Open—Await Response.”

For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106. We issued these recommendations to the state of North Dakota on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 2 years ago.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of New Mexico on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of New Mexico on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of New Hampshire on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of New Hampshire on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 2 years ago.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106. We issued these recommendations to the state of Montana on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue (SAR) flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 2 years ago.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of Missouri on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of Missouri on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of Mississippi on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of Mississippi on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the commonwealth of Massachusetts on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the commonwealth of Massachusetts on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of Maine on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of Maine on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of Louisiana on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of Louisiana on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106. We issued these recommendations to the commonwealth of Kentucky on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 2 years ago.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106. We issued these recommendations to the state of Iowa on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search and rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 2 years ago.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of Indiana on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of Indiana on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the District of Columbia on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the District of Columbia on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of Connecticut on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of Connecticut on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of Colorado on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of Colorado on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of California on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of California on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of Arkansas on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of Arkansas on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of Arizona on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of Arizona on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of Wisconsin on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of Wisconsin on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of Tennessee on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of Tennessee on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of South Dakota on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of South Dakota on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of “Open—Await Response.”

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of South Carolina on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of South Carolina on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the commonwealth of Pennsylvania on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the commonwealth of Pennsylvania on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of Oregon on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people. We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of Oregon on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of “Open—Await Response.” For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of New York on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of New York on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of “Open—Await Response.”

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of Nevada on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of Nevada on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

This letter addresses NTSB Safety Recommendations A-13 21 and A-14-100 through -106. We issued A-13-21 to the state of West Virginia on May 15, 2013, as a result of our investigations of three accidents in which airplanes inadvertently collided with meteorological evaluation towers, fatally injuring four people.

We issued A-14-100 through -106 to the state of West Virginia on November 24, 2014, as a result of our investigation of the March 30, 2013, accident in which a Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter, operated by the Alaska Department of Public Safety, impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska.

We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. We have yet to hear from you regarding your progress toward addressing these recommendations, which were issued more than 4 and 2 years ago, respectively.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating any actions you have taken or plan to take to implement these recommendations; until then, these recommendations will retain their current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

For additional background information about Safety Recommendation A-13-21, please refer to our May 15, 2013, recommendation transmittal letter. For additional background information about Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through -106, please refer to pages 54 through 63 of our Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter accident report.

We note that your efforts to develop a formal SMS program are ongoing. Pending your completion of the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-14-105 remains classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

-From Leo P. Schmitz, Director, Illinois State Police: The JSP AOB is in the process of reviewing Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circulars (AC) I20-92A and Safety Management Tool Kit. The ISP AOB continues to develop a formal SMS program. Update: The ISP continues to work on a formal SMS system with the goal of having it completed by the end of 2017.

We note that you have not been able to address these recommendations because, as of the date of your letter, your state’s budget had not yet been approved. However, we are encouraged to learn that, once this issue has been resolved, the ISP intends to re-examine these recommendations. In the meantime, pending our receipt of future updates and completion of the recommended action, Safety Recommendations A 14-103 and A-14-105 and -106 remain classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We are pleased to learn that the DPS has implemented an SMS that is consistent with the Airborne Law Enforcement Association’s (ALEA) SMS Toolkit. This action satisfies Safety Recommendation A-14-105, which is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

-From Leo P. Schmitz, Director, Illinois State Police: Response: The ISP AOB is in the process of reviewing Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circulars (AC) 120-92A and Safety Management Tool Kit. The ISP AOB continues to develop a formal SMS program.

Update: Currently, the state of Illinois does not have a budget in place. Without a budget, the Air Operations program cannot complete the necessary purchases to respond to A-14-105. This safety recommendation will be re-examined when a budget is approved.

You previously informed us that the ISP was reviewing guidance on developing and implementing an SMS and was considering becoming accredited by the Airborne Law Enforcement Association. We note, however, that these plans have also been delayed until after the ISP has an approved budget. Accordingly, pending our receipt of future updates and completion of the recommended actions, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and -106 remain classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

-From Steven C. McCraw, Director, Texas Department of Public Safety: AOD currently meets the following SMS Toolkit requirements as suggested by ALEA-C to include; a safety committee that meets quarterly (est. 2008), a crew rest policy (est. 1993), Emergency Response Plan (est. 2008), issuance and requirement of crewmembers to wear protective equipment (est. 1995), suggested safety documents, safety library, and the recently implemented Flight Risk Assessment Tool. In January, 2016, AOD added to the SMS a Hazard Tracking Form to log risk items identified through gap analysis, safety surveys, Hazard Identification: Reports, or from other avenues reported to the safety team and administrators.

