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  3. NTSB A-00-079
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NTSB · Safety Recommendation

Safety Recommendation A-00-079

Recommendation

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Review the 6-foot height requirement for exit assist means to determine if 6 feet continues to be the appropriate height below which an assist means is not needed. The review should include, at a minimum, an examination of injuries sustained during evacuations.

Safety Issue and Context

Since its inception, the National Transportation Safety Board has been concerned about the evacuation of commercial airplanes in the event of an emergency. Several accidents investigated by the Safety Board in the last decade that involved emergency evacuations prompted the Safety Board to conduct a study on the evacuation of commercial airplanes.

Response History

December 31, 2003 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The Safety Board thanks the FAA for providing the details of the review it conducted. With the conclusion of this review, the FAA has completed the work recommended. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation A-00-79 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

October 3, 2003 · Recipient Response · FAA

SWAT Meeting: The FAA reviewed the Safety Board’s Safety Study on emergency evacuation, which was the basis for this recommendation. The FAA found that in 92% of the cases there was no injury. Of the remaining 8%, 6% of the total were minor, and only 2% were serious. Of these serious injuries, 10% (or 0.2% of all passengers evacuated) were related to difficulty evacuating due to the assist means, and thus might benefit from changing the 6’ rule. The FAA noted that changing the 6’ height might also present other problems, such as not being able to achieve the necessary flow rates on more shallow slides.

On the basis of the 0.2% of passengers who might benefit, the FAA does not believe a revision to this rule is justified. Results Safety Board staff noted that based on the information the FAA gave in the SWAT meeting, it appeared that they had performed the review recommended. If the FAA will send to the Safety Board a description of the review performed, and the findings, this recommendation will be classified "Closed-Acceptable Action."

October 29, 2001 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The Safety Board is disappointed by the FAA's action. In the safety study of emergency evacuation of commercial aircraft that prompted this recommendation, the Board found that the majority of serious evacuation-related injuries in the study, excluding an accident in Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 1, 1999, occurred at airplane door and overwing exits without slides. As noted in the recommendation, the Board believes the FAA needs to consider serious injuries sustained by passengers exiting without an assist means from exits with a sill height of less than 6 feet. The Board asks the FAA to reconsider its position on this recommendation.

Pending completion of the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-00-79 is classified "Open--Unacceptable Response."

July 25, 2001 · NTSB Correspondence · FAA

The Safety Board notes that this recommendation specifically asks that the FAA's review include an analysis of injuries, and the Board requests that the FAA communicate the need for the ARAC to include such an analysis in its assessment. Pending results of the review of the 6-foot height requirement for exit assist means, including an analysis of injuries sustained during evacuations, Safety Recommendation A-00-79 is classified "Open--Acceptable Response."

June 4, 2001 · Recipient Response · FAA

Letter Mail Controlled 06/08/2001 7:19:13 PM MC# 2010481 The issue of exit sill height and the appropriate height for an assist means was examined in 1985 during the Public Technical Conference on Emergency Evacuation. At that time, the matter was thoroughly discussed. The FAA concluded that there was no basis to change the required 6-foot limit and that assist means at reduced heights could introduce problems in evacuation. Any exit larger than a Type I is not considered a passenger exit unless it has an assist means. Types A, B, and C exits require an assist means regardless of sill height.

The FAA has determined not to task the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) to consider this safety recommendation. The current priority workload of the ARAC on other regulatory projects makes it impossible at this time to add this issue. The FAA has reviewed the 6-foot sill height and determined that this was an appropriate height for an assist means. The FAA does not believe that there is new compelling data that would change its position on the adequacy of this requirement. I consider the FAA's action in response to this safety recommendation to be completed at this time.

November 8, 2000 · Recipient Response · FAA

Letter Mail Controlled 11/14/2000 4:39:44 PM MC# 2001688 The issue of exit sill height and the appropriate height for an assist means was examined in 1985 during the Public Technical Conference on Emergency Evacuation. At that time, the matter was thoroughly discussed and the FAA concluded that there was no basis to change the required 6-foot limit, and that assist means at reduced heights could introduce problems in evacuation. Any exit larger than a Type I is not considered a passenger exit unless it has an assist means. Types A, B, and C exits require an assist means regardless of sill height.

The FAA will task ARAC to assess this safety recommendation and, if appropriate, propose new standards. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on this safety recommendation.

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Recommendation Facts

Status
Closed - Acceptable Action
Issued
July 14, 2000
Priority
CLASS II
Recipient
FAA
Adopted
June 27, 2000
Closed
December 31, 2003
Related Investigation
80703
Related Report
SS-00-01