Safety Recommendation A-00-066

This letter provides information about the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) May 29, 2024, report Runway Incursion and Rejected Takeoff, American Airlines Flight 106, Boeing 777-200, N754AN, and Delta Air Lines Flight 1943, Boeing 737-900, N914DU (NTSB/AIR-24-01). The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • the need for a procedural crosscheck that requires flight crews to verbalize the number of a runway they are about to cross as indicated by runway signs; • the lack of flight deck technology to detect potential traffic conflicts on a taxiway or runway surface; • the need for additional risk mitigation strategies to reduce the likelihood that flight crew surface navigation errors result in runway incursions; and • the need for cockpit voice recorders with a 25-hour recording capability. Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendations to the FAA.

Additional information regarding these recommendations can be found in the noted sections of the report. • Encourage Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91K, 135, and 121 operators to incorporate into their standard operating procedures a procedural crosscheck that requires flight crews to verbalize the number of a runway they are about to cross, as indicated by runway signs, unless an installed automated system already provides an aural advisory. (A 24 2) (See section 2.3.1.)

• Encourage Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 operators to use their safety management system to identify flight crew surface navigation errors resulting from the performance of concurrent tasks during taxi and develop and implement effective risk mitigation strategies considering human factors principles. (A-24-3) (See section 2.3.2.) • Collaborate with aircraft and avionics manufacturers and software designers to develop the technology for a flight deck system that would provide visual and aural alerts to flight crews of traffic on a runway or taxiway and traffic on approach to land. (A-24-4) (See section 2.3.3.)

• Require that the technology developed in response to Safety Recommendation A 24 4 be installed in all newly certificated transport-category airplanes. (A 24 5) (See section 2.3.3.) • Require that existing transport-category airplanes be retrofitted with the technology developed in response to Safety Recommendation A 24 4. (A 24 6) (See section 2.3.3.) • Evaluate the effectiveness of the activation logic for the runway status light system considering the circumstances of this incident. (A 24 7) (See sections 1.9.1.1 and 2.4.1.)

• Using the findings of the evaluation conducted in response to Safety Recommendation A 24 7, update the runway status light system activation logic as necessary to improve system effectiveness. (A-24-8) (See sections 1.9.1.1 and 2.4.1.) • Require retrofit of all cockpit voice recorders (CVR) on all airplanes required to carry both a CVR and a flight data recorder with a CVR capable of recording the last 25 hours of audio. (A 24 9) (See sections 1.9.1.2 and 2.6.)

In addition, the NTSB reiterates the following recommendation to the FAA: • Require all newly manufactured airplanes that must have a cockpit voice recorder (CVR) be fitted with a CVR capable of recording the last 25 hours of audio. (A-18-30) In the same report, we also classified the following safety recommendations: • Require, at all airports with scheduled passenger service, a ground movement safety system that will prevent runway incursions; the system should provide a direct warning capability to flight crews. In addition, demonstrate through computer simulations or other means that the system will, in fact, prevent incursions.

(A-00-66) Safety Recommendation A-00-66 is classified Closed—Unacceptable Action/Superseded in section 2.3.3 of the report. This recommendation is superseded by Safety Recommendations A-24-4 through -6. • By January 1, 2024, require retrofit of all cockpit voice recorders (CVR) on all airplanes required to carry both a CVR and a flight data recorder with a CVR capable of recording the last 25 hours of audio. (A-18-31) Safety Recommendation A-18-31 is classified Closed—Unacceptable Action/Superseded in section 2.6 of the report. This recommendation is superseded by A-24-9, which is classified Open—Unacceptable Response.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (Safety Recommendations A-24-2 through -9, reiterated Safety Recommendation A-18-30, and classified Safety Recommendations A-00-66 and A-18-31). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.

If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. Justification for A-00-66 supersede from report "Runway Incursion and Rejected Takeoff, American Airlines Flight 106, Boeing 777-200, N754AN, and Delta Air Lines Flight 1943, Boeing 737-900, N914DU," May 29, 2024, John F. Kennedy International Airport, Queens New York: 2.3.3 Flight Deck Technologies for Preventing Runway Incursions The NTSB has long advocated the development of technologies for the prevention of runway incursions.

The NTSB has, for example, recommended systems to alert air traffic controllers to the presence of traffic conflicts. This resulted in the development of ASDE-X. The ASDE-X installation at JFK likely prevented this incident from becoming an accident; however, it required adequate time for the controller to detect the warning, identify the problem, and determine the necessary action before attempting to contact the DAL1943 flight crew. Moreover, the FAA is no longer installing ASDE-X at US airports because it considers the system too expensive to install and maintain. Therefore, many airports currently lacking this technology will not have access to it in the future.

In 2000, the NTSB recommended that the FAA require, at all airports with scheduled passenger service, a ground movement safety system that would prevent runway incursions, with the capability of providing a direct warning to flight crews (Safety Recommendation A-00-66). In the accompanying letter, the NTSB suggested that these direct warnings could be provided through such means as RELs and stop bars located at all runway/taxiway intersections, or by other means, such as a datalink.

This incident highlights the limitations of RELs (which will be discussed in section 2.4) and suggests that crew positional awareness would be enhanced by a flight deck display of ground traffic with both visual and aural conflict alerts. Flight deck technology for improving flight crew awareness of surface traffic and alerts to potential conflicts has been developed. Such systems could use ADS-B data to display the location of traffic that is on, approaching, or departing a runway, in the air or on the ground. This capability would provide a redundant means for flight crews to detect the presence of another aircraft (in addition to visually scanning the external environment).

Such systems could aurally alert and visually display to flight crews potential traffic conflicts that could prevent them from entering a runway where another airplane is departing, without pilots having to rely solely on visual scanning of the outside environment or on the intervention of a controller who has detected or received an alert about a conflict, thereby providing an addi

We note that, following the safety summit that the FAA hosted in March 2023, you issued a safety alert with recommendations for improving procedures and training for your controllers; tasked an independent safety review team with examining ways to enhance safety and reliability in the air traffic system; awarded $221 million to airports for projects related to reducing the risk of runway incursions; and launched Stand Up for Safety, which is a communications campaign that provides mandatory special-emphasis training for your controllers.

