Safety Recommendation A-06-022

From the Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02, “Midair Collision over the Potomac River PSA Airlines Flight 5342, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) RJ Aviation CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700), and US Army Priority Air Transport Flight 25, Sikorsky UH-60L Washington, DC January 29, 2025”

1.15.3 ADS-B The NTSB also has a long history of supporting the use of technologies, such as ADS-B, that provide identification and location information for aircraft due to the ability of these technologies to improve safety. Between 2006 and 2007, we recommended requirements for equipment that could provide increased aircraft identification, location, and communication capabilities for aircraft operations in the Gulf of America and remote areas of Hawaii and Alaska, with the intent of enhancing flight location, collision avoidance, and weather information services for these operations (see Safety Recommendations A-06-21 and -22, and A-07-025 and -26; NTSB, 2006; NTSB, 2007a).

Following the 2006 midair collision involving a business jet and a transport category airplane over Brazil that claimed 154 lives, we recommended requirements for equipment that could provide pilots with enhanced alerts regarding the status of transponder and traffic collision avoidance capabilities (Safety Recommendations A 07-35 through -37; NTSB, 2007b).

Following the 2007 fatal midair collision of two news-gathering helicopters over Phoenix, Arizona, the NTSB sought to enhance the traffic-avoidance logic for helicopters’ onboard equipment by recommending the development of standards and requirements for the incorporation of specific criteria for the types of maneuvers and environments unique to helicopters (Safety Recommendations A 09 4 and -5, superseded by Safety Recommendations A 10 127 and -128; NTSB 2009; NTSB, 2010).

In an October 2007 notice of proposed rulemaking to require ADS B Out, the FAA stated that it did not plan to also require ADS-B In capability because ADS-B In “has not been identified as a requirement for maintaining the safety and efficiency of NAS operations.” In a letter dated February 14, 2008, in response to this notice of proposed rulemaking, the NTSB expressed our belief that this assessment was incorrect and stated that equipping aircraft with ADS-B In capability would “provide an immediate and substantial contribution to safety,” especially near airports.

The NTSB further stated in our response to the FAA’s proposed rule that “the FAA's failure to expedite the adoption of full ADS-B capability (both ADS-B In and ADS-B Out) would be unfortunate and would result in missing or unnecessarily delaying an opportunity to remedy a serious and notorious safety issue” (NTSB, 2008).

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled, “Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems,” which was published at 84 Federal Register 72438 on December 31, 2019. We welcome the opportunity to provide comments on this NPRM, which the FAA has identified as an important step in safely integrating unmanned aircraft (or drones, as defined in the NPRM) into the national airspace system (NAS).

The FAA stated that remote identification (remote ID) for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), which includes location information for both the unmanned aircraft and the ground control station, is a necessary milestone for supporting expanded operations, such as those involving cargo delivery, flights over people, and flights beyond visual line of sight. The NTSB has a long history (dating back to 1969) of supporting the use of technologies that provide certain identification and location information for manned aircraft, based on the ability of these technologies to improve aviation safety.

Over the past few decades, we have issued numerous safety recommendations for the use of technologies to enable pilots, air traffic controllers, and other personnel (such as operators’ flight-followers) to maintain awareness of aircraft location, both in the NAS and in proximity to other aircraft. Thus, in the context of aviation safety, we support the general concept of remote ID for UAS. We offer our comments on the NPRM as a general concurrence with the concept as a milestone for enabling the safe integration of a wide variety of UAS operations into the NAS by supporting enhanced aeronautical services, such as collision avoidance and air traffic management.

For example, between 2006 and 2007, we recommended requirements for equipment that could provide increased aircraft identification, location, and communication capabilities for manned aircraft operations in the Gulf of Mexico and remote areas of Hawaii and Alaska, with the intent of enhancing flight location, collision avoidance, and weather information services for these operations (Safety Recommendations A-06-21 and -22 and A-07-25 and 26).

In addition, following the 2006 midair collision involving a business jet and a transport-category airplane over Brazil that claimed 154 lives, we recommended requirements for equipment that could provide pilots with enhanced alerts regarding the status of transponder and traffic collision-avoidance capabilities (Safety Recommendations A-07-35 through -37).

On November 8, 2006, the FAA issued SAFO 06018, Notification of Available ADS-B Services to Commercial Operators. The SAFO informs operators in remote areas, such as the Gulf of Mexico, that ADS-B will not be fully operational for several years, but operators are still required to provide flight locating service for their aircraft. The SAFO notes that until ADS-B is fully operational, operators should make use of currently available flight tracking systems.

The Safety Board notes that the recommendation asks the FAA to inform operators about the benefits of commercial flight-tracking systems and encourage the operators to acquire such systems (emphasis added). The SAFO recommends that operators use commercially available flight tracking systems but does not inform them of the benefits or encourage the systems’ acquisition. However, although the Safety Board believes that the document should have done more, the SAFO minimally satisfies the recommendation. Therefore, Safety Recommendation A-06-22 is classified Closed Acceptable Action.

Letter Mail Controlled 7/17/2006 4:17:14 PM MC# 2060341: The FAA will issue a SAFO advising the operators in the Gulf of Mexico that there are commercial flight-tracking systems available and that the use of these systems may provide a safer method of tracking aircraft until the National Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Program in the Gulf of Mexico is fully functional. The SAFO will be issued by July 30,2006. I will provide the Board with a copy of the SAFO as soon as it is issued.