Legal Interpretations
Bocci 1991
Summary
The Question
May Nike use a single time-sharing agreement under 14 CFR 91.501(b)(6) to fly its CEO and certain public officials on personal, non-business flights?
Background
Nike, Inc. asked whether it could enter one time-sharing agreement with its chief executive officer covering a series of personal, non-business flights in its company-owned Gulfstream III for him and certain unnamed public officials.
The FAA’s Interpretation
No. The regulatory history of the time-sharing provisions shows they contemplate parties with corporate identities, and the FAA has consistently held that 14 CFR 91.501(b)(6) does not permit leasing a company aircraft to an individual. The flights would appear permissible under 14 CFR 91.501(b)(4) if no charge, assessment, or fee is made for the transportation.
- Requester
- Bocci
- Issued
- December 13, 1991
- Subject
- General Operating & Flight Rules
Regulations Cited
Page 1
December 13, 1991
Mr. Marc S. Bocci
Assistant Corporate
Counsel Nike, Inc.
One Bowerman Drive
Beaverton, Oregon 97005-6453
Dear Mr. Bocci:
This is in response to your letter of November 22, 1991 in which you have asked for a legal opinion regarding the use of your company-owned Gulfstream III airplane. You have asked whether Nike can enter into a single time-sharing agreement with its Chief Executive Officer to cover a series of flights operated for him and for certain unnamed public officials for personal, non-business purposes.
The regulatory history of Subpart F of Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (formerly Subpart D) indicates that those provisions relating to time-sharing contemplated that the parties to those agreements have corporate identities. The FAA has consistently held that FAR 91.501(b)(6) does not permit the lease of a company aircraft to an individual, since that subsection relates to "The carriage of company officials, employees, and guests...".
It is therefore our opinion that the operation proposed by you, in which Nike, Inc., would lease its aircraft to its Chief Executive Officer and certain public officials, could not be conducted pursuant to the time-sharing provisions of FAR 91.501(b)(6). Those operations would appear to be permissible under FAR 91.501(b) (4), if no charge, assessment, or fee is made for the transportation.
I hope that this answers the questions raised in your letter. If you have any further questions regarding this matter, please feel free to contact our office.
Sincerely,
GEORGE L. THOMPSON
Assistant Chief Counsel
By:
PETER R. LAYLIN
Attorney
Regulations Referenced
Snapshot retrieved August 6, 2026.