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NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-08-002

Recommendation

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AND THE PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION: In collaboration with air carriers, manufacturers of lithium batteries and electronic devices, air travel associations, and other appropriate government and private organizations, establish a process to periodically measure the effectiveness of your efforts to educate the air-traveling public, including flight crews, about the safe carriage of secondary (rechargeable) lithium batteries or electronic devices containing these batteries on board passenger aircraft.

Safety Issue and Context

On February 7, 2006, a United Parcel Service Company (UPS) cargo aircraft had an in-flight cargo fire and made an emergency landing at Philadelphia International Airport. Although the cause of the in-flight fire could not be determined in the UPS accident, the presence of a significant quantity of electronic equipment in the containers where the fire most likely originated led the Safety Board to closely examine safety issues involving the transportation of rechargeable lithium batteries on commercial aircraft, including batteries in airline passengers’ laptop computers and other personal electronic devices.

Response History

August 20, 2021 · NTSB Correspondence · PHMSA

On February 1, 2021, the FAA sent us a letter describing its and PHMSA’s efforts to collaborate with other federal agencies and industry (including lithium battery and cell manufacturers, shippers, end users, and transporters) and develop and disseminate lithium battery safety information and best practices to educate the air-traveling public, including flight crews, about the safe carriage of secondary (rechargeable) lithium batteries and electronic devices containing these batteries on board passenger aircraft, as well as the tools and processes that have been developed to periodically measure the effectiveness of this information.

We are writing to inform you that these actions satisfy the intent of Safety Recommendations A-08-1 and -2, which are classified CLOSED-- ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

We appreciate your efforts to improve aviation safety.

August 20, 2021 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that, on December 13, 2007, you published advisory circular (AC) 121-40, “14 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 121 and Part 135 Dangerous Goods Transportation Operations,” which contains guidance for operators on establishing a comprehensive dangerous goods training program and manual, including suggestions to enhance passenger notification of the hazardous materials requirements specified in Title 49 CFR 175.25.

We previously told you that your work with PHMSA to develop guidance and increase awareness among individuals and companies about the dangers associated with shipping—and travelling with—these batteries were positive; however, we have been waiting for the FAA to develop an evaluation program that will help you determine the overall effectiveness of your joint efforts to address this safety issue. We are pleased to learn that you have implemented a multistep process that includes steps to evaluate the effectiveness of your activities and make continuous improvements that account for changes in technology and products, passenger habits, and the air cargo environment.

We also note that a division was created within the FAA’s Office of Hazardous Materials (AXH) to develop safety messaging campaigns, including identifying strategies for online engagement and attending in-person events to participate directly with key stakeholders, including air carriers, lithium battery and electronic device manufacturers, and air travel associations. You reported that, to determine the effectiveness of a campaign, activities are evaluated at the beginning and end of a campaign, and you consider both qualitative and quantitative data, which are then used to determine future activities and whether guidance needs to be revised or developed.

We believe that the FAA’s and PHMSA’s efforts to collaborate with other federal agencies and industry (including lithium battery and cell manufacturers, shippers, end users, and transporters) and develop and disseminate lithium battery safety information and best practices to educate the air-traveling public, including flight crews, about the safe carriage of secondary (rechargeable) lithium batteries and electronic devices containing these batteries on board passenger aircraft, as well as the tools and processes that have been developed to periodically measure the effectiveness of this information, satisfy the intent of these recommendations.

February 1, 2021 · Recipient Response · PHMSA

THIS LETTER IS FROM FAA AND DESCRIBES FAA AND PHMSA ACTIVITIES. -From Steve Dickson, Administrator: The FAA and the PHMSA continue to collaborate on these safety recommendations, and we continue the safety promotion strategies as described in our July 7, 2016, update to the Board and our August 6, 2020, meeting with NTSB staff. The FAA and PHMSA have successfully taken a comprehensive and collaborative approach to establish processes to ensure the wider, highly visible, and continuous dissemination of information and guidance related to safe carriage of secondary (rechargeable) lithium batteries or electronic devices containing these batteries on board passenger aircraft.

The FAA has also developed tools and processes to periodically measure the effectiveness of the messaging to the air-traveling public, including flight crews.

Guidance and Rulemaking

The FAA previously stated it was developing an advisory circular (AC) for enhancement of passenger notification under Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 175.25, Passenger Notification System, that would include guidance from the Aviation Rulemaking Committee on Passenger Notification of Hazardous Materials. At that time, we informed the Board we had postponed publication of this AC to allow ample time to review and evaluate the recently adopted changes made by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Dangerous Goods Panel on passenger notification provisions.

On March 30, 2017, PHMSA published the final rule, Hazardous Materials: Harmonization with International Standards, to amend the hazardous materials regulations to maintain consistency with ICAO changes to passenger notification requirements, in which operators must inform passengers of restrictions on the types of hazardous material (including lithium batteries) they may or may not carry aboard an aircraft (82 FR 15796).

On December 13, 2017, the FAA issued AC 121-40-14, 14 CFR Part 121 and Part 135 Dangerous Goods Transportation Operations. This AC’s primary audience is certificate holders and applicants seeking to operate under either

February 1, 2021 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Steve Dickson, Administrator: The FAA and the PHMSA continue to collaborate on these safety recommendations, and we continue the safety promotion strategies as described in our July 7, 2016, update to the Board and our August 6, 2020, meeting with NTSB staff. The FAA and PHMSA have successfully taken a comprehensive and collaborative approach to establish processes to ensure the wider, highly visible, and continuous dissemination of information and guidance related to safe carriage of secondary (rechargeable) lithium batteries or electronic devices containing these batteries on board passenger aircraft.

The FAA has also developed tools and processes to periodically measure the effectiveness of the messaging to the air-traveling public, including flight crews.

Guidance and Rulemaking

The FAA previously stated it was developing an advisory circular (AC) for enhancement of passenger notification under Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 175.25, Passenger Notification System, that would include guidance from the Aviation Rulemaking Committee on Passenger Notification of Hazardous Materials. At that time, we informed the Board we had postponed publication of this AC to allow ample time to review and evaluate the recently adopted changes made by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Dangerous Goods Panel on passenger notification provisions.

On March 30, 2017, PHMSA published the final rule, Hazardous Materials: Harmonization with International Standards, to amend the hazardous materials regulations to maintain consistency with ICAO changes to passenger notification requirements, in which operators must inform passengers of restrictions on the types of hazardous material (including lithium batteries) they may or may not carry aboard an aircraft (82 FR 15796).

On December 13, 2017, the FAA issued AC 121-40-14, 14 CFR Part 121 and Part 135 Dangerous Goods Transportation Operations. This AC’s primary audience is certificate holders and applicants seeking to operate under either

October 5, 2016 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that you have decided to postpone the release of an advisory circular (AC) that would enhance passenger notification of the hazardous materials requirements specified in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 175.25 until after you have evaluated recently adopted changes made by the International Civil Aviation Organization Dangerous Goods Panel on Passenger Notification Provisions. In the meantime, we are pleased to learn that your hazardous materials inspectors are attending conferences and meetings of interested parties to explain how the hazardous materials regulations apply to them.

We also note that you are developing a multistep process to measure the effectiveness of your efforts to educate the air-traveling public, including flight crews, about the safe carriage of secondary lithium batteries and electronic devices containing these batteries on passenger aircraft.

We believe that your ongoing outreach efforts and the issuance of the proposed AC could increase awareness among passengers and companies regarding the dangers associated with shipping—and traveling with—lithium batteries. For example, in a recent case, the FAA distributed the following statement to the media: “In light of recent incidents and concerns raised by Samsung about its Galaxy Note 7 devices, the Federal Aviation Administration strongly advises passengers not to turn on or charge these devices on board aircraft and not to stow them in any checked baggage.”

