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NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-14-042

Recommendation

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Convene a special certification design review of how the Boeing 777 automatic flight control system controls airspeed and use the results of that evaluation to develop guidance that will help manufacturers improve the intuitiveness of existing and future interfaces between flight crews and autoflight systems.

Safety Issue and Context

This report discusses the July 6, 2013, accident involving a Boeing 777-200ER, Korean registration HL7742, operating as Asiana Airlines flight 214, which was on approach to runway 28L when it struck a seawall at San Francisco International Airport (SFO), San Francisco, California. Three of the 291 passengers were fatally injured; 40 passengers, 8 of the 12 flight attendants, and 1 of the 4 flight crewmembers received serious injuries. The other 248 passengers, 4 flight attendants, and 3 flight crewmembers received minor injuries or were not injured. The airplane was destroyed.

Safety issues relate to the need for Asiana pilots to adhere to standard operating procedures regarding callouts; reduced design complexity and enhanced training on the airplane’s autoflight system; opportunity at Asiana for new instructors to supervise trainee pilots in operational service during instructor training; guidance for Asiana pilots on use of flight directors during a visual approach; more manual flight for Asiana pilots; a context-dependent low energy alert; research that examines the injury potential from significant lateral forces in airplane crashes and the mechanism that produces high thoracic spinal injuries; evaluation of the adequacy of slide/raft inertia load certification testing; aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) training for officers in command of an aircraft accident response; guidance on when to use a skin-piercing nozzle on a burning airplane fuselage; integration of the medical supply buses at SFO into the airport’s preparation drills; guidance or protocols for ensuring the safety of passengers and crew at risk of a vehicle strike during ARFF operations; requirements for ARFF staffing; improvements in SFO emergency communications; and increased Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversight of SFO’s emergency procedures manual.

Safety recommendations are addressed to the FAA, Asiana Airlines, Boeing, the ARFF Working Group, and the City of San Francisco.

Response History

June 10, 2026 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Bryan Bedford, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) previously stated it was waiting for Boeing to complete software updates to the Boeing 787 Flight Management Function and Displays Crew Alerting System, as well as the Boeing 747-8 Flight Management Computer and Integrated Display System, to address this recommendation and support issuance of corresponding Airworthiness Directives (ADs).

• On October 23, 2024, the FAA published final rule AD 2024-16-07 (89 FR 76413), requiring the installation of certain new software as well as a software configuration check for Boeing 787 airplanes.

• Boeing continues to develop and certify software updates for the Boeing 747-8/8F airplanes, which the FAA intends to mandate via AD. Boeing has requested a delay in the 2025 expected completion of the software until early 2027. The FAA is discussing options with Boeing to accelerate completion from this new scheduled date. The FAA will initiate the rulemaking process when the software is complete.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA’s progress on Safety Recommendations A-14-42 and -43 and anticipate providing an update by January 31, 2027.

November 4, 2024 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We are aware that AD 2024-04-09 requires 777 operators to install new software and perform a software configuration check. We are also aware that, on September 18, 2024, you published AD 2024-16-07, which is effective October 23, 2024, and requires 787 operators to update their thrust management, displays, and crew-alerting operational program software. On August 2, 2024, your staff informed us that Boeing continues to develop and certify software updates for 747 8/8F airplanes, and that you intend to publish an AD for those airplanes after Boeing’s updates have been finalized, which you expect to occur by the end of 2024.

Although the FAA was previously reviewing data collected from its Continued Operational Safety (COS) evaluation to determine if changes to current certification guidance material and policy are needed to address this safety issue for new designs, your staff informed us that this issue will be addressed as part of the design requirements that you are working on in response to Safety Recommendation A-14-43, which is discussed below.

Read Recommendation

Recommendation Facts

Status
Open Acceptable Alternate Response
Issued
July 16, 2014
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
FAA
Adopted
July 11, 2014
Related Investigation
DCA13MA120
Related Report
AAR-14-01

We believe your ongoing work to address this safety issue is responsive to this recommendation. Pending our review of the recommended guidance, Safety Recommendation A-14-42 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATE RESPONSE.

August 21, 2023 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Kathryn Thomson, Deputy Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) previously stated it was waiting on Boeing to complete software updates sent to the Boeing 777 Airplane Information Maintenance System, the Boeing 787 Flight Management Function and Displays Crew Alerting, and the Boeing 747-8 Flight Management Computer and Integrated Display System to address this recommendation with corresponding airworthiness directives (AD).