In addition, in June 2023, you hosted an industry event to learn about commercially available, production-ready, cost-effective industry solutions and capabilities that could enhance surface safety. We note that you identified the following surface technologies, which you are testing:

• a surface awareness initiative (SAI), which would provide surface traffic displays to towers at airports without a surface surveillance system • approach runway verification (ARV), which would provide controllers an aural and visual alert of aircraft alignments (to prevent wrong runway landings) • a runway incursion device (RID), which would provide controllers a visual and aural alert for occupied and closed runways that are not available for departing or landing aircraft

We point out that the intent of this recommendation is to provide flight crews a direct warning of a potential runway incursion; however, the surface technologies described above would only assist controllers. Although we support your efforts to increase controller situational awareness, we do not believe they are responsive to this recommendation.

Specifically, we are concerned that alerting controllers would unnecessarily increase the time to alert flight crews of a potential runway incursion, as a significant amount of time is required for the controller to detect the warning, identify the nature of the problem, and determine the necessary action before attempting to contact the flight crew. Flight crews would then need to act appropriately and without delay to avert a collision.

We continue to believe your work to install, at some large airports, ground surveillance and safety systems, such as Airport Surface Detection Equipment-X (ASDE-X), Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC), and runway status lights (RWSLs) is positive; however, because this recommendation asks you to address all airports with scheduled passenger service—including medium and small airports—we would like to know how you intend to address those airports without a surface surveillance system.

-From Kathryn B. Thomson, Deputy Administrator: In March 2023 more than 200 safety leaders from across the aviation industry met to discuss ways to enhance flight safety in an FAA-sponsored safety summit. A number of outcomes resulted from the safety summit:

• The FAA issued a safety alert with specific recommendations to ensure operations are conducted at the highest level of safety, including changes to procedures or training. The Air Traffic Organization announced additional steps to ensure that supervisors devote their full attention to the operation and airfield during peak traffic periods at each facility and provide controllers with more dedicated training for unusual circumstances.

• On April 25, 2023, the FAA named an independent Safety Review Team (SRT) to further examine ways to enhance safety and reliability in the nation’s air traffic system. The final SRT report is expected by the end of 2023.

• In May 2023 more than $100 million was awarded to 12 airports to reduce the risk of runway incursions. Projects will reconfigure potentially confusing taxiways, install new lighting systems and provide more flexibility on the airfield. In August 2023, another $121 million was awarded to airports across the country.

• In August 2023, the Air Traffic Organizations launched a Stand Up for Safety communications campaign, which provides mandatory special emphasis training for its controller workforce.

In addition to the Safety Summit, in June 2023, the FAA hosted an industry event focusing on how the agency can enhance situational awareness for Air Traffic Controllers on the airport surface. The goal of the event was to gain a better understanding of commercially available, production-ready, cost-effective industry solutions and capabilities that could enhance surface safety. As a result, three surface technology sprints were initiated:

• The Surface Awareness Initiative (SAI) will provide surface traffic displays to towers at airports that do not currently have a surface surveillance system. This technology will improve controller situational awareness and reduce runway incursions. This sprint effort began in June 2023.

• The Approach Runway Verification (ARV) is an aural and visual alert to the Air Traffic Controllers of aircraft alignments which will aid in the prevention of wrong runway landings. This sprint effort began in September 2023.

We note that 35 airports currently operate Airport Surface Detection Equipment-X (ASDE-X) and 8 operate Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC); of those 43 airports, 20 operate runway status lights (RWSLs). We also note that your “Runway Incursion Prevention through Situational Awareness” initiative is working to identify different types of potential surveillance system technologies, including low-cost solutions that are suitable for smaller airports.

In addition, you are in the process of deploying, at surface surveillance-equipped airports, an Aviation Risk Identification and Assessment surface module, which uses surveillance data to identify and categorize the potential risk of collision between an aircraft and moving objects within a predetermined area on or surrounding the airport.

We are also aware that, instead of focusing only on the number and severity of runway incursions, you are now assessing the severity of risk for all types of events that occur in the runway environment. We note that, as part of your Runway Incursion Mitigation program, the FAA continues to work with airports that have a history of runway incursions to identify locations with risk factors that might contribute to runway incursions, develop strategies to mitigate those risks, and track outcomes.

According to your website, there was a 77-percent average reduction in runway incursions after mitigations were implemented, including taxiway reconfigurations and changes to lighting, markings and aircraft operations and education campaigns, and hot spot designations.

Although this recommendation asks the FAA to install a ground movement safety system that will prevent runway incursions at all airports with scheduled passenger service, we recognize that solutions such as ASDE-X, ASSC, and RWSLs may not be practical at all airports. We are encouraged that you are exploring viable and affordable technologies, such as the Small Airport Surveillance Sensor, that can directly warn flight crews and would be practical to install at airports with scheduled passenger service that do not have runway incursion detection technology.

Although you indicated your actions are complete, we would like to schedule a meeting with your staff to discuss the status of your efforts to implement these technologies. Pending the results of that meeting and completion of the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-00-66 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

-From Steve Dickson, Administrator: The FAA continues to deploy surface safety systems designed to prevent runway incursions at the highest risk airports with passenger service in the National Airspace System (NAS). Currently, there are 35 Airport Surface Detection Equipment-X (ASDE-X) airports and 8 Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC) airports. In addition, 20 of those 43 airports have Runway Status Lights (19 ASDE-X and 1 ASSC).

As traffic levels and complexity of airports change, we expect that the requirements for new technology to reduce runway incursions will also change. The FAA’s NextGen Runway Incursion Reduction Program is looking towards the future to determine what runway incursion mitigation technologies will be needed. In the shorter term, the FAA’s Runway Incursion Prevention through Situational Awareness initiative is seeking surveillance system technologies that are not dependent upon the presence of any equipment onboard an aircraft (non-cooperative surveillance) and are a “right-site, right-size” approach to technology solutions for small to medium size airports in the NAS.

In the longer term, the FAA’s NextGen Organization is seeking to leverage emerging surveillance system technologies that could be dependent upon the presence of certain equipment onboard an aircraft (cooperative surveillance) to help mitigate runway incursions. Examples of innovative technologies being further explored include:

• Small Airport Surface Sensor, which provides low-cost secondary surveillance for small airports and supports automated runway incursion alerting to flight crews; and

• Surface Taxi Conformance Monitoring, which is a speech recognition technology that has the capability to provide an aural or visual indication of the aircraft’s position on the airport surface to the pilot, a visual depiction of the aircraft’s assigned taxi route, and an aural or visual indication of deviation from the assigned route and runway occupancy conflict warnings.

