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  3. NTSB A-12-066
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NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-12-066

Recommendation

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require aircraft owners who have installed a safety device that contains an explosive component under a supplemental type certificate since the most recent triennial re-registration to submit a new Federal Aviation Administration Form 8050-1A, providing updated information regarding the newly installed device.

Safety Issue and Context

Many airplanes are equipped with ejection seats, ballistic recovery systems (BRS), and inflatable restraints that contain explosive components to activate the safety devices, and the number is increasing as newly certificated aircraft with BRS and after-market inflatable restraints become more prevalent. The five accidents discussed below are examples of accidents that the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has investigated in which the presence of these devices on the accident aircraft was not initially known to those on scene.

Although none of these accidents resulted in injuries or fatalities to first responders or accident investigators due to postaccident activation of the explosive components in these safety devices, these explosive components, if they remain charged and are unknown to first responders and investigators, pose a high level of risk to those working in and around the aircraft wreckage.

Response History

July 11, 2014 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

In our March 13, 2013, letter, we noted that, although you agree with the intent of these recommendations, you did not agree with collecting this information during the triennial re registration or using FAA Form 8050-1A to do so. Regarding the alternatives you said were being considered, we commented that we did not consider your suggested action (enhancing the standards for the size, number, and location of warnings and placards on an aircraft containing a safety device with an explosive component) to constitute an acceptable response to these recommendations.

We said that the potential was too great for such warnings and placards to be damaged or destroyed in a crash or a post-crash fire, rendering them useless. We also emphasized that information about explosive components should be readily available to first responders and accident investigators before they arrive at an accident site.

Despite our concerns, after considering various alternatives, you continue to believe that the first responder training and education and the placarding currently required are sufficient. None of these actions were taken after these recommendations were issued, and none will provide any information to first responders or accident investigators about explosive components on a crashed airplane before they arrive on scene to help them prepare adequately. We do not agree that you have effectively addressed these recommendations, although you have made it clear in your letter that you plan no further action.

Consequently, Safety Recommendations A 12-64, -65, and -66 are classified CLOSED—UNACCEPTABLE ACTION.

May 9, 2014 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: As stated in our previous letter. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Form 8050-1 A, Aircraft Re-Registration Application. would require rulemaking to effectively capture which aircraft contain a ballistic safety device. Rulemaking, however, is not supported since there is no history of injury or death related to these devices. After considering various alternatives, as discussed in our previous letter, the FAA believes that first responder training. education, and the placarding currently required is sufficient. Aircraft manufacturers are responsible for providing this training.

Cirrus Aircraft, for example, has conducted training for first responders and the public and published various media about their ballistic safety devices.

Additionally, the FAA Safety Team has educated first responders and the public about such devices, and we provide publicly available information on the proper interaction with ballistic safety devices at the following Web site: http://www.faa.gov/airports/airport safety/aircraft_rescue_fire_fighting/

The installation of a ballistic safety device is rare. For accident airplanes equipped with such a device. to date, no device has deployed due to postaccident activation. This lack of activation supports the current FAA/ industry approach to train and educate first responders. The FAA is committed to providing a safe working environment for first responders, and will continue to monitor the incorporation of ballistic safety devices into the general aviation fleet.

March 13, 2013 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We acknowledge the concerns cited by the FAA as the reasons why the agency agrees with the intent of these recommendations but does not agree with either collecting this information during the triennial re-registration or using FAA Form 8050-1A to collect it. We look forward to learning what alternative action the FAA will take, but we offer the following comments on some of the alternatives that the FAA is considering.

We do not regard enhancing the standards for the size, number, and location of warnings and placards on an aircraft containing a safety device with an explosive component, to constitute an acceptable response to these recommendations. We believe that the potential is too great for such warnings and placards to be damaged or destroyed in a crash or a post-crash fire, rendering them useless. We also believe that information about explosive components should be readily available to first responders and accident investigators before they arrive at an accident site. The airworthiness certification process may form the basis for an acceptable alternate response, provided that—

• It can be used reliably to record all aircraft containing explosive components in safety devices including, for example, surplus military aircraft equipped with ejection seats. • Information will be consistently and reliably recorded in the aircraft registry when a safety device that contains an explosive component is installed under the provisions of an STC. • Information collected on these components will reliably and consistently be placed in the aircraft registry. • The aircraft registry will be revised to make this information readily available to accident investigators and first responders who will know only the N number of a crashed aircraft.

Pending the FAA’s taking the recommended actions or acceptable alternate actions, Safety Recommendations A-12-64 and -66 are classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

February 6, 2013 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: The FAA agrees with the intent of this recommendation. However, using FAA Form 8050- IA may not be the most efficient way to collect the desired data. Currently, all uses for FAA Form 8050-1 A directly relate to the registration and ownership of the aircraft and not the equipment on board. As previously mentioned, further adjustment of FAA Form 8050-1 A would require extensive aircraft registry programming changes, additional rulemaking, and further clearance from OMB. This would be a difficult and expensive process.

Instead of using FAA Form 8050-1A, we will discuss these possible alternatives with various interest groups representing first responders, crash investigators, and involved FAA offices to determine the most appropriate path forward.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on this safety recommendation and provide an updated response by January 30, 2014.

Read Recommendation

Recommendation Facts

Status
Closed - Unacceptable Action
Issued
November 1, 2012
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
FAA
Adopted
October 19, 2012
Closed
July 11, 2014
Related Investigation
ERA12FA149
Related Report
None