This month, AOD has paid the initial application fee and formally applied for ALEA-C Accreditation as the Texas DPS Office of General Counsel works to formalize the contractual agreement. We are looking forward to this worthwhile endeavor.

We note that the MSP Aviation Unit has implemented a formal SMS program, based on the Airborne Law Enforcement Association’s Safety Management System Toolkit, and that the program is reviewed annually by your local FAA Flight Standards District Office. These actions satisfy Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and -106, which are classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

-From Leo P. Schmitz, Director, Illinois State Police: Currently, the State of Illinois does not have a budget in place. Without a budget, the Air Operations program cannot complete the necessary purchases to respond to A-14-105. This safety recommendation will be re-examined when a budget is approved.

You previously informed us that, although the ISP has incorporated some safety management processes, it does not currently have a formal SMS program in place. We are encouraged to learn that the ISP is reviewing guidance on developing and implementing an SMS and is considering becoming accredited by the Airborne Law Enforcement Association. Pending our receipt of future updates regarding the department’s progress in implementing an SMS and, once implemented, the regular auditing of the program, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and -106 remain classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

-From Colonel Kriste Kibbey Etue, Director, State of Michigan, Department of State Police: This letter is in response to your correspondence dated September 16, 2015, to Governor Rick Snyder detailing the safety recommendations of your department. The two action items, A-16-105 and A-16-106, indicate that the Michigan State Police (MSP) Aviation Unit does not have a formal Safety Management System (SMS),• and tt is not reviewed externally every three years. Both recommendations are classified "Open-Acceptable Response." This is to advise that the MSP Aviation Unit does have a formal SMS in place and it is reviewed by the Federal Aviation Administration annually.

The Aviation Unit's SMS was carefully developed by closely following the Airborne Law Enforcement Association (ALEA) standards. It contains the following key components listed in the SMS Toolkit provided by ALEA. • A Safety Policy letter issued, and authorized by the Director of the State Police • The Safety Section of the units operations manual includes o Purpose of the Safety Program o Safety duties of all members of the unit o Safety Officer duties o Hazard reporting o Hazard review o Accident and incident investigation o Safety training o Safety equipment o Safety procedures o Safety meetings o Pre-Accident plan

The Aviation unit conducts an annual internal review of our SMS, as well as, an external program review by the Flight Standards District Office of the Federal Aviation Administration.

We note that the WSP’s Aviation Section does not conduct SAR operations; however, we believe that all air operations could benefit from the safety improvements specified in these recommendations. Because these recommendations were specifically aimed at public operators who conduct SAR operations, however, Safety Recommendations A 14-100, -101 and -103 through -106 are classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED.

We note that, although the MSP Aviation Unit has a safety program that incorporates some safety management processes, it does not have a formal SMS program. We point out that the Airborne Law Enforcement Association has developed the Safety Management System Toolkit to help law enforcement agencies develop an SMS designed to fit the size, nature, and complexity of their organizations. This aid can be downloaded free of charge at http://www.alea.org/downloads/safety/SMS-Toolkit.pdf. We encourage the MSP to review this guidance and to develop a formal SMS program that is appropriate for the state of Michigan.

Pending our receipt of future updates regarding MSP’s progress in implementing an SMS and, once implemented, the regular auditing of the program, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and 106 remain classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

-From Greg Abbott, Governor: Thank you for your letter addressed to former Governor Rick Perry regarding NTSB Safety Recommendations A-14-100 through 106. I am sharing your letter with the Texas Department of Transportation's Aviation Division, which will coordinate with my office in discussing the flight safety issues you addressed. Please let me know if I can assist you in the future.

