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  3. NTSB A-08-084
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NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-08-084

Recommendation

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of turbine-powered helicopters to include, in pilot preflight safety briefings to passengers before each takeoff, information about the location and activation of all flotation equipment, including internal or external liferafts (depending on which system has been installed on the helicopter).

Safety Issue and Context

On December 29, 2007, about 1531 central standard time, a Bell 206L1 helicopter, N211EL, operated by Air Logistics, LLC, impacted the water while approaching South Pass Block 38 (SP38), an offshore platform in the Gulf of Mexico, with a commercial pilot and three passengers aboard. All four occupants survived the crash, but one passenger died while awaiting rescue. The pilot was seriously injured, and the two other passengers received minor injuries. The on-demand air taxi flight was operated under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

Response History

September 11, 2014 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

Neither the NPRM nor the final rule included the revisions that we recommended. Consequently, Safety Recommendation A-08-84 is classified CLOSED—UNACCEPTABLE ACTION.

We are aware that, in section 135.619, the February 21, 2014, final rule requires operators to provide a supplemental preflight safety briefing to medical personnel on board air ambulance helicopters and that this briefing must include information specific to the air medical transport flight, such as physiological aspects of flight, patient loading and unloading, safety in and around the aircraft, and emergency procedures. We are also aware that, as an alternative to providing the supplemental preflight safety briefing, certificate holders are permitted to provide training every 2 years to medical personnel through an FAA-approved training program.

Although we have not issued any safety recommendation regarding this issue, in our comments on the proposed rule, we stated that medical personnel should complete this training annually.

January 2, 2014 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The FAA’s only letter concerning Safety Recommendation A-08-84, dated January 15, 2009, proposed a requirement for passenger preflight briefings on aircraft that operate beyond a power-off landing distance from the shore. Our May 27, 2010, reply expressed concern that what constitutes “beyond a power-off landing distance from the shore” would be difficult for operators to accurately define, since that distance is largely dependent on in-flight weather conditions that can deteriorate quickly, as they did during the accident flight’s approach to the platform.

We stated that the circumstances of this accident demonstrate the need for passenger briefings on all flotation equipment aboard helicopters, regardless of the distance from a suitable landing area or the shoreline. Consequently, pending the FAA’s taking the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A 08-84 was classified OPEN—UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE on May 27, 2010. In the intervening years, we have received no response from the FAA addressing this concern, and we ask how the FAA plans to address this issue.

May 27, 2010 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

Although the FAA’s proposed revisions would require passenger preflight briefings on aircraft that operate beyond a power-off landing distance from the shore, we are concerned that what constitutes “beyond a power-off landing distance from the shore” would be difficult for operators to accurately define since that distance is largely dependent on in-flight weather conditions that can deteriorate quickly, as they did during the accident flight’s approach to the platform.

The NTSB continues to believe that the circumstances of this accident demonstrate the need for passenger briefings on all flotation equipment aboard helicopters, regardless of the distance from a suitable landing area or the shoreline. Consequently, pending the FAA’s taking the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-08-84 is classified OPEN -- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

January 15, 2009 · Recipient Response · FAA

Letter Mail Controlled 2/20/2009 1:36:31 PM MC# 2090095: - From Robert A. Sturgell, Acting Administrator: FAA Comment. The FAA has reviewed the current advisory and regulatory requirements pertaining to required flotation device briefings. Currently, 14 CFR 5 135.1 17, Briefing of Passengers before Flight, states, in part, that: Before each takeoff each pilot in command of an aircraft carrying passengers shall ensure that all passengers have been orally briefed on: Location of survival equipment; and If the flight involves extended over water operation. Ditching procedures and the use of required flotation equipment.

Flotation equipment includes both life vests and liferafts stowed on a particular aircraft. However, because the aircraft in this accident was not on an extended over water flight, the pilot in command did not brief the passengers. The FAA will consider rulemaking to revise 5 135.1 17(a)(6) to require such briefing anytime an aircraft is beyond a power-off landing distance from shore.

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Recommendation Facts

Status
Closed - Unacceptable Action
Issued
October 20, 2008
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
FAA
Adopted
October 15, 2008
Closed
September 11, 2014
Related Investigation
DFW08FA053
Related Report
None