The FAA is also continuing to explore the feasibility of other innovative technology options for providing situational awareness and alerting technology, such as:

• ASSC with Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) only. This would enable ASSC to be installed at airports without existing surface surveillance radar; and

• Surface Indications and Alerts or similar ADS-B In applications. This has the potential to provide direct alerting to pilots; however, adequate avionics do not yet exist.

We note that 17 airports currently operate runway status light (RWSL) systems, and that the prototype RWSL systems in use at the Dallas/Fort Worth, Boston, and San Diego airports are scheduled to be replaced with baseline production RWSL systems.

During our forum, “Runway Incursion Safety Issues, Prevention, and Mitigation,” which was held on September 19 and 20, 2017, your staff discussed technologies to prevent runway incursions that are currently available and being installed at select airports. However, we are also interested in learning about the solutions you are considering for airports that are either no longer planning to install RWSL systems or that have had their low-cost ground surveillance systems removed.

In addition, we would like an update on the technologies that were submitted in response to your July 23, 2013, announcement inviting companies and individuals to submit technologies and procedures that may be worth evaluating and prototyping under the Runway Incursion Reduction Program. Previously, you told us that you were assessing the feasibility of these technologies and that you would recommend potential prototype systems to address specific runway incursion causal factors identified at small- to medium-sized airports. We look forward to reviewing this information in your next update.

We continue to believe that your efforts to reevaluate technologies and procedures that reduce and eliminate runway safety risks and to identify affordable solutions for all airports with scheduled passenger service are positive steps toward addressing this recommendation. Accordingly, pending your identifying viable and affordable technologies that can be used to develop runway safety systems for all US airports with scheduled passenger service, Safety Recommendation A-00-66 remains classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

-From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: As a follow-up to our November 30, 2015, response, we provide the following information on technologies to improve airport safety and manage runway incursions. Runway Status Lights CRWSL): RWSL systems provide a direct indication to pilots and vehicle operators when a runway is unsafe for entry, crossing, or departure. RWSL systems display critical, time-sensitive safety status information directly to pilots and vehicle operators, reducing the time it takes to alert them of potentially unsafe situations. RWSL systems require the installation of Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X or Airport Surface.

At present, R WSL systems are operational at 17 of 20 airports: Baltimore (BWI); Orlando (MCO); Washington-Dulles (IAD); Phoenix (PHX); Minneapolis-St. Paul (MSP); George Bush Intercontinental (IAH); Seattle-Tacoma (SEA); Charlotte Douglas (CL T); Las Vegas (LAS); Ft. Lauderdale (FLL); Chicago (ORD); Detroit (DTW); LaGuardia (LOA); Los Angeles (LAX); Newark (EWR); New York Kennedy (JFK); and San Francisco (SFO).

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) chartered the Surface Safety Initiatives Team (SSIT) to work with airports that are no longer planning to have production R WSL systems installed. Teams have been established for Dall as/Fo1t Wo1th (DFW); Boston (BOS); and San Diego (SAN) and recommendations were documented. The FAA recently decided to add DFW, BOS, and SAN back into the RWSL waterfall schedule to replace the prototype systems with baseline production systems. For the three remaining a irpor1s: DFW construction started in March 2017, and BOS construction started in May 2017. Both DFW and BOS are expected to become operational by September 2018.

Following the review of the SSIT recommendations, SAN was added back to the system baseline in May 2017, with construction scheduled to start in November 2017 and become operational by June 2019.

I will keep the Board informed of the FAA' s progress on this safety recommendation and provide an update by April 2018. l will include an update on emerging technologies in our next response.

You reported that you continue to reevaluate ways in which runway safety can be addressed with new technologies and procedures. We note that you have identified several candidate technologies worth prototyping that companies and individuals proposed in response to your July 23, 2013, announcement inviting them to do so. We also note that you are conducting a preliminary feasibility assessment of these technologies and that you intend to publish a report recommending potential prototype systems that would address specific runway incursion causal factors identified at small- to medium-sized airports.

In addition, we are pleased to learn that the Surface Surveillance Initiatives Team (SSIT) has established teams to work with airports that are either no longer planning to have runway status lights installed or that have had their Low Cost Ground Surveillance systems removed to identify affordable solutions to address these airports’ runway safety needs. We understand that you plan to use the methodology developed by the SSIT to find cost-effective solutions to address runway safety needs at other airports, as well.

We believe that your efforts thus far to reevaluate technologies and procedures designed to reduce and eliminate runway safety risks and identify affordable solutions for deployment to all airports with scheduled passenger service are positive steps in addressing this recommendation. Accordingly, pending your identifying viable and affordable technologies that can be used to develop runway safety systems for all US airports with scheduled passenger service, Safety Recommendation A-00-66 remains classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

-From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: As a follow-up to our October 8, 2014, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) letter, we are providing the following information on technologies to improve airport safety and manage runway incursions.

Runway Status Lights CRWSL): RWSL systems provide a direct indication to pilots and vehicle operators when a runway is unsafe for entry, crossing, or departure. R WSL systems display critical, time-sensitive safety status information directly to pilots and vehicle operators, reducing the time it takes to alert them of potentially unsafe situations. RWSL systems require the installation of Airport Surface Detection Equipment- Model X or Airport Surface Surveillance Capability to operate and use the safety logic to determine runway status.

RWSL prototype systems were successfully tested in Los Angeles (LAX), Boston (BOS), Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW), and San Diego (SAN). The LAX system was upgraded to a production system and went operational in March 2015. The BOS, DFW, and SAN prototype systems are still operating and are baselined for sustainment through Fiscal Year (FY) 2016. The FAA believes there is an opportunity to reassess R WSL systems at these prototype sites, but no commitments have been made to proceed with any capability beyond the prototype sustainment through FY 2016.

R WSL production systems will be installed at 17 airports and are currently operational at the following 13 airports: Las Vegas (LAS), Orlando (MCO), Washington Dulles (lAD), Phoenix (PHX), Houston (IAH), Minneapolis-Saint Paul (MSP), Seattle-Tacoma (SEA), Charlotte Douglas (CLT), Detroit (DTW), Los Angeles (LAX), New York City (LGA), Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood (FLL), and Newark (EWR) airports.