We are pleased to learn that the DPS is currently undergoing accreditation by the Airborne Law Enforcement Association (ALEA). We note, however, that, although the DPS has a safety program that incorporates some safety management processes, the department does not have a formal SMS program in place. We point out that the ALEA has developed its SMS Toolkit to help law enforcement agencies develop an SMS designed to fit the size, nature, and complexity of their organizations. This aid can be downloaded free of charge at http://www.alea.org/downloads/safety/SMS-Toolkit.pdf.

We encourage the DPS to review this guidance and to develop a formal SMS program that is appropriate for the state of Texas. Pending our receipt of future updates regarding the department’s progress in implementing an SMS and, once implemented, the regular auditing of the program, Safety Recommendations A 14 105 and 106 remain classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

-From Leo P. Schmitz, Director, Illinois State Police: Response: The Chief Pilot/Safety Officer is responsible for ensuring all pilots receive adequate training to perform their jobs safely. This includes annually conducting four quarterly check rides, including operational, flight review, instrument proficiency and night time. The Chief Pilot tailors the check rides to conform to the Department's missions and industry best practices. Update: The ISP AOB is in the process of reviewing Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circulars (AC) 120-92A and Safety Management Tool Kit. The Bureau continues to develop a formal SMS program.

-From Lieutenant D. Jim Nobach: Reference our phone conversation on Monday, July 27, 2015 concerning follow-up information regarding the A-14-100 questions, the Washington State Patrol (WSP) Aviation Section does not actively engage in Search and Rescue operations. Therefore, the follow-up information previously requested is no longer required of the WSP. At this time we will consider all A-14-100-106 related requests of WSP satisfied.

If you have any additional questions, please contact the Washington State Patrol Aviation Section.

We understand that the MSP has a Health and Safety Plan that includes a formal system of risk management, safety methods, and internal oversight programs to improve safety and prevent accidents. We note that the MSP is also currently developing a Safety Quality Management System (SQMS) that will eventually replace its existing plan and will include procedures for collecting data from the multi-purpose fight recorder (MPFR), cockpit video recorder (CVR), health and usage monitoring system (HUMS), and satellite flight tracking system.

We commend the MSP for its plans to make these additional enhancements; however, because its existing Health and Safety Plan constitutes an acceptable SMS and was implemented before we issued Safety Recommendation A-14-105, the recommendation is classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED.

-From Colonel Kriste Kibbey Etue, Director, Michigan State Police: • As detailed in the correspondence dated January 23, 2015, the MSP Aviation Unit does have a SMS compliant safety program that is reviewed annually by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). • The Aviation Unit Operations Manual Chapter 6 details the unit safety program. Included in this SMS compliant safety program is Safety Officers duties and responsibilities, hazard reporting procedures, safety training requirements, accident investigation procedures, and a pre-accident plan. 1 have published a memorandum as the Director detailing my support and guidance for the Aviation Unit safety program.

The Aviation Unit safety program along with many other aspects of the unit's operation is review annually by the Grand Rapids Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) of the FAA.

We understand that the NJSP has the recommended SMS; however, because your program was implemented before we issued Safety Recommendation A-14-105, the recommendation is classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED.

We note that the PRPD has incorporated some safety management processes, but that it does not currently have a formal SMS program in place. We point out that the International Helicopter Safety Team has developed the Safety Management System Toolkit to aid in the development of such a program. This aid can be downloaded free of charge at http://ihst.org/Portals/54/SMS-Toolkit.pdf. Another resource is the FAA’s AC 120 92A, Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers. We encourage the PRPD to review this guidance and to develop a formal SMS program that is appropriate for its size.

Pending our receipt of future updates regarding the department’s progress in implementing an SMS and, once implemented, the regular auditing of the program, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and -106 are classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We note that SHP established an SMS program in 2009, and that all members assigned to aircraft operations have received training in the program. We are pleased to learn that SHP’s safety officer is in the process of updating the program with ideas from other law enforcement aviation organizations; however, because your existing SMS program was implemented before Safety Recommendation A-14-105 was issued, this recommendation is classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED.

