Flying Lessons - 110210

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FLYING LESSONSFLYING LESSONS for February 10, 2011

suggested by this week’s aircraft mishap reports FLYING LESSONS uses the past week’s mishap reports to consider what might have contributed to accidents, so you can make better decisions if you face similar circumstances. In almost all cases design characteristics of a specific make and model airplane have little direct bearing on the possible causes of aircraft accidents, so apply these FLYING LESSONS to any airplane you fly. Verify all technical information before applying it to your aircraft or operation, with manufacturers’ data and recommendations taking precedence. You are pilot in command, and are ultimately responsible for the decisions you make.

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FLYING LESSONS is an independent product of MASTERY FLIGHT TRAINING, INC. www.mastery-flight.training.com This week’s lessons:

Experienced pilots will tell you the first rule when faced with an emergency is to “maintain control of the airplane”—and they’d be right. An emergency does not negate your primary responsibility of flying the airplane…in fact, this is precisely the time you need to be at your best on the stick, throttle and rudder.

But we rarely think about the second rule of dealing with an emergency. No, it’s not “run the checklist,” which is still down on your priorities list. The second rule of emergencies is to “point the airplane toward a landing area.” Every second you delay in heading toward an airport or landing zone is altitude lost that you might need to get there, or speed away from better weather, land (if over water) or lower terrain if your emergency checklist actions don’t resolve the problem.

Even an abnormal condition, which is an “emergency” without the urgency (such as an alternator failure, a rising oil temperature or dropping oil pressure, a window that pops open in flight, or a landing gear problem) calls for aiming the airplane in the direction you’d want to be going if the problem suddenly becomes a true emergency.

Concurrently, if you are able, or immediately after you have confirmed control and pointed the airplane toward recovery, you must process the emergency checklist from memory (in the event of engine failures or other can’t-wait scenarios), or by reference to the printed checklist (in less time-intense situations).

This prioritization, Maintain control, Aim in a good direction, Perform the checklist actions, is another way of expressing a similar axiom of aviation: Aviate, Navigate, Communicate. Faced with an emergency or abnormal condition, continue to aviate through the flight controls (or an available autopilot as appropriate), navigate the airplane toward a recovery zone (the Second

Rule of Emergencies), and communicate with the airplane by means of memory and printed checklists.

Surprised by an emergency or unusual situation in flight? Prioritize your actions by remembering this slant on Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.

Once you’re headed in the right direction, don’t let the abnormality distract you away from continuing to fly the airplane. Altitude, Altitude, Angle of Attack…all are intertwined with every step of an emergency procedure.

For example, I teach the memory Engine Failure in Flight steps in a multiengine airplane to be:

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In late December FLYING LESSONS began an ambitious project to look at the Top 10 causes of fatal general aviation accidents as determined by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board and reported by the Federal Aviation Administration. We vowed to look at one cause category per month, and develop lesson plans to teach avoidance of the most common deadly threats.

In February we turn to the 9th most common cause of fatal GA events, Low Altitude Maneuvering/ Loss of Control. Here are the 2008-2009 accident scenarios attributed by NTSB to this cause:

setting of 10 degrees. Representatives of the land management agencies reported to the NTSB that due to the local procurement arrangement for this flight, several levels of personnel typically involved in the decision making and dispatch processes for wildfires were not involved, and the airplane was not properly configured for aerial fire support.

2. The pilot had made multiple touch-and-go landings prior to the accident. Witnesses observed the airplane heading toward the runway of intended landing before making a hard right turn and subsequently nosing into the ground. One witness said he heard a "loud engine rev" before the engine "died out." Examination of the airplane revealed that the propeller was not under power when it impacted terrain. The interior of the wings, the wreckage, the vegetation, and the ground did not indicate any signs of a fuel odor or a fuel spill. An examination of the aircraft and engine failed to reveal any preimpact anomalies, which would have precluded normal operation.

An FAA inspector reported it appeared that the airplane had run out of fuel and stalled on approach, causing it to enter a spin prior to impacting terrain in a near vertical attitude.