The remaining four airports are in various stages of installation and/or testing and are expected to be operational by March 2017: New York City December 2015 Chicago April 2016 Baltimore March 2017 San Francisco March 2017 (JFK) (ORD) (BWI) (SFO)

Additionally, the FAA chartered the Surface Safety Initiatives Team (SSIT) to work with airports that are no longer planning to have production R WSL systems installed or have had their Low-Cost Ground Surveillance systems removed. The SSIT is working with each of these airports and their stakeholders to identify surface safety needs and consider both technological and non-technological solutions that are affordable to both the FAA and the airports. Teams have been established for each of the airports and recommendations are being formulated. The FAA will provide annual updates on the progress of testing and evaluations for the selected technology.

In your letter, you provided a status update on the major systems being evaluated or scheduled for installation at a limited number of airports. The few systems being installed at these airports, which provided only a partial solution to the runway safety problem, were so expensive that you state it is not practical to consider installing them at all 459 US airports with scheduled passenger service.

We note that you are now reevaluating ways in which the runway safety issue can be addressed with new technologies and procedures. As a first step in this reevaluation, on July 23, 2013, you issued a “Broad Agency Announcement” that invited companies and other members of the public to submit proposals for technologies and procedures that may be worth evaluating and prototyping. This announcement did not specify the technology that was to be used, but instead invited the submission of proposals that may not have previously been considered.

We also note that you chartered a senior-level Surface Surveillance Initiatives Team (SSIT) that will work with the airports previously scheduled to have runway safety systems installed for which improvements have been cancelled because of installation costs. The SSIT will work with each airport to identify affordable technological and other solutions to address the runway safety needs of the airports. We understand that you plan to use the methodology developed by the SSIT to find cost-effective solutions to address runway safety needs at other airports.

On January 30, 2014, your staff met with NTSB staff to discuss your recent actions in response to this recommendation, including those described in your October 8, 2014, letter. Your staff clarified that your evaluation of responses to the July 23, 2013, announcement would not be limited to systems that provide a direct cockpit warning. Although many of the proposals contain proprietary information which cannot yet be publicly released, some examples of proposals were discussed in general terms at the meeting.

NTSB staff clarified that, if an acceptable system that does not use a direct cockpit warning were identified, we would be open to considering its installation to constitute an acceptable alternate response, provided that the solution satisfies all elements of the recommendation. We also emphasized that avoiding any potential runway collision is a time-critical situation having catastrophic consequences if delayed. We recommended a direct cockpit warning to remove the delay associated with a controller’s first having to recognize a potential runway incursion/collision risk and then needing to communicate with the affected aircraft before the risk can be addressed.

-From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is implementing safety systems to prevent runway incursions through various initiatives. There are 543 airports in the United States that are certificated for air carrier use under Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations Part 139. Of these airports, 459 have scheduled air carrier service (a few have only seasonal scheduled service). The FAA classifies airports in terms of providing either scheduled or unscheduled air carrier service and by the size of the aircraft using the airport.

The FAA, along with the airport and airport users, selects appropriate programs and technologies to address runway incursion risk by reviewing many factors, which include the number of operations, airfield geometry, type of aircraft that use the airport, and weather. We have been working with Board staff to make sure the Board is aware of our activities. FAA staff most recently met with Board staff on January 30, 2014, to discuss the viability of individual technologies. Potentially Viable Technologies • Runway Status Lights (RWSL) systems were successfully tested in Los Angeles, Boston (BOS), San Diego, and Dallas-Ft. Worth airports.

The FAA is in various stages of installing production R WSL systems at 17 airports at this time.

The program originally planned for the system to be installed at 23 airports, but due to unforeseen implementation challenges this technology is too expensive to maintain. Therefore, the FAA's Air Traffic Organization will be pursuing other technologies. The RWSL installation updates can be found at: http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/technology/rwsl/.

• Implementation of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) is allowing aircraft, through technological advances in Global Positioning System (GPS) sources, to determine ADS-B position reports. However, current single-frequency GPS position sources will require some form of augmentation to provide the needed accuracy. The dual-frequency GPS position sources, expected to become available around 2018, may provide sufficient accuracy for the proper functioning of Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF-IA), which is an airport ground traffic safety program.

The NTSB appreciates the update on progress to develop and deploy ground safety movement systems that will prevent runway incursions and for the deployment schedule for Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDE-X) and Runway Status Lights (RWSL) systems. The schedule shows that ASDE-X is scheduled to be deployed at 35 airports, and RWSLs at 23 airports, by December 2015.

We note the development of (1) the Final Approach Runway Occupancy System (FAROS), with evaluation systems installed at two airports and a final design review scheduled shortly, and (2) low-cost ground surveillance (LCGS) systems that will use commercially available radar systems to provide basic ground surveillance capability at airports where deployment of ASDE-X systems is not currently planned. We further note that one prototype LCGS system has been installed; in the coming year, the FAA plans to install, at four additional airports, various designs for LCGS for the purpose of evaluating these other designs.

RWSL systems are a valuable means of providing a direct cockpit warning for one type of runway incursion/collision risk. However, RWSL systems do not provide the full range of warnings needed, and the FAA’s plan to install these systems at only 23 airports, to be completed 15 years after this recommendation was issued, does not constitute an acceptable response to this recommendation, which requests ground movement safety systems at all airports with scheduled passenger service. FAROS appears to be a complimentary technology that also provides a direct cockpit warning for the runway incursion/collision risks not covered by RWSLs.

However, FAROS is still in development and appears to be years away from deployment. FAROS also depends on the airport’s having a ground movement radar system not likely to be installed at most airports with scheduled passenger service. Although the FAA is developing LCGS for airports without sophisticated ground movement radar systems, development of these systems is only in the early stages, and we are unlikely to see deployment for many years. In addition, the information concerning LCGS that has been provided to NTSB staff thus far leads us to believe that such systems will not be able to provide a direct cockpit warning.

At one time, the FAA was pursuing runway incursion/collision warning systems based on automatic dependent surveillance–broadcast (ADS-B) systems. Such systems could have provided a direct cockpit warning, and the FAA is moving to use ADS-B at all airports with scheduled passenger service. Use of ADS-B technology to provide this capability depends on the aircraft having ADS-Bin capability.

CC# 201100224: - From J. Randolph Babbitt, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is continuing to pursue ground safety movement systems that will prevent runway incursions, which will address this re on1mendation. Enclosed is the deployment schedule for Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDE-X) and Runway Status Lights (RWSL), which are the primary technologies addressing the subject recommendation. Along with ASDE-X and RWSL, below is an update of the additional technologies we are testing aimed at further improvement of runway safety.