We note that the MSP has incorporated some safety management processes and is revising its operations manual to incorporate a formal SMS program, as recommended. We also note that, once a formal SMS program is in place, the MSP intends to have audits conducted on a regular basis by an outside organization. Pending our receipt of future updates regarding the MSP’s progress in implementing an SMS and, once implemented, the regular auditing of the program, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and -106 are classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We note that the ISP has incorporated some safety management processes, but that it does not currently have a formal SMS program in place. We point out that the International Helicopter Safety Team has developed the Safety Management System Toolkit to aid in the development of such a program. This aid can be downloaded free of charge at http://ihst.org/Portals/54/SMS-Toolkit.pdf. Another resource is the FAA’s AC 120 92A, Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers. We encourage the ISP to review this guidance and to develop a formal SMS program that is appropriate for its size.

Pending our receipt of future updates regarding the department’s progress in implementing an SMS and, once implemented, the regular auditing of the program, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and -106 are classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We are pleased to learn that, in 2013, you implemented a formal SMS program consistent with the guidance contained in Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular 120-92A, Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers, as well as the Airborne Law Enforcement Association (ALEA) and International Helicopter Safety Team’s standards. Because you implemented this program before we issued Safety Recommendation A 14-105, the recommendation is classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED.

We note that WSP has incorporated some safety management processes and that its efforts to implement a formal SMS program are ongoing. We also note that, once a formal SMS program is in place, WSP intends to have audits conducted regularly by an outside organization. Pending our receipt of future updates regarding WSP’s progress in implementing an SMS and, once implemented, the regular auditing of the program, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and -106 are classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We note that the MSP does not currently have an SMS program but is researching such programs with the intention of implementing one. We point out that the International Helicopter Safety Team and the Airborne Law Enforcement Association have each developed SMS toolkits to help operators develop an SMS designed to fit the size, nature, and complexity of their organizations. These aids can be downloaded free of charge at http://ihst.org/Portals/54/SMS-Toolkit.pdf and http://www.alea.org/downloads/safety/SMS-Toolkit.pdf, respectively. Another resource that the MSP may find helpful is the FAA’s AC 120 92A, Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers.

We encourage the MSP to review this guidance and to develop a basic, formal, and appropriate SMS program that includes the recommended elements. Pending our receipt of future updates regarding MSP progress to implement an SMS and, once implemented, the regular auditing of the program, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and 106 are classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We note that you do not currently have an SMS program and that you believe individual operators should be allowed to tailor an SMS program to their own operations. We agree; however, we believe that every SMS should include the basic elements listed in Safety Recommendation A 14-105, at a minimum. We also believe that regular, ongoing reviews are vital to ensuring the program’s effectiveness, improvement, and success. We point out that the International Helicopter Safety Team and the Airborne Law Enforcement Association have each developed SMS toolkits to help operators develop an SMS designed to fit the size, nature, and complexity of their organizations.

These aids can be downloaded free of charge at http://ihst.org/Portals/54/SMS-Toolkit.pdf and http://www.alea.org/downloads/safety/SMS-Toolkit.pdf, respectively. Another resource you may find helpful is the FAA’s AC 120 92A, Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers. We encourage you to review this guidance and to develop a basic, formal SMS program that is appropriate for the state of Kansas and that includes the recommended elements. Pending our receipt of future updates regarding your progress to implement an SMS and, once implemented, the regular auditing of the program, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and -106 are classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We are encouraged to learn that the FWC is in the process of implementing the recommended SMS program. Pending our receipt of future updates regarding your progress, Safety Recommendation A-14-105 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We note that ALEA has incorporated some safety management processes; however, it is unclear whether the agency has the recommended formal SMS program in place. We point out that the International Helicopter Safety Team and the Airborne Law Enforcement Association have each developed SMS toolkits to help operators develop an SMS designed to fit the size, nature, and complexity of their organizations. These aids can be downloaded free of charge at http://ihst.org/Portals/54/SMS-Toolkit.pdf and http://www.alea.org/downloads/safety/SMS-Toolkit.pdf, respectively. Another resource that ALEA may find helpful is the FAA’s AC 120 92A, Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers.

We encourage the agency to review this guidance and to develop a formal SMS program if it has not already done so. Pending completion of the recommended action or our receipt of clarification that ALEA already has a formal SMS system in place, Safety Recommendation A-14-105 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We note that, although you have incorporated some safety management processes and are considering becoming accredited by the Airborne Law Enforcement Association (ALEA), you do not currently have a formal SMS program. We point out that the International Helicopter Safety Team and ALEA have each developed SMS toolkits to help operators develop an SMS designed to fit the size, nature, and complexity of their organizations. These aids can be downloaded free of charge at http://ihst.org/Portals/54/SMS-Toolkit.pdf and http://www.alea.org/downloads/safety/SMS-Toolkit.pdf, respectively.

