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  3. NTSB A-06-014
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NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-06-014

Recommendation

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require emergency medical services operators to use formalized dispatch and flight- -following procedures that include up-to-date weather information and assistance in flight risk assessment decisions.

Safety Issue and Context

Emergency medical services (EMS) aviation operations (conducted with either helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft) provide an important service to the public by transporting seriously ill patients or donor organs to emergency care facilities. The pressure to safely and quickly conduct these operations in various environmental conditions (for example, inclement weather, at night, and unfamiliar landing sites for helicopter operations) makes EMS operations inherently dangerous, and the hazards associated with EMS operations are resulting in an increasing number of accidents.

Response History

September 11, 2014 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

We are aware that, in section 135.619, the February 21, 2014, final rule requires certificate holders with 10 or more helicopter air ambulances to establish operation control centers (OCC) and to document, in their operations manuals, duties and training for operations control specialists. Although the final rule does not require air ambulance operators with fewer than 10 helicopters to establish an OCC, Advisory Circular 120 96, “Integration of Operation Control Centers into Helicopter Emergency Medical Services Operations,” provides useful guidance for these operators regarding how to scale an OCC to fit even the smallest operations.

We believe that these actions constitute an acceptable alternative approach to addressing the risks. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation A-06-14 is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATE ACTION.

May 6, 2013 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

From the accident report of the August 26, 2011 crash following loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion near Mosby, Missouri of the Air Methods Corporation Eurocopter AS350 B2, N352LN. Report adopted on April 9, 2013 and published on May 6, 2013: Company communication specialists provided dispatch services to pilots but were not qualified to provide operational guidance. Company individuals qualified to provide operational guidance, such as representatives of the OCC or managers such as the chief pilot, were available but were not contacted by the communication specialist or the pilot.

If an operationally qualified individual had been involved in the decision-making process that led to the departure from Harrison County Community Hospital with insufficient fuel reserves, such an individual likely would have asked the accident pilot how much fuel was on board the helicopter, understood that there was not sufficient fuel on board to meet minimum fuel requirements, and proposed delaying or canceling the mission and having fuel brought to the helicopter. At the time of the accident, the company communication specialists had guidance to contact the OCC for certain operational issues, but these issues did not include fuel-related issues and unplanned deviations.

Following the accident, Air Methods added these items to the list of issues requiring immediate notification of the OCC. Additionally, Air Methods developed a procedure and provided training to its communication specialists on how to recognize potential elevated risk situations and when to contact the OCC. The OCC was staffed at all times with at least one specialist with HEMS operational experience who was available as a central contact point for pilots to discuss operational concerns, such as launch decisions due to developing weather.

However, the OCC did not share responsibility for “go/no go” decisions, which were solely the responsibility of the PIC,34 and the risk assessment matrixes used by pilots at the time of the accident did not include a risk threshold that triggered mandatory consultation with the OCC. Pilots interviewed after the accident stated that they rarely contacted the OCC to discuss operational issues. This practice was evident in the accident when the pilot told the communication specialist about his low fuel situation but did not contact the OCC.

Following the accident, Air Methods revised its risk assessment program by replacing its risk assessment matrix with a risk assessment tool used by the pilot to calculate a numerical risk assessment value at the beginning of each shift and then update it before beginning each flight leg. Depending on the numerical value, the risk is categorized as

August 22, 2012 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The FAA’s proposed revisions to 14 CFR Part 135 to mandate the creation of an operations control center and the use of operations control specialists for helicopter air ambulance operations satisfy the intent of this recommendation. Accordingly, pending the expeditious issuance of a final rule as proposed, Safety Recommendation A-06-14 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

March 23, 2012 · Recipient Response · FAA

-From Michael P. Huerta, Acting Administrator: On October 12, 2010, the FAA issued Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), Air Ambulance and Commercial Helicopter Operations, Part 91 Helicopter Operations, and Part 135 Aircraft Operations; Safety Initiatives and Miscellaneous Amendments. The comment period closed on January 10, 2011. The FAA received the comments submitted by the Board and is reviewing those comments as part of the rulemaking process. The NPRM proposes to add requirements for: • A load manifest for all aircraft operated under part 135 (§ 135.63(c)); • Radio altimeters for all helicopters operated under part 135 (§ 135.160);