4. The pilot told several people that he intended to do a flyby over the model airplane flying field. Several witnesses observed it flying straight and level at less than 100 feet above the ground. The airplane pitched up, rolled right and impacted the ground vertically, heading in the opposite direction. One witness observed the airplane flying inverted when the nose pitched up, suddenly performing an “aileron roll,” then sharply rolled nose down toward the ground. The pilot did not have a previous history of aerobatic flight at low altitude.

While the circumstances of the accident suggest the possibility of incapacitation, potentially due to an abnormal heart rhythm or seizure [that was not reported to FAA, but for which the pilot was taking prescription medication], the investigation was unable to determine whether the pilot became incapacitated at the time of the accident.

5. The pilot and a passenger departed on a brief aerial observation flight with the purpose of locating a bear tracking collar. The airplane was observed by multiple witnesses in multiple locations to be flying at "very low" altitudes. Most of these observations occurred when the airplane flew over several lakes in the local area. The airplane returned to the origination airport for landing about 1/2 hour after its departure. Instead of flying a normal airport traffic pattern, the pilot flew along the runway in the direction opposite of his intended landing direction, at an altitude of approximately 100 feet above the ground.

He then initiated a rapid pull-up and small radius turn to complete the landing. The airplane impacted airport property in a near-vertical attitude, approximately 900 feet from the approach threshold. No evidence of any preimpact mechanical failure or malfunction was found that would have prevented the engine from developing power. Several individuals stated that the non-standard landing maneuver was not unusual for the pilot.

Digital images recovered from the passenger's camera revealed that during the accident flight the airplane was operated at low altitude above the surfaces of several lakes, and that on at least one occasion the airplane's tires were in contact with the surface of a lake.

6. The pilot was performing low passes over a private ranch. The airplane was fueled the day before the accident with 17.4 gallons of fuel and had a 42-gallon fuel capacity. The pilot had commented to his wife prior to the accident that he didn't want a full fuel load for the flyover. After the pilot refueled, he flew the airplane for at least an hour that day and for an undetermined amount of time the day of the flyover. The pilot planned for and flew three low-altitude passes, ending each pass with a pull-up. During the pull-up from the third pass, the airplane was seen to roll to the left followed by a steep dive into a car parking area.

The airplane turned approximately 270 degrees from the start of the pull-up until it impacted the ground. An examination of the airplane showed no evidence of aviation fuel at the accident site, in the airplane's fuel tanks, or in the engine fuel lines. The propeller and engine case damage was consistent with that of an engine not developing power at impact. The engine manual states that the engine burn rate is approximately 9.5 gallons per hour in economy cruise flight and 12.3 gallons per hour in performance cruise flight.

Readers: Here’s where I need your help. For any or all of the seven mishaps:

A. Suggest Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM) factors and “decision points” that presented themselves prior to the accident, and the information the pilot might have had with which to make go/no-go decisions;

B. List the Stick and Rudder Training (START) skills that could have helped the pilot avoid, and ultimately, escape the likely threats;

C. Recommend specific FLYING LESSONS we can learn from each tragic experience, to incorporate in checkride-preparation and recurrent flight training so we can noticeably reduce the fatal general aviation accident rate; and

D. Propose a lesson plan for each FLYING LESSON you identify.

I warned you I was going to need your help to make a difference! Do your part by emailing your ADM/START observations and recommendations to mastery.flight.training@cox.net. Identify your responses by the accident number (1 through 7). I’ll compile, edit (as necessary) and publish your responses (anonymously on request). And I’ll add my thoughts from the exercise as well. By the end of February we should have a series of recommended additions and modifications to the traditional way of training pilots…changes that may be our best hope of reducing the rate of fatal accidents.

What’s your opinion? Tell us at mastery.flight.training@cox.net.

Share safer skies. Forward FLYING LESSONS to a friend.

Fly safe, and have fun!

Thomas P. Turner, M.S. Aviation Safety, MCFI

2010 National FAA Safety Team Representative of the Year

2008 FAA Central Region CFI of the Year

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