Another resource you may find helpful is the FAA’s AC 120 92A, Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers. We encourage you to review this guidance and to develop a formal SMS program that is appropriate for the state of Texas. Pending our receipt of future updates regarding your progress to implement an SMS and, once implemented, the regular auditing of the program, Safety Recommendations A-14-105 and -106 are classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We note that your Department of Public Safety is in the process of developing an SMS program. We point out that the International Helicopter Safety Team has developed the Safety Management System Toolkit to aid in the development of such a program. This aid can be downloaded free of charge at http://ihst.org/Portals/54/SMS-Toolkit.pdf. Another resource you may find helpful is the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Advisory Circular (AC) 120 92A, Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers, issued August 12, 2010. We encourage you to review this guidance as you develop your program.

Pending our receipt of future updates regarding your progress, Safety Recommendation A-14-105 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From Michael W. DeRuggiero, Safety Management Officer, Aviation Command, Maryland State Police: In 2004, the MSPAC developed and implemented an Aviation Safety Program consistent with AC 120-66B and named it the MSP AC "Health and Safety Plan". In January 2009, shortly after the accident involving Trooper 2, an independent Aviation Safety Consultant Group was retained by the Maryland State Treasures Office to conduct a "Gap Analysis" of the MSPAC's Aviation Safety Program.

Based on the results of the Gap Analysis, in April2009, the MSP AC "Health and Safety Plan" was updated to include the policy, process, and procedures concerning the utilization of the Weight and Balance/Risk Assessment (WB/RA) Tool by MSPAC flightcrews and was officially codified when the Commander of the MSPAC signed Active Flight Policy# 20 and #88 on July 20, 2009 and November 13, 2009, respectively.

Additionally, the MSPAC retained the services of an Aviation Certification Consultant Firm (ICF SH&E) to pursue FAA Air Carrier Certification IA W Title 14 CFR 119 and conduct all air ambulance operations under 14 CFR Part 135. As part of the "Technical Order Request for Proposal" (TORFP), ICF SH&E was also tasked with developing/implementing a Safety and Quality Management System (SQMS) IAW AC 120-92A and unique to the MSPAC multi-mission operational profile and will hold senior state personnel accountable for the safety of the MSP AC aircraft operations. To the extent possible, MSPAC's SQMS will incorporate information obtained from the AW-139's aircraft operations.

To the extent possible, MSPAC's SQMS will incorporate information obtained from the AW-l39's flight data monitoring program, video/audio, and satellite flight tracking information to identify deviations from established norms, as well as other potential safety issues or trends that may occur during flight operations. The MSP AC anticipates implementation of its new SMS concurrent with 14 CFR 135 certification.

We note that you are in the process of developing an SMS program, but that you are still trying to find the program that is best suited for your operation. We point out that the International Helicopter Safety Team has developed the Safety Management System Toolkit to help operators develop an SMS designed to fit the size, nature, and complexity of their organizations. This aid can be downloaded free of charge at http://ihst.org/Portals/54/SMS-Toolkit.pdf.

Another resource you may find helpful is the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Advisory Circular (AC) 120-92A, Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers, issued August 12, 2010, which provides additional guidance on establishing an acceptable program. We encourage you to review this guidance and to develop a formal SMS program that is appropriate for the state of Ohio. Pending our receipt of future updates regarding your progress, Safety Recommendation A-14-105 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

We are pleased to learn that, in 2012, an outside organization helped you to develop and implement a formal SMS program that is tailored for the helicopter operations that you perform and is consistent with industry standards. Because your program was implemented before Safety Recommendation A-14-105 was issued, the recommendation is classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED.

-From Joseph R. Fuentes, Colonel, Superintendent: The New Jersey State Police Aviation Bureau has a formal SMS program. We use a web based system called PRISM. This incorporates a flight risk analysis tool tailored to specific missions which generates a numerical risk assessment to assist in 'Go/No Go' decision making. The flight risk analysis tool quantifies risk for each individual flight. Flights whose risk is evaluated to be outside acceptable limits are reviewed by higher authority and mitigated or declined. Our SMS also includes a safety locker to promulgate safety information and a HazRep program tracker to identify potential safety issues and track their mitigation.