We also believe that the process you are developing could help you refine your outreach products and determine the overall effectiveness of your efforts to address this safety issue. Pending our receipt and review of the AC and updates on your process to periodically measure the effectiveness of your outreach efforts, Safety Recommendations A 08 001 and -002 remain classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

September 27, 2016 · NTSB Correspondence · PHMSA

The FAA informed us that they have decided to postpone the release of an advisory circular (AC) that would enhance passenger notification of the hazardous materials requirements specified in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 175.25 until after they have evaluated recently adopted changes made by the International Civil Aviation Organization Dangerous Goods Panel on Passenger Notification Provisions. In the meantime, we are pleased to learn that hazardous materials inspectors are attending conferences and meetings of interested parties to explain how the hazardous materials regulations apply to them.

We are also aware of your involvement in developing a multistep process to measure the effectiveness of your efforts to educate the air-traveling public, including flight crews, about the safe carriage of secondary lithium batteries and electronic devices containing these batteries on passenger aircraft.

We believe that your ongoing outreach efforts and the issuance of the FAA’s proposed AC could increase awareness among passengers and companies regarding the dangers associated with shipping—and traveling with—lithium batteries. We also believe that the process you are developing with the FAA could help you refine your outreach products and determine the overall effectiveness of your efforts to address this safety issue. Pending our receipt and review of the FAA’s AC and updates on your process to periodically measure the effectiveness of your outreach efforts, Safety Recommendations A-08-001 and -002 remain classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

July 6, 2016 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: We are currently developing a process to measure the effectiveness of efforts to educate the public about the dangers of lithium batteries. While that process is not yet complete, it will include the following steps: 1) Proposal and Development The safety promotion strategy will be proposed and developed and may include a new technique, method, approach, policy, and promotional materials. This step will usually be internal to the FAA and involve assessing the proposal's overall contribution to the existing safety promotion portfolio. 2) Formative Evaluation

A formative evaluation method will be used to review, validate, and measure the effectiveness of the developed strategy on a small scale prior to full scale adoption or implementation. This will primarily consist of the formation of focus groups comprised of either internal or external stakeholders to assess the effectiveness and to validate the utility of the strategy in terms of promoting safety with passengers. However, this second step will not always be employed when a safety promotion product needs refinement to keep it up to date with evolving regulation and policy changes.

For example, our Pack Safe Web site is continuously reviewed and modified, when appropriate, to ensure that the most current safety information is provided to passengers. 3) Adoption or Implementation The developed safety promotion strategy will be adopted or implemented. Depending on the nature of the safety promotion strategy, this step may include a production component and/or coordination with relevant stakeholders via agreement. 4) Review of Effectiveness The effectiveness of the safety promotion strategy will be reviewed post full-scale adoption or implementation to verify the effectiveness of the strategy where relevant data exists.

In certain instances, small focus groups will be formed to assess the safety promotion strategy in practice to see if any lessons learned can be applied to refine the strategy.

This overall process is circular to ensure that safety promotion strategies are continuously improved. Safety promotion is ongoing and always evolving as passenger habits and consumer products change over time. The effectiveness of one particular safety promotion strategy cannot be assessed independently of all others within the safety promotion portfolio. Each strategy has an incremental, and often qualitative, impact on the overall level of passenger awareness of hazardous materials safety.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on these recommendations and provide an update by June 30, 2017.

November 18, 2015 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that the Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) on Passenger Notification of Hazardous Materials has developed guidance for operators to comply with the new passenger notification requirements specified in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 175.25 that specifically address lithium battery restrictions. We also note that you are considering publishing an advisory circular (AC) that would include the ARC’s proposed guidance and would encourage operators to refer passengers to the FAA’s “Pack Safe” website.

In addition, we note that, as part of your lithium battery outreach program, you have (1) developed a lithium battery outreach poster for dissemination to the air cargo industry, (2) developed frequently asked questions (on your website) for airline passengers traveling with batteries, and (3) are working with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to update their “Shipping Batteries by Air” booklet.

We believe that the actions you have taken thus far and the issuance of the proposed AC could increase awareness among passengers and companies regarding the dangers associated with shipping, and travelling with, lithium batteries. We look forward to learning about your efforts to develop an evaluation program to help you refine your outreach products and to determine the overall effectiveness of your efforts to address this safety issue. Pending our receipt and review of the AC and an evaluation process to periodically measure the effectiveness of your efforts, Safety Recommendations A-08-1 and -2 remain classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

August 14, 2015 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: The FAA understands the value of measuring the effectiveness of outreach efforts and appreciates the Board's recognition that this is a challenging issue. With limited resources and the need to enhance our baseline outreach program, our focus in the past year has been on developing quality outreach content. The FAA decided that the absence of outreach content on critical hazardous materials was more problematic than the absence of an evaluation program on this issue. Our response to NTSB Safety Recommendation A-08-01 describes some of this new content.

We continue to believe that an evaluation program will assist us in refining our outreach products. Before our next update, we hope to have discussions with PHMSA and the Board’s staff to consider approaches that are cost effective and not redundant between the FAA and PHMSA.

September 19, 2014 · NTSB Correspondence · PHMSA

The FAA informed us that you intend to use web analytics and social media to monitor the effectiveness of the Safe Travel website redesign discussed above and that you may use an industry advisory group to develop, review, and evaluate the effectiveness of the outreach programs available on your website. We recognize that this is not an easy recommendation to address, but we are encouraged by your commitment to finding an effective solution. Pending our review of an evaluation process that addresses the concerns described in Safety Recommendation A-08-2, the recommendation is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

May 12, 2014 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We note that you are considering using an industry advisory group to develop, review, and evaluate the effectiveness of the outreach programs available on your website. We recognize that this is not an easy recommendation to address, but we are encouraged by your commitment to finding an effective solution. Pending our review of an evaluation process that addresses the concerns described in Safety Recommendation A-08-2, the recommendation is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

January 21, 2014 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: The FAA agrees that it is important to measure the effectiveness of outreach programs and plans to implement a formative evaluation approach while improvements to the hazardous materials communication strategy and message are developed in collaboration with industry. Emphasis will be given to formative evaluation because it is recognized that conducting a meaningful, ongoing, evaluation of changes in passenger behavior may be cost prohibitive, especially in this budgetary environment. For example, the FAA will consider utilizing an industry advisory group to develop, review, and evaluate updates to its Web site.

We would welcome the opportunity to collaborate with NTSB staff in considering additional, cost effective processes to measure the effectiveness of our lithium battery-related outreach programs.

However, the Board incorrectly stated that it has been over 5 years since the FAA responded to this recommendation. Both the Calendar Year 20 l 0 and 20 I I Annual Reports on Air Carrier Safety Recommendations contain information about this recommendation. These reports, as required by Congress (Public Law 111-216, Section 202), were also provided to the Board for its review and consideration.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA• s progress on these recommendations and provide an update by December 31, 2014.

March 28, 2013 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We are aware of the FAA’s and PHMSA’s efforts to collect and assess incident data for changes in passenger and flight crew awareness and behavior. We previously requested additional information from PHMSA regarding the incident data being collected to assess changes in passenger and flight crew awareness and behavior with regard to the safe transport of secondary lithium batteries. We are also aware that a method for evaluating the effectiveness of these efforts was being developed; however, we have received no information regarding the status of either of these efforts. Please share these data with us so that we may better assess your agency’s efforts.

Because it has been over 5 years since the FAA’s last response to this recommendation and, during that period, neither the FAA nor PHMSA has provided the NTSB with (1) documentation to indicate that the guidance has been effective or (2) information about the methodology used to measure the effectiveness of this guidance, Safety Recommendation A-08-2 is classified OPEN—UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

January 4, 2013 · Recipient Response · FAA

-Michael P. Huerta, Acting Administrator: We continue to agree that it is important to measure the effectiveness of our safety outreach programs. We are currently focusing on ways to improve the quality and extend the reach of our safety outreach programs by exploring cost -beneficial methodologies to measure their effectiveness.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on these recommendations and provide an update by December 31. 2013.