• Low Cost Ground Surveillance (LCGS) is a low cost commercially available radar surveillance system that will provide basic ground surveillance capability to improve situational awareness at airports where deployment of surface surveillance equipment is not currently planned. A prototype system was installed at Spokane, Washington, for evaluation. Once the air traffic control operational evaluation is complete, we hope to issue a report by the end of Fiscal Year 2011. The LCGS program will then evaluate four operational systems from four different vendors at four different airports. These evaluations will end December 2012.

• Final Approach Runway Occupancy System (FAROS) is a fully automated system. This system commands the Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) to flash to provide direct indication to pilots on approach of an occupied runway with no controller action required. The evaluation system was installed at Long Beach, California, and will remain in use there.

Enhanced FAROS (eFAROS) was successfully tested at Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas, which employed ASDE-X Safety Logic and activated flashing PAPIs based upon both runway occupancy and the proximity of an aircraft to a preset threshold (e.g. 1.5 nautical miles).

Future activities include a final design review of e-FAROS communications interface by May 2011.

Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs) with Surface Moving Maps (SMMs) is an electronic display system that gives pilots access to a variety of aviation data such as charts and manuals equipped with airport moving map displays enhancing pilots' situational awareness.

The FAA has initiated an evaluation of cockpit moving map displays with airline partners that will measure the effectiveness of EFBs with SMMs as a NextGen initiative and verify the runway safety and performance benefits. Additionally, the FAA will develop standards for an Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast application called Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Surface with Indications and Alerts that includes cockpit surface conflict alerting. I will keep the board informed of the FAA's progress on this safety recommendation and provide an update by May 2012.

The FAA’s March 13, 2009, letter described its programs concerning technologies to mitigate the risk of a runway incursion.

These technologies include (1) runway status lights (RWSL), a visual alerting system utilizing in-pavement red lights that alert pilots and vehicle operators that it is unsafe to enter or begin a takeoff on a runway; (2) the final approach runway occupancy signal (FAROS) system, which flashes the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) lights to provide pilots on final approach a direct notification that the runway is occupied; and (3) the Low Cost Ground Surveillance (LCGS) Program, to provide basic ground traffic surveillance capability at small and medium airports where cost-effective deployment of airport surface detection equipment model X (ASDE-X) technology is not possible.

Per the FAA’s letter, several years ago the FAA installed a test RWSL system at Dallas–Ft. Worth International Airport (DFW). This system has worked very well, and the FAA commissioned an additional RWSL test system at Los Angeles International Airport in June 2009. Another RWSL test system is being installed at Boston Logan Airport. In addition, beginning in 2011, the FAA will initiate a program for national deployment of RWSL systems at 22 ASDE-X sites throughout the United States. The FAA has recently completed two studies of FAROS systems evaluating whether flashing PAPI lights should be used, or if other types of warning lights on a runway would be more effective.

The FAA found that the PAPI was as effective as the alternatives studied, and it is considerably less expensive and less complicated to install and maintain. DFW installed, and has been testing since September 2008, an enhanced version of the FAROS system, integrated with the RWSL. The FAA did not describe any plans for national deployment of FAROS systems. The FAA indicated that it had completed engineering and technical evaluations of two LCGS products and has initiated a pilot project to deploy LCGS products at several airports.

The FAA intends to use the results of these pilot projects to develop requirements and an acquisition strategy for deployment of LCGS systems at additional airports.

This recommendation is now 9 years old, and it has been on the Most Wanted List almost since the recommendation was issued. The three technologies the FAA described appear to be promising, and their development and deployment is responsive to this recommendation; however, the NTSB is disappointed that the FAA will not even begin a deployment of any of these systems, at a limited number of airports, until 2011. Although RWSLs appear to be moving toward operational deployment, FAROS is only planned for a test at one airport, with no plans for deployment at any more airports in the near future.

Letter Mail Controlled 3/25/2009 3:43:56 PM MC# 2090176: - From Lynne A. Osmus, Acting Administrator: 3/13/09 The Federal Aviation Administration has continued its research, development, and testing of technologies to mitigate the risk of a runway incursion.

The technologies that we are actively testing are: The Runway Status Lights (RWSL) program, which provides a safety back-up using visual alerting provided by in-pavement red lights, alerting pilots and vehicle operators that it is unsafe to enter or begin a take-off on a runway; The Final Approach Runway Occupancy Signal (FAROS) system, which provides pilots on final approach a direct notification that the runway is occupied by using flashing Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) lights; and The Low Cost Ground Surveillance (LCGS) program, which is intended to provide basic ground traffic surveillance capability at small and medium airports where cost-effective deployment of Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDE-X) technology is not possible.

RWSL In March and April 2008, the FAA established agreements with Los Angeles World Airport and the Massachusetts Port Authority to install RWSL test systems at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) and Boston Logan International Airport (BOS). The LAX installation will be completed during the second quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2009; the BOS installation will be completed during the first quarter of FY 20 10. In 2007, the FAA approved a program for national RWSL deployment. Deployment will include installing and commissioning RWSL production systems at 22 ASDE-X sites throughout the United States.

It also will replace the research and development software at our test sites, including LAX and BOS. We anticipate RWSL production system deployment beginning in2011. FAROS In November 2007, the FAA completed a study in the MITRE simulator looking at the PAPI for the FAROS system (enclosure 1). In September 2008, the FAA completed an additional study in the MITRE simulator looking at alternatives to the PAP1 for the FAROS system (enclosure 2). The two alternatives tested were the flashing redwhite threshold lights and the flashing touchdown zone lights.

The PAPI was found to be as effective as the two alternatives and considerably less expensive and less complicated to install and to maintain. The Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) installed and tested an enhanced version of the FAROS system, integrated with the RWSL. Enhanced FAROS is designed for high density air carrier airports with ASDE-X and terminal radar and provides runway occupancy information only when it is time critical. In September 2008, the FAA initiated an operational evaluation of enhanced FAROS with the RWSL system at DFW.

On January 10, 2007, the FAA briefed Board Members and staff on progress made by FAA in developing a system offering "Direct Flight Deck Warning of Runway Incursions."