-From Leo P. Schmitz, Director, Illinois State Police: The Chief Pilot/Safety Officer is responsible for ensuring all pilots receive adequate training to perform their jobs safely. This includes annually conducting four quarterly check rides, including operational, flight review, instrument proficiency, and night time. The Chief Pilot tailors the check rides to conform to the Department's missions and industry best practices.

-From Jose L. Caldero Lopez, P.R.P.D. Superintendent, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico: Our Security Plan establish a- That each mission is evaluated in detail before proceeding b- The assignment of well traini4ed and experimented personnel according to the mission to be accomplished c- A plan of action in accordance with security, flight conditions and environmental issues in which the mission is to be held. d- Coordination with the Dispatch and Control Center e- Alternate plans if needed f- A log or journal of each mission g- A written Action Plan and Results obtained

h- A briefing held with the flight crew after the mission to determine and identify deficiencies, (If any), in order to make room for improvement

-From Lieutenant Jim Nobach, Washington State Patrol (WSP) Aviation Chief Pilot: The WSP has essential components of a Safety Management System (SMS) and is incorporating the “four pillars of safety management” developed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The WSP began the process of incorporating SMS into its aviation program in 2011. During the last three years, we have continued to train personnel on the SMS process and implement procedural changes that incorporate the systems approach. Our next goal is to achieve International Standards for Business Aircraft Operations (IS-BAO) certification by the end of 2018.

We are working with a recognized industry professional organization that offers a comprehensive package of SMS services and tools that will lead us through the necessary changes to achieve this goal and further the effectiveness of our SMS.

-From J. Spencer Collier, Secretary, Alabama Law Enforcement Agency: ALEA Aviation has developed and implemented most, if not all, of the safety management system requirements to match industry standards for commercial operators.

Although most of ALEA Aviation missions fall under the Public Use area of operation according to the FAA, ALEA Aviation has implemented safety procedures that are tailored to its required missions, to include a tool accountability program initiated by the Director of Maintenance, FAA approved simulator training performed annually, Bell Helicopter Training Academy attendance for each pilot annually for emergency procedure training, and a monthly training syllabus that not only requires all pilots to be current by FAA standards in Part 91, but also provides for a level of proficiency that surpasses the industry standards in both airplanes and helicopters.

In addition, ALEA Aviation requires daily inspections to be performed on each aircraft at the pilots' respective bases, which allows for the tracking of maintenance issues that get forwarded directly to the Chief Pilot and the Director of Maintenance. All aircraft maintenance is accomplished with a level of redundancy with a cross-check at the completion of maintenance by another mechanic. A hazard reporting system is also in place on the Unit's Incident Worksheets that are completed after each flight. See attachments in APPENDIX ref.

A-14-105 Aviation has implemented procedures that meet or exceed the requirements of a safety management system, although ALEA Aviation does not presently have a formal safety management system in place that holds senior state officials accountable for the safety of law enforcement aviation operations.

-From William Grey, Colonel, Commanding, North Carolina Department of Public Safety, State Highway Patrol: 1. We established a Safety Management System (SMS) in November 2009. Our Safety Management System is based on the model established by, the then, Bell Helicopter Training Academy Safety Manager and team member of the International Helicopter Safety Team. 2. SMS training was provided to all members assigned to Aircraft Operations. 3. The designated Safety Officer for Aircraft Operations has been assigned to update the SMS with best known industry standards.

Our Safety Officer will be attending an Airborne Law Enforcement Association regional safety conference in late January 2015 to survey and solicit ideas from other law enforcement aviation organizations. 4. We are located within an organizational unit (Troop) that oversees other high-liability law enforcement units.

-From Colonel Matthew C. Langer, Chief, Minnesota State Patrol: The MSP will research and formalize a safety management system for aircraft operations that: 1) holds senior state personnel accountable for the safety of state law enforcement aircraft operations; 2) is tailored to the department's missions; and 3) is based on industry best practices.