On June 22, 2022, the FAA published the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking AD - The Boeing Company Airplanes (87 FR 37249) for Boeing 777 airplanes. We expect to publish the final rule AD by the end of Calendar Year 2023.

Boeing is still developing software updates for the Boeing 787 and 747-8/8F airplanes, which the FAA intends to mandate. Boeing is scheduled to submit the software updates by the end of Fiscal Year 2023.

Finally, the FAA is continuing to review all continued operational safety evaluation information to determine if certification guidance needs to be revised to address this safety issue for new designs.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA’s progress on Safety Recommendation A-14-42 and anticipate providing an update by May 31, 2024.

June 24, 2022 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

As a result of your Continued Operational Safety (COS) evaluation, you determined that Boeing 777, 787, and 747-8 airplanes are vulnerable to low-energy events. We note that, once Boeing has completed the necessary software updates, you intend to develop airworthiness directives (ADs) that will address this safety issue on these airplanes by requiring changes to the autothrottle and low airspeed alerting systems. We believe your plan is positive; however, we would also like to know if you completed your review of COS evaluation information to determine if current certification guidance material and policy needs to be revised to address this safety issue for new designs.

Pending our review of this information, and completion of the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-14-42 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATE RESPONSE.

May 9, 2022 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Billy Nolen, Acting Administrator: On July 30, 2021, meeting with staff from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provided a briefing on proposed changes to the autothrottle (A/T) and low airspeed alerting systems on the Boeing 777, 787, and 747-8 airplanes. These changes include the A/T system maintaining a sufficient thrust setting, such that the A/T will be able to advance the throttles, and the engines respond in time to maintain an acceptable airspeed for safe flight. The airspeed alerting change slightly increases the airspeed at which the low airspeed alerts are presented to the flight crew under certain conditions.

All changes will be implemented using software updates sent to the Boeing 777 Airplane Information Maintenance System (AIMS-2), the Boeing 787 Flight Management Function (FMF) and Displays Crew Alerting (DCA), and the Boeing 747-8 Flight Management Computer (FMC) and Integrated Display System (IDS).

Also provided during the FAA’s briefing to the NTSB was Boeing’s development schedule for the Boeing 777 AIMS-2, 787 FMF and DCA, and 747-8 FMC and IDS software updates, which support the FAA’s planned airworthiness directive (AD) rulemakings. Once Boeing completes these software updates, the FAA expects to proceed with rulemaking and begin to issue ADs in early 2023.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA’s progress on Safety Recommendation A-14-42 and provide an update by July 31, 2023.

July 2, 2020 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We previously told you that we would consider an alternative action not involving an SCR to satisfy this recommendation, pointing out that such action might include examining your aviation safety information analysis and sharing system (ASIAS) to determine if AFCS problems identified in our report are unique to the Asiana Airlines flight 214 accident, or if similar hazardous, low-energy situations have periodically occurred during other line flight operations.

We note that you used the Continued Operational Safety (COS) process to review over 1,700 in-service reports and, although you identified events where the airspeed decreased below the target airspeed while on approach and during landing, you did not identify any direct similarities between those events and the Asiana accident. As part of the COS process, you evaluated the functionality of all Boeing AFCS designs, combined with each model’s low-speed alerting characteristics, training aspects, and fleet age and size.

We note that you determined that the Boeing 777, 787, and 747-8 series airplanes are vulnerable to low-energy events and plan to address this unsafe condition by issuing airworthiness directives (ADs) after Boeing has developed the respective model design solutions and service bulletins (SBs). We also note that you are reviewing information gathered from your COS evaluation to determine if changes to current certification guidance material and policy are necessary to prevent similar issues from occurring on new designs.

We believe your in-service report reviews, Boeing AFCS design evaluation, and plan to issue ADs to address the unsafe condition on each of these models represent an acceptable alternate solution to this problem. We would appreciate receiving copies of the SBs and the notice of proposed rulemakings for each of the corresponding ADs once they are available. In addition, we would appreciate an FAA briefing about the AFCS vulnerabilities that you identified on Boeing 777, 787, and 747-8 series airplanes and how these vulnerabilities were inadvertently introduced and accepted into the Boeing fleet (relative to other Boeing series airplanes’ designs, standard operating procedures, and training).

Pending our review of the issued SBs and corresponding ADs, Safety Recommendation A-14-42 remains classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATE RESPONSE.