In its 3/1/2006 annual report to Congress, Regulatory Status of the National Transportation Safety Board's "Most Wanted" Recommendations to the Department of Transportation, the DOT wrote: In fiscal year (FY) 2005, a study was conducted to determine if a direct warning capability to flight crews could he developed by implementing a set of technologies that would create a layered safety net for the prevention of runway incursions.

The technologies included the Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Airport Movement Area Safety System safety logic, and the on-going research initiatives such as Runway Status Lights, Arrival Occupancy Lights, Runway Guard Lights, Enhanced Surface Markings and Modified Taxiway Lead-On Lights. A solution set with three technology levels was proposed, and a human-in-the loop simulation was conducted in May 2005 to assess the effectiveness of the solution set. Thirty-six commercial and general aviation pilots participated in the simulation, and the simulation involved 15 scenarios consisting of different incursion situations and aircraft movement states.

The final report was issued September 2005. The findings from the simulation showed that significant runway safety risk reduction is achievable with the integration of the candidate technologies. Additionally, the FAA successfully completed initial field tests of a Runway Status Lights system at the DalladFort Worth International Airport. Initial test results are promising and additional tests to determine the extent to which this technology can be beneficially applied throughout the National Airspace System are being pursued.

In FY 2006, MITREICAASD, in conjunction with the FAA, will coordinate the findings from the simulation with airports, pilots, other aviation user group representatives, and runway safety technology experts. In addition, alternative operational and system solutions will be explored in order to address gaps found in the simulation. As an extension to the ground-based direct warning system, an analysis of a flight deck-based direct warning system will be initiated to define, simulate, and field test a pilot warning system that is effective for surface operations.

The Safety Board notes that during the past fiscal year (FY), the FAA conducted a study to determine whether a direct warning capability could be developed that would alert flightcrews of a runway incursion risk. The team conducting the study developed a system and tested it with 36 commercial and general aviation pilots who participated in simulations involving 15 different incursion scenarios and states of aircraft movement. The results indicated a significant reduction in the risk of a runway safety incident when the technologies evaluated were used. Also during FY 2005, the FAA installed a runway status light system at the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport.

During FY 2006, the FAA will evaluate this installation to determine whether such a system should be installed at other airports. The FAA will work with its contractor, Mitre Corporation, to share the results of its studies with aviation user groups (pilots and airports). In addition, the FAA will evaluate and develop alternative operational and system solutions to reduce runway incursion risks not adequately addressed by the system recently developed and tested.

Staff from the Safety Board have seen and been favorably impressed by demonstrations of the technologies developed and tested during the past year. At the November 15, 2005, Safety Board meeting concerning the List of Most Wanted Safety Improvements for Federal agencies, a simulation was shown demonstrating how a recent serious runway incursion incident at Boston's Logan Airport would likely have been prevented by the new system. Although, the Safety Board is encouraged by the progress, it has been 5 years since this recommendation was issued and the FAA is only now evaluating technologies that are responsive to the recommendation.

The FAA does not yet have a plan to evaluate airports or to install needed technologies that will provide a direct warning to flightcrews of runway incursion risks. Pending full responsiveness to Safety Recommendation A-00-66, it remains classified OPEN -- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

Letter Mail Controlled 11/15/2005 8:40:31 AM MC# 2050527 - From Marion C. Blakey, Administrator: 11/4/05 In fiscal year (FY) 2005, a study was conducted to determine if a direct warning capability to flightcrews could be developed by implementing a set of technologies that would create a layered safety net for the prevention of runway incursions. The technologies included the Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Airport Movement Area Safety System safety logic, and the on-going research initiatives such as Runway Status Lights, Arrival Occupancy Lights. Runway Guard Lights, Enhanced Surface Markings and Modified Taxiway Lead-On Lights.

A solution set with three technology levels was proposed, and a human-in-the-loop simulation was conducted in May 2005 to assess the effectiveness of the solution set. Thirty-six commercial and general aviation pilots participated in the simulation, and the simulation involved 15 scenarios consisting of different incursion situations and aircraft movement states. The final report was issued September 2005. The findings from the simulation showed that significant runway safety risk reduction is achievable with the integration of the candidate technologies.

Additionally, the Federal Aviation Administration successfully completed initial field tests of a Runway Status Lights system at the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport. Initial test results are promising and additional tests to determine the extent to which this technology can be beneficially applied throughout the National Airspace System are being pursued. In FY 2006, MITRE/CAASD, in conjunction with the FAA, will coordinate the findings from the simulation with airports, pilots, other aviation user group representatives, and runway safety technology experts. In addition, alternative operational and system solutions will be explored to address gaps found in the simulation.

As an extension to the ground-based direct warning system, an analysis of a flight deck-based direct warning system will be initiated to define, simulate, and field test a pilot warning system that is effective for surface operations. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on this safety recommendation.

In its 2/1/2005 annual report to Congress, Regulatory Status of the National Transportation Safety Board's "Most Wanted" Recommendations to the Department of Transportation, the DOT wrote: The FAA established an initiative in its Flight Plan 2004-2008 to “develop a proof of concept that leads to a prototype ground-movement safety infrastructure to provide direct warning capability to pilots, drivers, and controllers.”

Beginning in FY 2004, FAA asked MITRE/CAASD to conduct an operational and costlhenefit analysis that 1) defines runway safety risk scenarios, 2) characterizes existing airport infrastructure for airfields that support scheduled commercial service, and 3) recommends possible solution sets based on available runway safety technologies. From an integrated system perspective, MITREiCAASD analyzed the full set of potential encounter scenarios, developed a consolidated set of critical risk encounter geometries, and delivered an introductory runway incursiontechnology briefing in FY 2004. Planning and development work for test scenarios are scheduled throughout FY 2005. Technology solution

sets under consideration to provide a direct warning to pilots will he analyzed for effective protection against the critical risk encounter geometries. These solution sets will include a combination of the following: surface surveillance with safety logic, such as Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) or Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X (ASDE-X); Runway Status Lights (RWSL); enhanced surface markings; enhanced airfield lighting; taxiway lead-on lights; and Final Approach Runway Occupancy Signal (FAROS). Solution sets will be airport-specific, and therefore, non-technology related solutions might be more effective in some instances.

In the future, solution sets may also include surface moving maps with runway incursion alerting available from the ADS-B data link. AMASS has been commissioned at 34 airports that predominantly handle commercial operations and have a large volume of traffic. The next generation ground surveillance software being deployed is the ASDE- X, which presents aircraft and vehicle position and identification information overlaid on a color map showing the surface movement area and arrival corridors. ASDE-X has been commissioned at two sites and 33 more airports will receive this technology currently scheduled over the next five years. The development of RWSL technology is continuing.