-From Mark A. Bruce, Colonel, Superintendent, Kansas Highway Patrol: Recently we received a copy of the NTSB's proposed safety recommendations (attached) from your office. We have reviewed them and assessed the impact to KHP aircraft operations. We anticipate the impact to be similar in nature to other law enforcement aircraft operations within the state of Kansas. Below is our assessment and response to those specific NTSB safety recommendations.

We appreciate the spirit and nature of the recent recommendations (A-14-100 through -106) provided by the NTSB in their letter dated November 24, 2014. We have not taken the recommendations lightly and have reviewed them for their well-intentioned benefits. Part of our review has included the referenced accident involving the Alaska Department of Public Safety Eurocopter AS350 B3 helicopter in March of 2013.

Keeping the purpose of the recommendations in mind, as well as our already high commitment to safety, we must mention that a considerable obstacle to implementation of several of the proposed measures is cost. Many states and their government agencies have fiscal challenges, and the Kansas Highway Patrol is no exception. While a price cannot be put on a life, we have a responsibility to the public we serve with the very nature of the services we provide, as well as to the employees we request to carry out those services.

In return for our responses, we would very much appreciate reciprocation by being provided the responses of other agencies from other states as well. Their opinions and recommendations could be quite valuable. This would also encourage an open dialogue without unintentionally suppressing potentially innovative methods to pursue best practices in a more cost effective manner.

Implementation of a comprehensive safety management system (SMS) would be agreeable and beneficial to agencies. However, the programs should be designed by each agency to address their specific needs. Courses for providing guidance in designing programs should be standardized with flexible and general guidelines while being readily available to agencies at little to no expense in order to encourage participation. The KHP, like most other law enforcement agencies, are not in a position to readily absorb significant additional "mandated" costs.

-From Colonel Curtis Brown, Director, Division of Law Enforcement, Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission: As previously noted, the FWC flight manual is in the process of being amended and it is intended to now provide for a comprehensive safety management system program tailored specifically to the unique way in which the aviation unit conducts operations. This SMS program will include implementation of risk assessments, a change management program, hazard reporting, overdue/crashed aircraft response, and safety climate assessments. This program was developed in line with the ALEA standard and portions of the program have already been implemented.

The operational safety of agency aircraft is mandated and coordinated at every level of the agency. This includes such items as the use and approval of flight risk assessments and hazard reports to the review and approval of all aviation-related documents, manuals, and procedures.

-From Col. Kriste Kibbey Etue, Director, Michigan State Police and Kirk T. Steudle, Director, Michigan Department of Transportation: • The MSP Aviation Unit's SMS is contained in the unit's operations manual which provides the standard operating procedures for the unit. The operations manual is reviewed and approved by the commander of the Field Support and Aviation Section and the commander of the Special Operations Division on a yearly basis. Adherence to the policies and procedures outlined in the manual is mandatory for all Aviation Unit personnel.

The Aviation Unit operations manual is specific to the Aviation Unit and contains policy directives unique to law enforcement and public safety aircraft missions. The core safety management sections of the manual are: Mission Priorities, Risk Assessment and Flight Authorization, Safety Officer Program, TFO Program, Pilot Certification and Training, Flight Planning, Crew Rest, Prisoner Transport, Vehicle Pursuits, Emergency Medical Transports, and Use of Weapons.

The Aviation Unit operations manual was written and implemented following published recommendations, and identified best practices, from the Airborne Law Enforcement Association (ALEA). ALEA is a nationally recognized 501 (c) (3) organization dedicated to the education and support of organizations who utilize aircraft for law enforcement and public safety missions. The Aviation Unit operations manual will be updated and approved yearly to reflect current best practices impacting flight safety.

• Development of the SMS is currently in progress including the identification of senior state personnel accountable for the safety of MOOT flight operations.

-From Steven C. McCraw, Director, Texas Department of Public Safety: The Flight Operations Manual is a comprehensive standard that regulates all aspects of Aircraft Operations. The FOM dictates who, when, and how a person becomes a Pilot Agent or TFO, what missions are approved, and under what circumstances are those missions performed. In 2007, AOD formed a Safety Team to not only comprise the Safety Training Captain and Lieutenants, but to include a member from each lieutenant area. The lieutenant is responsible for the effective, efficient, and safe operation of those activities performed, but the safety member is another avenue to insure that all matters concerning safety are addressed.