• Initial and recurrent pilot testing to include procedures for aircraft handling in flat-light, whiteout, and brownout conditions (§ 135.293(a)(9)); • Competency checks that include a demonstration of the pilot's ability to maneuver solely by reference to instruments (§ 135.293(c)

January 10, 2011 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

Notation 8272: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) titled "14 CFR [Code of Federal Regulations] Parts 1, 91, 120, and 135 Air Ambulance and Commercial Helicopter Operations, Part 91 Helicopter Operations, and Part 135 Aircraft Operations; Safety Initiatives and Miscellaneous Amendments; Proposed Rule," which was published at 75 Federal Register 62640 on October 12, 2010. The FAA is proposing that commercial HEMS operators with 10 or more helicopters that are engaged in HEMS activities establish operations control centers (OCCs).

This requirement is partially responsive to Safety Recommendation A-06-14; however, numerous aspects of the proposed change do not meet the intent of Safety Recommendation A-06-14 and are delineated below.

The FAA proposes to limit the OCC requirement to HEMS operators with 10 or more helicopters that are dedicated to HEMS transport. The NTSB does not agree with this limitation and believes that the requirement for an OCC should be applied to all HEMS operators. Advisory Circular 120 96, “Integration of Operation Control Centers into Helicopter Emergency Medical Services Operations,” provides guidance on how to scale an OCC to fit the size of the organization, including Model 1, which is appropriate for the smallest HEMS operators. The NTSB interprets Model 1 to apply to HEMS operators with as few as one or two helicopters.

The FAA states that there were 74 certificate holders who were authorized to conduct HEMS operations in February 2009. Of these, 50 operators had fewer than 10 helicopters in their fleet. These certificate holders operated 264 of the 884 helicopters (30 percent) dedicated to HEMS operations at that time. Testimony provided during the 2009 NTSB hearing on HEMS safety indicated that, in 2007, each EMS helicopter, on average, flew 580 hours and transported 420 patients annually. The NTSB believes that if the current proposed rule is enacted, operators with fewer than 10 helicopters will transport approximately 100,000 patients or more per year without the added safety benefit of an OCC.

May 11, 2010 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The FAA’s May 5, 2008, issuance of Advisory Circular (AC) 120-96, Integration of Operations Control Centers [OCC] into Helicopter Emergency Medical Services Operations, which provided guidance on the establishment and operation of an OCC by an EMS operator, and the FAA’s subsequent survey to determine how many helicopter EMS (HEMS) operators had adopted the guidance in the AC are responsive actions to this recommendation. However, the NTSB remains concerned about the long time required by the FAA to develop and issue new regulations.

After the FAA completes drafting of the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), the document will need to be reviewed and approved by the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, followed by review and approval by the Office of Management and Budget.

Despite the delays in completing action to address Safety Recommendation A-06-14, because of the FAA’s recent actions, on February 18, 2010, the Board voted to retain the classification of this recommendation as OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE pending timely issuance of a final rule mandating formalized dispatch and flight-following procedures that include up-to-date weather information and assistance in flight risk assessment decisions.

November 4, 2009 · Recipient Response · FAA

Letter Mail Controlled 11/23/2009 2:32:06 PM MC# 2090695: - From J. Randolph Babbitt, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration has taken a number of steps in support of this recommendation. On September 22, 2005, the FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 00-64, Air Medical Resource Management (enclosed), to EMS operators establishing minimum guidelines for Air Medical Resource Management training. The training is for all medical service operations team members, which includes pilots and dispatchers. As part of the decision making training, the AC recommends EMS operators develop a risk assessment program. It also provides guidelines for weather training.

In March 2006, the FAA and the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research hosted a weather summit in Boulder, Colorado, to identify the EMS-specific issues related to weather products and services. Attendees explored possible regulatory improvements, weather product enhancements, and operational fixes specific to EMS operations. As a result of this meeting, the FAA funded the development and implementation of a graphical flight planning tool for ceiling and visibility assessment along direct flights in areas with limited surface observation capability available. This tool improves the quality of go/no-go decisions for helicopter EMS (HEMS) operators.