An operational evaluation of a prototype system at DallasiFort Worth International Airport is scheduled to begin in Spring 2005. This evaluation will provide data with which to validate the operational suitability and safety benefit of RWSL. Program implementation recommendations will follow the successful conduct of the operational evaluation and a program cost-benefit analyses.

As part of its November 9, 2004 meeting addressing the Safety Board's Most Wanted List of safety improvements, the Board voted to reclassify this recommendation from "Open-Acceptable Response" to OPEN -- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

The Safety Board appreciates receiving the update on the various initiatives and technologies that the FAA is developing and deploying to prevent runway incursions. We note that in August 2002, the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) and the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC) approved an action recommended by the Runway Incursion Joint Safety Implementation Team to provide surface surveillance capability at all FAA control towers.

The FAA points out that, in particular, the CAST/GAJSC directs the FAA to provide active and/or passive airport surface surveillance capability at all FAA air traffic control towers and provide conflict alerting capabilities as they become available.

The Safety Board notes that Safety Recommendation A-00-66 indicates that runway incursion prevention technologies should provide a direct warning capability to flight crews. The Board is concerned that the CAST/GAJSC recommendation is directed only at air traffic control towers and may not include a direct warning capability to flight crews. Among the technologies the FAA reported that it is evaluating are several that provide a direct warning capability to flight crews, including ground markers, addressable signs, and surface moving map technology.

Thank you for the progress report on the FAA's activities related to this safety recommendation. Pending the availability of a ground movement safety system that provides a direct warning capability to flight crews and that will prevent runway incursions at all airports with scheduled passenger service, Safety Recommendation A-00-66 remains classified OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

Letter Mail Controlled 2/11/2003 2:51:51 PM MC# 2030087 - From Marion C. Blakey, Administrator: In August 2002, the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) and the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC) approved an action recommended by the Runway Incursion Joint Safety Implementation Team to provide surface surveillance capability at all FAA control towers. In particular, the CAST/GAJSC directs the FAA to provide active and/or passive airport surface surveillance capability at all FAA air traffic control towers and provides conflict alerting capabilities as they become available.

It should be noted that surface surveillance capability covers a wide range of potential solutions and is not limited to radar-centered solutions. Capability can be provided through active sensors like ADS-B or passive sensors like magnetic/infrared sensors. The FAA continues to evaluate lower cost technologies that can provide ground movement safety system functionality at airports beyond those scheduled to receive Airport Surface Detection Equipment (ASDE)-3/Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) and ASDE-X. In response to the Board's request for airport runway incursion data, the FAA has determined that from 1990- 1999, 375 airports had runway incursions.

With respect to large airport systems, the FAA continues to make progress with the AMASS at deployed sites. As of December 3 1, 2002, 28 AMASS systems are operational and being used to control live traffic. Of these 28 operational systems, 24 have been commissioned; the remaining 4 are in the precommissioning, operational suitability demonstration phase. A total of 34 AMASS systems are scheduled to be installed. Work also continues on the ASDE-X, which is undergoing testing. The first ASDE-X system is scheduled for deployment in the spring of 2003. This system will be installed initially at 25 airports.

The FAA has revised the ASDE-X program baseline to include ASDE-X deployment to eight ASDE-3/AMASS sites. The FAA continues to make progress on potential solutions for the next tier of airports. The FAA completed its review of the technical performance of six potential solutions identified as a result of the initial Surface Technology Broad Agency announcement last July. The two promising solutions (ground markers and addressable signs) have undergone additional evaluation since the last report. The FAA has also demonstrated other potential solutions for this tier of airports to include:

· A demonstration of the Flashing Precision Approach Path Indicator concept, a final approach runway occupancy awareness aid at Long Beach Airport, California; · Laser technology demonstrations, which enhance surface painted markings in low visibility conditions, at Anchorage International Airport, Alaska; · An evaluation of Light Emitting Diode technology, which enhances hold position markings at runway/taxiway intersections, at Omaha Airport, Nebraska; and · Testing of ultraviolet sensor technology for use as a point sensor to detect boundary crossings in the airport movement area at Otis Air Guard, Massachusetts.

Thank you for the progress report on the FAA's activities related to this safety recommendation. The Safety Board asks that the FAA provide an anticipated schedule of when airports not receiving ASDE-3/AMASS or ASDE-X systems will be equipped with a ground movement safety system. Pending the response to that question and the availability of a ground movement safety system that provides a direct warning capability to flight crews and that will prevent runway incursions at all airports with scheduled passenger service, Safety Recommendation A-00-66 remains classified OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

Thank you for the clarification on how deployment decisions are made and for the 10-year runway incursion data.

Letter Mail Controlled 02/20/2002 6:09:41 PM MC# 2020165 - From Jane F. Garvey, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Runway Incursion Joint Safety Implementation Team are continuing the study of the feasibility of installing a ground movement safety system at all airports with scheduled passenger service. The Board expressed concern about basing deployment decisions on the occurrence of runway incursions at individual airports in a single year. The FAA does not make safety system fielding decisions based on a single data point.

Sites are selected through an extensive analysis process that looks at multiple airport characteristics that include operational and environmental elements. The FAA intends to identify and implement ground movement safety systems as widely as possible. The FAA is currently evaluating lower cost technologies that can provide ground movement safety system functionality at airports beyond those scheduled to receive Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model 3 (ASDE-3)/Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) and ASDE-X. In response to the Board's request for airport runway incursion data, the FAA has determined during a l0-year period (1990-1999), 375 airports had runway incursions.

With respect to large airport systems, the FAA completed installation of the AMASS at 34 sites. As of January 25, 2002, 13 of these systems are operational and used to control live traffic. Of these 13 operational systems, 8 have been commissioned. The remaining 5 systems are in the precommissioning, operational suitability demonstration phase. Work also continues on the ASDE-X, which initially will be installed at 25 airports. The first ASDE-X system is scheduled for deployment in Spring 2003.

The FAA has also decided to deploy the enhanced ASDE-X multilateration and display technology to the 34 ASDE-3/AMASS sites, thereby providing AMASS airports with the same enhanced ground movement surveillance capability as ASDE-X airports. The FAA is also making progress on potential solutions for the next tier of airports. The FAA has reviewed the technical performance of four potential solutions identified as a result of the initial Surface Technology Broad Agency Announcement. Two of these solutions--ground markers and addressable signs--show promise and are being considered for functional and operational testing in an airport environment.