June 15, 2011 · NTSB Correspondence · PHMSA

The NTSB notes PHMSA’s ongoing efforts to develop guidance material to educate the air-traveling public and flight crews about the safe carriage of secondary lithium batteries and the electronic devices that contain these batteries on board passenger aircraft. We believe that the guidance developed thus far contains much useful information; however, we remain concerned that the guidance will not prove effective unless individuals and/or companies are already familiar with the dangers associated with the shipping of, and travelling with, these batteries.

The NTSB believes that outreach efforts, such as those targeted at e-cigarette retailers, are an effective method for increasing the level of awareness among travelers and other companies that may otherwise be unfamiliar with the associated risks, and we would like to know how PHMSA determines when these additional efforts are necessary and whether any are planned for the future.

The NTSB previously requested additional information regarding the incident data being collected by PHMSA to assess changes in passenger and flight crew awareness and behavior with regard to safe transport of secondary lithium batteries. PHMSA had indicated that a method for evaluating the effectiveness of these efforts was being developed; however, we have received no information regarding the status of either of these efforts. Please share this data with us so that we may better assess your agency’s efforts.

Because the guidance that PHMSA has developed to educate the public of the dangers of flying with lithium batteries, and with devices containing lithium batteries, contains useful information, Safety Recommendation A-08-1 remains classified "Open--Acceptable Response." However, because PHMSA has not provided the NTSB with (1) documentation to indicate that the guidance has been effective or (2) information about the methodology used to measure the effectiveness of this guidance, Safety Recommendation A-08-2 is classified OPEN--UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

The NTSB would like to schedule a meeting with PHMSA to discuss these safety recommendations and to address any concerns or questions that either agency may have regarding them. We will contact your office in the near future to arrange such a meeting.

April 4, 2011 · Recipient Response · PHMSA

CC# 20110149: - From Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator: I appreciate the effort you have made in the area of hazardous material and pipeline safety transportation. We share an interest in taking strong actions to continually improve the safe transportation of these materials throughout our country. In that regard, I have been meeting with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)'s hazardous materials and pipeline safety programs to assess our actions on the NTSB recommendations in the last six months.

My goal is to continually address your safety recommendations by taking actions to assure that the "unacceptable actions" are moved into the "open-acceptable" category and to achieve a "closed-acceptable" in a timely manner on as many recommendations as possible. I recognize that a number of "open-acceptable" recommendations are works in progress and may take a year or more to complete. In the last six months you have issued four "Closed-Acceptable Action" classifications for the following recommendations: P-04-02, P-07-07, P-07-08 and P-10-01.

In an effort to continue this progress, I have asked our hazardous material and pipeline staff to compile outstanding letters to the NTSB that request a change in the classification of a recommendation. I have enclosed a copy of the PHMSA letters requesting that the following five recommendations be classified as "Closed-Acceptable Action": A-07-107, A-07-108, R-07-05, A-08-01, and A-08-02. I am hopeful that you will review these letters and close the recommendations if you believe we have been responsive.

In addition, I ask that you review NTSB Recommendation H-04-23 requiring that periodic nondestructive testing be conducted on nurse tanks to identify material flaws that could result in a failure. PHMSA published a final rule on February 1, 2011, requiring inspection and nondestructive testing to allow continued use of nurse tanks with missing or illegible ASME plates. I have enclosed a copy of the Final Rule as published in the Federal Register. In addition, our sister agency, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration contracted with Virginia Polytechnic Institute to research nurse tank safety.

October 13, 2010 · Recipient Response · PHMSA

CC# 201000381: - From Cynthia Douglass, Chief Safety Officer: The PHMSA continues its ongoing focus to educate the public on the safe use and handling of batteries and devices containing batteries. The SafeTravel campaign focuses on bringing people to the SafeTravel Web site for information by branding guidance material and other content with the SafeTravel logo. The PHMSA includes the Safetravel logo on outreach materials and PHMSA Web site. Links to the Safetravel Web site also appear on many other familiar information sources for air travelers, such as the Transportation Security Administration and FAA. Recently, Fast Line, the official blog of the U.S.

Secretary of Transportation featured SafeTravel. The PHMSA continues to maintain and expand the SafeTravel Web site to provide up-to-date guidance to air travelers. Additionally, PHMSA developed an extensive guide for shipping batteries safely by air that targets infrequent shippers of batteries of all types and includes full color pictures and plain language guidance to facilitate compliance with the applicable rules (copy enclosed). The PHMSA also modified the highly recognizable "These Fly... " poster (copy enclosed) to place a greater emphasis on lithium batteries and lithium battery-powered devices. Recently, PHMSA has targeted its outreach efforts to specific groups.

During the fall of 2009, PHMSA contacted more than 100 retailers and distributors of e-cigarettes to make them aware that lithium batteries, such as those contained in e-cigarettes, are regulated by the Hazardous Materials Regulations and provided them with information on the safe shipment of lithium batteries and battery-powered devices. The FAA, in conjunction with the airline industry, embarked on a series of tests to determine the optimum procedure for fighting a laptop computer fire onboard an aircraft. Based on this testing, FAA developed a training video that demonstrates effective and practical methods of extinguishing a cabin fire involving lithium batteries in a laptop computer.

The video, "Extinguishing In-Flight Laptop Computer Fires," may be viewed at the Fire Safety Team Web site: www.fire.tc.faa.gov. Subsequently, FAA issued a Safety Alert for Operators (June 23, 2009), titled, "Fighting Fires Caused by Lithium Type Batteries in Portable Electronic Devices." The purpose of the Safety Alert for Operators is to recommend procedures for fighting fires caused by lithium type batteries in portable electronic devices. The PHMSA and FAA continue to collect and assess incident data for changes in passenger and flight crew awareness and behavior.

August 17, 2010 · NTSB Correspondence · PHMSA

CC# 201000303. No response necessary.

August 9, 2010 · Recipient Response · PHMSA

CC# 201000303: - From Ola Parsons, PHMSA Executive Secretariat: Thank you for your letter of July 21 to the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regarding Safety Recommendations A-07-104 through A-07-108 and A-08-1 and A-08-2 issued by the National Transportation Safety Board to the DOT, In light of the scope of your request and the need for DOT to coordinate its response, completion of our final response will take some time, We will provide a response as soon as possible, and we appreciate your patience. For your reference, we have assigned control number PHMSA-l 00803-002 to your letter.

July 21, 2010 · NTSB Correspondence · PHMSA

PHMSA indicated that it plans to address these two recommendations under a separate rulemaking; because of the proliferation of personal electronic devices carried by the traveling public, the NTSB urges it to expedite this effort. PHMSA’s efforts to educate the public about potential hazards related to the air transportation of lithium batteries appear to be responsive to Safety Recommendation A-08-1; however, the NTSB has not received sufficient documentation to determine that the process established has succeeded in achieving the goals of the recommendation.

Accordingly, pending our review of documentation that PHMSA’s efforts have ensured wider, highly visible, and continuous dissemination of guidance and information to the air-traveling public, including flight crews, about the safe carriage of secondary (rechargeable) lithium batteries or electronic devices containing these batteries on board passenger aircraft, Safety Recommendation A-08-1 remains classified “Open—Acceptable Response.” Regarding Safety Recommendation A-08-2, before closing the recommendation, the NTSB needs additional information regarding the methodology used to measure the program’s effectiveness.