The Aviation Digital Data Service Experimental HEMS Tool became available in November 2006. The response from the users continues to be very favorable. On May 5, 2008, the FAA issued AC 120-96, Integration of Operations Control Centers into Helicopter Emergency Medical Services Operations. This AC, which the Board has found responsive to this recommendation, provides detailed guidance to HEMS operators for the creation and operation of operations control centers as well as guidance for establishing the formalized dispatch and flight-following procedures recommended.

On January 12, 2009, the FAA had inspectors with oversight responsibility of HEMS operators find out how many operators have adopted specific FAA-recommended best practices. All 74 operators were surveyed and validated by FAA inspectors. The percentages of operators that have adopted the following programs are: • Decision making skills and risk assessment programs -94 percent; and • Integration of an operations control center -89 percent While voluntary compliance is the most expeditious manner in implementing new programs, the FAA also understands that under certain circumstances, follow-up rulemaking is also required.

Therefore, in April 2009, the FAA began drafting a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for air ambulance and commercial helicopter operations. There will be language in the NPRM addressing risk assessment programs and operations control centers. We plan to complete internal work on the NPRM in January 2010. Publication of the NPRM will occur after clearance from the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

January 23, 2009 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The National Transportation Safety Board met on October 28, 2008, to consider our list of Most Wanted Safety Improvements issued to Federal agencies. At this meeting, the issue Improve the Safety of Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Flights was added to the list, as were Safety Recommendations A-06-12 through -15, stated below. The Safety Board also reclassified three (A-06-12, -13, and -15) of the four recommendations.

All four recommendations were issued to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as a result of the Safety Board’s special investigation of a number of aviation accidents between January 2002 and January 2005 involving aircraft performing EMS operations. In May 2008, the FAA published Advisory Circular (AC) 120-96, which provides detailed guidance about the creation and operations of Operations Control Centers for helicopter EMS operations.

Among the activities described in the AC are the formalized dispatch and flight-following procedures recommended; however, an AC is only a guidance/advisory document and does not represent a requirement. Although the AC is responsive to the recommendation, the FAA now should require that all EMS operators incorporate the guidance contained in the AC into their operations. Pending the FAA’s implementing such a requirement, Safety Recommendation A-06-14 remains classified OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

October 3, 2008 · Recipient Response · FAA

Letter Mail Controlled 10/7/2008 1:08:49 PM MC# 2080609: - From Steven B. Wallace, FAA: On May 5, 2008, the FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 120-96, Integration of Operations Control Centers into Helicopter Emergency Medical Services Operations.

July 1, 2008 · Recipient Response · FAA

Letter Mail Controlled 7/2/2008 11:28:41 AM MC# 2080390: - From Steven B. Wallace, FAA: On May 5, 2008, the FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 120-96, Integration of Operations Control Centers into Helicopter Emergency Medical Services Operations.

April 3, 2007 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

During the October 12, 2006, meeting, the FAA described its activities in response to this recommendation. The FAA is examining the role that a communications specialist could play in performing dispatch and flight following activities for an EMS operator. Currently, the FAA is developing a set of best practices related to standardization of communications specialists’ position descriptions and training requirements. The FAA is also examining the role of the communications specialist in operational control and flight following activities.

Pending adoption of a requirement for formalized dispatch and flight following procedures for EMS operators, Safety Recommendation A-06-14 is classified OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

May 30, 2006 · Recipient Response · FAA

Letter Mail Controlled 6/14/2006 10:24:44 AM MC# 2060276: - From Marion C. Blakey, Administrator: The FAA has identified the area of dispatch and operational control as its next area of emphasis. In the documents produced during last year, the FAA has emphasized the role of the communications specialist in assisting the pilot with the information regarding the "Go/No GO" decision. A study is being initiated to identify best industry practices in ground communications and dispatch to support effective FAA requirements and policy. The study will last approximately 1 year. The results of the study will be provided to the Board.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on this safety recommendation.

Undated Correspondence · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

At the October 25, 2008 Board meeting addressing the NTSB’s Federal Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements (MWL), the Board voted to place Safety Recommendations A-06-12 through A-06-015 on the Federal MWL under the issue category “Improve the Safety of Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Flights.”