The FAA continues to pursue surveillance-controlled runway status light solutions for both large and small airports. Operational concepts and functional requirements are being developed in anticipation of operational evaluations using a number of surveillance sources beginning in fiscal year 2002. In addition, the FAA continues to support vendor development and certification of surface moving map technology through its Safe Flight 21 Program. The FAA is currently surveying other high runway incursion airports not scheduled to receive ASDE/AMASS or ASDE-X solutions to determine the appropriateness of various technology interventions.

Further, the Safety Board agrees with the FAA that providing a direct warning to flight crews may work best in preventing runway incursions. The Board is pleased that in the FAA’s review of ground movement safety systems for airports, other than the 59 airports scheduled for AMASS or ASDE-X, the FAA will consider the use of runway status lights and cockpit moving map displays to provide direct warning capability to flight crews. The Board remains concerned that without the use of stop bars on the airport surface (or some other form of direct warning to flight crews), runway incursions will remain a possibility for airports that are to receive AMASS or ASDE-X.

The Board is aware that on-board demonstrations of moving map technology have shown that runway incursions may be reduced through the use of this system. The Board urges the FAA to fully fund and support activities to develop and deploy this technology as soon as possible. Pending completion of the recommended actions, Safety Recommendation A-00-66 remains classified OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

Letter Mail Controlled 05/31/2001 8:57:12 PM MC# 2010448 - From Jane F. Garvey, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Runway Incursion Joint Safety Implementation Team are studying the feasibility of installing a ground movement safety system at all airports with scheduled passenger service. Since only 150 airports with scheduled passenger service recorded a runway incursion in 2000, it is essential that the study be continued to determine if it is cost beneficial to place a system at the approximately 460 airports with scheduled passenger service.

The FAA is currently installing an Airport Movement Area Safety System at 34 airports and an Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDE-X) at 25 airports. This effort will result in the deployment of airport surface safety systems at 59 of our busiest airports. Deploying these systems demonstrates the FAA's commitment to establishing an effective ground movement surveillance system for controllers to help prevent accidents as a result of a runway incursion.

Solutions for the next tier of airports (which will be independent of these larger system installations) are currently under review to determine the minimum surveillance requirements necessary to operate ground movement safety systems effectively at these airports. The potential solutions, which resulted from the Surface Technology Broad Agency Announcement issued in September 2000, include the use of infrared sensors, in-surface magnetic sensors, ground marker digital radio communications, vehicle tracking by radio frequency data link, and message boards driven by electronic flight progress strips.

Other potential solutions include the use of runway status lights and cockpit moving map displays to provide direct warning capability to flightcrews. Cockpit moving map technology is being demonstrated as part of the Safe Flight 21 Program. A major issue with surface safety technologies is the limited ability to predict and prevent runway incursions. Most designs are capable of preventing accidents by providing warnings to air traffic controllers, but the FAA's studies thus far have shown that these technologies provide only limited capability to preclude incursions from occurring.

A method of providing direct warning capability to flightcrews may work best in actually preventing incursions. The FAA will, however, continue to evaluate technology to prevent both incursions and accidents. For example, the infrastructure necessary to provide surface surveillance to the cockpit could possibly be deployed with future deliveries of ASDE-X and ASDE-3B through the incorporation of Traffic Information Service-Broadcast.

The Safety Board notes that the FAA is taking actions to identify and implement technology solutions, and is also continuing to deploy AMASS, ASDE-3, and ASDE-X. Although the broad agency announcement will assist the FAA in identifying available technologies that may meet the intent of this recommendation, the FAA should commit to developing and deploying an effective ground movement system that will prevent runway incursions and provide a direct warning capability to flight crews. Pending the development and deployment of such a system, Safety Recommendation A-00-66 is classified OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

Letter Mail Controlled 09/11/2000 2:50:05 PM MC# 2001258 - From Jane F. Garvey, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is working with representatives from airports and the aviation industry to reduce runway incursions and prevent accidents caused by runway incursions. The Board's desire to deploy a system that prevents runway incursions is beyond current capabilities. While it is difficult to eliminate runway incursions, technology offers means for both controllers and flightcrews to create situational awareness of runway incursions in sufficient time to prevent accidents.

Consequently, the FAA is taking actions that will identify and implement technology solutions, in conjunction with training and procedural evaluation and changes, to reduce runway accidents. The FAA has initiated efforts to address the ground movement safety issues. Airport Surface Detection Equipment-3 and Airport Movement Area Safety Systems will be operational in 34 airports. In addition, Airport Surface Detection Equipment-X (ASDE-X) will be deployed at 25 additional airports.

A broad agency announcement will be released to request information about technologies that can be evaluated to provide cost effective solutions to augment these systems and provide surface situational awareness for remaining airports, particularly the smaller airports. In the area of direct warning capability to flightcrews, the FAA, as an initial effort, is evaluating cockpit display avionics for both large and small aircraft operators as part of Safe Flight 21 (Ohio River Valley and Capstone demonstrations).

The future ASDE-X fusion box, along with Traffic Information Service-Broadcast, offers the technology to manage sensor data and provide a data link of this information to the cockpit. As part of the broad agency announcement, additional technology solutions will be solicited. The information obtained as a result of the broad agency announcement will be evaluated and the more promising applications explored further. This effort could result in an acquisition program for a new system or a product certification. The ultimate goal will be to deploy effective technology as rapidly as possible.

The broad agency announcement will also request information about simulation tools that can be used to assist in demonstrating that new technology solutions would have prevented past incursions.

At the 1990 Board meeting addressing the NTSB’s Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements (MWL), the Board voted to place Safety Recommendations A-86-33, A-86-40 and A-86-42 on the Federal MWL under the issue category “Runway Incursions/ Ground Collisions of Aircraft.” On November 8, 2007 at the Board meeting addressing the Federal Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements the category’s name was changed to “Improve Runway Safety.” Since 1990, the Board has voted to include Safety Recommendations A-91-29, A-91-30, A-91-54 through A-91-58, A-91-110 through A-91-115, A-95-86, A-95-92, A-95-93, A-95-97, A-00-66, A-0067, A-00-68, and A-07-57 is this category as well.