Accordingly, pending the NTSB’s review of (1) documentation that the program has been effective in informing the public of the dangers of flying with lithium batteries and devices containing lithium batteries and (2) information about the methodology used to measure the program’s effectiveness, Safety Recommendation A-08-2 remains classified OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

April 14, 2010 · NTSB Correspondence · PHMSA

Notation 7772F: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), “Hazardous Materials: Transportation of Lithium Batteries,” that was published at 75 Federal Register 1302 on January 11, 2010. The NPRM requests comments on revisions to the requirements for the transportation of lithium batteries in the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs). The primary purpose of the NPRM is to enhance the safe transportation of primary (non-rechargeable) and secondary (rechargeable) lithium batteries when transported as cargo in all modes, with an emphasis on aviation.

The NTSB believes that PHMSA has proposed requirements that should improve the level of safety for transporting lithium battery cargoes, particularly on aircraft. However, the NTSB offers the following comments to strengthen and clarify the proposed rule. Overview The NPRM proposes new requirements that address Safety Recommendations A-07-104, A-07-105, and A-07-107 through -109 that were issued as a result of the NTSB’s 2006 investigation of an in-flight cargo fire on a cargo airplane at Philadelphia International Airport in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

The NPRM specifically addresses these safety recommendations through proposed requirements concerning the stowage of lithium batteries, the reporting and analysis of lithium battery failures, and the elimination of regulatory exceptions for small lithium batteries. The NTSB has included detailed comments about each of these areas in subsequent sections of this letter. The NTSB notes that PHMSA also proposes other requirements, and those are addressed as well. The NPRM does not address Safety Recommendations A-08-1 and -2, which were issued separately from the Philadelphia accident report but also pertain to the transportation of lithium batteries.

Safety Recommendations A-08-1 and -2 concern the implementation and evaluation of public awareness programs for air passengers and crews who carry portable electronic devices containing lithium batteries or pack spare lithium batteries in their baggage or carry-on items. The NTSB notes that PHMSA plans to address these two recommendations under a separate rulemaking. However, because of the proliferation of personal electronic devices carried by the traveling public, the NTSB urges PHMSA to expedite its rulemaking regarding these recommendations. Stowage of Lithium Batteries

Cargo shipments of primary lithium batteries have been prohibited on passenger aircraft for more than 10 years, but they are still permitted on cargo-only aircraft. Cargo shipments of secondary lithium batteries are permitted on both passenger and cargo-only aircraft. The transportation of primary lithium batteries is potentially dangerous, particularly on board aircraft, because there is currently no known fire suppression system capable of extinguishing fires involving these types of batteries. Fires involving secondary lithium batteries are extinguishable by fire suppression systems approved by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

April 14, 2010 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

Notation 7772F: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), “Hazardous Materials: Transportation of Lithium Batteries,” that was published at 75 Federal Register 1302 on January 11, 2010. The NPRM requests comments on revisions to the requirements for the transportation of lithium batteries in the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs). The primary purpose of the NPRM is to enhance the safe transportation of primary (non-rechargeable) and secondary (rechargeable) lithium batteries when transported as cargo in all modes, with an emphasis on aviation.

The NTSB believes that PHMSA has proposed requirements that should improve the level of safety for transporting lithium battery cargoes, particularly on aircraft. However, the NTSB offers the following comments to strengthen and clarify the proposed rule. Overview The NPRM proposes new requirements that address Safety Recommendations A-07-104, A-07-105, and A-07-107 through -109 that were issued as a result of the NTSB’s 2006 investigation of an in-flight cargo fire on a cargo airplane at Philadelphia International Airport in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

The NPRM specifically addresses these safety recommendations through proposed requirements concerning the stowage of lithium batteries, the reporting and analysis of lithium battery failures, and the elimination of regulatory exceptions for small lithium batteries. The NTSB has included detailed comments about each of these areas in subsequent sections of this letter. The NTSB notes that PHMSA also proposes other requirements, and those are addressed as well. The NPRM does not address Safety Recommendations A-08-1 and -2, which were issued separately from the Philadelphia accident report but also pertain to the transportation of lithium batteries.

Safety Recommendations A-08-1 and -2 concern the implementation and evaluation of public awareness programs for air passengers and crews who carry portable electronic devices containing lithium batteries or pack spare lithium batteries in their baggage or carry-on items. The NTSB notes that PHMSA plans to address these two recommendations under a separate rulemaking. However, because of the proliferation of personal electronic devices carried by the traveling public, the NTSB urges PHMSA to expedite its rulemaking regarding these recommendations. Stowage of Lithium Batteries

Cargo shipments of primary lithium batteries have been prohibited on passenger aircraft for more than 10 years, but they are still permitted on cargo-only aircraft. Cargo shipments of secondary lithium batteries are permitted on both passenger and cargo-only aircraft. The transportation of primary lithium batteries is potentially dangerous, particularly on board aircraft, because there is currently no known fire suppression system capable of extinguishing fires involving these types of batteries. Fires involving secondary lithium batteries are extinguishable by fire suppression systems approved by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

October 16, 2009 · Recipient Response · PHMSA

Letter Mail Controlled 10/22/2009 3:09:01 PM MC# 2090655: - From John D. Porcari, Deputy Secretary of Transportation: We agree with NTSB that air carriers should be required to report all incidents involving lithium batteries, consistent with Safety Recommendation A-07-107. To this end, on January 14, PHMSA published a final rule under Docket No. HM-215JlHM-224D entitled "Hazardous Materials: Revision to Requirements for the Transportation of Batteries and Battery-Powered Devices; and Harmonization With the United Nations Recommendations, International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code, and International Civil Aviation Organization's Technical Instructions" (74 2200; copy enclosed).

In this final rule, we amended the Ilazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) to include a comprehensive incident reporting requirement for batteries and battery-powered devices. As specified in the final rule, incidents involving batteries and battery powered devices that result in a fire, violent rupture, explosion, or dangerous evolution of heat must be reported. In addition to the written incident report, the final rule requires immediate telephonic reporting of incidents involving batteries and battery-powered devices in air transportation.

We agree that an examination of failed batteries and associated electronic devices and equipment will provide valuable data and information as we continue to assess the transportation risks associated with these items. To that end, we are working with FAA and airlines to establish a cooperative program for effectively securing and preserving evidence and passenger information when incidents occur. We developed a standard protocol to be used by aircraft operators in the event of an incident.

This protocol includes procedures for: (1) immediate reporting of the incident to DOT; (2) preservation of the batteries and/or electronic equipment that failed and transfer to appropriate authorities for analysis and evaluation; and (3) obtaining relevant information from passengers and crewmembers, including contact information for follow-up interviews as necessary. In addition, we are proposing a regulatory change to require a shipper, carrier, package owner or person reporting an incident to provide upon request by an authorized government representative reasonable assistance in investigating the damaged package or article.

Consistent with Safety Recommendation A-07-108, PHMSA has completed an analysis of the causes of lithium battery incidents (copy enclosed). The data suggest that the most likely causes of lithium batte~yin cidents are: 1. External short circuiting - occurs when an exposed battery terminal contacts a metal object. When this happens, the battery can heat up and may cause ignition of the battery andlor the surrounding combustible materials. 2.

November 25, 2008 · NTSB Correspondence · PHMSA

In its letter, PHMSA described an extensive program to make the public aware of the dangers posed by lithium batteries transported by air, including when the batteries are transported inside electronic devices; the program involves airlines, airline associations, other government agencies, manufacturers and associations related to lithium batteries and devices that use lithium batteries, general media, and media that specifically appeals to users of devices that rely on lithium batteries. As outlined, the program may satisfy the intent of Safety Recommendation A-08-1.

In addition, the Safety Board believes that the activities being taken in response to Safety Recommendation A-08-2, described in the next paragraph, will provide a reliable basis after some time to determine whether the activities being taken in response to Safety Recommendation A-08-1 have fully achieved the intent of informing flight crews and the public of the dangers of lithium batteries transported by air. Pending completion of these actions and our review of documentation that the program has succeeded in effectively informing the public about this issue, Safety Recommendation A-08-1 is classified Open Acceptable Response.