Read Recommendation

Recommendation Facts

Status
Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
Issued
February 7, 2006
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
FAA
Adopted
January 25, 2006
Closed
September 11, 2014
Related Investigation
SIR0601
Related Report
SIR-06-01
“Low/Med,”
“High,”
or
“Ex High.”
The instructions for the risk assessment tool indicate that High and Ex High risk values must be mitigated by the pilot to a Low/Med value. The tool includes a specific risk factor for fuel. However, there is still no risk threshold that triggers mandatory OCC consultation.

Rather, the instructions state, “If the PIC cannot mitigate a High or Ex High risk to an acceptable level for flight acceptance, then the PIC might consider conferring with either the OCC or with their Regional Management structure in an attempt to gain assistance in finding mitigators to a lower risk threshold.” The NTSB is encouraged that Air Methods has revised the list of specific items that trigger the communication specialist to involve the OCC and has provided training on identifying elevated risk situations to its communication specialists.

However, the NTSB is concerned that it is not standard practice for pilots to contact the OCC for help with operational decision-making and that Air Methods’ new risk assessment matrix does not include a risk threshold that triggers mandatory OCC consultation. By contrast, both the FAA and the NTSB have emphasized the importance in air medical operations of having someone who is operationally qualified and outside the immediate situation provide an independent judgment on the safety of a launch.

For example, in its 2006 Special Investigation Report on Emergency Medical Services Operations (NTSB 2006c), the NTSB noted that its investigations of EMS accidents revealed that “many EMS operators lack a consistent, comprehensive flight dispatch procedure, which—as part of a flight risk evaluation program—would help EMS pilots determine whether it is safe to accept or continue a mission.” Further, the NTSB stated that a flight dispatcher (not the 911 or hospital dispatcher) “would be less susceptible to making flight decisions based on the urgency of the situation and would be able to obtain an overall perspective of the mission’s safety.”

As a result, on February 7, 2006, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation A-06-14, which asked the FAA to “require emergency medical services operators to use formalized dispatch and flight-following procedures that include up-to-date weather information and assistance in flight risk assessment decisions.” In May 2008, the FAA published AC 120-96, “Integration of Operations Control Centers into Helicopter Emergency Medical Services Operations” (FAA 2008b), which provided detailed guidance about the creation and operation of OCCs for HEMS operations.

In the AC, the FAA noted that “the main concept of OCCs and flight dispatch procedures is joint mission responsibility…[which] requires that at least one qualified ground staff member, in addition to the PIC, be responsible for monitoring factors affecting mission and flight status.” Further, the FAA specified that the OCC specialist should maintain awareness of all operational considerations including “weather, communication, fuel, [and] landing zone.”

On October 12, 2010, the FAA issued an NPRM on air ambulance and commercial helicopter operations (Federal Register 2010, 62639) that included a proposed requirement to mandate the creation of an OCC and the use of operations control specialists for HEMS operations. On January 10, 2011, the NTSB submitted comments to the FAA on the NPRM, noting that the NPRM partially addressed Safety Recommendation A-06-14 by proposing that commercial HEMS operators with 10 or more helicopters that are engaged in HEMS activities establish OCCs. However, the NTSB indicated that it believes the requirement for an OCC should be applied to all HEMS operators.

The NTSB stated that “The vast majority of HEMS accidents have historically involved poor decision-making by various personnel involved in launching or conducting a HEMS flight. Having [operational control specialists] who are trained and available to help manage the HEMS launch and in-flight decision-making will help pilots recognize and avoid high-risk situations.” Further, the NTSB noted that while it supports the FAA’s proposal to require HEMS operators to implement preflight risk assessment programs, a preflight risk assessment is only one part of the overall risk reduction process and that it “cannot substitute for the services and support provided by an OCC.”

On August 22, 2012, the NTSB classified Safety Recommendation A-06-14 “Open—Acceptable Response,” pending the issuance of a final rule mandating OCCs for HEMS operators. This accident exemplifies the need for OCC involvement in operational decision-making. An operationally qualified individual outside the immediate situation would likely have recognized that the pilot’s decision to continue the mission was inappropriate. Although Air Methods was proactive in establishing its OCC, the OCC did not share responsibility for launch and in-flight decisions, and there were no procedures specifying that the OCC should be notified of abnormal fuel situations.