February 11, 2020 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Steve Dickson, Administrator: In our previous letter dated May 10, 20 16, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) determined that- although a special certification review (SCR) is without warrant in this case- conducting a thorough technical review of the Boeing 777 automatic flight control system (AFCS) design would evaluate the adequacy of our current certification requirements and guidance. In response. the Board's August 11, 2016. letter identified three specific issues to address in our review that may determine an acceptable alternative to the recommended SCR.

The FAA provides its comment to these issues below. 1. “An analysis of information from Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing to address the question we posed.”

In the review, we utilized our Continued Operational Safety (COS) process and reviewed over 1,700 in-service reports. We determined that- while there were no direct similarities to the Asiana accident- there were indications of other events where airspeed decreased below the target airspeed while on approach and during landing.

2. “A comparison of significant functional and training similarities and differences between the Boeing 777 AFCS and AFCS designs installed on other Boeing airplanes (for example, auto throttles always recommended to be engaged, reversionary mode changes in response to manual throttle inputs. and gaps in low airspeed protection features).”

As part of the COS process, the FAA evaluated the functionality of all Boeing AFCS designs, combined with each model’s low speed alerting characteristics, training aspects, and fleet age and size. 3. “A summary of the circumstances for each Boeing flight. certification flight. or operational line flight event with the Boeing 777 AFCS (or equivalent system. such as the AFCS on the Boeing 787) that resulted in mode confusion. delayed low airspeed recognition. and/or a low airplane energy state.”

As discussed in the FAA response to issue one above, we found no direct similarities to the Asiana accident in our review of in-service reports. However, during the Boeing 787 certification flight test program we documented behavior similar to that observed in the Asiana accident scenario. although it occurred at a safe altitude and with full test pilot awareness.

In addition. the FAA determined in December 2017 that the Boeing 777, 787. and 747-8 series airplanes are vulnerable to low-energy events similar to the scenario that led to the Asiana flight 214 accident in 2013. To determine if an unsafe condition exists on any of the other Boeing models, we used information gathered in our COS evaluation of Boeing models for susceptibility of the auto flight system to lead to lo \v airspeed I low energy events. The FAA is pla1ming to issue airworthiness directives (ADs) to address the unsafe condition on each of these models.

The FAA and Boeing agreed on a schedule for each program to:

• Develop and approve a design solution; • Issue service bulletins for the design change: and • Issue ADs to mandate these changes in U.S. operators' airplanes, with the exception of older Model 777 airplanes-configured with original Airplane Information Management System (AIMS) hardware- referred to as AIMS-1.

We anticipate implementing a design solution for Boeing 777 AIMS-I airplanes (expected to be approximately 130 airplanes by 2023 due to retirements) to first require retrofit of the entire suite of AIMS to the later AIMS-2 configuration. We are still developing the schedule for addressing the Model 777 AIMS- I airplanes with Boeing.

To provide protection for low airspeed events at low altitudes for the Boeing 777 and 787. Boeing has proposed a combination of enJ1anced low airspeed alerting and changes to the automatic throttle functionali ty. The FAA evaluated these changes in an engineering simulator and we consider the changes an acceptable means to address the unsafe conditions for these two models. Boeing committed to publish service bulletins for the 787 and the 777 AIMS-2 configured airplanes to implement these changes by June 2020. Boeing is still developing the publication schedule for a service bulletin for Model 777 AIMS-1 configured airplanes.

The FAA expects to release an airworthiness directive notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for each of the previously mentioned airplane models approximately nine months after Boeing publishes the corresponding service bulletin.

The Boeing 747-8 system architecture is significantly different from that of the Boeing 777 and 787. For the 747-8, Boeing is proposing a change to the low airspeed alerting system. The FAA is currently evaluating this proposal to determine its acceptability. Boeing committed to publishing a service bulletin for the 747-8 by December 2022, and the FAA will release a NPRM approximately nine months later.

We are also reviewing the information we gathered from our COS evaluation to determine if changes to current ce11ification guidance material and policy are necessary to prevent similar issues from occurring on new designs.

August 11, 2016 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that you do not believe that an SCR, as defined in FAA Order 8110.4C, “Type Certification,” is warranted; however, you are conducting a thorough review of the Boeing 777 AFCS design using normal investigative processes managed by the responsible FAA type certificate management office. We understand that this technical review will focus on the areas of airspeed control and associated flight crew interfaces and that, based on your results, you plan to evaluate your current certification requirements and guidance.

We have previously said that we believed our investigation of the Asiana Airlines flight 214 accident provided sufficient justification for you to initiate an SCR of the Boeing 777 AFCS but that we would consider additional information that you submitted indicating that an alternative action not involving an SCR was more appropriate.

