NTSB · Safety Recommendation
Safety Recommendation A-07-035
Recommendation
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require, for all aircraft required to have a traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) installed and for existing and future system designs, that the airborne loss of collision avoidance system functionality, for any reason, provide an enhanced aural and visual warning requiring pilot acknowledgment.
Safety Issue and Context
On September 29, 2006, about 1657 Brasilia standard time,1 a Boeing 737-800 (PR-GTD) operated by Gol Airlines of Brazil and an Embraer Legacy 600 business jet (N600XL) owned and operated by Excelaire of Long Island, New York, collided in flight over the Amazon jungle approximately 100 nautical miles (nm)2 southeast of Cachimbo Air Base, Brazil. The Boeing 737 was destroyed by in-flight breakup and impact forces; all 154 occupants were killed. The Embraer Legacy sustained damage to the left wing and left horizontal stabilizer, and the flight crew subsequently performed an emergency landing at Cachimbo Air Base.
The two crew members and five passengers were not injured, and there was no further damage to the airplane. The Boeing 737 was operating as a scheduled domestic air carrier flight on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan; the Embraer Legacy was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 and was also on an IFR flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area at the time of the accident.
Response History
February 17, 2026 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA
From the Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02, “Midair Collision over the Potomac River PSA Airlines Flight 5342, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) RJ Aviation CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700), and US Army Priority Air Transport Flight 25, Sikorsky UH-60L Washington, DC January 29, 2025”
1.15.3 ADS-B The NTSB also has a long history of supporting the use of technologies, such as ADS-B, that provide identification and location information for aircraft due to the ability of these technologies to improve safety. Between 2006 and 2007, we recommended requirements for equipment that could provide increased aircraft identification, location, and communication capabilities for aircraft operations in the Gulf of America and remote areas of Hawaii and Alaska, with the intent of enhancing flight location, collision avoidance, and weather information services for these operations (see Safety Recommendations A-06-21 and -22, and A-07-025 and -26; NTSB, 2006; NTSB, 2007a).
Following the 2006 midair collision involving a business jet and a transport category airplane over Brazil that claimed 154 lives, we recommended requirements for equipment that could provide pilots with enhanced alerts regarding the status of transponder and traffic collision avoidance capabilities (Safety Recommendations A 07-35 through -37; NTSB, 2007b).
Following the 2007 fatal midair collision of two news-gathering helicopters over Phoenix, Arizona, the NTSB sought to enhance the traffic-avoidance logic for helicopters’ onboard equipment by recommending the development of standards and requirements for the incorporation of specific criteria for the types of maneuvers and environments unique to helicopters (Safety Recommendations A 09 4 and -5, superseded by Safety Recommendations A 10 127 and -128; NTSB 2009; NTSB, 2010).
In an October 2007 notice of proposed rulemaking to require ADS B Out, the FAA stated that it did not plan to also require ADS-B In capability because ADS-B In “has not been identified as a requirement for maintaining the safety and efficiency of NAS operations.” In a letter dated February 14, 2008, in response to this notice of proposed rulemaking, the NTSB expressed our belief that this assessment was incorrect and stated that equipping aircraft with ADS-B In capability would “provide an immediate and substantial contribution to safety,” especially near airports.