Regarding Safety Recommendation A-08-2, PHMSA has requested available metrics for related actions being taken by collaborating organizations, and PHMSA is coordinating with the FAA to continually assess data from incidents involving lithium batteries in order to evaluate changes in passenger behavior. The Safety Board notes that PHMSA is working to capture information about passenger behaviors independent of incidents and is developing a method to evaluate the effectiveness of efforts to educate flight crews of the dangers of lithium batteries transported by air.

Currently, PHMSA compiles monthly status reports to track and measure the effectiveness of its public education campaign about lithium batteries. Pending completion of the effort to measure the effectiveness of the public awareness program on the dangers of lithium batteries in air transportation, Safety Recommendation A-08-2 is classified OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

November 25, 2008 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The Safety Board notes that the FAA has been working in conjunction with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) in actively educating the air-traveling public, including flight crews, about the safe carriage of rechargeable lithium batteries on board passenger aircraft.

The FAA listed industry gatherings to which it has contributed, along with two guidance documents: Hazardous Materials Carried by Passengers and Crewmembers and Batteries Carried by Airline Passengers Frequently Asked Questions, which includes a table, with illustrations and simple verbiage explaining the allowances and limits for carrying all types of batteries and battery-powered equipment in airplane checked or carry-on baggage. The documents are located on the FAA’s Web site and are proactive measures for mitigating the hazards associated with the carriage of rechargeable lithium batteries.

The FAA indicated that it will continue to work with PHMSA and other government and industry entities to develop processes for the continued dissemination of information to the flying public and methods for periodically measuring the effectiveness of these and other established processes.

The Safety Board commends the FAA on its timely efforts and looks forward to reviewing an update on this information. Pending an established process that will ensure the continuous dissemination of guidance and information to the air-traveling public and a process for periodically measuring the effectiveness of those efforts, Safety Recommendations A-08-01 and A-08-02 are classified OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

March 28, 2008 · Recipient Response · PHMSA

Letter Mail Controlled 4/7/2008 2:14:34 PM MC# 2080174: - From Stacey L. Gerard, Assistant Administrator/Chief Safety Officer: We are committed to heightening public awareness related to the hazards associated with the air transportation of lithium batteries, including batteries contained in electronic devices. This is a key component of our comprehensive strategy to enhance safety and reduce incidents.

Since February 22, 2007, we have been working with air carriers, battery manufacturers, air travel associations, airline pilot and flight crew associations and other government agencies, including the Transportation Security Administration, to educate the public about potential safety problems and measures that will reduce or eliminate those problems. We agree that our initiative must be highly visible and continuous to be effective and are initiating several approaches to achieve this objective. One of our most visible programs to promote battery safety is the SafeTravel Web site, which includes guidance and information on how to travel safely with batteries and battery-powered devices.

Traffic on the SafeTravel site increased from a hit count of 57,000 in April 2007, to a count of 1,316,000 hits in December 2007. In January, the site recorded 4,608,000 hits, over 3.5 times the December count. In terms of external web mentions of the SafeTravel site by URL name, a mid-November count found about 500 mentions. That number has since grown to over 5,000. In conjunction with development of the SafeTravel website, we have been working with major airlines to place SafeTravel on their web sites and to include battery safety tips in their in-flight magazines and in their electronic communications with passengers.

We are also contacting personal computer and gaming magazines to provide information to their customers; contacting local print and electronic news media sources and major print media contacts in major metropolitan markets in advance of holiday travel; developing magazine drop-in advertisements; and distributed 1,000 media kits and over 30,000 digital information packets with links to the media kit. We have also been working with the Air Transport Association (ATA) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) to provide SafeTravel information for ticketed passengers and frequent flyers, and to place printed battery safety materials in seat pockets on passenger planes.

As a result of our partnership with ATA, many airlines now include battery safety tips on their websites and in travel magazines and are working with us to promote passenger awareness and safety. We continue to enhance our battery safety outreach efforts and are making progress in additional venues. For example, to increase visibility in the coming months, we initiated a partnership with the Interactive Travel Services Association (ITSA) to encourage large online travel vendors such as Orbitz, Travelocity, Hotwire, and others, to include access to the SafeTravel site in their electronic communications and on their web sites.

March 28, 2008 · Recipient Response · FAA

Letter Mail Controlled 4/9/2008 12:53:11 PM MC# 2080188: - From Robert A. Sturgell, Acting Administrator: The FAA and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) are actively involved in efforts to raise awareness on the safe transport of lithium batteries. Lithium battery fires remain a top safety priority for the FAA, and we have been involved in several government and industry outreach activities regarding lithium batteries. These include industry meetings and the development of guidance documents. A list of some of the meetings held and documents developed follows: Industry Meetings:

February 13, 2008-National Air Carrier Association safety meeting, Arlington, Virginia: FAA delivered a presentation to U.S. charter air carriers that centered on lithium battery dangers, incidents, and regulations;

January 29, 2008-Air Transport Association, Washington, D.C.; FAA met with the safety representatives of the major U.S. air carriers and discussed a variety of hazmat issues including lithium batteries carried as carry-on and in checked baggage;

November 15, 2007-Dangerous Goods Advisory Council, Annual Conference, Santa Fe, New Mexico: FAA gave a presentation on various hazmat subjects including lithium batteries to an industry audience that included shippers, air carriers, freight forwarders, and hazmat consultants;

August 28, 2007-PHMSA public meeting, Washington, D.C.: FAA’s Office of Security and Hazardous Material (ASH), Flight Standards Service (AFS), and PHMSA discussed lithium battery cargo and baggage issues with the major laptop computer manufacturers. The on-board charging of laptops was a major issue discussed;

May 24-25, 2007- Portable Rechargeable Battery Association (PRBA)-PHMSA public meeting, Dulles, Virginia: The ASH and AFS offices of FAA participated in a battery safety conference sponsored by the PRBA and PHMSA. Lithium ion battery design, testing, and charging issues were discussed; and

February 22, 2007-PHMSA public meeting, Washington, D.C.: The ASH office of FAA participated in a public meeting specifically dedicated to the air transport of batteries. Attendees included representatives from the major passengers and cargo air carriers and members of the battery and electronics industries. Meeting attendees were asked for their input on how to best deal with the ongoing battery fires in air cargo and baggage.

Guidance Documents January 9, 2008-FANASH posted on its Web site “Batteries Carried by Airline Passengers - Frequently Asked Questions,” (copy enclosed) a guidance document for airline passengers. This guidance document answers the most frequent passenger questions about batteries and provides an illustrated table that explains in layman’s terms the allowances and limits for carrying all types of batteries (including lithium metal and lithium ion) and battery-powered equipment in checked or carry-on baggage; and

Read Recommendation

Recommendation Facts

Status
Closed - Acceptable Action
Issued
January 7, 2008
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
PHMSA, FAA
Adopted
January 3, 2008
Closed
August 20, 2021
Related Investigation
DCA06MA022
Related Report
AAR-07-07

Recipient Responses

PHMSA: Closed - Acceptable Action

FAA: Closed - Acceptable Action

Accordingly, Safety Recommendations A-08-1 and -2 are classified CLOSED-- ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

We appreciate your efforts to improve aviation safety.

parts 121
or 135. The secondary audience is all FAA personnel responsible for dangerous goods transportation certification, surveillance, and safety oversight activities. This AC provides recommended content and guidance for a dangerous goods training program and a manual designed to guide and manage dangerous goods operations on the following:

• Developing dangerous goods training programs applicable to personnel providing a transport related job function for, or on behalf of, the certificate holder; • Implementing operational Safety Management Systems (SMS), and the structure of the operator’s risk analysis as they relate to dangerous goods; and • Developing the manual for dangerous goods transportation/rejection as cargo or baggage, and a plan to prevent undeclared dangerous goods. Operators are directed to AC 121-40-14 for guidance in developing or revising their dangerous goods manuals. In Fiscal Year 2018, the FAA approved 428 new and/or revised dangerous goods manuals.