The NTSB concludes that because there was no policy requiring that the Air Methods OCC be notified of abnormal fuel situations, available operationally qualified personnel outside the

); • The use of helicopter terrain awareness and warning systems in helicopter air ambulance operations (
§ 135.605
); • An FAA-approved procedure for conducting pre-flight risk analyses when conducting helicopter air ambulance operations (
§ 135.615
); • An operations control center and operations control specialists for helicopter air ambulance operations (
§ 135.617
); and

• A briefing by the pilot in command or designated crewmember to medical personnel prior to each helicopter air ambulance operation (§ 135.619).

Additionally, the NPRM defines helicopter air ambulance in § 135.601(b)(l) as operations by a part 135 certificate holder. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on these recommendations, and provide an updated response by March 31, 2013.

Therefore, the NTSB believes that OCCs can improve operational safety by incorporating timely decision-making and sound judgment into HEMS operations of any size. Based on HEMS accident investigations, it is the NTSB’s experience that each HEMS flight is unique and its safety is not dependent on the size of the certificate holder. Each HEMS flight is dependent on the skill and knowledge of the local personnel involved in planning and conducting the HEMS flight.

The FAA contends that preflight risk assessments may suffice for smaller operators, in lieu of an OCC. While a requirement for preflight risk assessment is one that the NTSB supports (and is discussed later in this letter), the NTSB does not believe it is an adequate substitute for OCCs. In reality, preflight risk assessment is one step in a series of risk-reduction activities that should be undertaken before, during, and after a HEMS flight. In the opinion of the NTSB, preflight risk assessment cannot substitute for the services and support provided by an OCC. It is only one part of the overall risk reduction process.

The NTSB believes that a requirement for all HEMS operators to establish an OCC should apply to all HEMS operators and will have a significant and positive impact on HEMS operational safety.

The FAA also proposes that HEMS operators with an OCC establish and implement an FAA-approved initial and recurrent training and testing program for operations control specialists (OCS) and that they receive initial and recurrent training and demonstrate knowledge competency through written and practical tests. The FAA further states that OCC personnel would be “performing safety-sensitive functions such as providing preflight weather assessments, assisting with fuel planning, assessing alternative airport weather minimums, and communicating with pilots regarding operational concerns during flight.”

Further, the FAA proposes that OCSs be subject to duty time limitations, as well as randomized alcohol and drug testing, which the NTSB strongly supports. However, under the current proposed rule, OCSs will have no official accreditation other than the certification of their employer.

In the NPRM, the FAA asks whether HEMS OCSs should be provided with “certificates of demonstrated proficiency.” The NTSB does not agree with this concept. Rather, the NTSB believes that each HEMS OCS should be required to earn FAA certification as a HEMS OCS. The NTSB believes that the level of responsibility that is assigned to the OCS requires standard testing and certification, which should be controlled by the FAA. Establishing such a requirement will not preclude individual operators from adding company-specific training or content to the responsibilities of each OCS.

Having an official FAA OCS certificate will provide multiple advantages. It will allow the development of professional OCS staff to man the OCCs. The vast majority of HEMS accidents have historically involved poor decision-making by various personnel involved in launching or conducting a HEMS flight. Having OCSs who are trained and available to help manage the HEMS launch and in-flight decision-making will help pilots recognize and avoid high-risk situations. Further, an FAA certificate will ensure that the FAA has oversight over training, testing, and certification, which is key, from the NTSB’s perspective, to ensuring quality control.

Finally, the existence of professional OCSs with a standard certification requirement may facilitate the development of OCCs that will be able to subcontract their services to smaller HEMS entities, making the establishment of OCCs for smaller operators less challenging.

Safety Recommendation A-06-14 asks the FAA to “require emergency medical series operators to use formalized dispatch and flight-following procedures that include up-to-date weather information and assistance in flight risk assessment decisions.” This recommendation is on the Most Wanted List and is currently classified “Open—Acceptable Response.”