The Safety Team meets quarterly before each Supervisor meeting. The Safety Training Captain then presents to the supervisors all safety concerns brought to the Safety Team. Action is taken by the administration to address and mitigate any hazards in operations, procedures, or standards. AOD is constantly reviewing, and updating the Flight Operations Manual to reflect the best practices and industry standards.

-From Cari R. Maines, Ohio State Highway Patrol, Office of the Superintendent: The Ohio State Highway Patrol’s Aviation Section was started in 1947 with the approval of Senate Bill 221. The following year we made the purchase of one fixed wing bonanza. The original mission intent was for disaster relief, air searches, transportation, aerial photography, and errands of mercy. We had one aircraft and one pilot.

Today, 67 years later, we have 16 pilots, 1 office assistant, and 16 aircraft. Annually, we log around 7,000 flight hours. Our fleet includes:

• 2 Cessna 172R Skyhawk fixed wing airplanes • 2 Cessna 182S Skylane fixed wing airplanes • 9 Cessna 182T Skylane fixed wing airplanes • 1 Cessna 208B Caravan fixed wing airplane • 2 American Eurocopter AS350B2 helicopters

Our primary mission is aerial traffic enforcement, and it comprises approximately 85% of our flight time. The remaining flight time is spent conducting other missions, including:

• Searches (stranded motorists, downed aircraft, lost children, elderly walkaways, drowning victims, manhunts, etc.) • Surveillance (criminal interdiction, reconnaissance) • Photo flights (crashes, evidentiary, reconnaissance) • Drug interdiction flights including marijuana eradication • Emergency transportation (personnel, blood relays) • Special response team operations • Training

Since our inception, we have suffered three crashes. Two of those were fatal fixed wing crashes (1970 & 1976) and the other was a minor injury helicopter crash in 1993. Since 1976, we have accumulated over 250,000 hours of accident free fixed wing flight.

Our operations are a bit unique compared to most state agencies. We only use personnel assigned to the Aviation Section as part of our flight crew. Every Trooper / Pilot has spent time in the field as a State Trooper. State Troopers applying for a Trooper/Pilot position must possess a Private Pilot’s License (Airplane – Single Engine Land) with an Instrument Rating prior to appointment. After spending some time in the Section, some of our pilots are then trained as Tactical Flight Officers. Our helicopter pilots are also chosen from among the Section’s fixed wing pilots.

We make a concerted effort to make safety our highest priority. We believe that “If it’s predictable, it’s preventable.”

-From Gary Folger, Commissioner, Department of Public Safety: Alaska Department of Public Safety recognizes a need for a comprehensive safety management system (SMS). In the fall of2014, DPS secured an SMS through a national vendor and has been working to load department specific criteria into the system. The SMS is tailored to hold senior personnel accountable for the safety of the mission. The Department is working to make sure that the SMS follows best industry practice as well as the FAA advisory circular that governs this area. Department pilots have been trained on this new system and we expect full implementation by the summer of 2015.

-From Colonel Mark McDonough, Commissioner, Department of Public Safety: The Division is currently using a commercial online Aviation Safety Management System (SMS) for flight organizational compliance, standards, manuals, tracking and reporting. The SMS, designed by Baldwin Aviation Inc. enables the organization to monitor and enhance the safety culture while simplifying compliance with industry standards, regulations and practices. The SMS is tailored for helicopter operations that suit our needs. The Aviation Director has final authority and responsibility in the decision making process.

-From Colonel Nathaniel McQueen, Jr., Superintendent, Delaware Department of Safety and Homeland Security, Division of State Police: The Delaware State Police Aviation Section has incorporated a Safety Management System into our operations. The program incorporates the recommendations of FAA AC-129-92A Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers and the accreditation standards of the Airborne Law Enforcement Association.

The program includes the following: Safety Polices and Objectives, appointment of key aviation safety personnel, appointment of a safety committee, emergency preparedness and response, SMS documentation and records, risk management, safety performance monitoring and measurement, management of change, safety promotion and training, and communication procedures. The program manager and section members utilize the web-based PRISM Aviation Research Program to assist in risk management, compliance, communication and record keeping. During 2015, the section plans to complete the ALEA Accreditation process.