Interagency Cooperation

The FAA continues to collaborate with Federal partners and other organizations to further disseminate lithium battery safety information. Section 333 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (Public Law No: 115-254), Safe Air Transportation of Lithium Cells and Batteries, directed the Secretary of the Department of Transportation (DOT) to carry out a wide range of activities related to lithium batteries that includes revising regulations to more closely harmonize with international standards, evaluating packaging standards, and providing forums to enhance stakeholder input. The FAA and PHMSA have both assumed leading roles under § 333.

On May 9, 2019, PHMSA established the Lithium Battery Air Safety Advisory Committee to facilitate communication between lithium battery and cell manufacturers, shippers, end users, transporters, and the Federal Government, to provide a forum for the Secretary to discuss the activities of the department, and seek stakeholder input relating to lithium battery transportation safety, including input that helps the government develop positions to advocate in international forums. The advisory committee held its first meeting on January 22-23, 2020. The advisory committee held its second, and most recent meeting, on September 16-17, 2020.

As required by the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, the advisory committee will continue to meet at least twice per year, and terminate six years after the date on which the committee was established.

Under § 333(c), PHMSA established the Interagency Lithium Battery Safety Working Group to share best practices and report to Congress on Federal agency efforts related to the safe manufacture, use, and transport of lithium batteries and cells. The FAA is a member of this Working Group. The reports to Congress each year, (under the requirements by § 333 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, (c) Lithium Battery Safety Working Group, and (e), Cooperative Efforts to Ensure Compliance with Safety Regulations), demonstrate the wide range of lithium battery safety activities in which the FAA and PHMSA participate.

Additionally, under § 333(e), the FAA transmitted a report to Congress on February 26, 2020, addressing cooperative efforts with PHMSA to ensure shippers who offer lithium ion and lithium metal batteries for air transport to or from the United States comply with applicable regulations. As described in the report, the PHMSA and the FAA participate in the ICAO Dangerous Goods Panel (DGP), and conduct outreach with internal and external stakeholders to promote safety regulations and foster an integrated approach to oversight.

ICAO Member States collaborate through the DGP to develop overarching regulations, standards, and best practices to ensure safe, secure, and efficient transportation of dangerous goods, both internationally and domestically. This collaboration promotes better understanding of the requirements and methods of compliance among the international aviation community.

Furthermore, PHMSA is engaged in several activities and initiatives for lithium battery safety, focusing on a multi-modal approach, including highway, rail, air, and vessel transportation. PHMSA’s “Check the Box” campaign is an example of their multimodal approach to lithium battery safety. DOT launched the “Check the Box” campaign in August 2018 to raise public awareness of hazardous materials shipments, including lithium batteries. PHMSA continues to lead the multi-modal Undeclared Hazardous Materials Working Group with federal partners: Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, FAA, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S.

Postal Inspection Service to create a unified strategic approach in collaboration with dangerous goods stakeholders to support the reduction of undeclared hazardous materials shipments by all modes of transportation. The sharing of lessons learned and best practices can help improve each office’s ability to provide safety messaging. See https://checkthebox.dot.gov for more information.

Stakeholder Engagement

In the FAA’s 2016 response, we stated that we were working to develop a multistep process to measure lithium battery safety messaging effectiveness to include the following steps: 1) Proposal and Development; 2) Formative Evaluation; 3) Adoption or Implementation; and 4) Review of Effectiveness. As described in the 2016 response, the overall process is circular to ensure that safety promotion strategies are continuously improved. Safety promotion is ongoing and always evolving as passenger habits, air cargo environment, and consumer products change over time. An overview of the FAA’s approach to this multi-faceted process is described below.

This process is further demonstrated in the discussion of the FAA’s safety messaging activities.

parts 121
or 135. The secondary audience is all FAA personnel responsible for dangerous goods transportation certification, surveillance, and safety oversight activities. This AC provides recommended content and guidance for a dangerous goods training program and a manual designed to guide and manage dangerous goods operations on the following:

• Developing dangerous goods training programs applicable to personnel providing a transport related job function for, or on behalf of, the certificate holder; • Implementing operational Safety Management Systems (SMS), and the structure of the operator’s risk analysis as they relate to dangerous goods; and • Developing the manual for dangerous goods transportation/rejection as cargo or baggage, and a plan to prevent undeclared dangerous goods. Operators are directed to AC 121-40-14 for guidance in developing or revising their dangerous goods manuals. In Fiscal Year 2018, the FAA approved 428 new and/or revised dangerous goods manuals.

Interagency Cooperation

The FAA continues to collaborate with Federal partners and other organizations to further disseminate lithium battery safety information. Section 333 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (Public Law No: 115-254), Safe Air Transportation of Lithium Cells and Batteries, directed the Secretary of the Department of Transportation (DOT) to carry out a wide range of activities related to lithium batteries that includes revising regulations to more closely harmonize with international standards, evaluating packaging standards, and providing forums to enhance stakeholder input. The FAA and PHMSA have both assumed leading roles under § 333.

On May 9, 2019, PHMSA established the Lithium Battery Air Safety Advisory Committee to facilitate communication between lithium battery and cell manufacturers, shippers, end users, transporters, and the Federal Government, to provide a forum for the Secretary to discuss the activities of the department, and seek stakeholder input relating to lithium battery transportation safety, including input that helps the government develop positions to advocate in international forums. The advisory committee held its first meeting on January 22-23, 2020. The advisory committee held its second, and most recent meeting, on September 16-17, 2020.

As required by the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, the advisory committee will continue to meet at least twice per year, and terminate six years after the date on which the committee was established.

Under § 333(c), PHMSA established the Interagency Lithium Battery Safety Working Group to share best practices and report to Congress on Federal agency efforts related to the safe manufacture, use, and transport of lithium batteries and cells. The FAA is a member of this Working Group. The reports to Congress each year, (under the requirements by § 333 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, (c) Lithium Battery Safety Working Group, and (e), Cooperative Efforts to Ensure Compliance with Safety Regulations), demonstrate the wide range of lithium battery safety activities in which the FAA and PHMSA participate.

Additionally, under § 333(e), the FAA transmitted a report to Congress on February 26, 2020, addressing cooperative efforts with PHMSA to ensure shippers who offer lithium ion and lithium metal batteries for air transport to or from the United States comply with applicable regulations. As described in the report, the PHMSA and the FAA participate in the ICAO Dangerous Goods Panel (DGP), and conduct outreach with internal and external stakeholders to promote safety regulations and foster an integrated approach to oversight.

ICAO Member States collaborate through the DGP to develop overarching regulations, standards, and best practices to ensure safe, secure, and efficient transportation of dangerous goods, both internationally and domestically. This collaboration promotes better understanding of the requirements and methods of compliance among the international aviation community.

Furthermore, PHMSA is engaged in several activities and initiatives for lithium battery safety, focusing on a multi-modal approach, including highway, rail, air, and vessel transportation. PHMSA’s “Check the Box” campaign is an example of their multimodal approach to lithium battery safety. DOT launched the “Check the Box” campaign in August 2018 to raise public awareness of hazardous materials shipments, including lithium batteries. PHMSA continues to lead the multi-modal Undeclared Hazardous Materials Working Group with federal partners: Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, FAA, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S.