We stated that such an alternate action might include examination of your aviation safety information analysis and sharing system (ASIAS) to determine whether (1) AFCS problems identified in our report (such as the potential for mode confusion and delayed flight crew recognition of decaying airspeed with the autothrottle on and in HOLD mode) are unique to the Asiana Airlines flight 214 accident or (2) similar hazardous low-energy situations have periodically occurred during other line flight operations.

Your review may constitute an acceptable alternative that will result in guidance that will help manufacturers to improve the intuitiveness of existing and future interfaces between flight crews and auto flight systems. To aid us in evaluating whether the review is acceptable, we ask that you provide us your results after completing it. Specific issues we will consider when determining whether the review is an acceptable alternate include the following:

1. An analysis of information from ASIAS to address the question we posed 2. A comparison of significant functional and training similarities and differences between the Boeing 777 AFCS and AFCS designs installed on other Boeing airplanes (for example, auto throttles always recommended to be engaged, reversionary mode changes in response to manual throttle inputs, and gaps in low airspeed protection features) 3.

A summary of the circumstances for each Boeing flight, certification flight, or operational line flight event with the Boeing 777 AFCS (or equivalent system, such as the AFCS on the Boeing 787) that resulted in mode confusion, delayed low airspeed recognition, and/or a low airplane energy state

Pending completion of your review and appropriate revisions to guidance and certification standards regarding interfaces between flight crews and auto flight systems, Safety Recommendation A-14-42 is classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATE RESPONSE.

May 10, 2016 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) evaluated the Board's accident report along with the Boeing 777 automatic flight control system (AFCS) design and service history and determined that a special certification review (SCR), as defined in FAA Order 811 0.4C, Type Certification, is not warranted. An SCR is appropriate for potential safety issues linked to complex or unique design features. The 777 AFCS, which is similar to the AFCS design installed on other Boeing airplanes, has been in service for more than 20 years.

In addition, as cited in the Board's report, contributing factors to the accident were the operator's Jack of understanding and mismanagement of the AFCS coupled with a lack of crew resource management during a critical phase of flight.

Although an SCR is not warranted in this case, the FAA is in the process of conducting a thorough review of the 777 AFCS design using normal investigative processes managed by the responsible FAA type certificate management office. This technical review, which will include evaluation of relevant service history, is focused on the areas of airspeed control and associated flightcrew interfaces. The outcome of this review will be used to evaluate the adequacy of our current certification requirements and guidance.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on this recommendation and provide an update by February 28, 2017.

December 12, 2014 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

It is unclear whether your plan to work with Boeing to review the design and examine the various means by which the Boeing 777 AFCS controls airspeed constitutes an SCR as described in FAA Order 8110.4; if not, such a plan does not constitute an acceptable response.

We believe that our investigation of the Asiana Airlines flight 214 accident provides sufficient justification for you to initiate an SCR of the Boeing 777 AFCS, which (according to the order) would involve a thorough exploration of every significant aspect and ramification of the potential safety problem in question by a team of FAA personnel from multiple offices and possibly additional personnel from other governmental agencies, outside consultant firms, and/or industry representatives. We will consider additional information that you submit indicating that an alternative action not involving an SCR may be more appropriate.

Such action might include, for example, an examination of information in your aviation safety information analysis and sharing system to determine whether (1) AFCS problems identified in our report (such as the potential for mode confusion and delayed flightcrew recognition of decaying airspeed with the autothrottle on and in HOLD mode) are unique to the Asiana Airlines flight 214 accident or (2) similar hazardous low-energy situations have periodically occurred during other line flight operations. Pending your convening an SCR of how the Boeing 777 AFCS controls airspeed or providing us an acceptable alternate solution, Safety Recommendation A-14-42 is classified OPEN—UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

October 9, 2014 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: In March 2013, the Avionics Systems Harmonization Working Group (ASHWG) submitted the Low Airspeed Alerting findings and recommendations to the FAA. To address the ASHWG recommendations, we are considering rulemaking for parts 121 and 129.

We will evaluate the effectiveness of the potential rule change to determine whether additional work will be needed to address context-dependent low energy alerting systems for airplanes engaged in commercial operations.

The FAA will also work with Boeing to review the design and examine the various means by which the Boeing 777 automatic flight control system controls airspeed. We will evaluate the results of our review and determine the appropriate course of action regarding flightcrew interfaces with autoflight systems.