Postal Inspection Service to create a unified strategic approach in collaboration with dangerous goods stakeholders to support the reduction of undeclared hazardous materials shipments by all modes of transportation. The sharing of lessons learned and best practices can help improve each office’s ability to provide safety messaging. See https://checkthebox.dot.gov for more information.

Stakeholder Engagement

In the FAA’s 2016 response, we stated that we were working to develop a multistep process to measure lithium battery safety messaging effectiveness to include the following steps: 1) Proposal and Development; 2) Formative Evaluation; 3) Adoption or Implementation; and 4) Review of Effectiveness. As described in the 2016 response, the overall process is circular to ensure that safety promotion strategies are continuously improved. Safety promotion is ongoing and always evolving as passenger habits, air cargo environment, and consumer products change over time. An overview of the FAA’s approach to this multi-faceted process is described below.

This process is further demonstrated in the discussion of the FAA’s safety messaging activities.

The FAA’s Office of Security and Hazardous Materials Safety (A

If you have questions regarding any of these recommendations, please do not hesitate to call. Together, we are making a positive difference in the safe transportation of hazardous materials, including those transported by pipelines.

Independent of incident data, PHMSA assesses the continued visibility of the SafeTravel public awareness campaign as a measure of the success of the campaign. The PHMSA partnerships with government and industry have ensured that SafeTravel information continues to figure prominently on government and airline Web sites and monthly in-flight magazines. Based on the actions outlined above, we request that Safety Recommendations A-08-1 and A-08-2 be classified as "Closed-Acceptable Action." We appreciate your consideration of this request.

Although fire suppression systems are required in cargo compartments of passenger aircraft, they are not required in cargo-only aircraft. The investigation of the Philadelphia accident showed that flight crews on cargo-only aircraft remain at risk from in-flight fires involving primary lithium batteries and from fires involving secondary lithium batteries on aircraft not equipped with fire suppression systems. Consequently, the NTSB issued the following recommendations to PHMSA:

Require aircraft operators to implement measures to reduce the risk of primary lithium batteries becoming involved in fires on cargo-only aircraft, such as transporting such batteries in fire resistant containers and/or in restricted quantities at any single location on the aircraft. (A-07-104) Until fire suppression systems are required on cargo-only aircraft, as asked for in Safety Recommendation A-07-99, require that cargo shipments of secondary lithium batteries, including those contained in or packed with equipment, be transported in crew-accessible locations where portable fire suppression systems can be used. (A-07-105)

The NTSB believes that the NPRM fully addresses Safety Recommendation A-07-105 but only partially addresses Safety Recommendation A-07-104. The proposed rule would require that if either primary or secondary lithium batteries are transported in inaccessible cargo compartments or freight containers, the compartments or containers must be equipped with an FAA-approved fire suppression system, or that the packages of batteries must be transported in an FAA-approved fire-resistant container.

Because current FAA-approved suppression systems are ineffective on fires involving primary lithium batteries, the NTSB believes that the NPRM would be improved if it explicitly required that shipments of primary lithium batteries be transported in FAA-approved fire-resistant containers. When the FAA approves a fire suppression system that is proven to be effective on fires involving primary lithium batteries, the NTSB would consider such a suppression system an acceptable alternative to an FAA-approved fire-resistant container.

Because current FAA-approved fire suppression systems are effective on fires involving secondary lithium batteries, the NTSB supports the NPRM in that it would require that inaccessible shipments of secondary lithium batteries be transported in either cargo compartments or freight containers equipped with an FAA-approved fire suppression system or in FAA-approved fire-resistant containers. PHMSA states in the NPRM that it is considering whether a limit on the number of primary lithium battery packages transported in a single airplane or single container would further enhance safety.

Although PHMSA acknowledges the cumulative effect and the potential risks of packaging thousands of small primary batteries in close proximity, it has not proposed any requirements to mitigate the risks. The NTSB believes that the NPRM would be improved if restrictions were imposed on the clustering of primary lithium battery shipments on cargo-only aircraft. Reporting and Analysis of Lithium Battery Failures In the Philadelphia accident report, the NTSB noted that the causes of secondary lithium battery failures are not well understood or documented.

The NTSB suggested that this may be due, in part, to the fact that proper evaluation of failed lithium batteries is not always performed, and that, in many cases, these batteries are disposed of before the incident is reported, precluding an accurate analysis of the failures. As a result, the NTSB issued the following recommendations to PHMSA:

Require commercial cargo and passenger operators to report to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration all incidents involving primary and secondary lithium batteries, including those contained in or packed with equipment, that occur either on board or during loading or unloading operations and retain the failed items for evaluation purposes. (A-07-107)

Analyze the causes of all thermal failures and fires involving secondary and primary lithium batteries and, based on this analysis, take appropriate action to mitigate any risks determined to be posed by transporting secondary and primary lithium batteries, including those contained in or packed with equipment, on board cargo and passenger aircraft as cargo; checked baggage; or carry-on items. (A-07-108) On July 31, 2008, PHMSA published an NPRM to revise requirements for the transportation of battery-powered devices and batteries and to harmonize the U.S. Department of Transportation HMRs with international standards.

The NPRM included a proposal to require that all incidents involving lithium batteries and devices containing them be immediately reported. In a letter dated November 19, 2008, the NTSB suggested that the

Although fire suppression systems are required in cargo compartments of passenger aircraft, they are not required in cargo-only aircraft. The investigation of the Philadelphia accident showed that flight crews on cargo-only aircraft remain at risk from in-flight fires involving primary lithium batteries and from fires involving secondary lithium batteries on aircraft not equipped with fire suppression systems. Consequently, the NTSB issued the following recommendations to PHMSA:

Require aircraft operators to implement measures to reduce the risk of primary lithium batteries becoming involved in fires on cargo-only aircraft, such as transporting such batteries in fire resistant containers and/or in restricted quantities at any single location on the aircraft. (A-07-104) Until fire suppression systems are required on cargo-only aircraft, as asked for in Safety Recommendation A-07-99, require that cargo shipments of secondary lithium batteries, including those contained in or packed with equipment, be transported in crew-accessible locations where portable fire suppression systems can be used. (A-07-105)

The NTSB believes that the NPRM fully addresses Safety Recommendation A-07-105 but only partially addresses Safety Recommendation A-07-104. The proposed rule would require that if either primary or secondary lithium batteries are transported in inaccessible cargo compartments or freight containers, the compartments or containers must be equipped with an FAA-approved fire suppression system, or that the packages of batteries must be transported in an FAA-approved fire-resistant container.

Because current FAA-approved suppression systems are ineffective on fires involving primary lithium batteries, the NTSB believes that the NPRM would be improved if it explicitly required that shipments of primary lithium batteries be transported in FAA-approved fire-resistant containers. When the FAA approves a fire suppression system that is proven to be effective on fires involving primary lithium batteries, the NTSB would consider such a suppression system an acceptable alternative to an FAA-approved fire-resistant container.

Because current FAA-approved fire suppression systems are effective on fires involving secondary lithium batteries, the NTSB supports the NPRM in that it would require that inaccessible shipments of secondary lithium batteries be transported in either cargo compartments or freight containers equipped with an FAA-approved fire suppression system or in FAA-approved fire-resistant containers. PHMSA states in the NPRM that it is considering whether a limit on the number of primary lithium battery packages transported in a single airplane or single container would further enhance safety.

Although PHMSA acknowledges the cumulative effect and the potential risks of packaging thousands of small primary batteries in close proximity, it has not proposed any requirements to mitigate the risks. The NTSB believes that the NPRM would be improved if restrictions were imposed on the clustering of primary lithium battery shipments on cargo-only aircraft. Reporting and Analysis of Lithium Battery Failures In the Philadelphia accident report, the NTSB noted that the causes of secondary lithium battery failures are not well understood or documented.

The NTSB suggested that this may be due, in part, to the fact that proper evaluation of failed lithium batteries is not always performed, and that, in many cases, these batteries are disposed of before the incident is reported, precluding an accurate analysis of the failures. As a result, the NTSB issued the following recommendations to PHMSA:

Require commercial cargo and passenger operators to report to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration all incidents involving primary and secondary lithium batteries, including those contained in or packed with equipment, that occur either on board or during loading or unloading operations and retain the failed items for evaluation purposes. (A-07-107)

Analyze the causes of all thermal failures and fires involving secondary and primary lithium batteries and, based on this analysis, take appropriate action to mitigate any risks determined to be posed by transporting secondary and primary lithium batteries, including those contained in or packed with equipment, on board cargo and passenger aircraft as cargo; checked baggage; or carry-on items. (A-07-108) On July 31, 2008, PHMSA published an NPRM to revise requirements for the transportation of battery-powered devices and batteries and to harmonize the U.S. Department of Transportation HMRs with international standards.

The NPRM included a proposal to require that all incidents involving lithium batteries and devices containing them be immediately reported. In a letter dated November 19, 2008, the NTSB suggested that the

In-use situation - generally relating to improper "chirging" andlor "discharging" conditions associated with the use of equipment (e.g., computer or cell phone). This also includes inadvertent activation and subsequent overheating (such was the case when a power drill activated and burned in a passenger's checked baggage). 3. Non-compliance - includes faulty design of the battery (cells or battery packs), false certification of compliance with regulatory testing/classification requirements, and improper packing afid handling inciudingsome counterfeit batteries. 4. Internal shall circuit - can be caused by foreign matter introduced into a cell or battery during the manufacturing process.

An internal short circuit can also occur when a battery is physically damaged (e.g. dropped or punctured). PHMSA has initiated a rulemaking project to propose enhanced regulatory requirements to mitigate the risks identified in the incident analysis. The rulemaking is intended to strengthen the current regulatory framework by imposing more effective safeguards, including design testing, packaging, and hazard communication measures for various types and sizes of lithium batteries in specific transportation contexts. PHMSA plans to publish an NPRM this fall. The rulemaking will address the following issues: Elimination of current exceptions for small lithium batteries.

Currently, shipments of small lithium batteries are excepted from certain packa-g in-g and hazard communication requirements. Instead, packages must conform to minimum packaging requirements and must be identified as containing lithium batteries for which special procedures should be followed in the event the package is damaged. We are considering eliminating the exceptions for small lithium batteries and imposing more stringent packaging and hazard communication requirements, including shipping papers, package marks and labels, and emergency response information.

Elimination of the current exceptions would enhance safety by ensuring that all lithium batteries would be packaged to reduce the possibility of damage to the batteries that could lead to an incident and accompanied by hazard information that would ensure appropriate and careful handling by air carrier personnel and inform transport workers and emergency response personnel of actions to be taken in the event of an emergency. UN design tvpe test results.

Currently, all lithium battery and cell types must be subjected to a series of tests as specified in the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria. The tests are intended to ensure that lithium batteries and cells will withstand conditions encountered during transportation. We are considering adopting a requirement for manufacturers to provide evidence of satisfactory completion of the UN design type tests for each lithium battery and cell that is offered for transportation in commerce. The intended effect would be to enhance compliance with the test requirements.

Lithium battery shipping descriptions. Currently, all types of lithium batteries are transported using the same UN identification number. However, differences in chemistry, functionality and behavior when exposed to a fire are well documented for different types of batteries. The fact that all types of lithium batteries share the same UN number has the potential to cause significant problems in acceptance procedures for carriers and may unnecessarily hinder or delay the transportation of these products.

Thus, we are considering revising the current shipping descriptions to account for different battery types and chemistries and for consistency with shipping descriptions in international transport standards and regulations. Stowage in crew accessible locations. We are proposing restricting stowage of lithium batteries on an aircraft to crew accessible locations to permit immediate investigation and response to smoke or fire.

Recalled batteries. We are considering the development of appropriate safety measures for the air transport of lithium cells or batteries identified by the manufacturer, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, or the Department of Transportation as being defective for safety reasons, or

ITSA has agreed to assist us with enhancing the branding of our safety message and to expand our reach to the traveling public. We have also met with the Association of American Airport Executives (AAAE) and the Airports Council International to discuss placement of awareness materials in airports. We are considering how we can simplify our safety message and effectively communicate it to the common airline passenger so that the message is easily understandable and effective for broadcast through displays in airports. We are working with FAA and TSA to develop a strategy for introducing our hazardous materials and battery safety public safety announcements in airports.

In addition to promoting SafeTravel articles and links to gaming and PC industry magazines, we have directly promoted the web site to gadget and travel blogs and online vendors of batteries and electronics. We are also contacting major retailers and distributors with the goal of establishing in-store, electronic, and print media promotion of the battery safety agenda. We recently acquired commitments from Wal-Mart and Radio Shack to support our efforts. An important component our public awareness campaign is our partnership with the Portable Rechargeable Battery Association (PRBA) and the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA).

Both PRBA and NEMA have published articles in support of battery safety awareness for air travelers. PFWA and NEMA are working with member manufacturers to include a reference to the SafeTravel website on lithium battery retail packaging. They are also working with their members to include SafeTravel information in printed material accompanying rechargeable batteries, such as those used in laptop computers. We are continuing to leverage our existing industry partnerships in an effort to create a more visible public campaign, in addition to specific news events and press releases.

We are participating in major conventions and exhibitions to conduct outreach and increase both industry and consumer awareness of battery safety issues. PHMSA staff recently participated in the 25th International Battery Safety Conference, where more than 350 representatives from the battery and battery powered device manufacturing industry attended, and explained the incidents that have occurred, the steps being taken and invited them to partner with us in expanding the outreach and public awareness campaign.

On April 11, 2008, we will meet with stakeholders to discuss partner actions to provide continuous, repeated mass media presence and to roll out a renewed battery safety plan focused on a multi-faceted approach to reducing the risk of the transport of lithium batteries. We are mindful that NTSB stressed actions to promote lithium battery safety awareness among flight crew specifically, and that Recommendation A-08-2 focuses on more robust assessment of passenger and flight crew awareness and behavior.

We are working with ATA, their member airlines, the Airline Pilots Association and the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA) to raise flight crew awareness of measures they can take to avoid incidents as well as how to respond effectively should an incident occur in the cabin. We have requested available metrics for partner actions, and are coordinating with FAA to continually assess incident data focusing on root causes, in order to gauge any changes in passenger behavior.

In the coming year, we will work to capture information about passenger behaviors independent of incidents, and work with FAA and with partners representing airline flight crews to ensure that battery safety and response information is made available. We also will develop a method for evaluating the effectiveness of our efforts to educate the public and flight crews. We will keep you informed of our progress. Attached is a status report of our actions. We are now compiling monthly status reports to track and measure our effectiveness. If you have any questions, please contact me at (202) 366-4831. We request that you classify recommendations A-08-1 and A-08-2 as Open -Acceptable Action.

We thank you for consideration of our request.

January 1, 2008-FANASH updated its on-line guidance document, “Hazardous Materials Carried by Passengers and Crewmembers” (copy enclosed) to include the recent changes in 49 Code of Federal Regulations affecting lithium batteries in checked and carry-on baggage.

The FAA will continue to work with government agencies and industry to develop processes for the continued dissemination of information to the flying public. I will provide an update on our progress within six months.

FAA Comment to A-08-02: The FAA concurs with this recommendation and will work with PHMSA and the groups identified in the recommendation to increase efforts to devise ways to measure the effectiveness of our outreach efforts. Because we can expect the production, use and transport of lithium batteries to increase every year, using data such as transportation incidents would not be an effective metric. We will continue to seek ways to measure our effectiveness and will provide an update on our progress within six months.